THE CONTEXT OF THE DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSFORMATION OF PAKISTAN’S TRADITIONAL RELIGIONS IN THE 21ST CENTURY

Traditionally, the territory of Pakistan has been home to followers of various religions. However, due to the division of British India along religious lines, Pakistan has become a de facto mono-religious country, with a large majority of Muslim citizens. [1, 21-45] However, even after 1947, communities of Christians, Sikhs, Hindus and some other religions continued to live in the country. The founder of Pakistan, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, believed that despite the religious composition of the population, the country should become a secular, democratic and liberal republic. [2] Legally, from 1947 to 1955, Pakistan remained a secular country. It was only in the Constitution of 1956 that Pakistan was recognized as an Islamic Republic. [3] However, for quite a long time, until the end of the 70s, many Islamic laws were not adopted or acted in a limited way. For example, the alcohol prohibition law was only passed in 1977. Thus, the image of Pakistan as a country living to a greater extent according to the laws of Islam took shape only in the 80s of the 20th century: after the adoption of a new constitution in 1973 and the formation of new Islamic structures in the government and the adoption of a number of acts under Prime Minister Zia-ul-Haq. And if the changes of the 70s were adopted mainly in connection with the full-fledged entry into Pakistan of the northwestern regions (now Khyber Pakhtunwa) and the demands of the political and religious parties of the Pashtuns, then the reforms of Zia-ul-Haq were actually imposed by Islamist and the fundamentalist ideas of the United States, which prepared a platform in Pakistan for the formation of Al-Qaeda and the outbreak of the Afghan war. [4] Zia ul Haq became known as “the man 131] His pro-Islamic reforms include: Sharia courts and judicial boards were established, new types of relevant articles were added to Pakistani legislation, educational standards were revised, etc. the same forces organized “the slide into the fundamentalist Islamist Middle Ages.” This was necessary in the context of the neo-colonialist policy pursued by the United States and Great Britain in this region and actually allowed Pakistan to be considered a conditional “colony” of these countries, the political and economic elite of which became incapable of pursuing an independent foreign policy. 131] His pro-Islamic reforms include: Sharia courts and judicial boards were established, new types of relevant articles were added to Pakistani legislation, educational standards were revised, etc. the same forces organized “the slide into the fundamentalist Islamist Middle Ages.” This was necessary in the context of the neo-colonialist policy pursued by the United States and Great Britain in this region and actually allowed Pakistan to be considered a conditional “colony” of these countries, the political and economic elite of which became incapable of pursuing an independent foreign policy. new types of relevant articles were added to the Pakistani legislation, educational standards were revised, etc. Thus, if in Afghanistan, through the efforts of the United States, a war was unleashed against the USSR, then in Pakistan, the same forces organized “sliding into the fundamentalist Islamist Middle Ages.” This was necessary in the context of the neo-colonialist policy pursued by the United States and Great Britain in this region and actually allowed Pakistan to be considered a conditional “colony” of these countries, the political and economic elite of which became incapable of pursuing an independent foreign policy. new types of relevant articles were added to the Pakistani legislation, educational standards were revised, etc. Thus, if in Afghanistan, through the efforts of the United States, a war was unleashed against the USSR, then in Pakistan, the same forces organized “sliding into the fundamentalist Islamist Middle Ages.” This was necessary in the context of the neo-colonialist policy pursued by the United States and Great Britain in this region and actually allowed Pakistan to be considered a conditional “colony” of these countries, the political and economic elite of which became incapable of pursuing an independent foreign policy.

The situation began to improve somewhat since the death of Zia ul Haq (August 17, 1988), which coincided with the end of the Afghan war and the withdrawal of the Soviet contingent from Afghanistan (from May 15, 1988 to February 15, 1989). Considering that Haq’s death occurred in the form of a plane crash, it is difficult to assume that it was an accident, however, all the difficulties and problems due to the Islamization and Pakistani politics, economy and society remain. Another problem was the liquidation or emigration during the years of his reign of the vast majority of self-sufficient and independent of the influence of Great Britain and the United States politicians. Even the leaders of the Pakistan People’s Party (founded by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto) were unofficially financed from abroad, as a future “pro-Western” force, alternative to Haq, but at the same time also controlled by the global West. The Pakistan Muslim League Party, founded in the days of British India, was initially under British influence. Thus, there was no significant shift in Pakistan’s domestic and foreign policy in the late 80s, and the further collapse of the USSR, as an alternative force to the United States, strengthened the traditional Islamic policy of the country, which continued to be used by the West as a territorial platform for monitoring Afghanistan and new countries. Central Asia.

Development in the 21st century
Positive changes in the orientation of Pakistan were outlined only in 1999 after the establishment of the military dictatorship of General Musharraf, who leveled the influence of both pro-Western parties: the PML (Nawaz Sharif) and the PPP (Benazir Bhutto), and also began to pursue a policy of eliminating corruption, and negotiations with India (on the Kashmir issue) and Afghanistan (on the issue of terrorism). And also, the beginning of the formation of a new party, Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaf (Movement for Justice), which was founded by former athlete Imran Khan in 1996 and gained popularity as part of the expression of disagreement by the urban educated intelligentsia and the middle class with the “old colonial elite” internal and foreign policy of Pakistan and imposed aggressive Islamism. Thus, it can be considered

In addition, it should be noted a few more points that influenced the development and transformation of the religious space in Pakistan in the 21st century.

Firstly, this is Pakistan’s exit from the conditions of international isolation and the development of migration trends. Despite several major migration episodes in the history of the country, Pakistan remained one of the most isolated countries in the world until the 21st century. Visas to Pakistanis were issued very difficult and with numerous conditions and restrictions, and there were practically no open migration routes. In the 21st century, the situation was eased by large migration countries – Canada, Australia, the USA, Great Britain, part of the countries of Europe and, on the other hand, the countries of the Arab world (mainly the oil-producing region – the Gulf countries). And if wealthy Pakistanis rushed in the first direction – emigration, study, business, tourism, then in the second – the middle and low-middle social strata in the form of labor migration. According to the Ministry of Emigration and Overseas Employment of Pakistan, published in 2023, more than 10.80 million people have moved abroad in the past 3 decades. [6] Taking into account the development of technology, both large migration pools continued to maintain ties with relatives or acquaintances who remained in the country, influencing the consciousness of society and the perception of traditional cultural values ​​through the prism of Euro-American or Arab society.

Secondly, the ratio of the number of communities of traditional religions has somewhat changed. So in 1951, the number of representatives of Islam was 97.1%, Hinduism – 1.6%, Christianity – 1.2% and 0.1% were representatives of other religions. And according to the 2017 census, the number of representatives of Islam decreased to 96.47%, Hinduism, on the contrary, increased to 2.14%, Christianity actually retained its position at 1.27%, and other religions totaled 0.12%. It is worth noting that according to the legislation of Pakistan, other religions include: Ahmadiyya, Sikhs, Bahais, Parsis, Buddhists and animists (Kalash). In percentage terms, the effect of the decline in the Muslim population is not so pronounced, but if we take absolute numbers (and the population of all of Pakistan is 224,418,238 people in 2021), then it is very noticeable. [7] While that it is possible to officially change the religion in the country only in the direction of Islam (accept Islam), demographic changes are caused by the birth rate in various religious groups and migration processes. Thus, the educated and well-to-do Muslim and Christian population is trying to leave for permanent residence in the countries of the West, reducing both populations. However, the Christian is more actively renewed due to the high birth rate in the lower social strata. Particularly high birth rates and low migration rates are observed among Hindu communities, despite the fact that neighboring India has opened resettlement programs to all non-Muslim residents of Pakistan. The number of Muslims in Pakistan could decrease even more if the Arab countries, the main recipients of labor migration, launched citizenship programs,

Thus, the change in the attitude of the political elite towards the Islamization of power and society, migration and demographic movements marked the beginning of the religious transformation of Pakistani society.

It should be noted that the hypothesis of secularization and the complete departure of society from religion by the 21st century did not justify itself even in Euro-American communities, and was gradually replaced by the hypothesis of religious transformation, when the growth of individualism, social fragmentation, departure from cultural traditions and the general modernization of society does not lead to to the rejection of religion, but makes it itself more flexible, providing an individual-personal approach, as well as the functioning of truncated forms of religiosity: invisible, diffuse, latent, vicarious, or the manifestation of syncretism. Some of these phenomena also capture modern Pakistan.

The zero years of the 21st century caused in the political elites of Pakistan a course towards a gradual departure from the course imposed by the regime of Zia ul Haq (and Washington’s neo-colonial introductory) towards the Islamization of the state and society. Given the significant political weight and relying on the support of the army, Musharraf was able to reform the country’s laws in the direction of their departure from radical Islam. Despite the fact that the attempt at constitutional reform failed (he was unable to gain the support of more than 2/3 of Parliament), many liberal laws were passed, and the use of the most brutal legal norms of the time of Zia ul Haq was frozen. As part of the reforms, Musharraf faced fierce opposition from the ultra-conservative MMA alliance, led by cleric Maulana Nurani, and after his death, with opposition from the ARD (Alliance for the Restoration of Democracy: PPP and PML-N parties), led by Benazir Bhutto. [8] Despite opposition from political and religious opposition, Musharraf passed in Parliament the “Women’s Protection Bill” in 2006, which, while not repealing the Hudud (Rape Situations) Decree, significantly softens its provisions. His government increased the number of reserved seats for women in the National Assembly and provincial parliaments. The number of reserved seats in the National Assembly was increased from 20 to 60. In the provincial assemblies, 128 seats were reserved for women. This situation has led to an increase in the participation of women both as elected and as voters. [9] In addition, the education system was also transformed, where the Islamist inclination was removed from the general education subjects, while leaving Islamiat as a separate subject. In 2008, some other strict rules of law were also abolished. In general, regarding religious issues, Musharraf adhered to the Enlightened moderation position, however, he believed that a sharp curtailment of the course towards the rejection of Islamism in the political sphere and public administration was impossible for Pakistan in the 2000s.The Strategy for Enlightened Moderation was unveiled by Musharraf during the 2002 OIC Summit in Malaysia. [10]

The PPP, which came to power in 2008, and then the PML-N in 2012, despite having previously criticized the liberal-secular position of Musharraf, in fact continued to reform and deepen the departure from rigid Islamist norms. However, if in public life as a whole there has been a direction towards de-Islamization and, moreover, Westernization of the Pakistani society, then there have been no cardinal shifts in the legislative sphere. The main rigid laws of the period of Islamism were neither abolished nor reformed. And although in practice they are not actually used (with the exception of a few high-profile cases), the threat of restoration of application remains. It can be noted that in the course of the political struggle, the government of Shahbaz Sharif (despite the fact that formally initiated by a private individual) initiated the blasphemy law against former Prime Minister Imran Khan and more than 150 others following the Masjid-e-Nabwi incident. [11] Thus, by 2015-17, 2 opposing approaches to Islam were actually formed in Pakistan: the governmental one – secularization and Westernization within the framework of the neo-colonial policy of the West (but without the real abolition of Islamist legislation) and the radical Islamic one implemented by Islamic parties and Islamist organizations. During the reign of Imran Khan (2018-2022), attempts were made to bring these directions closer together and form a certain moderate sense of Islamic socialism, however, they were not completed and were criticized from both sides. Moreover, The PML-N and the PPP (both essentially Western-oriented parties) merged with the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam movement (a fundamentalist Islamist movement closely associated with the Taliban (banned in Russia) of Afghanistan) into the Pakistan Democratic movement (Pakistan Democratic movement) against the rule of Khan. Which raises certain questions: moderate Islam in Pakistan absolutely does not suit the countries of the collective West, who prefer the pro-Western political and economic elite and the uneducated Islamist “lower classes” in order to incite them to power if the elite gets out of control.

Thus, at the moment in Pakistan there is an increased stratification of society in relation to religion – either the extreme secular Western version of “religion in the soul”, or hard Islamism with a formalized approach and traditional norms (which do not always correspond to the establishment of Islam), and both approaches are supervised by Western services within the framework of the policy of neo-colonialism. An attempt to transform approaches to religion by socializing it, leading to mediocrity and moderation, and withdrawing Islamism from political and legal practice was not successful.

Meanwhile, the mass access of the population of Pakistan to the Internet, which occurred in the last decade, has also led to an active spiritual search inside and outside of religion, understanding the place of religion in real life, the creation of a large number of pro-Islamic channels on social platforms, and religious blogging. Moreover, all three religious trends have their own platforms: Westernism with secularization, moderate Islam (including movements to restore Islamic norms and clean them from Western influence and from the influence of Islamism at the same time) and Islamism itself.

Regarding Westernism, it can be said that it reflects the opinion of the Pakistani top elites, traditionally associated with the UK and the US. The materials distributed in them are in line with modern Western trends, while the very fact of Islam is not rejected, but it is considered “indecent” to demonstrate it. Such a latent form of religiosity, where a post about wearing European-style clothes for a girl can be followed by a post about what dishes to cook for iftar (breaking the fast in the month of Ramadan), and then generally assert that faith should be only in the soul.

Moderate Islam is supported, as a rule, by the educated intelligentsia and the middle classes of businessmen. Both of them are trying to find positive in the norms of Islam and use religion to ensure sustainable and progressive development of society. An example is the Nisaism feminist movement, which stands for the rights of women, which are guaranteed to them by Islam (and which are completely absent from Islamism and are largely limited by modern Pakistani law). Some of these groups are people connected with the countries of the Arab world by business or working there under a contract. It is the progressive development of these countries, combined with the norms of Islam, that is an excellent example of the possible future development of Pakistan.

Islamism is preached mainly by destructive forces, whose efforts are concentrated on the uneducated urban and rural poor and are often associated precisely with material incentives to join the organization, loud slogans that have little in common with the real laws of Islam. These sermons do not always begin with a display of violence or cruelty, people are drawn in with calls for “pure, original Islam”, which indicates the real international training of preachers, as well as the harshness of Islamic laws against women – uneducated men who do not have a stable income and often faced with the violence of the upper strata of society towards themselves, it becomes important to get into the hands of an even more defenseless creature to splash out the accumulated discontent and aggression, especially when male aggression is presented as the laws of religion. Calls not only for direct violence against women (for any misconduct), but also calls for the elimination of kitchen items (women at the time of the Prophet did not use microwave ovens), furnishings (sofas were also not used at the time of the Prophet), weaning / non-purchase telephones for women (they waste time chatting and do not perform household duties and religious rites), etc. It is clear that a woman who grew up in a family with such attitudes will never think about any other possible life attitudes, which actually deprives her of the possibility of a religious search and she blindly follows her father, and then her husband. furnishing items (sofas were also not used in the time of the Prophet), weaning/not buying phones for women (they waste time chatting and do not perform household duties and religious rites), etc. It is clear that a woman who grew up in a family with such attitudes will never think about any other possible life attitudes, which actually deprives her of the possibility of a religious search and she blindly follows her father, and then her husband. furnishing items (sofas were also not used in the time of the Prophet), weaning/not buying phones for women (they waste time chatting and do not perform household duties and religious rites), etc. It is clear that a woman who grew up in a family with such attitudes will never think about any other possible life attitudes, which actually deprives her of the possibility of a religious search and she blindly follows her father, and then her husband.

Strictly speaking, it is Islamism that successfully applies this form of religious transformation, religious marketing. He is very successful in calculating market research (knows his environment), knows the direction of religious activity (specific people who are targeted by Islamist influence), produces an effective sample of methods of influence (religious appeal), and provides the necessary product in the form of concise, clear laws.

What is convenient for the uneducated Pakistani population is that religious advertising in the form of religious symbolism is widely used. So, it was easy for radical parties to bring their followers to the streets of Pakistan, it was enough to spread information about the desecration of the Koran (burning, tearing books) in any of the Western countries, where the Koran acted not as a holy book, but as a symbol of Islam, oppressed by the Western civilization. Although it was quite clear that the Western-oriented political elites of the country would not be able to do anything about this and would limit themselves to regular formal statements, but this understanding lay already outside the minds of the masses processed in the appropriate ways.

The religious search inherent in the Pakistani society at this time cannot be called an unambiguously positive or negative phenomenon. On the one hand, it takes modern, thinking, educated people beyond the traditional experience of life, more based on the principles of culture, patriarchal traditions and more than 30 years of the country’s existence within the laws of Islamism, into the possibility of building a new society with new laws and culture. Both categories of Westerners and moderates have not yet decided on their place in the future development of the country and the presence / absence of religion in it, and even the form of this religion. On the other hand, a search without education and solid knowledge often contributes to the transition of a person to Islamism, which is not only more widely promoted,

Since Islam in Pakistan is not homogeneous, but is a mixture of several directions and currents (the most widespread is the Sunnism of the Hanafi madhhab), the processes of transformation of religion proceed in it heterogeneously and at different speeds. Westernization is most active in groups of wealthy Shiites. This is due to several factors: most of them are old aristocratic families, closely associated with the British aristocracy, who began the process of Westernization in the 19th century; based on the first, they have enough funds to train new generations outside the country, which has a significant impact on the formation of a Western-style worldview; they submit to the government of Pakistan very conditionally, honoring first of all the Iranian leaders of the Shiites;

Development and transformation of Pakistani: Christianity, Sikhism and Hinduism
As for the development of other traditional confessions in Pakistan, all of them are within the framework of the development of Islam, but there are differences.

Christians in Pakistan are conditionally divided into two unequal groups: those coming from the lower social strata (the caste of untouchables-Dalits-Kharijites) about 75% and the higher social strata (more often the descendants of Brahmin families who converted to Christianity; missionary priests from Goa and Anglo-Indians) about 25 %. Accordingly, they differ significantly from each other, including in approaches to religious views and the possibility of religious transformation. [12, 112-143] The first group is a very traditional majority, which is hard to change approaches to religious practices due to lack of information and low level of education. At the same time, the second group, which has access to many Christian organizations in the West, receives grants and subsidies from them, and also has a high educational potential, is undergoing religious transformations, similar to modern Western trends. Such as: the departure of religion into the inner world, the individualization of religion, a kind of syncretism. However, taking into account the fact that Pakistani Christians usually live in small communities among the Muslim population, which is often biased towards them, their internal consolidation and cohesion around churches or religious centers is very strong, which does not correspond to Western trends.

Sikhs in Pakistan are actually not subject to the processes of transformation of their religious views and the community is focused on maintaining contacts with the Khalsa in India, protecting their religious monuments and upholding property rights. In fact, Pakistani Sikhism is not independent and develops in line with Indian Sikhism. [13]

Hindus in Pakistan have proven to be the most discriminated community due to the fact that Pakistan and India are in a state of frozen conflict over the Kashmir issue. The transformation and erosion of Hinduism is taking place in their Pakistani community in several ways. First, educated members of urban Hindu communities (typically in Karachi) often associate with the ISKCON (International Society for Krishna Consciousness, colloquially known as the Hare Krishna or Hare Krishna movement, founded in 1966 in New York), which combines both clear religious canons and Western trends. Secondly, rural poor Hindu communities often become very vague communities due to the lack of educated religious leaders and training programs (new educational standards, including a program on Hinduism were adopted in Pakistan only in 2021) and, accordingly, are victims of Islamic or Christian missionaries, or else they become in fact syncretic communities that observe their own traditions and religious institutions of their closest neighbors (Sikhs, Muslims, Christians). [14]

Thus, the following conclusions can be drawn:

Since its inception, Pakistan has been a country for Hindu Muslims, but not an Islamic country, but a secular one. It began to acquire the features of an Islamic Republic from the moment the first Constitution of 1956 was adopted and the Northwestern Province was adapted into the country in the 70s, but it underwent the greatest transformation in the style of imposed Islamism during the reign of Zia ul Haq and direct US intervention in the process of developing the tandem of religion and politics.

At present, Pakistan is gradually moving away from rigid government Islamization, but it does not concern key laws and decrees, since the influence of Islamist parties in Parliament is quite strong. In addition, the neo-colonial influence of the global West on Pakistan implies the creation of two opposing groups in the country: Euro-elites and Islamist grassroots, which, with the support of confrontation between them, will make it easy to control Pakistan from the outside.

In general, Pakistani society itself is currently characterized by the processes of transformation of religion in three directions: Westernization, Arabization according to a moderate type (the middle path of educated moderation) and Islamization. The most active work, including in social networks, is carried out by supporters of the latter on developments that were previously used to create Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and ISIS banned in Russia.

Since the Islamic Pakistani society is not homogeneous: combining representatives of various branches of the religion of Islam, the transformation and development of religion in them goes in different ways and at different speeds. Pakistani Shiites from high social groups are subject to the most transformation of religious vision and practices (with the predominant direction of transformation being Westernization).

Representatives of other Pakistani religious groups are also subject to the transformation of their religious ideas, and in different groups the changes go in different directions.