CROSS-BORDER AND TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS OF PAKISTAN AND THE ROLE OF RUSSIA
Pakistan, as one of the large countries that emerged after the collapse of British India, inherited complex relations in both cross-border and transnational politics. The geopolitical situation associated with the intervention of the Anglo-Saxon line in the region only complicated these relations. Meanwhile, Pakistan, as a region located at the junction of South and Central Asia, is very relevant for Russian political, economic and cultural interests.
This issue is practically not reflected in the Russian scientific community, while the currently relevant “Russia’s Turn to the East” requires its careful study. First of all, for the effective implementation of Pakistani-Russian economic projects, improving relations with Iran and China, and resolving the Afghan case.
Despite the fact that Pakistan can currently lay claim to the maximum role of a regional leader, its location is strategically important from a geopolitical point of view. As part of the West-East direction, Pakistan is located at the intersection of both land and sea routes between the Middle East, South Asia and China (potentially the Far East), and within the North-South direction it provides the closest access to the countries of all Central Asia to the Arabian Sea. to the sea. And what is important is that Pakistan is an active member of both the SCO and the OIC, and at the same time a potential member of BRICS.
In recent years, Pakistan has demonstrated a decent level of ability to withstand and adapt to global challenges and geopolitical changes. But this was largely due to the country’s former Prime Minister Imran Khan, and then to the political and economic crises that did not allow the transitional government to pursue strict foreign policy contours. It is worth noting that after the elections on February 8, 2024, the situation could change dramatically, especially if the Sharifs’ PLM-N wins, which enjoys extremely low support at present, but intends to win by eliminating its main rival, the PTI.
The very fact of the creation of Pakistan is a certain time bomb, planted by British policy and diligently fueled by the position of the Indian national movement during the Second World War.
Despite the fact that the division of British India was declared on religious principles, many “Muslim” territories entered India due to territorial proximity, the successful British battle against leaders or the blitzkriegs of the Indian army. In fact, the territory inherited by Pakistan on a residual basis initially confronted it with cross-border and transnational problems. And if the official border with India was at least documented (not counting the separate situation with Kashmir), then the rest remained unresolved. Thus, in the north-west, the Durand Line is not recognized by the Afghan government (and absolutely any version of the government) and some Pashtun nationalists from the territory of Khyber Pakhtunwa. The border with Iran is criticized by Balochistan separatists, who demand the creation of a separate country for them, assembled from the territories of Pakistani and Iranian Balochistan. There is no need to talk about Kashmir – both the actual border with India and the border with China are in question, and the status of Gilgit-Baltistan, as well as the peoples living in it, has not yet been determined.
The USSR’s policy of global strategic partnership with India contributed to freezing the Kashmir conflict, which is one of the key ones in modern Pakistani politics, but could not help resolve it completely. First of all, due to Moscow’s exclusively pro-Indian position, which has been maintained unchanged since 1947. At the same time, his decision could not only help improve relations between India and Pakistan, but also “dilute” China’s presence in the region. As a matter of fact, the position of China is also clear here, which clearly supports Pakistan in the Kashmir case: any transfer of the territories of Kashmir (and with it Gilgit-Baltistan) will lead to a complete stop of Chinese projects to access the Arabian Sea, Afghanistan and Iran, which is very “on hand” of India, seeking to oust Beijing from “its” so-called region.
The Afghan war and the method of “squeezing” Afghans into the territory of Pakistan, used in it by the Soviet contingent, led to a humanitarian crisis in the country, which has not yet been resolved and which intensifies the confrontation between Islamabad and Kabul, being one of the key issues of interethnic politics. The policy of expelling Afghans, which has been actively applied since November 2023, is a direct consequence of both the Afghan war and the reduction of UN humanitarian programs against the backdrop of the economic crisis in Pakistan. It is worth noting that within the framework of friendly Soviet-Afghan relations, recognition of the Durand Line as the official border between the countries could have been pushed through, but now this is seriously difficult. The situation is really difficult. In fact, modern Afghanistan positions itself as a Pashtun state, and this despite the fact that most of the Pashtuns live in Pakistan (and by the way, except for a few political figures, they do not at all strive to live in Afghanistan), and large Central Asian peoples, representatives of whom there are generally more than Pashtuns.
Relations with Iran are significantly complicated by the Baluchistan issue. As a matter of fact, official Islamabad and Tehran adhere to the same point of view in this case – that independent Baluchistan has no right to exist and to some extent this is historically justified; a single Baloch state has never existed, only several scattered principalities.
However, the Baluchistan separatist opposition has found good support, both moral and financial, from the Global West, which sooner or later results in the creation of terrorist groups.
And this, among other problems, significantly slows down the development of Pakistani-Iranian relations, especially trade. It is worth noting that the Balochistan opposition, in turn, is actively hindering the development of nationalism within Balochistan, inhibiting the development of such national minorities in the controlled territory as: Brahuis, Pashtuns, Harareans, Siddis. It is the Balochistan terrorist attacks that are creating problems for China in its Belt and Road Initiative with access to Gwadar.
It is worth noting that one way or another, all Pakistani cross-border cases based on transnational problems are a legacy of British colonization and the Great Game policy of the late 19th century. Taking into account modern relations between the countries of the Global South and Russia, in fact, Pakistan is currently surrounded by states friendly or loyal to Moscow and Russian influence (not unilateral, of course, and not only in its favor) could contribute to their successful resolution, as well as – reducing tension in the region. However, difficulties arise here too. The fact is that the National Security Strategy of Pakistan, adopted in January 2022 (under the power of PTI, and therefore significantly distorted and violated by the temporary ones in the present) contains a mention of Russia and the framework of cooperation with it: “ Pakistan is seeking to rethink its partnership with Russia in the field energy, defense cooperation and investment. Relations are already showing positive dynamics and Pakistan will continue to strive to maximize mutual benefits. Russia, Central Asian countries and Pakistan are also important partners in achieving our common goals of ensuring peace and stability in Afghanistan . ” At the same time, the Russian Foreign Policy Concept of 2023 does not specifically mention Pakistan.
Russia’s assistance in solving cross-border and transnational problems for Pakistan could significantly ease Moscow’s relations in general with the countries of South Asia, as well as contribute to the construction of an effective model of a multipolar world, but at the moment there is apparently no point in hoping for this.