SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW Volume 22 No. 46
IS-KP: Potent challenger
On April 29, 2024, Islamic State-Khorasan Province (IS-KP) terrorists attacked the Shia Imam Zaman Mosque in the Andisheh town of Guzra District in Herat Province, killing seven worshippers, including the prayer leader of the mosque, two women and a child. The attack took place during the evening (between Maghrib and Isha) prayers. Iran’s Embassy in Kabul strongly condemned the attack.
On October 14, 2023, seven people were killed in an IS-KP suicide attack at the Shia Imam Zaman Mosque in the Pul-e-Khumri District of Baghlan Province. However, in a statement, IS-KP claimed that one of their suicide bombers killed “50 Shia and wounded dozens more” by detonating an explosive vest.
On August 5, 2023, IS-KP terrorists shot dead a civilian accusing him of espionage for the Taliban in the Sarkani District of Kunar Province. No information about the victim’s identity was disclosed.
On June 6, 2023, Taliban ‘acting governor’ Mawlavi Nisar Ahmad Ahmadi and his driver were killed and six others were injured in an IS-KP orchestrated suicide bomb blast in Badakhshan Province. The blast occurred at 8:15 am [AST] when Ahmadi’s vehicle was on its way to a court in Faiz Abad, the provincial capital.
On March 9, 2023, an IS-KP suicide bomber, armed with explosives, blew himself up near the Governor of Balkh Province, Mohammad Dawood Muzamil, killing him along with two civilians, in Mazar-e Sharif, the capital city of the province. In addition, four other people were injured, including three military personnel and one civilian.
On April 19, 2022, a series of bomb blasts in Abdul Rahim Shaheed High School and near the Mumtaz Education Center, both of which are located within the predominately Hazara Shiite neighbourhood of Dasht-e-Barchi in West Kabul, killed six and injured at least 11. IS-KP took responsibility for the attack.
According to data collated by Institute for Conflict Management, a total of 429 persons, including 136 IS-KP cadres, 58 Taliban, 220 civilians, and 15 persons whose identities were not specified, have been killed in 73 IS-KP linked incidents since August 15, 2021, when the Taliban seized power in Afghanistan (data till May 3, 2024).
IS-KP was formed in 2015, during the Islamic State’s second wave of expansion outside the Levant. The group takes its name from an old Persian term for the region, Khorasan, that included parts of Iran, Turkmenistan and Afghanistan, as well as areas of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Its propaganda, translated into regional languages as well as English, vows to establish a caliphate spanning this area. Since the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in 2021, IS-KP has been resilient and continuing to inflict violence, across the region. The ethnic composition of the group is an added point of difference. While the Taliban is largely Pashtun-led, IS-KP draws on a diverse cohort of jihadists, which is often more inclusive.
IS-KP’s media operations and narratives have gone through three stages since 2015, showcasing its changing priorities. The first phase (2015-19) focused on anti-Taliban sentiment and rosy narratives about life under the so-called ‘caliphate’, in an attempt to recruit followers. The second phase (2020-21) focused on instilling fear and highlighting the group’s resolve to survive amid significant territorial losses. The current phase is IS-KP’s most aggressive and sophisticated propaganda and outreach campaign yet, unprecedented in its form, quantity, and number of languages used – a worrisome sign of the group’s aim to reach recruits and sympathizers well outside its immediate region of activity.
While the Taliban and IS-KP share some ideological similarities, they are ‘doctrinally distinct’ given the Taliban’s close relationship with IS’s rival Al Qaeda, and IS-KP’s view of the Taliban’s Afghanistan-focused nationalist political project as counter to the IS vision of a global caliphate. As is made evident from IS-KP’s March 25, 2024, ‘official’ statement following its March 22, attack at a concert in Moscow, reprimanding the ruling Afghan Taliban for seeking relations with the United States, Russia, China and other countries. The 30-page statement focused on criticizing and mocking the Taliban in Afghanistan, long an enemy of the IS-KP group.
There is also widespread apprehension among Taliban officials, of surprise attacks by IS-KP. On March 27, 2024, Plan and Operation Management, Kabul Province Police Command, the Ministry of Interior Affairs of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, published a letter in Dari, numbered 2905, on the IS-KP threat:
Information of the new tactic of the enemy (Khawarij) today is as follows:
Attention Mujahideen!.
Especially to the officials of the Emirate such as district governors, commanders, governors, and heads of courts.
The tunnel is strategically located – it’s almost equidistant (35km-40km) from Dantewada and Bijapur, and a mere 10km from Bhairamgarh Police Station. It gives Maoists easy passage near Indravati river. Tactically, Indravati river is a geographical hurdle for security forces.
Khawarij [IS-KP] has started another new tactic and trick, which is that they write false petitions and make fake lawsuits and make friends with mujahideen and other officials at checkpoints through forgery. In this way, the enemy is trying to harm the mujahideen and make them martyrs. So, all the mujahideen should know that the enemy should not achieve their evil goals. Share it on your [social media] groups so that all the mujahideen will be informed…
Mentioning Afghanistan as a significant IS-KP coordination hub, a report dated April 23, 2023, stated that IS-KP was planning attacks across Europe and Asia and was engaged in “aspirational plotting” against the United States. IS-KP has been developing a cost-effective model for external operations that relies on resources from outside Afghanistan, operatives in target countries, and extensive facilitation networks. The model will likely enable IS-KP to overcome obstacles, such as competent security services, and reduce some plot timelines, minimizing opportunities for detection and disruption.
Furthermore, a March 26, 2024, report claimed that Iraqi security agencies believed that IS-KP was working to establish a regional network of jihadi fighter cells that could help execute international attacks, based on information from dozens of senior ISIS operators detained over the preceding two years. Also, 90 per cent of IS-KP’s cadre was now non-Pashtun, the report added.
At the domestic level, IS-KP has increased its operational capabilities inside Afghanistan, with the total number of fighters and family members associated with the group estimated at 4,000 to 6,000, as reported in August, 2023. The group has also become more sophisticated in its attacks against both the Taliban and international targets. On July 11, 2023, Taliban’s spokesperson for the Interior Ministry, Abdul Mateen Qaneh, confirmed that a letter was delivered on July 9 to the Taliban’s Police command throughout Afghanistan, stating that IS-KP operatives would target Provincial Governors, chiefs and civilian leaders in their offices and residences houses by means of suicide bombings, a threat that was subsequently realized in several cases.
Following their ‘coming to power’, the Taliban has been striving to gain international recognition and establish relations with governments that IS-KP vilifies and frames as authoritarian or repressive to Muslims. The Taliban’s international outlook has helped IS-KP present itself as a more uncompromising and dedicated Islamic force in the region. Following the Doha Accord of 2020, IS-KP blamed Taliban for abandoning jihad by signing a deal with the United States, and portrayed itself as the true jihadist group in Afghanistan. This narrative not only helped IS-KP maintain relevance but also gave it an edge in the propaganda war against the Taliban. In its quest to prove itself as the truest champion of jihad, IS-KP presents itself as a relentless challenger to the Taliban in Afghanistan.
KCNF: Violent surge
On April 28, 2024, two cadres of the Kuki-Chin National Front (KCNF) were killed during a raid by Army personnel in the remote Baklai Para area in the Ruma Upazila (Sub-District) of the Bandarban District of Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT). Three firearms, ammunition, and a walkie-talkie used by the armed group were recovered.
On April 22, 2024, a KCNF operative was killed in a raid by an Army patrol in the remote Munlai Para area in Ruma. Some weapons and ammunition were recovered.
On January 28, 2023, a KCNF cadre was shot dead in a gunfight with the Army in Ruma. Police recovered his body on January 29. The gunfight took place when KCNF cadres attacked Army Personnel in the Artha Para and Bachlang Para areas of the Upazila on January 28. It was the first incident of killing of a KCNF cadre since the formation of the outfit in 2017.
According to the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) database, four KCNF cadres have been killed (mentioned above) thus far (data till May 3, 2024).
Security Forces (SFs) have also arrested 74 KCNF cadres during this period, including 70 in 2024. On April 7-8, 2024, 53 KCNF cadres, including 18 women, were arrested by the Bangladesh Army and the Police in the Bandarban District in two separate operations. Seven firearms, 20 bullets, and other equipment were recovered during the operations.
On the other hand, since 2017, KCNF-related violence has resulted in death of 17 persons, including one civilian, four SF personnel and terrorists each, and eight in the Not Specified (NS) category. Of the 17 fatalities, three (all KCNF cadres) were reported in 2024 and 14 (one civilian, one KCNF terrorist; four SF personnel and eight in NS category) were reported in 2023.
Some of the prominent KCNF-linked incidents of killing included:
April 6, 2023: Eight persons were killed during a gunfight between the United People’s Democratic Front-Democratic (UPDF-D) and KCNF, in Khamtang Para of Rowangchhari Upazila in Bandarban District.
May 16, 2023: Two officers of the Bangladesh Army were killed and another two were injured when KCNF detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) and opened fire near Jarulchhari Para in Ruma.
KCNF operatives have also been found involved in a range of other criminal activities, including bank robberies and abduction.
On April 3-4, 2024, three branches of two banks (Sonali and Krishi) were attacked and looted by more than 100 male and female cadres of KCNF in Thanchi (Bandarban District) and Ruma areas. During the attacks, KCNF militants opened fire, targeted security officials and abducted a bank manager. They also looted 14 firearms from the SFs. The Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) later rescued the bank manager.
Meanwhile, on April 5, 2024, KCNF’s ‘media and intelligence wing chief, ‘colonel’ Solomon, stated, on the group’s Facebook page, that the group had launched the recent attacks as the Peace Establishment Committee had violated the terms of the agreement signed between KCNF and the Committee on November 5, 2023.
KCNF was formed in 2017 by former Dhaka University student Nathan Bom, and aims to establish separate governance in nine Upazilas in Bandarban and Rangamati Districts of the CHT: Baghaichari, Barkal, Belaichari and Jurachari Upazilas of Rangamati Hill District and Ruma, Thanchi, Lama, Alikadam and Rowangchhari Upazilas under Bandarban. They named this region the ‘Kuki-Chin Territorial Council (KTC)’. Bom was previously affiliated with the Pahari Chhatra Parishad (PCP), the student wing of the Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti (PCJSS).
KCNF claims that they represent six ethnic communities – Bawm, Pankhowa, Lusai, Khyang, Mro, and Khumi. The members belong to the Kuki – Chin, a conglomeration of various ethnic groups, primarily residing in the Sylhet and CHT regions of Bangladesh, the north-eastern states of India, and the Chin State of Myanmar. In the Indian States of Manipur and Mizoram, they are referred to as Kuki and Mizo, respectively, while in Myanmar they are known as Chin.
KCNF claimed that, in 2021, more than 100 members of their ‘military wing’ moved to Myanmar’s Kachin Province for guerrilla training. A trained group later returned to Bangladesh in the same year. KCNF initially had 300 armed members, and is now reported to have a cadre strength of nearly 700. It is suspected that the group keeps strong ties with separatist groups that share similar ideologies and operate in the Rakhine State in Myanmar as well as Mizoram and Manipur in India.
Peace negotiations with the KCNF began with a discussion on May 29, 2023, with the intention of reintegrating the armed group into society at large. During the peace negotiation, the KCNF asked the government to accede to the six demands that initially inspired the rebels to organize and take up arms. The demands included:
The establishment and forming of a separate administrative system of a KTC covering areas in the hilly Districts of Bandarban and Rangamati.
The formation of the Kuki-Chin Armed Battalion.
The non-return of 500 people from the Bam community who had sought refuge in Mizoram, India, until the peace agreement is executed.
Any person from the hills or plains could buy land and settle in the KTC and the circle chiefs or headmen of Mauza would have no power on land.
The official functions of KTC shall not be under the jurisdiction of Hill District Councils or Chittagong Hill Regional Council.
The chairman of KTC should be equivalent to a minister.
Subsequently, on June 9, 2023, the Peace Establishment Committee was formed, comprising 18 members. The Committee seeks to facilitate the return of KCNF members to civilian life. Within its parameters, the KCNF committed to cooperating with law enforcement and abstaining from violence during the peace process.
However, in August 2023, terming the KCNF a terrorist organization, the CHT Peace Accord Implementation and Monitoring Committee asked the Government to act against it. Additionally, the Committee recommended that the Secretary of the Ministry of Chittagong Hill Tracts Affairs write a letter to the Ministry of Home Affairs, requesting that prompt action be taken against KCNF.
The first direct negotiation between KCNF and the Peace Establishment Committee was held on November 5, 2023, at Ruma. After that, on November 6, 2023, Kanchan Joy Tanchanga, a government-backed negotiator and one of 19 members of the Peace Establishment Committee, observed,
The Peace Committee cannot give any assurance about meeting their main demands for they are matters of the state. But the negotiation discussed possibilities of releasing arrested KCNF members, withdrawing cases against them, rehabilitating ethnic minorities evicted by the conflict, and helping KCNF fighters to return to a normal life.
In a letter to Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina on December 8, 2023, KCNF President Nathan Bom urged the Government to support the conditions necessary for a ceasefire, work on disarmament procedures, and grant its demand for a Kuki-Chin State within the bounds of the Constitution.
More recently, on March 5, 2024, in a bid to restore peace and stability in the hill areas and to address the ongoing conflict in the region, KCNF engaged in its second face-to-face meeting with the Peace Establishment Committee in Ruma. The meeting was led by Bandarban Zila Parishad Chairman and Peace Establishment Committee convener Kyaw Shwe Hla and KCNF ‘general secretary’ Laljongmoy Bawm alias ‘brigadier’ Muiya.
The two rounds of direct talks led to the signing of four Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) on November 5, 2023, relating to a cessation of armed activities by KCNF in the hill tracts. Nevertheless, in defiance of the MoUs, KCNF continued to engage in violence.
Not surprisingly, later on April 4, 2024, Kyaw Shwe Hla announced a suspension of peace negotiations with KCNF. The grounds for suspension were declared as KCNF’s involvement in bank robberies in Ruma and Thanchi on two consecutive days as well as the outfit’s role in providing training to Jamatul Ansar Fil Hindal Sharqiya (JAFHS) operatives in Bandarban in exchange for money. The decision of suspension, he added, was triggered by the continuous violations of the terms of the agreement, as well as the abduction of locals.
Despite several virtual meetings and two rounds of direct dialogue held on November 5, 2023, and March 5, 2024, KCNF persisted in its armed activities, violating agreements made in two memoranda of understanding regarding abstention and other matters.
In October 2022, law enforcement agencies discovered that KCNF operatives had provided combat training and taught operational strategies to operatives of the terrorist group JAFHS at KCNF training camps in Bandarban.
KCNF violence certainly presents a challenge to enforcement agencies and the state in Bangladesh, but ramifications of the activities of this militant outfit extend beyond Bangladesh’s borders, since Kuki-Chin affiliation extend into three national jurisdictions, and the KCNF is affiliated with militant groups functioning in both Myanmar and North-eastern India. Kuki-Chin militancy has heightened tensions in the region, and has also facilitated arms and drug trafficking. The suspension of negotiations by the Peace Committee is likely to exacerbate these problems. Although efforts have been made to initiate a peace process between KCNF and the Government, the distrust shown by the Peace Committee because of KCNF’s recent activities could jeopardise the whole process. Bangladesh, India and Myanmar must come together to combat the group, as well as the wider Kuki-Chin militancy in the region.
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