SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa: Bajaur Ablaze

On July 3, 2024, former Senator Hidayatullah Khan was killed along with four others, when the senator’s car was targeted in an improvised explosive device (IED) attack in the Damadola area of Bajaur in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP). Bajaur District Police Officer Sajjad Ahmad disclosed that the former senator was on his way to a by-election campaign in Damadola when he was attacked. Hidayatullah, brother of ex-Governor Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Engineer Shaukatullah Khan, was in Damadola to support his nephew Najibullah’s election campaign for PK 22 in the upcoming by-election on July 11. No outfit has claimed responsibility for the attack, while the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) denied involvement, stating that its focus is on Security Forces (SFs), not civilians.

On June 30, 2024, Dr. Abdul Rasheed who was serving at the District Hospital Khar, was shot dead by unidentified gunmen in the Mamond area of Bajaur District. He had shot dead two militants who came to extort some money from him a few years ago. Since then he had been receiving threats and had been attacked more than 25 times over the past 5 years.

On June 5, 2024, a Police Constable was shot dead in an incident of targeted killing in the Shah Wali market of Inayat Kallay Bazar in Bajaur District. The Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) claimed responsibility for the attack.

The Tribal District of Bajaur has witnessed a significant rise in terrorist attacks on local politicians, religious scholars, tribal elders and Government officials over the past few years. According to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), Bajaur District has already recorded at least 35 terrorism-related fatalities (20 civilians, 12 SF personnel and three terrorists) in 2024, thus far (data till June 7, 2024). During the corresponding period of 2023, the province had registered 14 terrorism-related fatalities (five civilians, two SF trooper and seven terrorists). In the remaining period of 2023, another 77 fatalities (68 civilians, one SF trooper and eight terrorists) were recorded. If the fatalities of one suicide attack on July 30 is deducted, in which 54 people perished, the half-yearly fatalities figure was almost the same as the annual fatalities.

Fatalities in the first six months of the current year in Bajaur have already crossed all previous recorded annual fatalities since 2000, with the exception of 2023, which was the highest due to the major suicide attack of July 30. Bajaur District has accounted for a total of 234 fatalities (148 civilians, 43 terrorists and 43 SF personnel) since March 6, 2000, when SATP commenced compiling data on Pakistan. These fatalities have been recorded in a total of 93 incidents of killing. 16 of these 93 incidents were ‘major’ (each involving three or more fatalities). These major incidents resulted in the death of 131 persons (78 civilians, 32 terrorists and 21 SF personnel).

The district has recorded a total of 143 violent incidents since March 6, 2000, including 55 incidents of explosion and three suicide attacks. The biggest major attack of the District occurred on July 30, 2023, when a suicide attack claimed lives of at least 54 people, including a Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam-Fazl (JUI-F) local leader, while more than another 100 sustained injuries at the JUI-F workers’ convention at Shanday Morr near the National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) office in the Khar town of the District. The blast that took place during the speech of a JUI-F leader, Maulana Laeeq. ISKP claimed responsibility for the attack.

With a population of more than 1.28 million, Bajaur had been a hotbed of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) activities, as it is located on the volatile Pakistan-Afghan border, sharing its Western border with Afghanistan’s Kunar Province. The district shares borders with three other districts of KP: Lower Dir in the North, Mohmand to the South and Malakand to the West. Two of these adjoining districts, Mohmand and Lower Dir, also share borders with Afghanistan. As a result of multiple operations by the Pakistan Army in the tribal areas [the erstwhile Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)], the district became relatively peaceful and overall fatalities came down to a low of four in 2018. Since 2019, a regional branch of the Islamic State, ISKP has primarily been responsible for the targeted assassination campaign in the District.

The Khorasan Diary (TKD), an Islamabad-based news and research platform that monitors militant groups, however, noted on August 1, 2023, that the IS-KP had claimed responsibility for at least 23 attacks, exclusively targeting the JUI-F in Bajaur alone, since 2019. Riccardo Valle, director of research at TKD, revealed on August 1, 2023,

The Khorasan Diary (TKD), an Islamabad-based news and research platform that monitors militant groups, however, noted on August 1, 2023, that the IS-KP had claimed responsibility for at least 23 attacks, exclusively targeting the JUI-F in Bajaur alone, since 2019. Riccardo Valle, director of research at TKD, revealed on August 1, 2023,
The Khorasan Diary (TKD), an Islamabad-based news and research platform that monitors militant groups, however, noted on August 1, 2023, that the IS-KP had claimed responsibility for at least 23 attacks, exclusively targeting the JUI-F in Bajaur alone, since 2019. Riccardo Valle, director of research at TKD, revealed on August 1, 2023,

November 21, 2023: Haji Sattar Khan, the father of JUI-F’s Ansar Ul Islam leader for Bajaur, Maulana Abdul Salam, was killed and another three were injured in an improvised explosive device (IED) explosion in the Mamund area of Bajaur District.

June 22, 2023: IS-KP assassinated JUI-F leader Maulana Noor Muhammad in the Inayat Kalay Bazaar of Bajaur District.

April 18, 2023: Maz Khan, the son of JUI-F leader Mufti Bashir Ahmad, was killed and his friend was injured when unidentified assailants opened fire on them in the Inayat Kallay Bazaar of Bajaur District.

October 1, 2022: Unidentified assailants killed a senior JUI-F leader, Maulana Shafiullah, in the Mamond tehsil (sub-district) of Bajaur District.

March 26, 2021: JUI-F leader Maulana Abdul Salam was killed in a remote-controlled bomb blast in the Dama Dola area of Mamond tehsil in Bajaur District.

October 29, 2019: Senior leader JUI-F Mufti Sultan Mohammad was shot dead by unidentified assailants near a mosque in the Badan area of Mamond tehsil in Bajaur District. Mufti Mohammad was the head of JUI-F Mamond tehsil.

The seeds of enmity between IS-KP and JUI-F lie in their conflicting politics. The anti-JUI-F sentiments initially developed within a sub-group of the TTP, led by the then TTP chief, Hakimullah Mehsud, who supported the idea of targeting JUI-F’s chief Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman and the rest of his party’s senior leadership due to their pro-democracy and pro-Pakistani Constitution stance. At the end of 2014, some prominent leaders of a breakaway faction of the TTP pledged bayah (allegiance) to Islamic State (IS)-Central’s then Amir, Abu-Bakr-al-Baghdadi. Those who pledged allegiance to the IS included the then TTP ‘spokesperson’ Shahidullah Shahid; Kurram Agency ‘chief’ Hafiz Quran Dolat; Khyber Agency ‘chief’ Gul Zaman; Peshawar ‘chief’ Mufti Hassan; Hangu ‘chief’ Khalid Mansoor; and Orakzai Agency ‘commander’ Hafiz Saeed Khan. Soon after, this group shifted base into the Nangarhar Province of Afghanistan, as did most terrorist groups operating in the tribal areas of Pakistan, under the impact of Operation Zarb-e-Azb launched by the Pakistani SFs. On January 26, 2015, IS-KP was officially announced with a 12-member Shura (governing council) consisting of nine Pakistanis, two Afghans, and one person of unknown origin. Hafiz Saeed Khan became the Amir. He was, however, killed on July 26, 2016, in the Achin District of Nangarhar Province in Afghanistan. Later, in May 2019, a separate chapter for Pakistan – Islamic State-Pakistan Province (IS-PP) – was established.

While the animosity between the IS-KP and JUI-F does have a history, there has been a significant escalation in attacks in recent times, as the IS-KP perceives the JUI-F as being closely connected with the Taliban Government in Afghanistan. A KP Provincial Home and Tribal Affairs Department report of November 25, 2023, noted that the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam – Fazl (JUI-F) is the most vulnerable among mainstream political parties to terrorist attacks in KP.

While the TTP is targeting SF personnel, the IS-KP’s attacks against civilians is on rise, twice weakening the security situation in Bajaur.

Ansar al-Islam/ABT: Menacing Dregs

On July 2, 2024, the Counter Terrorism and Transnational Crime Unit (CTTC) of the Dhaka Metropolitan Police (DMP) arrested three operatives of Ansar-al-Islam/ Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT), Mohammad Mamun Hossain, Abu Bakkar, and Hasibul Islam, in the Mohakhali Bus Terminal area of Dhaka, the capital city.

On July 1, 2024, an Ansar al-Islam operative, Parvin Akhtar (24), who was secretly training and recruiting members under the guise of running a fish farm, was arrested by the Anti-Terrorism Unit (ATU) in the Netakona District of Dhaka Division. A Police official disclosed, “Arrested Parvin Akhter and her associates were giving training and recruiting members for the banned group under the guise of running a fish farm. They used the fish farm as a training centre, discreetly gathering and training recruits from across the country, using their vehicles.”

On July 1, 2024, the ATU recovered three Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) from a flat in a four-story residential building rented by operatives of Ansar al-Islam in Rupganj Upazila (Sub-District) in Narayanganj District of Dhaka Division and later defused them through controlled explosions. Mohammad Sanowar Hossain, Superintendent of Police (Operations) of ATU, said, “The flat was rented by militants as a hideout. Two men and one woman, along with two children, were living in this flat for a few months. Those three adults have connections with Ansar al-Islam.”

On June 27, 2024, the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) arrested three suspected Ansar al-Islam cadres, Zakaria Mandal, Mohammad Niamat Ullah and Mohammad Ozair, in the Chowfaldandi area of Cox’s Bazar District, Chittagong Division. RAB recovered ten extremist books, 29 leaflets, one diary, two madrasa identity cards, two national identification cards (NIDs), two mobile phones, and BDT 4,590 from their possession.

On June 14, 2024, RAB arrested two Ansar al-Islam militants, Mohammad Asaduzzaman Asif (22) and Mohammad Ahad (21), and recovered jihadi books from Shikalbaha in Chittagong (Chattogram) District, Chittagong Division.

On June 1, 2024, DMP’s CTTC Unit arrested three cadres of Ansar al-Islam, Shakil Ahmed, Fardin Ahmed Mirdul and Rayhan Hosain, from the Wari Police Station area of Dhaka District in Dhaka Division.

According to partial data collected by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), at least 18 ABT/Ansar al-Islam cadres/leaders have been arrested in 2024, thus far (data till July 05, 2024). 32 such arrests were made in 2023, while five were arrested in 2022. Since 2013, Security Forces (SFs) have arrested at least 425 ABT/Ansar al-Islam cadres/leaders from across the country.

Ansarul al-Islam, formerly known as ABT, was banned in March, 2017 due to its extensive use of violence against intellectuals, writers, atheists, secularists, and gay rights activists between 2014 and 2016. During 2007 a group named Jama’atul Muslemin, funded by different Non-Governmental Organisations, started its activities in Bangladesh. The group, however, ceased to operate when funding ended. It resurfaced during 2013 as ABT. The ABT was banned on May 25, 2015. It resurfaced as Ansar al-Islam, which, in turn, was banned on March 5, 2017. The notification said activities of the organization were contrary to the country’s peace and order and had already been considered as a threat to public safety. From the middle of 2015 onwards, Ansar al-Islam referred to itself as the Bangladeshi wing of Al-Qaeda in the Indian Sub-Continent (AQIS).

Shortly thereafter, Ansarul al-Islam and AQIS both started claiming credit for or linking themselves to nearly all of the assaults in Bangladesh against progressive and secular people. In 2015 and 2016, at least fifteen such individuals were killed or seriously injured, while others on the AQIS/ Ansarul al-Islam hit list either left the country or went into hiding. In September 2016, Ansal Al Islam/ABT published a hit list of bloggers and activists around the world, threatening to kill them. The majority of the individuals on the list — nine from the United Kingdom (UK), seven from Germany, two from the United States (US), one from Canada, and one from Sweden — were expatriate Bangladeshis, according to a statement released online.

The outfit came into prominence when its cadres started hacking bloggers, free thinkers and secular activists to death in 2013. It started with the killing of blogger Ahmed Rajib Haider near his house in Mirpur, on February 15, 2013. In August 2015, Ansarul al-Islam/AQIS had vowed to kill anyone who insulted or criticised Prophet Muhammad, misrepresented Islam, or — above all — voiced resistance to the country’s adoption of sharia law.

Some of the prominent incidents of killing related to the group included:

February 26, 2015: Bangladesh-born US citizen and secular author, Avijit Roy, was killed and his wife, Rafida Bonya Ahmed, was seriously wounded by Ansarul al-Islam in Dhaka.
August 7, 2015: AQIS/ Ansarul al-Islam’s spokesperson for Bangladesh, Abdullah Ashraf, claimed the death of blogger Niloy Neel in the Goran area of Dhaka “as vengeance for the honor of the messenger of Allah” and declared war “against the enemies of Allah”.
April 8, 2016: Cadres of ABT/Ansar al-Islam killed blogger Nazimuddin Samad (26), a Masters student at Jagannath University in Dhaka city. An Ansar al- statement posted online after the incident declared that its members carried out the attack in “vengeance”, because Samad “abused” God, Prophet Muhammad and Islam: “This operation was conducted to teach a lesson to the blasphemers of this land whose poisonous tongues are constantly abusing Allah, the religion of Islam and the Messenger under the pretext of so-called freedom of speech.”
April 25, 2016: Ansar Al-Islam militants killed same-sex rights activist Xulhaz Mannan and his friend, theatre activist Mahbub Rabbi Tonoy, after breaking into their Kalabagan residence in Dhaka.
A counterterrorism court in 2021 sentenced to death five Ansar Al-Islam militants and imprisoned another for life. A USD 5 million prize for any more information regarding fugitive members involved in the attack on Roy and his wife was also announced by the U.S. State Department’s Rewards for Justice Programme.

On June 29, 2024, Chief of DMP’s CTTC unit Mohammad Asaduzzaman stated that there was still a risk of militancy in Bangladesh. Among the four organisations that had carried out militant and sabotage activities in the country in the past, Ansar Al Islam was the most active. The remaining three organisations – Jamaatul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), neo-JMB and Harkat-ul-Jihad-al Islami Bangladesh (HuJI-B) had weakened. Law enforcement was consequently considering Ansar Al Islam the biggest remaining threat of militancy in the country.

Sources indicate that the Districts of Dhaka and Chittagong are the centres of ABT/Ansar al-Islam’s organisational activity. Kushtia and Satkhira Districts are also home to the group’s bases.

On May 24, 2024, RAB arrested three operatives of Shahadat, a new outfit based on the Ansar al-Islam ideology, in separate raids in the Dhaka and Narayanganj Districts of Dhaka Division. The arrestees were identified as Ismail Hossain (recruitment head of Shahadat) and its regional trainers Jihad Hussain aka Huzaifa, and Aminul Islam. RAB Legal and Media Wing Director, Commander Arafat Islam confirmed the arrests and disclosed that the arrestees were actually Ansal Al-Islam operatives. They formed the new outfit, Shahadat, as the name Ansar al-Islam was known to all, and it was sometimes difficult to continue activities under that identity.

According to CTTC, Ansar Al Islam was conducting its operations by establishing “cells” in practically all areas of the country, in addition to welcoming new recruits and routinely providing training to vetted veteran members. A cell’s leader is referred to as masul or accountable; their superior is referred to as majma masul, who is notified by a masul about their identity-disguising activities. Since 2016, the organisation has adhered to a stringent secrecy policy. For internal communication, they have also been utilising their own applications. Furthermore, Ansar al-Islam has been secretly recruiting Rohingya women and refugees to assist with tasks such as intelligence collection and couriering.

Sources further said Ansar Al Islam currently maintains 100 to 150 websites that showcase its actions on a regular basis. Additionally, they use Facebook, Instagram, Telegram, and X for their dawah (proselytising) activities. CTTC sources report that Ansar Al Islam is currently more active in recruiting technology experts. They have a different section called Idratul Dawah Network (IDN) for this purpose.

On June 1, 2024, the Deputy Commissioner of the DMP’s CTTC Unit, Jahidul Hoque Talukder, disclosed that Ansar al-Islam had raised BDT 1.8 million through crowdfunding within a few months after launching a platform called Deen Islam Foundation on Facebook, in the name of sending aid to victims in Palestine.

Bangladeshi counterterrorism officials issued a warning at the end of December 2021 regarding the potential reappearance of Ansar al-Islam, an official AQIS wing that fervently backs the Islamic Emirate of the Afghan Taliban. The CTTC claimed that Ansar al-Islam had been hiring and training people in Bangladesh’s interior and had persevered over the past years in spite of ongoing counterterrorism operations, which had targeted its hideouts and detained its cadres. Bangladeshi Police estimate that nearly 40 militants affiliated with Ansar al-Islam were arrested during 58 anti-terrorism operations across Bangladesh in 2021 alone.

Mufti Jashimuddin Rahmani, ‘chief’ of ABT/Ansar al-Islam, was released from the Kashimpur High Security Central Jail in Gazipur District on January 21, 2024, after securing bail in five cases filed under the Anti-terrorism Act. However, CTTC officials expressed concerns over his release and believe it would elevate the terrorist threat and impede trials of cases of terrorism filed against him. Rahmani was arrested on August 12, 2013, in Barguna District, along with 30 members of his organisation, in connection with inciting people to commit violence. Despite concerns, Mohammad Asaduzzaman, Chief of the CTTC Unit, observed, “We are now trying to track down Rahmani and he will be under our monitoring. And we believe we will be able to avert any untoward situations.”

A recent investigative report released on July 6, 2024, revealed information regarding the activities of militant organisations, including Ansar al-Islam, inside Bangladesh’s prison system. These groups use the country’s prisons not just as a hideout but also as a hub for planning acts of terrorism and for raising funds. The report indicates that one of the most alarming findings was Ansar al-Islam’s involvement in narcotics trafficking out of Kashimpur Central Jail (Part-1) in Gazipur District.

ABT/Ansar al-Islam, like other radical Islamist organisations in Bangladesh, has experienced losses as a result of actions of the Sheikh Hasina Government since it assumed office in January 2009. As with other terrorist formations, it is currently struggling to sustain operations. Nevertheless, there are ongoing attempts to engineer a resurgence. The revelations regarding Ansar al-Islam’s activities within the prison system are particularly alarming. These actions expose the widespread corruption and collusion in the criminal justice system, compounding the threat to national security. The groups’ capacity to maintain communications with external networks and generate funds through various sources, including drug trafficking creates a potential that could produce explosive violence in the foreseeable future.