Modi’s Moscow Mission: A Message To China And The West – OpEd

Modi’s trip to Moscow was to allay Russian apprehensions over a perceptible shift in India’s foreign policy favoring the West over Russia. Another purpose of the PM’s long overdue visit to Moscow, after half a decade, was to gauge the subtle shift in Russia’s foreign policy favoring China over India, or the so-called ‘China pivot’.

For the last two years, concerns were mounting within Russian diplomatic circles that India was not according priority to its ties with Russia under American pressure. While in Delhi, there was palpable unease over the so-called CRINK alliance – encompassing China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea – which only stands to benefit China. His visit was to “reassure, reaffirm, and reassert” India’s firm commitment to the ‘special and privileged strategic partnership’ with Russia. It was about protecting the country’s national interests while building on convergences and managing our differences at a time when India’s restrained position on the Ukraine conflict stems from Delhi’s geopolitical vulnerabilities.

The India-Russia relationship has been shaped by history, geography, economic and military interests, and it would survive the current geopolitical flux. Furthermore, Moscow has lent unstinted support for India’s permanent membership in an expanded UN Security Council, and has never been supportive of Pakistan in international forums, and also the Khalistani movement to the detriment of India.

A slew of developments since the start of the year unsettled Indian policymakers, and that’s why the PM was dispatched to Moscow in his very first overseas visit on returning to power for the third term. In February, the Valdai Club demoted India to the same level of regional influence as Pakistan and placed it at the lower end of its global pecking order. The club is a premier Russian think-tank and networking platform that hosts Putin in its annual meetings every fall. In early March, Russian Presidential aide, Yuri Ushakov, dropped hints of inviting Pakistan to the BRICS+ summit at Kazan in October this year. In early April, Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, initiated talks with his Chinese counterpart on a new Eurasian security concept broached by Putin in February this year, keeping India out of the structure. In April-May, a pro-Chinese foreign policy expert, Sergei Karaganov, was commissioned to do two studies on Pakistan – on military-industrial co-operation, and nuclear security – which raised several eyebrows in Delhi when the Western press amplified this news in May.

In May-June, with Russia’s nod, China launched a Brazil-led six-point peace initiative over Ukraine. This peace process aims to re-launch talks between Ukraine and Russia by the November G20 summit in Rio. In June, Indian media reported on Russian official media agencies questioning their country’s official policy on India’s territorial integrity. Alarmed Indian diplomats decided to get to the bottom of Kremlin’s shenanigans by hurriedly sending PM Modi to meet President Putin. However, three developments put a rattled South Block relatively at ease; Russia’s mutual defense pact with North Korea, Putin’s visit to Vietnam, and the prospect of India entering into a military logistics pact with Russia in the near future. From the warm exchanges between Putin and Modi, it can be construed that the Kremlin will reconsider its pivot to China, and it will be back to balancing between India and China, as Indian investments make deeper inroads into the Russian economy.

Although Russia’s share of Indian arms fell from 56% in 2015-19 to 36% in 2019-23, burgeoning imports of discounted Russian oil has pushed bilateral trade to $ 65.7 bn, but Indian exports to Russia account for a puny $4.27 bn. The lopsided trade in favor of Russia is primarily due to the Rupee-Ruble failure. India and Russia’s attempts to bypass Western sanctions by de-dollarizing and trading in their own currencies have faltered. The rupee’s lack of full convertibility, India’s limited range of exports, and the ruble’s volatility were the oft-cited reasons behind the failure. However, an encouraging report by Sberbank, which acts as the “Sherpa” in trade settlements with India, notes that, “Rupee denominated current accounts are now a reality in Russia, as are the rupee deposits. Since early this year, the volume of corporate deposits in rupees has increased six-fold, the rupee is now easily convertible in Russia, and a backlog of $30 bn accumulated in rupees has been cleared.”

Nonetheless, New Delhi will have to address the trade imbalance by widening the trade basket with Russia. India is exploring ways to boost its exports to Russia by encouraging Rupee-Ruble trade, and pushing Moscow to lift non-tariff barriers, starting with marine food products. The two sides are looking at the possibility of setting up a Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU comprising of Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan) – and India free trade agreement at the earliest. Both sides have set a target of $100 bn bilateral trade by 2030, and aims to tackle nine specific areas to achieve it, which includes; easing and facilitating trade, investment and remittances, and finding acceptable solutions for insurance and re-insurance of the traded goods. Russia’s high rupee reserves open up the possibility of joint ventures for manufacturing a range of industrial products in India. Getting the INSTC and also the Eastern Maritime Corridor started without much delay even if in a limited capacity will give a fillip in boosting trade.

Despite sanctions, India is doubling down on its investments in Russia’s energy sector, particularly in the Far East. This is significant as Russia is increasingly wary of losing these resource rich areas to persistent Chinese migration and encroachment. India’s presence will act as a check on further Chinese inroads. Russia has revamped its military industries, cranking up a war economy by putting its Soviet era industries to work. For India, striving to augment its indigenous defense manufacturing base, Russia remains accessible in terms of technology and production. Russia’s co-operation and knowledge sharing will also be vital in implementing India’s clean energy transition plans. Delhi-Moscow interaction has moved beyond the traditional buyer-seller relationship to acquire geo-economic and geo-strategic dimensions. Both sides invest in the strategic areas of each others’ economy, and actively co-operate in multi-lateral forums such as the BRICS, SCO, and the G20, while engaging in strategic areas of the South Asian region, for e.g.; in the field of nuclear power in Bangladesh, infrastructure in Sri Lanka, and security in Myanmar and Afghanistan.

Putin used Modi’s visit to convey to the West that Russia is not isolated, that he had by his side the leader of the world’s largest democracy, and to signal to China that Russia had other friends, and was not solely dependent on Beijing. Russia is by no means in Beijing’s orbit and would use the India card to deal with China’s overbearing attitude. Putin has invited Modi again in October for the BRICS summit in Kazan. In return, Modi has invited Putin to visit India next year for the India-Russia annual summit. India and Russia can work together to reduce Chinese dominance in BRICS and the SCO, and provide other options to the countries of the Global South for their growth and development.

PM Modi also used his visit to signal to China that India will do all that it can to hold back Russia from pivoting to China. BJP leaders have voiced concern over Western powers working to undermine the Modi government. The PM’s trip was therefore a clear message to Washington that India would not tolerate needless meddling in its internal affairs, and its support to the Khalistani movement. Modi’s Moscow mission was an assertion of India’s strategic autonomy and a calculated signal to all the major powers that India was a rising power with friends across the globe.