Has The West’s Strategy Toward India Failed? – Analysis

According to a report by the Russian TASS news agency, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, recently re-elected, made an official visit to Russia in July. This visit marked a departure from the tradition of newly elected leaders first visiting neighboring countries, indicating India’s focus on its relationship with Russia and its commitment to “strategic autonomy”. Raj Kumar Sharma, a senior researcher at the Indian think tank NatStrat, noted that amid strained relations with Western nations, Modi’s trip sends an important political signal. He emphasized that India views dialogue as the best approach to resolving the Russia-Ukraine conflict, stating, “For a multipolar world, India wants to see a strong Russia, rather than a weakened one”.

Since the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the West has made significant efforts to draw India closer, aiming to strengthen pressure on Russia and maintain strategic containment of China. Starting last year, Western nations have intensified their technological and economic cooperation with India, with research institutions in the West enhancing collaboration in areas such as biotechnology and green energy. Additionally, the long-stalled issue of transferring a complete aircraft engine production line was resolved this year. Regarding the assassination of Hardeep Singh Nijjar who was involved with the Khalistan Movement in Canada, the West has largely remained silent, further highlighting its effort to court India.

In stark contrast are India’s actions. India has consistently refused to participate in sanctions against Russia and has not abandoned its imports of Russian oil. In fact, it has even further strengthened its cooperation framework and content with Russia. With this, some media outlets believe that the West’s strategy to engage India has failed. However, researchers at ANBOUND believe that India’s new direction in cooperation with Russia does not indicate a failure of the West’s strategy. Instead, India seeks to leverage a series of strategically autonomous geopolitical maneuvers to enhance its presence as a rising power, aiming to become a leader among southern countries.

Firstly, India has remained aligned with the West’s original strategic goals. Whether it is the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy or the Indo-Pacific plans of European countries such as Germany and France, the primary target of these strategies has consistently been China, with India being considered a key regional pillar of this strategy. India’s own actions have proven that it has never disappointed the West. Despite its profound economic and trade dependence on China, the Indian government has never been lenient in suppressing Chinese enterprises in India. A few years ago, India imposed hefty fines on companies like Xiaomi under the pretext of tax evasion. Recently, Indian law enforcement arrested Vivo India’s interim CEO, Hong Xuqian (Chinese national), CFO Harinder Dahiya, and consultant Hemant Munjal on charges of alleged “money laundering”. On December 26, the court in New Delhi decided to extend the detention period of the three by two days. Additionally, the Indian Finance Ministry has decided to impose anti-dumping duties on industrial laser machines imported from China.

In terms of geopolitical competition, India has not softened its stance on countering China. In disputed areas between the two countries, India has aggressively pursued the construction of so-called “strategic villages”, similar to the U.S. military’s approach in the American War in Vietnam. India has intensively deployed cell sites in border regions and continuously upgraded military and police equipment there, a sign that it always remains vigilant. Moreover, India’s approach toward China has extended beyond the Indian Ocean. India has gifted patrol vessels to Vietnam and sent naval ships to visit the Philippines to bolster its morale. At the same time, Indian companies are preparing to explore and extract oil and gas resources in disputed waters between China and Vietnam. India is significantly deepening its political, economic, and defense cooperation with Southeast Asian and South Sea countries, aiming to dilute China’s strategic resources by strengthening regional resistance to China. Indeed, such efforts have made tangible progress. Whether in economic or diplomatic and defense matters, India’s stance against China remains firm due to profound territorial disputes and geopolitical confrontational demands. As long as India maintains its adversarial attitude toward China, Western strategies concerning India are unlikely to fail, as countering China remains the main objective, with countering Russia as a secondary concern.

Secondly, India’s increased cooperation with Russia is unlikely to revive Russia’s energy sector. Following the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the West largely severed its energy ties with Russia, prompting Russia to redirect its oil and gas exports to China and India. Recent data shows that last year, Russia exported 50% of its crude oil to China and 40% to India, marking a significant rise in the two’s imports of Russian energy. However, researchers at ANBOUND have highlighted that the combined oil and gas demand from China and India cannot match the previous levels of the West’s imports. Thus, the decline in Russian energy exports to the West cannot be entirely offset by increased sales to China and India. Both countries are pursuing energy transformation, and despite potential setbacks, this shift away from oil and gas consumption is likely to persist. Consequently, the demand for Russian energy in China and India faces fundamental limitations. India’s energy strategy remains grounded in pragmatic principles.

Since mid-last year, Indian refineries have complained that about the sharp reduction in discounts on Russian crude oil. India has also been actively pursuing a strategy of diversifying its energy imports, such as increasing oil imports from Nigeria. Recently, the worsening security situation in the Red Sea has prompted Indian companies to consider increasing their imports of Middle Eastern crude oil. This indicates that even India’s short-term demand for Russian imports is highly unstable. In terms of defense cooperation, Russian-made weapons have long constituted a substantial portion of the Indian military’s arsenal, and the maintenance and upgrading of this equipment necessitate continued defense collaboration with Russia. However, the decline in Russia’s capabilities since the end of the Cold War and the underperformance of Russian forces during the Russia-Ukraine conflict suggest that India must gradually move away from Russian-made equipment to fully enhance its defense capabilities. According to Indian data, the proportion of weapons imported from Russia has decreased from 64% in 2013 to 45% today. Meanwhile, arms exports from France and the U.S. to India are rapidly increasing. India’s decision to deepen defense cooperation with Russia primarily aims to ensure the effective operation and maintenance of existing equipment, but this will not reverse the broader trend of India gradually moving away from Russian-made weapons. The combination of technology transfers from Russia and the West, along with the advancement of India’s domestic defense production, will lead India to phase out relatively outdated Russian weapons. Consequently, defense trade will not provide Russia with a significant influx of new opportunities.

Overall, Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Russia and some of India’s strategic moves are not indicative of the failure of the West or Russia’s success but rather represent India’s strategic maneuvering from the perspective of strategic autonomy in pursuit of regional hegemony. In other words, India is using Russia as a bargaining chip in its negotiations with the West and using the West as leverage in its dealings with Russia. By navigating between these two powers, India is enhancing its own value and advancing its regional dominance. This has become a fundamental strategy for India in international relations.

While the deepening of Russo-Indian cooperation might seem beneficial for both Russia and India, China should be particularly wary. In terms of its relations with China, Russia has never deviated from its basic approach of counterbalancing China since the end of the Cold War. Russia has consistently exported advanced weapons and equipment to India, with higher technology and effectiveness compared to its arms exports to China. In the energy sector, despite facing obstacles in its own energy exports and having to deepen cooperation with China, Russia continues to seek to attract Central Asian countries to form a regional gas pipeline network, aiming to unify and control gas exports to China. In defense, the BrahMos missile, developed through Russo-Indian joint ventures, has been significantly improved over the years and now possesses strong penetration capabilities and high speed. When deployed from land, it poses a considerable threat to surface vessels. India is vigorously advancing the export of this missile to Vietnam and the Philippines and has already made substantial progress, which poses a significant threat to the safety of Chinese naval vessels. As Russo-Indian defense cooperation progresses, Russia’s remaining technological advantages will bolster India’s military capabilities, and these enhanced capabilities are likely to gradually flow into countries in the South China Sea and Southeast Asia with geopolitical disputes with China. This will increase pressure on China’s land and maritime borders. Russia’s support for India’s bid to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council could complicate matters. Even if successful, the process will be challenging and lengthy. Enhancing the influence and voice of a country with serious geopolitical opposition to China within the UN would not be beneficial for China’s influence and could be seen as a detrimental move against China.

One of the key focuses of the Russia-India talks at the end of last year was to further expand nuclear energy cooperation and the transfer of technology between the two countries. In the field of nuclear energy, Russia still holds certain advantages. However, it is important to note that Western countries are overall shifting their stance on nuclear energy, with the U.S. and Japan particularly intensifying their development and use of nuclear technology. In the Indian market, Russia may not be able to maintain a lasting advantage. However, the influx of Russian technology and its impact on enhancing India’s technical capabilities could benefit the latter in strengthening its nuclear energy competition with China in developing countries. This remains unfavorable news for China.

Soon after Modi winning the election this year, the pace of discussions between India and Russia on logistics and defense agreement accelerated. India is preparing to further involve Russia in the Indian Ocean region to counterbalance China. Russia has also agreed to collaborate with India in expanding its influence in Arctic affairs. Although the final implementation of these developments will take time and is primarily related to India’s pursuit of regional hegemony, the main target of these actions remains China’s regional interests.

Final analysis conclusion:

As Russia and India’s relationship continues to develop and deepen, some commentators have argued that the West’s efforts to court India have overall failed, misunderstanding the core of Western strategy toward India. The essence of the Western strategy is to leverage and utilize India to counter China, and India has never deviated from this fundamental position. However, deepening cooperation with Russia cannot fundamentally alter Russia’s unfavorable situation. Instead, it is China’s interests that are most visibly challenged under this cooperation.