US And Pakistan: A Counter-Terrorism Imperative – OpEd

Since the withdrawal of US and NATO forces from Afghanistan, there has been a 60 per cent increase in terrorism in Pakistan. Following this withdrawal, the ideological kins of the Afghan Taliban, who had fought alongside the United States, redirected their hostility towards Pakistan. Once allies in counter-terrorism efforts, the U.S. policy regarding security assistance to Pakistan now remains nebulous.

According to the U.N. report of 2024, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has consistently increased its attacks on Pakistan, with the number rising from 573 in 2021 to 1,203 in 2023, with further escalation observed in the first half of 2024. The Afghan Taliban are not only providing safe havens to the TTP but are also supporting their anti-Pakistan agenda. The U.N. report states, “The Taliban do not conceive of TTP as a terrorist group: the bonds are close, and the debt owed to TTP is significant.” Additionally, the report assesses that the TTP has links with international terrorist organizations such as al-Qaida and ISIS-K. It also highlights that the TTP is utilizing advanced caliber weapons, including night vision capabilities, which were left behind by the US and NATO, raising significant concerns for Pakistan.

On the southwestern front, the TTP has aligned itself with the Majid Brigade of Balochistan, which focuses on suicide bomb attacks and now recruits women for terrorist activities. Pakistan has evidence of Indian support for Baloch insurgents in Balochistan. It is regrettable that US politicians, such as Senator Marco Rubio, have recently proposed a bill in the Senate asserting that US security assistance to Pakistan is used against India. This bill aims to strengthen security ties with India and reduce security aid to Pakistan, proposing that the US Secretary of State sign a memorandum of understanding with India to enhance security cooperation.

Historically, Pakistan has been a security ally of the United States at various times over the 75 years of diplomatic relations, including during the Cold War. Despite the fluctuating nature of these relations, the US remains Pakistan’s largest trading partner, with annual trade exceeding three billion dollars, and Pakistan was the largest non-NATO ally of the US during the War on Terror. Given the historical relationship between the two countries, the US should address the TTP threat gravely. Concurrently, the US should take the TTP threat seriously due to its ideology and alliances with international terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), ISIS-K, the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), and the Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP).

Asfandyar Mir, a South Asia expert from the US Institute of Peace, predicts that if the TTP, along with other terrorist organizations, captures territories and resources within Pakistan, it could pose a significant threat to regional security and potentially extend its activities to other states or continents, including the United States. For example, in December 2009, the TTP, in collaboration with al-Qaida, managed to turn a CIA spy who had been sent to infiltrate al-Qaida’s leadership in Pakistan’s Waziristan region. The spy was returned to his CIA and allied government handlers with a suicide bomb, which detonated at a forward base in eastern Afghanistan, resulting in the deaths of several CIA officers. Additionally, in 2010, the TTP made an unsuccessful attempt to attack Times Square, New York City. Such ideologies pose a threat to global peace; strengthening the TTP would bolster the broader terrorist agenda worldwide.

At this critical juncture of converging interests, how can the U.S. assist Pakistan in neutralizing the threat? The United States can significantly aid Pakistan in addressing this threat through several strategic measures. First, providing security aid is essential, given Pakistan’s economic constraints and the extensive nature of its counter-terrorism operations. This aid could include funding for advanced counter-terrorism equipment, training programs for Pakistani security forces and LEAs, and logistical support to enhance their operational capabilities. Second, the US can improve its collaboration with Pakistani law enforcement by sharing critical intelligence. This would involve providing access to advanced intelligence-gathering technologies such as satellites and drones, enabling Pakistani agencies to track and intercept TTP operatives, disrupt their plans, and prevent attacks. Enhanced intelligence-sharing would improve situational awareness and coordination between the two countries. Finally, increasing the use of over-the-horizon strikes to target specific terrorist bases and hideouts across the border could weaken the TTP’s operational infrastructure.These precision strikes would aim to dismantle the TTP’s training camps, supply depots, and safe havens, thereby reducing their capacity to launch attacks and serving as a deterrent to other terrorist groups.

Together, these measures—security aid, intelligence-sharing, and targeted military actions—can substantially bolster Pakistan’s counter-terrorism efforts and contribute to regional stability and security.