America’s ‘self-defeat’ in Afghanistan
When World War II ended – not in a “ceasefire” or a “responsible exit strategy” or a “peace deal” but with the unconditional surrender of America’s enemies – the United States determined to create a new world order.
That required the transformation of Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and Imperial Japan into free and friendly nation-states.
And that, in turn, required leaving American troops on their soil. They are still there. Given the aggressiveness of post-Soviet Russia and Communist China, their continuing presence is as essential as ever.
In 2003, President George W. Bush toppled Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein. The justice of that regime change is beyond question. Its strategic wisdom, I will not relitigate today. I will argue that President Barack Obama’s withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Iraq in 2011 was a terrible mistake.
Members of Mr. Obama’s security cabinet had urged him to maintain a residual force to mount missions against both Sunni and Tehran-backed Shia terrorist groups, and to provide what George Shultz called “the shadow of power” for American diplomats serving as honest brokers to Iraq’s fractious religious and ethnic factions.
Then-Vice President Biden, however, was gung-ho about the bugout. Sent to Iraq to oversee it, he told Mr. Obama: “Thank you for giving me the chance to end this goddamn war!”
You know what happened next: Al Qaeda in Iraq morphed into ISIS and Shia militias loyal to the jihadi regime in Tehran were emboldened and empowered.
Less than three years later, Mr. Obama had to send American troops back to Iraq to battle ISIS which had conquered a territory the size of Britain.
Iran’s rulers went on to fund and arm terrorist militias in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, Gaza, and the West Bank.
President Biden entered the White House bound and determined to repeat in Afghanistan the policy that had failed in Iraq. He looked forward to delivering, on the 20th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, a speech congratulating himself for ending an “endless war.”
In fact, by February 2021, there were fewer than 2,500 U.S. troops in Afghanistan, and their mission was not combat but, since 2014, only anti-terrorist operations against al-Qaeda, along with training, assisting, and advising Afghan security forces battling the Taliban. About 8,000 NATO troops were providing additional support.
In June, Mr. Biden met with Afghan President Ashraf Ghani and told him: “The senseless violence has to stop.” He added: “But we’re gonna stick with you. And we’re gonna do our best to see to it you have the tools you need.”
What happened next was predictable and predicted (including by yours truly).
On August 15, 2021, Kabul fell to the Taliban.
On August 26, amid a chaotic American evacuation from the capital, a suicide bomber killed at least 170 Afghan civilians and 13 members of the U.S. military – the first Americans killed in action since February 2020, and the single largest loss of life of U.S. military personnel since 2011. The local branch of the Islamic State (ISIS-K) claimed responsibility.
The last American troops departed Afghanistan on August 30, leaving behind billions of dollars’ worth of Humvees, helicopters, and munitions, much of which the Taliban paraded last week as they celebrated the third anniversary since the American capitulation and their swift return to power.
Last year, the Biden administration released a short report defending the Afghanistan pullout. It stated, correctly, that Mr. Biden had inherited an ill-advised deal made with the Taliban by President Trump. It asserted, incorrectly, that Mr. Biden’s hands were therefore tied.
In truth, the deal was conditions-based, the Taliban was not fulfilling its obligations, and Mr. Biden had been reversing Mr. Trump’s policies since “day one” in the Oval Office.
Had lessons been learned from Iraq, a residual force of American and NATO troops would have stayed in Afghanistan to conduct counterterrorism operations, collect intelligence, and better enable Afghan security forces.
Those forces would have continued to confine the Taliban to remote rural areas, preventing them from controlling urban centers.
Kabul could have remained what it had become since the U.S. intervention: a city where a new generation of Afghans were coming of age, women prominent among them, studying and working in relative safety and freedom.
The U.S. also had developed a major asset: Bagram Air Base. In the Indo-Pacific, a region teeming with terrorist groups, gathering intelligence only from “over the horizon” is a mug’s game.
And just east of Afghanistan lies a country with which the U.S has serious national security concerns: the People’s Republic of China.
It’s true that, under both Republican and Democratic administrations, the U.S. did not fight the war in Afghanistan strategically. As Gen. H.R. McMaster (who now chairs the military center at my think tank) succinctly put it: “Persistent declarations of withdrawal across three administrations emboldened our enemies, sowed doubts among our allies, encouraged hedging behavior, perpetuated corruption, and weakened state institutions.”
The result was what he calls “self-defeat” which soon brought consequences elsewhere.
One year later, Vladimir Putin sent tanks and troops to conquer Ukraine.
Two years later, Hamas, a proxy of Tehran, invaded Israel and carried out a barbarous pogrom, followed within 24 hours by Hezbollah, Tehran’s Lebanon-based foreign legion, rocketing communities in northern Israel.
These wars are ongoing with those who speak for President Biden repeating, like a mantra, that they oppose “escalation,” and seek “ceasefires” and “responsible exit strategies” and “peace deals.”
America’s enemies get that and regard it as weakness which fuels their aggression along with their never-ending demands for concessions.
By now this lesson has been learned by all but the determinedly self-deluded. But that’s a significant and influential cohort in what is called – more hopefully than accurately – the “Washington foreign policy community.”