SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Balochistan: Spiralling retaliation
In the early morning of August 26, 2024, at least 23 Punjabi travellers were killed in the Rarasham area of Musakhail District in Balochistan when cadres of Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) offloaded passengers from trucks and buses and shot at them after checking their identities. According to Musakhail Assistant Commissioner Najeeb Kakar, armed men blocked the inter-provincial highway in the Rarasham area of the district and offloaded passengers from buses. The armed men also set fire to 10 vehicles. “Vehicles travelling to and from Punjab were inspected, and individuals from Punjab were identified and shot,” Kakar added.
As the day progress, Balochistan witnessed multiple attacks by Baloch insurgents across the province which left at least 38 people dead, including the 23 in Musakhail. In response, Security Forces (SFs) neutralised 21 terrorists and injured several others. BLA cadres targeted Levies and Police Stations in Mastung, Kalat, Pasni, and Suntsar, resulting in numerous casualties. Explosions and grenade attacks were reported in Sibi, Panjgur, Mastung, Turbat, Bela, and Quetta, with terrorists blowing up a railway track near Mastung. The Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) issued a statement later in the day, claiming that 21 terrorists had been killed, while 14 SF personnel, including four from law enforcement agencies, were killed during clearance operations.
However, in a statement released on its official media Hakkal, the BLA announced the successful completion of its Fidayeen Operation Herof (Operation Dark Storm), claiming to have killed 130 military personnel during a series of coordinated attacks across Balochistan. BLA ‘spokesperson’ Jeeyand Baloch claimed that the group’s elite Fidayeen unit, the Majeed Brigade, had “maintained control over the Bela camp for 20 hours,” during which “68 military personnel were killed and dozens more injured.” The BLA statement further claimed that four of its Fidayeen (suicide attackers) – including a female fighter named Mahal Baloch aka Zilan Kurd, from Sur Bandar, Gwadar, and Rizwan Baloch aka Hammal, from Panwan, Gwadar, were killed during the operation. The BLA also reported that its Fateh Squad and Special Tactical Operations Squad (STOS) had set up blockades on major highways across Balochistan, leading to the deaths of 62 military personnel. “After achieving the objectives of Operation Herof, the roadblocks on all highways were lifted,” the statement read.
This attack came against the backdrop of the Army’s undeclared ongoing operations in several parts of Balochistan. On August 22, 2024, SFs were conducting large-scale operations in the Mastung and Bolan Districts of Balochistan, deploying both ground troops and helicopter gunships. According to media reports, Army infantry and aerial operations had been ongoing for several preceding days, in these regions, with more than seven combat helicopters participating.
On August 19, 2024, the Army reportedly initiated a military operation in the Kalat District of Balochistan. The operation began early August 19-morning in Naghao, a mountainous area of Kalat District. The areas of Maru, Shishar, Islanji, and their surroundings were also under the operation. Frequent flights of gunships and other helicopters were undertaken, with shelling and explosions heard at several locations.
On August 18, 2024, the military also conducted operation in several areas of Kech District, with foot patrols, blockades, and helicopter gunships observed across the region. A significant number of military personnel were seen moving through Nasirabad, while several areas in Dasht were surrounded by SFs. Helicopter gunships were also seen flying over the Buleda area.
Military actions and counter-actions in Balochistan have made the province a very volatile region in recent years, and the troubles are escalating. The first eight months of the current year have almost touched the annual fatalities of the previous year. According to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), Balochistan has recorded a total 442 terrorism-related fatalities, including 180 civilians, 144 SF personnel and 118 terrorists, in the current year (data till August 31, 2024). During the corresponding period of 2023, the province had recorded 267 such fatalities including 142 SF personnel, 69 civilians and 56 terrorists. The whole of 2023 recorded 471 such fatalities, including 186 SF personnel, 160 civilians and 125 terrorists.
Meanwhile, a comparative analysis of terrorism-related fatalities in the first eight months of each respective year in the province shows 2024 with the highest since 2015: 442 in 2024, 267 in 2023, 250 in 2022, 195 in 2021, 136 in 2020, 158 in 2019, 338 in 2018, 211 in 2017 and 414 in 2016. In 2015, there were 481 fatalities in the first eight months.
On year-on-year basis, 2023 recorded 471 such fatalities, the highest since 2016. There were 406 fatalities in 2022, 308 in 2021, 215 in 2020, 180 in 2019, 384 in 2018, 341 in 2017 and 636 in 2016. With the present equation and four months to go for the current year, fatalities may cross the record of previous years.
The long-term state policy of enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings has led to a spiral of retaliatory attacks and violence by Baloch insurgents, targeting SFs and state establishments in the province. Civilians, especially members of state-backed ‘death squad’ have also been targeted. In this environment of chaos, Islamist terrorist groups have also thrived and even joined the Baloch groups. The major active Baloch insurgent groups include the Baloch National Army (BNA), Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF), Balochistan Liberation Tigers (BLT) and United Baloch Army (UBA). Some of the major attacks by the Baloch insurgent groups on SF personnel and military establishments in the provinces during the current year include:
August 14: Three soldiers were killed and another four sustained injuries when BLF cadres attacked military checkpoints in the Bondki, Oghar, Malsh-e-Band and Thank areas of the Mashkay tehsil (revenue unit) in Awaran District. BLF ‘spokesperson’ ‘major’ Gwahram Baloch claimed responsibility for these attacks.
July 23: Three Pakistani soldiers and one Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) ‘patrol commander’ were killed when the BLA cadres attacked a military post in the Sami area of Kech District. In a media statement, BLA ‘spokesperson’ Jeeyand Baloch claimed responsibility for the attack. Jeeyand Baloch claimed another team of BLA cadres also targeted and destroyed machinery of an ‘exploitative project’ near the military camp.
July 9: Four Army soldiers were killed and another three sustained injuries when BLA cadres attacked a military convoy on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) route in the Sami area of Kech District. BLA ‘spokesperson’ Jeeyand Baloch issued a statement to the media claiming responsibility for the attack.
June 24: At least 11 soldiers were killed and an unspecified number sustained injuries when BLA cadres attacked a military camp in the Iskalko area of Kalat District. BLA claimed responsibility for the attack.
March 25: Majeed Brigade cadres attacked the PNS Siddique Naval Air Station in the Turbat town of Kech District and claimed that more than 30 soldiers were killed. The Army, however, stated it thwarted the attack and killed four BLA cadres, while one soldier was killed.
March 20: Majeed Brigade cadres attacked the Gwadar Port Authority (GPA) Complex in Gwadar town (Gwadar District) and killed two soldiers. SFs, however, stated that they thwarted the attack and killed eight BLA cadres.
January 29: Nine BLA cadres, four Railway Police personnel and two civilians were killed, while four others, including two SF personnel and one child, sustained injuries when the Majeed Brigade launched three coordinated attacks targeting the Frontier Corps Headquarters, the Railway Station and the District Jail in the Mach town of Kachhi District. BLA ‘spokesperson’, Jeeyand Baloch claimed the attack, stating that it was a joint attack in coordination with other factions, during which BLA insurgents controlled Mach city and surrounding areas for over 72 hours.
The growing number of attacks by the insurgent groups are substantially a retaliation to the enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings of Baloch people by the SF and their proxies. Victims of enforced disappearances include political workers, journalists, human rights defenders, and students. According to the Voice for Baloch Missing Persons (VBMP) report of December 2023, more than 7,000 persons have gone ‘missing’ from Balochistan since 2000. However, the Commission of Inquiry on Enforced Disappearances formed in 2011 with the objective of tracing the missing persons and fixing responsibility on the individuals or organisations responsible for it, posted data on its website claiming that there were just 454 ‘active cases’ of enforced disappearances from Balochistan, as of October 2023.
Normal life in Balochistan for quite some time has been immensely uncertain as the Government continues its tradition of using force to suppress peaceful protests. Since July 27, there has been a standoff between the Government and Baloch protesters at multiple locations. Rallies, demonstrations, sit-ins, and protests are ongoing in various parts of Balochistan despite crackdowns by the Government. The protests began after the Government blocked the main highways in Balochistan the day before a political gathering organized by the Baloch Yakjehti Committee (BYC, Baloch Unity Committee) was scheduled to take place in Gwadar. The Baloch Raji Machi (Baloch National Gathering) organized by the BYC started on July 28, 2024, in Gwadar. On 27 July, the Frontier Corps (FC) fired at people travelling to join the Baloch protests, injuring at least 14. Blockades were created across the province to restrict freedom of movement and an order under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, banning all public assemblies of four or more people, was imposed in the provincial capital, Quetta. On July 28, at least three protestors were killed by SFs, in Gwadar and Talar, and dozens were injured. On July 29, the Police used tear gas to disperse protesters. Several organizers, along with dozens of protesters, were detained, including Sammi Deen Baloch, Sabghatullah Shah and Dr. Sabiha Baloch.
The heavy-handed State crackdown, resulting in multiple deaths, dozens of injuries, and the detention of nearly a thousand BYC supporters, has sparked further and widespread protests across Balochistan. Thousands of people have taken to the streets in cities, including Quetta, Khuzdar, Kharan, Kalat, and Dalbandin, demanding the release of detained activists and an end to ‘state violence.’ In Quetta, large crowds protested against what they described as ‘state violence’ against peaceful participants of the ‘Baloch National Gathering.’ In Dalbandin, Police attempted to disperse protesters demonstrating against the use of force, provoking the crowd to pelt stones, leading to the Police opening fire. Residents of Kharan had gathered to express solidarity with the participants of the ‘Baloch Raaji Muchi.’ In Khuzdar, Security Forces cordoned off and blocked BYC’s protest rally, raising concerns of another crackdown. These actions have led to road blockades and shutter-down strikes in many cities, with multiple highways in Balochistan being jammed.
The BYC is a rights group advocating for the civil, political, and socioeconomic rights of the Baloch. It described the Baloch National Gathering as a “referendum against the Baloch genocide, the exploitation of Baloch resources under the guise of so-called megaprojects, and the conversion of Balochistan into a prison under the pretext of security.” However, ISPR Director General (DG) Lieutenant General Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry denounced BYC on August 5 and called its “so-called leadership” a “proxy of terrorist organisations and criminal mafias and nothing more than that.”
Authorities in Balochistan as well as at the Federal level have long adopted the policy of suppressing peaceful political and public protests with an iron hand. For years, protesting families of the victims of enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings have faced similar patterns of violence by the security establishment. In one of the many earlier instances, in Gwadar, the authorities had used such tactics to suppress the Haq Do Tehreek (Give our Rights Movement) for basic rights and protection of the livelihoods of local people.
While the violence in the province has social and developmental causes, the adamant State establishment has chosen exclusively to supress the problem militarily. On August 22, 2024, the Government approved PKR 60 billion to carry out Operation Azm-e-Istehkam (Commitment for stability) to fight militancy in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. On June 22, the Central Apex Committee on the National Action Plan (NAP), chaired by Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, launched the new Army Operation Azm-e-Istehkam. In response, the BLA-led Baloch Raj Aajoi Sangar (BRAS), an umbrella organization of Baloch ‘pro-independence’ groups, issued a statement on July 8, 2024, against Pakistan’s military campaign. In a media release, BRAS ‘spokesperson’ Baloch Khan condemned the operation as a blatant intensification of the ongoing ‘genocide’ against the Baloch people. Baloch Khan claimed that the operation, which, according to the official narrative, aims to stabilize and secure Pakistan, is merely a pretext for escalating military aggression in Balochistan. He asserted that BRAS and its allied organizations were prepared to defend their land and people against any form of military action, promising to defeat the ‘invading’ forces.
The unending cycle of retaliatory violence will continue as long as the Pakistani state persists with its policy of endemic marginalisation and neglect of the local population, and the exclusive reliance on military and extra-legal repression. As the central authority in Pakistan weakens progressively, this will prove to be a counter-productive and, eventually, potentially suicidal strategy for the state.
Maoists: The end of a rebellion?
On August 29, 2024, three alleged Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) cadres were killed in an anti-Naxal [Left Wing Extremism, LWE] operation carried out by the Security Forces (SFs) in the Narayanpur District of the Bastar division of Chhattisgarh. After the firing stopped and a search was carried out around the encounter site, bodies of three uniformed female Maoists, .303 rifles, .315 bore guns, a large amount of explosive material, and items of daily use were recovered. Inspector General of Police (IGP), Bastar Range, Sundarraj P. disclosed, “Initially, all the killed Maoist cadres have been identified as members of the North Bastar Division Committee and PLGA Company No. 05. Detailed identification proceedings are being carried out.”
On August 28, 2024, CPI-Maoist cadres abducted and killed a villager, Sudru Karam (27), on suspicion of being an ‘informer’, in Patelpara Timnar village under Mirtur Police Station limits in the Bijapur District of the Bastar division of Chhattisgarh. The ultras killed him by slitting his throat and then threw the body on the outskirts of the village.
On August 25, 2024, a villager, Situ Madvi, was killed by CPI-Maoist cadres accusing him of being a ‘police informer’, in the Bhairamgarh area of Bijapur District in the Bastar division. The Maoists held a ‘Jan Adalat’ (people’s/kangaroo court organised by the Maoists) in the Bhairamgarh area, and Situ Madvi, a resident of Jagur village, was accused of giving information to the Police. A pamphlet was left beside his body by the Bhairamgarh Area Committee of the Maoists, claiming that Madvi had been informing the Police since 2021, which led to his killing. The Maoists took Madvi and another person with them. They left the other villager after a warning, but killed Situ Madvi.
On August 23, 2024, suspected CPI-Maoist cadres killed Zamindar Lancha Punem of Poosanar village, under Gangaloor Police Station limits in Bijapur District, accusing him of working as a ‘police informer’.
On August 21, 2024, CPI-Maoists allegedly killed Pallepati Radha aka Neelso aka Banti Radha, a female Maoist cadre who worked as a ‘protection team commander’ in the Andhra-Odisha Border (AOB) area, branding her as a ‘police informer’. Radha was killed in a forest area near Chennapuram in Cherla Mandal (an administrative subdivision) in the Bhadradri Kothagudem District of Telangana. In a letter purportedly written by the Maoists that was found on the woman’s body, she was accused of being a ‘Police informer’.
According to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), there have been a total of 256 fatalities (52 civilians, 20 SF personnel, and 184 Naxalites (Left Wing Extremists) in LWE-linked violence in the current year (data till August 31, 2024). During the corresponding period of 2023, the number of such fatalities was 100 (40 civilians, 24 SF personnel, and 36 Naxalites). An overwhelming surge of 156 per cent in the overall fatalities has been recorded in the comparative eight months’ timeframe.
Significantly, the surge in the overall fatalities in this timeframe demonstrates is overwhelmingly accounted for by LWE fatalities, signalling an escalation of SF operations to neutralize the Naxalites in their erstwhile areas of dominance.
In the fight against the rebels, SFs have lost 20 of their personnel, while neutralising 184 Naxalites across the country in 2024, maintaining a kill ratio of 1:9.2, the strongest in the last five years. In the corresponding period of 2023, the kill ratio was at 1:1.5; 2022 at 1:3; 2021 at 1:1.56; 2020 at 1:2.25; and 2019 at 1:2.80.
On a year-on-year basis, as well, the kill ratio has consistently favoured the SFs over the past five years: 2023 at 1:1.83; 2022 at 1:4.4; 2021 at 1:2.5; 2020 at 1:3.40; and 2019 at 1:3.14. The last recorded kill ratio favouring the Maoists was in 2010, at 1.01:1. Significantly, 2010 recorded the maximum fatalities in a single year, at a total of 1,180 (630 civilians, 267 SF personnel, 265 Naxalites, and 18 unspecified).
Nonetheless, the overall kill ratio has favoured the SFs at 1:1.67 since March 6, 2000, when SATP started compiling data on Left Wing Extremism (LWE)-linked violence across the country.
Civilian fatalities, a key index of security in a region, however, continue to take place with numbing regularity. 52 civilian fatalities have been recorded in the current year (data till August 31, 2024), as against 40 such fatalities in the corresponding period of 2023, yielding a significant spike of 30 per cent. The fatalities in this category stood at 42 in 2022, 40 in 2021, 30 in 2020, and 65 in 2019.
Annual data also suggests some sources of additional concern. Over the past five years, though civilian fatalities declined between 2019 and 2022, dropping from 99 in 2019 to 53 in 2022, they recorded a reversal to 61 in 2023, and are already at 52 in 2024, with almost four months remaining (data till August 31).
Similarly, in the SF category, while fatalities dropped from 49 in 2019 to 44 in 2020, they increased to 51 in 2021. SF fatalities dropped again to 15 in 2022 and more than doubled, at 31, in 2023. 20 SF fatalities have already been recorded in 2024 (till August 31). At peak, 630 civilians were killed in 2010 and 319 SF personnel in 2009.
Several visible parameters of violence indicate significant improvement in the situation relating to LWE activities across the country.
The number of overall LWE-linked terrorist incidents fell from 420 in 2023 to 382 in 2024 in the comparative eight-month timeframe. In particular, incidents of explosions orchestrated by the Maoists came down from 39 in 2023 to 30 in 2024. Incidents of arson carried out by the rebels came down from 25 in 2023 to eight in 2024.
Meanwhile, in the continuing campaign against the rebels, SFs have engaged in at least 85 incidents of exchange of fire with the Maoists in 2024, as compared to 61 such incidents over the same period in 2023. Through 2023, there were 89 such incidents. Further, at least 17 major incidents of killing (each involving three or more fatalities) in which SFs neutralised the rebels were registered in 2024, as compared to three such incidents over the same period in 2023. Through 2023, there were five such major incidents.
While declaring the observance of their ‘Martyrs’ Week’ (Shaheed Saptah), from July 28 to August 3, in a press release issued on July 22, 2024, CPI-Maoist party ‘secretary’ Ganesh declared that the Martyrs’ Week would be observed to honour the sacrifices of the comrades who had laid down their lives for the cause. Ganesh added,
In the last 6 months, 140 comrades have been martyred in Chhattisgarh alone. The Chhattisgarh government has launched a massive operation called Operation Kagar to suppress the Naxalites, which the organization has termed as a conspiracy to loot the wealth and resources of the dalits and tribals. The central and state governments are trying to eliminate our organization, but it’s impossible. The central government has announced Operation Kagar to eradicate Naxalism from the country within the next 3 years. In this war of destruction, the police are the main enemy, who are torturing people, molesting them, and killing them without any reason.
Ganesh also alleged that the government was trying to crush the movement by killing innocent people after branding them as Naxalites.
Significantly, on August 24, 2024, in a sensational pronouncement, Union Home Minister (UHM) Amit Shah asserted that the outlawed CPI-Maoist would be eliminated from the country by March 2026, under the strategy aimed at a final assault against the rebels. While chairing the review meeting of the inter-state coordination committee in Raipur, Chhattisgarh, UHM Shah asserted,
The fight against the Maoists has reached its final stage, and the country will be free from the Maoist problem by March 2026. The top 14 Maoist leaders were neutralised. From 2014 to ’24, there were a minimum number of cases related to Maoists registered.
Shah added that the strategy to counter the Maoists had twin objectives. First, the efforts were directed at establishing the rule of law in the Maoist-affected areas; and second, at developing the area that long witnessed destruction. Further, Shah claimed that Bihar, Jharkhand, Odisha, Andhra Pradesh, Telangana, Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra were the states that had been freed from the Maoist menace.
In another line of attack against the CPI-Maoist, on August 30, 2024, the National Investigation Agency (NIA) conducted searches in multiple locations across Delhi, Haryana, Punjab, and Uttar Pradesh to scuttle Maoist attempts to revive their presence in the Northern Regional Bureau (NRB) area. As part of the crackdown, nine locations linked with various accused and suspects in a case were searched. These included four locations in Punjab, two each in Uttar Pradesh and Haryana and one in Delhi. Several digital devices, including laptops, mobile phones, and pocket diaries, were seized during the searches conducted at the premises of suspects believed to be close aides of various accused in the case. According to the NIA, these suspects were receiving funds for the propagation of CPI-Maoist ideology from the erstwhile Eastern Regional Bureau (ERB) head Prashant Bose [a top Maoist leader who was instrumental in the merger of two prominent Maoist groups, the Maoist Communist Centre of India (MCC) and the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) People’s War (also known as the People’s War Group or PWG), to form CPI-Maoist in 2004. Bose is currently lodged in prison in Jharkhand]. The ERB, particularly Jharkhand, had been funding the suspects, believed to be long-time associates and over-ground workers (OGWs) of the accused, to recruit cadres and revive the organisation in the northern states.
On August 28, 2024, the NIA arrested CPI-Maoist leader, Bihari Paswan aka Rakesh aka Rishikesh, following extensive searches conducted at multiple locations in Bihar. A total of nine locations – seven in Begusarai and two in Gaya districts – were searched by NIA teams. The searches were conducted in the houses of associates of arrested CPI-Maoist top leaders/ ‘commanders’, OGWs, suspects, and supporters/sympathisers. Bihari Paswan, a CPI-Maoist ‘zonal committee member’, was arrested during the searches. Several mobile phones, SIM cards, and incriminating documents were seized during the searches. The case emanated from the arrest of two top CPI-Maoist leaders at Tekari Police Station, Gaya, on August 10, 2023. Subsequently, NIA registered a case on August 31, 2023, against three members of the proscribed outfit, identified as Pramod Mishra aka Sohan Da, a ‘Politburo’ member; Anil Yadav aka Ankush, a ‘sub-zonal committee member’; and Vinod Mishra, a CPI-Maoist sympathiser. They were found to be actively involved in the conspiracy to revive and strengthen the rebel group and were in the process of recruiting cadres and collecting ‘levies’ for this purpose.
Similarly, on August 13, 2024, NIA carried out searches at the premises of Konath Muralitharan aka Ajith aka Murali Kannamballi, a former CPI-Maoist Central Committee (CC) member and key aide of Maoist leader Sanjay Deepak Rao, in the Ernakulam district of Kerala, and seized several incriminating digital devices and documents. The searches were part of a case related to a conspiracy to wage war against the government by the members of the proscribed group. The accused had conspired to raise funds and recruit cadres to promote the activities of the CPI-Maoist in the Western Ghats region.
Meanwhile, focusing on the current epicentre of the Maoist insurgency, the Chhattisgarh Government has adopted several measures to keep the youth and children away from joining the Maoists, despite aggressive efforts by the rebels to expand recruitment. According to an August 31, 2024, report, for instance, the Chhattisgarh government has introduced interest-free education loans for students pursuing higher studies in Maoist-affected districts, with the aim of enhancing educational opportunities in these areas. The initiative is part of the ‘Chief Minister’s Higher Education Loan Interest Subsidy Scheme,’ which aims to provide financial relief to students pursuing technical and vocational courses. Students from Maoist-affected districts of Bastar, Bijapur, Dantewada, Jashpur, Kanker, Koriya, Narayanpur, Rajnandgaon, Surguja, Dhamtari, Mahasamund, Gariabandh, Balod, Sukma, Kondagaon, and Balrampur will be eligible for loans with zero per cent interest. Besides, students belonging to economically weaker families in other districts will be offered a reduced interest rate of 1 per cent for their higher education.
According to a February 7, 2024, PIB release, to address the LWE problem holistically, the Government of India (GoI) approved the “National Policy and Action Plan to address LWE” in 2015, envisaging a multi-pronged strategy involving security related measures, development interventions, ensuring rights and entitlements of local communities, among others.
On the development front, apart from the flagship schemes of the GoI, several specific initiatives have been taken in LWE-affected states, with a special thrust on the expansion of road networks, improving telecom connectivity, skill development, and financial inclusion. Some of the measures include:
For expansion of the road network, 13,620 kilometres of roads have been constructed in LWE-affected areas.
To improve telecom connectivity, 13,823 towers have been sanctioned in LWE-affected areas. More than 3,700 towers have already been commissioned so far.
For financial inclusion of the local populace in the LWE-affected districts, 4,903 new Post Offices have been opened. Further, 955 Bank Branches and 839 ATMs have been opened in 30 of the most LWE-affected districts since April-2015.
For skill development, 46 ITIs and 49 Skill Development Centres (SDCs) have been made functional in LWE-affected districts.
For quality education in tribal blocks of LWE-affected districts, 130 Eklavya Model Residential School (EMRS) have been made functional in LWE-affected districts.
Other crucial initiatives includes, inter alia:
Civic Action Programme (CAP): This Scheme is being implemented as a sub-scheme of the Umbrella Scheme ‘Modernization of Police Forces’ to bridge the gaps between SFs and local people through personal interaction and bring the human face of SFs before the local population. Under the Scheme, funds are released to the CAPFs, deployed in LWE-affected areas, for conducting various civic activities for the welfare of the local people. INR 1.2321 billion has been released to CAPFs since 2017-18.
Media Plan: This Scheme is being implemented as a sub-scheme of the Umbrella Scheme ‘Modernization of Police Forces’. The Maoists have been misguiding and luring the innocent tribals/ local population in LWE-affected areas through petty incentives or by following their coercive strategy. Their propaganda is targeted against the security forces and the democratic setup. The Government is implementing this Scheme to counter LWE propaganda and recruitment. Under the scheme activities such as the Tribal Youth Exchange programmes organised by Nehru Yuva Kendra Sangathan (NYKS), radio jingles, documentaries, pamphlets etc. are being conducted. INR 4.539 billion have been released under the scheme since 2017-18.
Aspirational District: The Ministry of Home Affairs has been tasked with the monitoring of the Aspirational Districts programme in 35 LWE affected districts.
Aggressive SF consolidation has squeezed the rebels out of most of their strongholds across the country, while they struggle to survive in their remaining safe havens, even as SF advances continue to erode such areas relentlessly. The Centre has, of course, announced a March 2026 deadline for the final ‘resolution’ of the Maoist insurgency across the country, and this is an attainable goal. The outcome could be hastened if the Maoists are provided a face-saving ‘political’ alternative at this juncture, when they are at their weakest. It is not necessary to kill every last Maoist to establish security and the national interest in the erstwhile areas of Maoist dominance.