Is The Dissolution Of Jemaah Islamiyah A Victory Or A Strategic Deception? – Analysis

On 30 June 2024 Abu Rusydan, a former leader of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and veteran of the Afghan conflict, announced the official dissolution of the militant group. Contemplating this development, one question looms large — is this the definitive end of JI, or is it a strategic deception with far-reaching implications?

Once the most feared terrorist organisation in Southeast Asia, with links to Al-Qaeda, JI’s demise was unexpected.

For decades, it has orchestrated some of the most devastating terrorist attacks in Southeast Asia, most notoriously the 2002 Bali bombings that killed 202 people.

Yet in recent years the group has struggled to maintain its once-formidable presence. Relentless counter-terrorism operations led by Southeast Asian governments, particularly Indonesia, played a pivotal role in JI’s downfall. The Indonesian National Police’s Detachment 88 (Densus 88) has been instrumental in dismantling the group’s cells, leading to over 1200 arrests and capturing key figures, including top JI leader Zulkarnaen.

Internal strife also weakened JI. The horrific scale of the Bali bombings and other attacks led to a loss of public support, driving potential recruits away and diminishing JI’s financial backing. Ideological disagreements, leadership disputes and factional splits further eroded the group’s cohesion.

Despite attempts at resurgence in the mid-2010s, during which time JI was committed to not engage in terrorism in Indonesia, JI could never reclaim its former strength. The arrest of its leader, Para Wijayanto, in 2019 was a crippling blow. And by 2022, even Wijayanto admitted in a prison interview that JI no longer existed as a unified entity.

But the story of JI does not end with its dissolution. Its ideological influence persists through figures like Dr Sunardi, whose death at the hands of Densus 88 led to widespread protests from the medical community, underscoring the need for transparent communication regarding counter-terrorism strategies.

Scepticism lingers within extremist circles and among counter-terrorism experts about the true nature of this disbandment. Is JI really gone or has it simply slipped into the shadows, waiting for a more opportune moment to re-emerge under a different guise?

One troubling aspect of the dissolution is the lack of transparency regarding JI’s economic assets. There has been no clear transfer of funds or disclosure of the group’s financial dealings, raising suspicions that this might be a tactical manoeuvre rather than a genuine disbandment. Is this a strategy to safeguard resources for future operations, or perhaps to infiltrate governmental structures, as has been seen in other conflict zones like Syria?

The case of senior JI member Bambang Sukirno, known as ‘Bangkir’, adds another layer of complexity. Despite suspicions about his collaboration with Indonesian authorities, Bangkir remains influential due to his substantial financial resources. It remains unclear whether he is a genuine supporter of JI or a covert ally of the authorities.

JI’s dissolution is an opportunity for governments to shift focus towards rehabilitation. Former JI members, now lacking an organisational structure, are at a crossroad. Effective rehabilitation programs can prevent these individuals from slipping back into extremism, instead guiding them towards social reintegration.

But this is easier said than done. Rehabilitation is not just about providing job training or education; it requires a holistic approach that addresses the root causes of radicalisation, including ideological indoctrination and social alienation.

With support from the National Counter Terrorism Agency, international donors and Islamic organisations such as Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama — though not yet strong in their rehabilitation efforts — can work closely with other civil society groups involved in preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) in Indonesia. These organisations can assist in ensuring that JI-affiliated schools, which continue to operate legally under Indonesian law, are rid of extremist ideologies and promote peace and tolerance.

Even as policymakers focus on rehabilitation, they must remain vigilant.

The enduring popularity of JI’s dual approach — preaching (dakwah) and armed struggle (jihad) — among certain segments of the population means that the group’s legacy may continue to inspire new generations of extremists. Without ongoing monitoring and engagement, new, even more dangerous, entities may emerge in the region.

JI’s dissolution is a critical moment in the fight against terrorism in Southeast Asia. But this apparent victory must not lull the region into complacency. Policymakers must continue to strengthen intelligence efforts, foster regional collaboration and build resilient communities capable of withstanding the ideological and operational threats that may yet arise in a post-JI era.

The real test of JI’s dissolution will be whether Southeast Asia can prevent its remnants from reconstituting and whether former members can be successfully rehabilitated. If this is achieved, the dissolution of JI may indeed be remembered as a victory against terrorism. If not, it could become just another chapter in the ongoing struggle against violent extremism in the region.