South Asia Intelligence Review
Manipur: New dimensions of violence
On September 8, 2024, a woman, identified as Nemjakhol Lhungdim (46), was killed when two groups of militants exchanged fire at Thangbuh village near Laimaton in Kangpokpi District.
On September 7, 2024, five persons were killed in firing between Kuki Liberation Army (KLA) and United National Liberation Front-Pambei (UNLF-P) at the Tea Estate of Rashidpur Part-II in Jiribam District. The killed were identified as KLA cadres Seiminlen Khongsai, Haogoulen Doungel and Nehboithang Haokip, all residents of Churachandpur District; UNLF-P cadre Baspatimayum Lakhi Kumar Sharma, a resident of Dibong Khunou, Jiribam District; and Kuki village volunteer Lhunkhohao Haokip, a resident of Mongbung Sejang, Jairolpokpi, Jiribam.
In another incident, on the same day, one Meitei person, identified as Yurembam Kulendra Singha (63), was shot dead by suspected Kuki militants in the Nungchepi area of Jiribam District. According to initial reports, suspected Kuki militants entered the house of the victim while he was sleeping and fatally shot him.
On September 6, 2024, a Meitei man, identified as R. K. Rabei (80) was killed and five others injured in a suspected rocket attack at the house of Manipur‘s first Chief Minister (CM), M. Korieng Singh, at Moirang in Bishnupur District. The rocket, believed to have been fired from the Churachandpur side, completely destroyed the statue of the first CM. The rocket was 23.8 kg in weight, five centimetres in thickness and nine feet in length.
In another incident of the same day, militants launched a rocket attack at Tronglaobi in Bishnupur District, damaging two structures. According to Police, rockets were fired from Churachandpur district’s hill areas, with a range of over three kilometres.
On September 2, 2024, three people were injured in a drone attack at Senjam Chirang in Imphal West District.
On September 2, 2024, three sophisticated service weapons were looted by unidentified armed from Indian Reserve Battalion (IRB) personnel after launching an attack accompanied by mortar and drone bombings in Meikhang village under the jurisdiction of the Lamlai Police Station in Imphal East District.
On September 1, 2024, two people were killed and nine others injured in a drone attack in Koutruk, Kadangband and Singda areas of Imphal West District, contiguous to Kangpokpi District. The drone came from the neighbouring hills. Imphal West is inhabited by the Meiteis and Kangpokpi is home to the Kuki community.
According to partial data compiled by the South Asian Terrorism Portal (SATP), there have been a total of 58 fatalities (36 civilians, five Security Force, SF, personnel, and 17 terrorists) in insurgency-related incidents in the current year (data till September 15, 2024). During the corresponding period of 2023, the number of such fatalities was at 133 (66 civilians, 13 SF personnel, 53 terrorists and one Not Specified, NS). The whole of 2023 had recorded 163 fatalities (72 civilians, 17 SF personnel, 73 terrorists and one NS).
Notably, Manipur in 2022 recorded an all-time low of seven fatalities (five civilians, one SF trooper and one terrorist), same as in 2020, which had recorded seven fatalities (one civilian, three SF personnel and three terrorists).
The dramatic surge in fatalities, as noted by SAIR earlier, is due to the emergence of clashes between two ethnic communities, the Meiteis and Kuki-Zo, in Manipur in May 2023. The conflict which started on May 3, 2023, and still going on, has so far claimed at least 217 lives (107 civilians, 22 SF personnel, 87 terrorists, one NS). Of the total 217 fatalities, the valley Districts – Bishnupur, Imphal East, Imphal West, Jiribam, Kakching and Thoubal – have accounted for 114 fatalities (65 civilians, 10 SF personnel, 39 terrorists), and the hill Districts – Chandel, Churachandpur, Kamjong, Kangpokpi, Noney, Pherzawl, Senapati Tamenglong, Tengnoupal and Ukhrul – have accounted for 91 fatalities (34 civilians, 10 SF personnel, 46 terrorists, one NS). The exact locations of killings of the remaining 12 fatalities are not known.
More worrying is the addition of new dimensions in the violence very recently. As mentioned above, terrorists have started using drones to drop bomb and rockets that can travel up to five to seven kilometres.
According to intelligence inputs, a factory-like setup where these drone and rockets are being manufactured near the Myanmar border has been identified, which SFs suspect to be the base of the attacks in Manipur at the beginning of September 2024. Security establishment sources also added that the drones and the rockets used in the attack are not military-grade and that the drones used to drop bombs are commercially available ones and the rockets are locally assembled.
One possible reason for drone attacks was given by a Government source, stating,
A large number of civilians in the valley and the hills have guns. Since armed people in the hills were finding it difficult to come close to the buffer zones as shoot-at-sight orders are in place, they used drones to drop the ammunition on Meitei villages.
Manipur Police in a statement have said,
Without the involvement of highly trained individuals with technical expertise and support, such attacks can’t be executed.
Meanwhile, in response to such attacks, the Central Government approved the use of anti-drone guns, Dronaam, by paramilitary forces deployed in Manipur.
Meanwhile, Manipur CM N Biren Singh on August 24, 2024, stated,
Some militant groups under Suspension of Operations (SoO) have already violated the ground rules and disrupted peace and tranquility in Manipur. We are keen to expel these militant groups from the agreement, but no official update has been received from the Centre yet. However, we have received information that the central government is discussing the matter.
Concerning the matter, the Manipur State Assembly on February 29, 2024, adopted a resolution to abrogate the agreement, for violation of the ground rules of the agreement by the Kuki militants.
Notably, SoO agreements were signed with a total of 25 Kuki outfits in Manipur in 2008. The Union Government and Manipur Government were part of the agreement. Earlier, on March 10, 2023, the Manipur government had decided to withdraw from the SoO agreement with two of the Kuki militant groups – Kuki National Army (KNA) and Zomi Revolutionary Army (ZRA). The remaining 23 Kuki groups, which had simultaneously entered into SoO agreements in August 2008, remain under these agreements.
However, the ‘spokesperson’ of Kuki National Organisation (KNO), Seilen Haokip in an interview with The Hindu published on August 26, 2024, said that Union Ministry of Home Affairs (UMHA), is yet to convey the list of ground rules violations committed by the Kuki-Zo militant groups and that the Central Government is putting forth a new procedure to address the allegations of ground rules violations. He also claimed that while Union Home Minister Amit Shah wants “SoO for peace”, Manipur Government is wanting unilateral withdrawal from the agreement and is acting against peace.
NRF – Resistance in the North
On September 11, 2024, three Taliban fighters were killed, and five were injured in an attack by the National Resistance Front (NRF) at Dawoodzi village in the Qarabagh District of Kabul Province.
On September 8, 2024, two fighters of a Taliban intelligence unit were killed in an ambush set by the NRF along a frequently used route in the Tala wa Barfak District of Baghlan Province. NRF also seized their weapons and equipment.
On September 4, 2024, three Taliban fighters were killed and another four persons, including three civilians (one of them, a child), as well as a Taliban fighter, were injured, when NRF launched an attack targeting Taliban cadres near the old Taloqan District of Takhar Province. A local source disclosed that the injuries resulted from a bicycle bomb explosion in the same area.
On September 3, 2024, NRF killed two Taliban fighters, and captured weapons and equipment, in Rabat Village in the Injil District of Herat Province.
On September 2, 2024, NRF ambushed a Taliban vehicle on the Herat-Farah highway, killing two Taliban fighters and injuring three, in the Azizabad area of Shindand District, Herat Province. The Taliban cadres’ vehicle was also destroyed.
On September 2, 2024, NRF ambushed a Taliban intelligence unit, killing two Taliban fighters and injuring one, in the Khataian area of Taloqan District, Takhar Province. A Toyota Hilux vehicle carrying the Taliban fighters was destroyed.
On September 1, 2024, three Taliban fighters were killed and another was injured when NRF conducted a rocket attack on the Taliban Police headquarters in the Bangi District of Takhar Province.
In any incident on the same day, two Taliban fighters were killed while riding a motorcycle, in an attack by the NRF in Herat City, Herat Province. Weapons and the motorcycle were seized.
According to partial data collated by the Institute for Conflict Management (ICM), since August 15, 2021, when the Taliban returned to power in Afghanistan, 904 Taliban fighters have been killed, 295 injured in 236 incidents by NRF; 113 NRF fighters have also been killed (data till September 11, 2024).
Meanwhile, as reported on September 1, 2024, Ahmad Massoud, the leader of NRF, asserted that his group had carried out 207 ‘military operations’ around Afghanistan in 2024, and that he has 5,000 ‘soldiers’ under his control.
The NRF’s declared objectives are to:
Establish social justice, equality and culture
Provide freedom for all citizens of Afghanistan.
Preserve Democracy in Afghanistan
Uphold women’s rights and human rights
Revive rational Islam in Afghanistan
Ideological objectives often promoted in the NRF’s declaration emphasize social justice, decentralization, and freedom from foreign intervention.
NRF is the main, armed opposition group the Taliban faces, and was formed in August 2021 by former Vice President Amrullah Saleh, Ahmad Massoud, and Former Defense Minister Bismillah Khan. Ahmad Massoud is the son of the late Ahmad Shah Massoud, who led resistance efforts against the Soviets and Taliban in the 1980s and 1990s. Ahmed Massoud reportedly operates from his ancestral homeland in the predominantly ethnic Tajik Panjshir Valley. Known as one of the most impregnable regions in Afghanistan, and located about 100 kilometres north of Kabul, it is a strategically advantageous location, to build a resistance movement. After 2021, Massoud was joined by former members of the Afghan Army, Police and other security officials, who had been abandoned by the US but wanted to continue the fight against the Taliban.
Ethnically, NRF comprises Uzbeks, Tajiks and Hazaras, along with a few anti-Taliban Pashtuns. NRF is fighting for a pluralistic state of Afghanistan that unites all ethnic groups under a decentralized democratic government, and has support from all ethnic groups across Afghanistan.
As reported on September 1, 2024, explaining NRF’s military operations, Massoud stated,
The National Resistance Front’s military activities started in August 2021 when the Taliban attacked us in the Panjshir Valley [in northern Afghanistan]. Since then, we have been resisting them. We started from two provinces in the north, yet now we have networks and operations in almost 20 provinces [out of 34 provinces in Afghanistan] after three years of expansion. Our operations at the moment are unconventional and mostly guerrilla operations. Yet, the military wing of the National Resistance Front is based inside Afghanistan, our bases, and our commando units are all in the country, and as every day passes, we are increasing our recruitment and operational capacity.
Given its geostrategic positioning, surrounded by the Hindu Kush Mountain range, the Panjshir Valley grants immense tactical advantage for guerrilla warfare. NRF mostly engages in hit- and-run attacks, and most of its operations occur under the cover of darkness, enhancing operational security and minimizing civilian exposure.
NRF also has the support of the diaspora communities. It has a presence on Instagram, Facebook, Twitter, Clubhouse, and other social networking platforms. NRF leaders and supporters are organizing, mobilizing, spreading awareness, and influencing public opinion in every possible way, and this is the Front’s strongest point.
The bulk of operations in the North has been reported from the provinces of Panjshir, Kapisa, Parwan, Baghlan, Badakhshan, and Takhar. NRF is joined on the battlefield by the Afghan Freedom Front (AFF). Former Afghan National Army (ANA) Chief of General Staff and Acting Minister of Defense, Yasin Zia, leads AFF. While AFF and NRF retain distinct identities, they collaborate in operations, to the detriment of the Taliban fighters. On April 11, 2024, the two forces, held their first joint meeting. In this virtual meeting, Yasin Zia issued a call to action for anti-Taliban factions to unite for a three-month offensive against the group. Ahmad Massoud, on his part, lauded the AFF’s aggressive stance against the Taliban and praised the recent resurgence of AFF’s military activities against the Taliban.
The Taliban regime, is presently fighting on three fronts: with the forces of Islamic State-Khorasan Province (IS-KP); with the resistance forces in the North; and, sporadically, with the Pakistan Army along the disputed Af-Pak border. However, though NRF mounts frequent attacks on the Taliban forces, the ‘regime’ is hardly affected. In terms of military capacity, with the US military hardware the Taliban inherited, including rifles, armored vehicles, night-vision device, etc., its capacities remain significant and cannot be matched by the NRF, which receives no outside military support. Nevertheless, the expanding sphere of guerilla operations by the resistance forces have significant disruptive potential for a regime that is struggling to establish some semblance of administrative and economic coherence within a situation of multiple and enveloping crises.
Weekly Fatalities: Major Conflicts in South Asia
September 9-15, 2024
Provisional data compiled from English language media sources.