Taliban’s Denial Of Al-Qaeda And TTP In Afghanistan: Strategic Deflection Or Enduring Alliances? – OpEd

United States intelligence reveals that Hamza bin Laden, son of Al-Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden and previously thought dead from a 2019 U.S. airstrike, is alive and leading the Al-Qaeda. In stark contradiction to the increasing evidence from numerous international sources, the Taliban government have persistently denied that Al-Qaeda and Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) are present in Afghanistan.

Although the Taliban, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IAG), maintain that these terrorist organizations are not present on the Afghanistan territory, a number of reports—including a recent Foreign Policy investigation—indicate that the resurgence of militant organizations is not only a reality but also a reason of increasing concern. The discrepancy between the Taliban’s stated position and the empirical data calls for a more thorough investigation of the strategic considerations underlying these denials.

The pursuit of international legitimacy is central to the Taliban’s public narrative. The IAG has been vying for international recognition since taking back power in 2021, but this recognition is still upon its capacity to uphold stability and combat terrorism. These efforts would be hampered by admitting to the existence of organizations like Al-Qaeda and the TTP, which would raise questions about the Taliban’s capacity and willingness to abandon their long-standing ties to the terrorist groups. The IAG might be using a deliberate distraction tactic to fend off foreign criticism while upholding internal cohesion by openly disputing the very existence of these organizations.

Yet a more thorough investigation into the Taliban’s coalitions during the conflict indicates a more nuanced dynamic at play. The Taliban’s association with Al-Qaeda and the TTP originates from ideological similarities and assistance. What is actually happening on the ground appears to contradict the Taliban’s affirmation that it will uphold its 2020 Doha Agreement and prevent terrorism from Afghanistan territory. Post US withdrawal from Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda has been reported to have reestablished training centers all over Afghanistan, and the TTP, a significant Taliban affiliate in the past, is expanding the area where it operates. These developments raise valid concerns about the IAG’s ability and willingness to really dismantle these networks.

The Taliban’s denial of the TTP’s existence might be more than a mere diplomatic maneuver from their point of view. The Taliban and TTP have a close relationship that is sometimes described as ironclad, with the latter being crucial to assisting the Taliban wage their insurgency against U.S.-led coalition. This collaboration throughout the period of war, based on ideological affinities, raises the possibility that the Taliban may take the TTP as an aid of a liability. The perception that the Taliban government in Afghanistan may commit to eliminating terror organizations within Afghan territory is made doubtful by allegations that the IAG issued TTP combatants passports and other kinds of logistical support.

Moreover, the unwillingness of the Taliban to recognize the existence of the TTP in Afghanistan needs to be viewed in context with the larger framework of regional security dynamics surrounding Afghanistan. Given its geographical location at the crossroads of major regional powers like China, India, Pakistan, and Iran, Afghanistan is a crucial theater for competing security interests. Though the TTP’s course of actions are destabilizing for Pakistan, the Taliban could utilize them as strategic counterbalance to its eastern neighbor. The TTP has a proven record of attempting to weaken the Pakistani government, thereby straining ties between Pakistan and the Taliban government in Afghanistan. Given this, the IAG might be in a position to utilize the Taliban’s protection of TTP fighters as a negotiating chip in its dealings with Islamabad.

The way the Taliban have managed their connections with Al-Qaeda is equally important. While the Taliban officially claim that Al-Qaeda is no longer active in Afghanistan, reports from foreign observers—including the United Nations—indicate otherwise. The resurgence of Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, especially in previously hostile regions like the Panjshir Valley, underscores the intricacy of the Taliban rule. As per the reports of the Voice of America, Taliban are enabling Al-Qaeda to establish up bases and ammunition storage facilities in regions previously inaccessible. This calls into question the Taliban’s ability to maintain their control over Afghanistan’s widespread militant landscape counterterrorism strategy.

The Taliban’s willingness to allow various terrorist groups on Afghan territory is again reflective of its traditional inconsistencies in its Afghan governance model. Despite international pressure, the IAG finds it challenging to cut ties with the terror groups, given the Taliban’s base of power remains closely entwined with these same organizations. Further complicating the Taliban’s counterterrorism endeavors, the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) is expanding influence in through Afghanistan. Despite the ideological differences between the Taliban and the ISKP, their cohabitation in Afghanistan highlights the difficulties the IAG faces in enforcing its authority over a volatile security environment and has impact over the larger regional security framework since ISKP is trying to take advantage of the power vacuum left by the withdrawal of the US. The Taliban are possibly trying to divert attention from its incapacity to curtail terrorist organizations operating from Afghanistan by denouncing the presence of Al-Qaeda and TTP.

Ultimately, the Taliban’s decision not to acknowledge the presence of Al-Qaeda and the TTP in Afghanistan underscores their preference for warfare allies above international concerns and provides their deficiencies as a dependable counterterrorism state. The Taliban’s capacity to shape what the future holds for Afghanistan has profound implications for regional and international security, given Afghanistan’s persistent unsettled terrorist situation.