China In The Mekong: The Evolving Dragon – Analysis
Sustaining the lives of over 65 million people, the Mekong River is a crucial lifeline for the six co-riparian Southeast Asian countries—China, Myanmar, Thailand, Lao PDR, Cambodia, and Vietnam. Given its rich biodiversity and fertile landscape, the Mekong impacts the food security and economic opportunities for tens of millions of people, in sectors such as agriculture, trade, connectivity, tourism and hydropower generation.
Not only does the Mekong originate in China—thus granting it unfiltered access—but as the region’s superpower, China’s behaviour in the Mekong basin holds grave significance for the food, water, energy and economic security of the other downstream riparian nations. In the era of increasing climate security and the evolving geopolitical order, unpacking China’s evolving role and participation in the Mekong Basin emerges as an interesting exercise.
Given its significance, the sustainable development of a critical transboundary water resource such as the Mekong is a must. And yet, regional cooperation and integrated management for it has been limited. Following the Second World War, the Lower Mekong Basin countries (LMB) of Thailand, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia chose to collaborate to foster the development of the Mekong River. This resulted in the establishment of the United Nations-backed Mekong Committee in 1957, which ultimately gave way to the establishment of the Mekong River Commission (MRC) in 1995.
The MRC streamlined the aims and responsibilities of the LMB when it came to the sustainable development, utilisation, and conservation of the Mekong River, and has played an important role in the dissemination of basin-wide hydrological data. However, any attempt at meaningful development and conservation of this river has emerged inadequate, without the engagement of the upstream regional hegemon, China.
Despite being a dialogue partner of the MRC, the notable lack of involvement by China has significantly stymied the MRC’s capacity to monitor or regulate the rapid rate of industrialisation, urbanisation, and infrastructural development in the Mekong Basin, leading to significant hydrological changes in the river’s ecology. Since 2002, China has only shared water level and rainfall data for the annual flood season (June–October), which has undermined the LMB’s ability to design accurate drought and flood models. It was only in 2020 that China agreed to share year-round flood data.
Due to the mountainous terrain that the river traverses, combined with its sheer volume, this river possesses an innate potential for hydroelectricity generation. Leveraging this potential along with its advantageous upstream positioning, China has, since the early 1990s, embarked on a unilateral spree of constructing dams and developing water resources for economic growth, transportation, and energy consumption. There are eleven major dams constructed, to date, along the mainstream and over 95 dams along the tributaries as they flow through Chinese territory.
China’s approach to the Mekong can be understood through two pillars. The first is ‘rights protection’ under which China asserts its territorial prerogative to use and develop the Mekong waters flowing in its borders as it deems fit. The second is China’s modernist development approach to fostering growth in the Mekong Basin. This paradigm combines achieving economic stability and regional development, with the construction of dams and other infrastructure to control transboundary waterways.
However, the unchecked development has come at the expense of severe ecological damage. Long-term hydrological tracking of the basin shows that the presence of the upper riparian dams has caused a fundamental shift in the river’s flow, and seasonal volume and triggered extreme climatic variations. Moreover, China has been accused of purposely holding water in its reservoirs, which has had disastrous consequences for the LMB. In combination with the low levels of precipitation, such moves trigger droughts, increase sediment load, and upend the food security for the lower riparian countries. China has denied these allegations of deliberately obstructing the river flow, maintaining that the dams serve the purpose of flood control.
Despite the long-term ecological disruption and backlash from various environmental activist and civil society groups, the “dam building boom” has only intensified over the years, due to increasing domestic water and energy needs, the expanding mandate of the Belt and Road Initiative, and the deepening of energy trade and foreign investment amongst the Southeast Asian countries. Under the country’s “Going Out” policy—which aims to mobilise external investments and control natural resources abroad—Chinese development banks and State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) have backed numerous dam constructions in the LMB. Their involvement has ranged from providing financial support, and equipment, to providing managerial and technical expertise. It is estimated that there are currently over 50 dams in the other Mekong riparian nations, supported by China.
In 2016, China launched the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC) initiative, marking a shift in their Mekong policy, towards strengthening and institutionalising multilateral interactions in the Mekong Basin. This venture was aimed at enhancing political security, sustainable and economic development, and furthering socio-cultural ties in the Mekong Basin. As such, it identified five priority areas: connectivity, production capacity, cross-border cooperation on economic and water resources, and poverty reduction. This move signalled a welcomed openness and region-first approach from China with the LMC being lauded as an example of “win-win cooperation”.
However, not all riparian stakeholders regard China’s involvement in the Mekong as benevolent. Many of the hydroelectric projects funded by China in the LMB have not garnered the output the host countries wished for, contributing towards the Chinese ‘debt trapping’ narrative. From dam breaches in Laos and the inadequate rehabilitation and compensation for displaced populations in Cambodia to the creation of ‘ghost towns’ in Thailand, Chinese (backed) hydropower initiatives have caused immense agony to the inhabitants of the basin.
Thus, China’s involvement in the Mekong remains difficult to characterise. At the ‘State’ level, China leads and frames co-riparian interactions, and through the LMC, has been able to overcome some of the implementational gaps in the MRC’s ability to coordinate and regulate development in the Mekong Basin. However, the on-ground impact of the Chinese model of development has threatened the security of the LMB, its people and the river’s ecology. In the era of compounding climate crises, the “upstream superpower’s” traditionalist developmental mindset is being directly challenged by the consequent environmental degradation. Mekong’s co-riparian nations are re-assessing the trade-off between development gains and environmental protection. With Cambodia placing a moratorium on the construction of any mainstream Mekong dam, and environmental activists in Myanmar successfully blocking the construction of the Myitsone Dam; many are left questioning the limits, veracity, and long-term viability of the “win-win” Mekong partnership spearheaded by China.