SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Balochistan: BLA blowback
On November 9, 2024, at least 31 persons, including 17 Security Forces (SFs) personnel, were killed and more than 60 persons, including 46 SF personnel sustained injuries, when a suicide bomber blew himself up near the ticket counter of the Quetta Railway Station in Balochistan. According to railway authorities, the Jaffar Express was scheduled to depart for Peshawar at 9 am. The train had not yet arrived at the platform when an explosion occurred near the station’s ticket office. Balochistan Inspector General of Police (IGP) Mouzzam Jah Ansari, stated that the target was Army personnel from the Infantry School. The Majeed Brigade of the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) claimed responsibility for the attack. “This morning, a Fidayee attack was carried out on a Pakistani army unit at Quetta Railway Station as they were returning via Jaffar Express after completing a course at the Infantry School,” the BLA ‘spokesperson’ Jeeyand Baloch said.
Later in the day, BLA released a detailed statement on its official media Hakkal, claiming it killed at least 31 non-commissioned officers of the Army and injured over 60 others. The BLA identified the suicide bomber as Muhammad Rafiq Bizenjo alias Washen alias Faheem. Bizenjo, a cadres of BLA’s “elite” Majeed Brigade, carried out the attack in response to what the BLA described as Pakistan’s “occupation” of Balochistan. According to the BLA, Bizenjo targeted Army personnel from multiple regiments, including the Punjab Regiment, Northern Light Infantry, Sindh Regiment, Frontier Force, Baloch Regiment, and Azad Kashmir Regiment. The soldiers had recently completed training at the School of Infantry and Tactics in Quetta, the BLA added. The BLA credited its intelligence wing, ZIRAB (Zephyr Intelligence Research and Analysis Bureau), with planning the attack. The group claimed ZIRAB monitored the Army’s movements closely and decided to delay the attack on November 8 to avoid civilian casualties. According to the BLA, November 9 was chosen because over 200 Army personnel were present, with minimal risk to civilians. In its statement, the BLA warned that if Pakistan’s military presence in Balochistan continues, future attacks will escalate and could extend to major cities in Pakistan.
On November 6, 2024, the BLA conducted an operation in station area of Nushki District in Balochistan, killing two “state-backed death squad” members, Israr Muhammad Hassani and Yasir Jamaldini. In a statement, BLA ‘spokesperson’ Jeeyand Baloch claimed that “Israr, from Badalkarez, and Yasir, from Killi Jamaldini, were on the payroll of the occupying forces.” Jeeyand Baloch added that the two were allegedly involved in military operations that included raids and enforced disappearances of Baloch youth. The group stated that they had been under surveillance prior to the attack and warned that others engaged in similar activities would “face similar consequences.”
On November 4, 2024, at least 10 soldiers were killed and another four sustained injuries, while two BLA cadres were also killed during a clash, after BLA ambushed a military convoy near the Qadirabad area of Nushki District. BLA claimed responsibility for the attack. BLA ‘spokesperson’ Jeeyand Baloch disclosed that two of the group’s cadres, Adnan Baloch and Yasir Baloch, were killed in the prolonged confrontation. “Despite his injuries, Martyr Adnan Baloch held his position for over an hour, covering his unit’s retreat before sacrificing his life,” Jeeyand Baloch added.
On October 28, 2024, the BLA killed five private security personnel deployed at a construction site in the Diz Paroom area of Panjgur District. BLA ‘spokesperson’ Jeeyand Baloch released a statement, claiming that the attack was carried out by BLA’s Fatah Squad, based on intelligence from BLA’s intelligence wing, Zirab. The attack targeted members of “death squads” allegedly supported by Pakistan’s military and intelligence agencies, whom the BLA claims were engaged in counterinsurgency operations against the Baloch independence movement.
According to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), in 59 BLA-linked incidents recorded in 2024, at least 254 persons, including 83 civilians, 122 SF personnel and 49 militants, have been killed (data till November 10, 2024). During the corresponding period of 2023, 34 such incidents resulted in 69 fatalities, including 16 civilians, 45 SF personnel and eight militants. The whole of 2023 recorded 39 incidents in which 77 persons were killed, including 19 civilians, 50 SF personnel and eight militants. Since the Balochistan tryst with insurgency, year 2024 has so far been the most violent, with BLA leading from the front among all the Baloch insurgent groups, orchestrating most of the attacks.
Since August 1, 2004, when the first BLA-linked incident, was recorded by SATP, at least 912 persons, including 277 civilians, 393 SF personnel, 222 militants, and 20 in the Not Specified category, have been killed (data till November 10, 2024). On August 1, 2004, five soldiers and a civilian were killed when BLA cadres targeted SF vehicles in the Khuzdar District.
The long-term state policy of enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings has led to a spiral of retaliatory attacks and violence by Baloch insurgents, targeting SFs and state establishments in the province. Civilians, especially members of state-backed ‘death squad’ have also been targeted. In this environment of chaos, Islamist terrorist groups have also thrived and even joined the Baloch groups. The major active Baloch insurgent groups include the Baloch National Army (BNA), BLA, Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF), Balochistan Liberation Tigers (BLT) and United Baloch Army (UBA). Among all the Baloch groups, the BLA has proved the most lethal.
Comprised mostly of Marri and Bugti tribe members, BLA was formed in response to the growing resentment in Balochistan over the continuous Government exploitation of the province’s natural resources and the neglect of development and welfare in the province. The group has about 6,000 cadres spread across Balochistan and in the bordering areas of Afghanistan. Sardar Akbar Khan Bugti, former Chief Minister of Balochistan is considered one of the ‘grandfathers’ of the organization and was killed in an Army operation on August 26, 2006. After Akbar Khan Bugti’s death, Balach Marri led the group, till his death in Afghanistan on 21 November 2007. After Balach’s death, his brother, Hyrbyair Marri has led the group since 2007, from exile in London. Bashir Zeb Baloch is the ‘commander-in-chief’ of the outfit.
Out of all Baloch insurgent groups, the BLA is the only one that has a dedicated suicide attack squad, the ‘Majeed Brigade’, named after two brothers, Majeed Langove Senior and Majeed Langove Junior, who carried out suicide attacks in August 1974 and March 2010, respectively. Majeed Senior tried to assassinate then Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto when he was on an official visit to Quetta. He wanted to kill the Prime Minister for his dismissal of the National Awami Party’s government in Balochistan, but Majeed Senior lost his life during the operation. Majeed Junior ‘sacrificed’ himself to save his associates when SFs raided the house where they were staying in Quetta’s Wahdat Colony. Majeed Junior held back the SF raiders to give his associates time to escape. Following Majeed Junior’s death, a BLA leader, Aslam Achu, established the insurgent group’s suicide squad, and named it the Majeed Brigade, currently led by Hammal Rehan Baloch. The Brigade carried out its first vehicle-borne suicide attack on December 30, 2011, when Baaz Khan Marri targeted tribal elder Shafiq Mengal, son of former acting Chief Minister and Federal Minister Naseer Mengal, on the Arbab Karam Khan Road in Quetta. Shafeeq, who had run a ‘death squad’ targeting Baloch insurgents in different parts of the province, escaped unhurt, but 14 persons, including women and children, were killed, and 35 were injured.
Apart from Majeed Brigade, BLA have a has special forces, the Special Tactical Operations Squad (STOS), under the command of Bashir Zeb Baloch, which has been monitoring and eliminating Army officers and their local “death squad” collaborators. STOS’ main function is the tracking of and intelligence gathering on targets.
BLA formed a new elite group, the ‘Fateh Squad’, whose cadres are known for their specialised skills. The Fateh Squad was formed in May 2021 after one of BLA’s ‘martyrs’, Fateh Qambrani, was killed during an operation to capture a Pakistani Army camp in the Meshdari area of Shahrag in Harnai District in September 2018. His action enabled the full capture of the Army camp. Fateh Qambrani also played a prominent role in various other operations. The cadres of the Fateh Squad are selected on the basis of their exceptional skills and face-to-face battle experience. They lead their fighters directly into Pakistani Army and paramilitary camps, paving the way for other fighters to enter the camps.
The growing strength and lethality of the BLA can be assessed by the August 25-26, 2024, coordinated and simultaneous attacks across seven Districts, ‘Operation Hereof’ (Operation Dark Storm). This was the largest act of retribution by any Baloch insurgent group. In the early morning of August 26, 2024, BLA cadres offloaded passengers from trucks and buses in the Rarasham area of Musakhail District and shot them after checking their identities. At least 23 Punjabi travellers were killed. The armed men also set fire to 10 vehicles. As the day progressed, Balochistan recorded multiple attacks across the province, which left at least 38 people dead, including the 23 in Musakhail. In response, SFs neutralised 21 terrorists and injured several others. BLA cadres then targeted Levies Forces and Police Stations in Mastung, Kalat, Pasni, and Suntsar, resulting in numerous casualties. Explosions and grenade attacks were reported in Sibi, Panjgur, Mastung, Turbat, Bela, and Quetta, with militants blowing up a railway track near Mastung. The Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) issued a statement later in the day, claiming that 21 terrorists had been killed, while 14 SF personnel, including four from law enforcement agencies, were killed during ‘clearance operations’.
However, in a statement released on its official media, Hakkal, BLA announced the successful completion of its Fidayeen Operation Hereof, claiming to have killed 130 military personnel during a series of coordinated attacks across Balochistan. BLA ‘spokesperson’ Jeeyand Baloch claimed that the group’s elite fidayeen unit, the Majeed Brigade, had “maintained control over the Bela Camp for 20 hours,” during which “68 military personnel were killed and dozens more injured.” The BLA also reported that its Fateh Squad and Special Tactical Operations Squad (STOS) had set up blockades on major highways across Balochistan, leading to the deaths of 62 military personnel. “After achieving the objectives of Operation Herof, the roadblocks on all highways were lifted,” the statement read.
Some of the other major attacks by the BLA in 2024 include:
October 8: Eight soldiers were killed and three were injured in two consecutive attacks by BLA cadres in the Gonden Marao area of Ispelanji in Mastung District. In a statement to the media, BLA ‘spokesperson’ Jeeyand Baloch said the attack took place in the Gonden Marao area of Ispelanji, where BLA cadres ambushed a Security Force convoy using heavy and automatic weapons.
June 24: At least 11 soldiers were killed and an unspecified number sustained injuries when BLA cadres attacked a military camp in the Iskalko area of Kalat District.
April 29: At least ten soldiers were killed and their military vehicle was completely destroyed in an improvised explosive device (IED) attack by BLA cadres in the Peer Ismail Indus area of Bolan District.
April 12: BLA cadres shot dead 11 passengers of Punjabi ethnicity on N-40 Regional Corporations Development (RCD) highway after checking their identities from a passenger bus in the Nushki. The victims were from Wazirabad, Mandi Bahauddin and Gujranwala Districts of Punjab. BLA claimed that they were Government employees.
March 25: Majeed Brigade cadres attacked the PNS Siddique Naval Air Station in the Turbat town of Kech District and claimed that more than 30 soldiers were killed. The Army, however, stated it thwarted the attack and killed four BLA cadres, while one soldier was killed.
March 20: Majeed Brigade cadres attacked the Gwadar Port Authority (GPA) Complex in Gwadar town (Gwadar District) and killed two soldiers. SFs, however, stated that they thwarted the attack and killed eight BLA cadres.
January 29: Nine BLA cadres, four Railway Police personnel and two civilians were killed, while four others, including two SF personnel and one child, sustained injuries when the Majeed Brigade launched three coordinated attacks targeting the Frontier Corps Headquarters, the Railway Station and the District Jail in the Mach town of Kachhi District. BLA ‘spokesperson’, Jeeyand Baloch claimed the attack, stating that it was a joint attack in coordination with other factions, during which BLA insurgents controlled Mach city and surrounding areas for over 72 hours.
Horrified with continuous and escalating BLA attacks, security personnel have started hesitating to serve in Balochistan. After the August 25-26 coordinated attacks, while chairing the Provincial Apex Committee in Quetta on August 30, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif emphasized the need for the deployment of capable and talented officers in Balochistan, acknowledging that, due to security concerns, some officers hesitate to serve in the province. However, under a new policy regarding officer deployment, officers from the 48th Common Training Program will be posted in Balochistan for one year, while officers from the 49th Common Training Program will be posted for one and a half years, after completing one year. Prime Minister Sharif also announced that special incentives would be provided to officers deployed in Balochistan, including four air tickets for their families every three months.
Heightening tensions, the Balochistan Police issued a notification on October 28, warning officers that the BLA was planning abductions of Government officials in Panjgur, Kech and Awaran Districts. “High-ranking officials such as DPOs, DCs, or ACs could be targeted in retaliation for the recent disappearance of BLA leader Basheer Zeb’s brother, Zaheer Baloch,” the Police notification stated. Zaheer Baloch went ‘missing’ on June 27 en route from his office on Quetta’s Zarghoon Road to his home on Sariab Road.
Instead of dealing with the Baloch insurgency through constructive measures such as peace-talks, negotiations or economic and relief measures to improve the abysmal developmental profile of the province, the Pakistan establishments has been following a ruthless approach of suppression of the Baloch people. On August 22, 2024, the Government approved PKR 60 billion to carry out Operation Azm-e-Istehkam (Commitment for Stability) to fight militancy in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. In response, the BLA-led Baloch Raj Aajoi Sangar (BRAS), an umbrella organization of Baloch ‘pro-independence’ groups, issued a statement on July 8, 2024, against Pakistan’s military campaign. In a media release, BRAS ‘spokesperson’ Baloch Khan condemned the operation as a blatant intensification of the ongoing ‘genocide’ against the Baloch people. He asserted that BRAS and its allied organizations were prepared to defend their land and people against any form of military action, promising to defeat the ‘invading’ forces.
While the violence in the province has social and developmental grievances, the Federal Government’s recent plan for the establishment of “internment centres” for terrorism suspects in the province and the November 1 proposed amendment to the Anti-Terrorism Act, granting the armed forces and paramilitary units the authority to detain individuals involved in serious crimes for up to three months, will further aggravate the issues of enforced disappearances in the province, likely provoking more BLA orchestrated attacks in the coming days.
Chhattisgarh: Delayed ‘Homecoming’
On November 7, 2024, Padam Some (29), a top-ranking female Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) cadre, carrying a reward of INR 100,000 on her head, surrendered to the Police and Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) in Sukma District. Padam, a resident of Chhote Kedwal under the Chintalnar Police Station limits in Sukma District, was involved in Naxalite [Left Wing Extremism, LWE] activities in Thana Golapalli, Maraiguda, Kistaram, and the Chintagufa area. She was the ‘president’ of the Singhanamdagu Revolutionary People’s Committee (RPC)’s ‘Janatana Sarkar’ (people’s government of the Maoists) and used to be very active in the organization.
On October 29, 2024, five CPI-Maoist cadres, including a female Maoist on whom a reward of INR 500,000 had been announced, surrendered in Bijapur District. Those who surrendered include Sushila aka Bujji aka Vimala Hemla, who served as an ‘area committee member (ACM)’ and had joined the organisation in 2009, in the children’s wing of Maoists, and then worked as a ‘militia’ (‘base force’ a secondary force of the Maoists’ people’s army) member in 2013. She was mainly involved in firing on the Police party and Security Force (SF) personnel in January 2018 in Mutvendi village and in gun battles with Police in Pidmel, Jingaon, and Simepalli between 2018 and 2019. She was active till 2023. The other four were Sukhram Modiyam, Suddu Korsa, Lakku Farsa, and Sannu Madvi, who have been involved in serious criminal activities, including murder, attacking the Police, planting spike holes, digging roads, and using lethal weapons such as Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), for a long time. The surrendered Maoists were associated with the Aheri ‘Area Committee’ of Gadchiroli Division and the ‘West Bastar Division Party’, and included ‘section commanders’ of the Bandepara RPC ‘militia’ as well as the Bodlapusanar Grama Rakshaka Dalam (GRD) ‘commander’.
On October 25, 2024, six CPI-Maoist cadres carrying a combined reward of INR 2.4 million on their heads surrendered before SFs in Sukma District. The surrendered Maoists, who had been active in the district, were identified as Pawan aka Kamalu Hemla, Bandu aka Bandi Sodi, Kunjam Roshan aka Mahadev, Dashru aka Kotesh Sodi, and the two women Maoist cadres Kamala aka Bandi Dudhi and Madvi aka Nagul Sushila.
These recent incidents of surrender are among many more by the CPI-Maoist cadres, who have surrendered citing that they have been troubled by the discrimination, neglect and atrocities on tribals in the Maoist organization. They have also stated that they were influenced by the surrender and rehabilitation policy of the government and decided to leave the path of violence and return to the mainstream to live a peaceful life.
According to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), at least 304 Naxalites have surrendered in Chhattisgarh in the current year, thus far (data till November 10, 2024). During the corresponding period of 2023, 159 Naxalites had surrendered in the state. Another, 28 Naxalites surrendered in the remaining part of the year, taking the total to 187 through 2023. 182 Naxalites had surrendered in 2022 and 328 in 2021. Significantly, since March 6, 2000, when SATP started compiling data on Left Wing Extremism (LWE) across the country, at least 4,435 Naxalites have surrendered in the state.
An analysis of the surrender data since March 6, 2000, suggests that around 96.39 per cent have taken place in the troubled Bastar Division Bastar Division, which is still considered a significant threat and the ‘Final Maoist Bastion,’ accounting for 4,275 surrenders, as compared to a total of 4,435 in Chhattisgarh. Such surrenders across the country stood at 17,180.
The Bastar Division, spread over a geographical area of over 40,000 square kilometres, comprises seven of Chhattisgarh’s 33 districts: Bastar, Bijapur, Dantewada, Kanker, Kondagaon, Narayanpur, and Sukma.
To facilitate the surrender of the Naxalites, some districts in the state launched specific initiatives to encourage insurgents to abandon their fight and to join the mainstream. Significantly, the Lon Varratu (a local Gondi dialect expression, meaning return to your home/village) Scheme was launched by Dantewada District Police on June 12, 2020, and it offered a range of incentives to encourage Naxalites to abandon their fight against the state and clear their names from Police records. So far 204 rewarded Naxalites have surrendered under this campaign, out of a total of 880 Naxalites who have joined the mainstream of society under this campaign (till October 21, 2024). Likewise, the Poona Narkom (a local Gondi dialect expression, meaning New Dawn) Scheme was launched by the Sukma District Police on August 9, 2021, and it offered medical facilities that were organised through medical camps in different places of the district, including the district headquarters, for the tribal villagers of rural areas, in collaboration with the district health department. Though the specific number of surrenders under the campaign have not been released, according to the SATP database, at least 436 surrenders have taken place Sukma district since then.
Moreover, on February 15, 2024, Chief Minister Vishnu Deo Sai disclosed that the Chhattisgarh government had decided to launch amenities and welfare schemes for villages in Maoist-affected regions of the state. Sai announced the Niyad Nellanar, scheme which emulates the Centre’s Pradhan Mantri Janjati Adivasi Nyaya Maha AbhiyaN (PM-JANMAN)scheme, catering to the socio-economic welfare of particularly vulnerable tribal groups (PVTGs). The initiative, which has been taken from the local Dandami term meaning ‘Your Good Village’, extends essential services and welfare benefits through security camps in Bastar. The ambit of these benefits is to extend to the villages situated within a five-kilometres radius of security camps. Chief Minister Sai stated,
These security camps will act as not only the police camps, but also as multi-faceted development camps wherein the government will ensure the availability of over 25 basic amenities besides extending the benefits of 32 individual-focused government schemes in the Maoist-affected villages… The government has provisioned an additional Rs.20 crore for this scheme and, if needed, more funds will be provided by both central and state governments.
In recent times, Bastar has seen the establishment of at least 14 new security camps, and these have been opened near the villages so that the people living within a radius of 5 kilometers will be provided the same facilities as the beneficiaries of the PM JANMAN Yojana implemented for special backward tribes. In these villages, all the families are provided housing facilities under the Prime Minister’s Housing Scheme, ration cards to all, free rice, gram-salt, jaggery and sugar to all, 4 free gas cylinders under the Ujjwala scheme, Anganwadi (rural child care centre) and community hall, similar to the special backward tribes, Sub Health Centre, Primary School, Irrigation pumps including bore wells for irrigation of farms, hand pumps, solar pumps, sports ground in every village, free electricity, bank Sakhi (women trained to facilitate banking operations), ATM, skill development, forest rights lease, mobile tower, DTH and TV. Facilities including helipads and bus facility till block the headquarters are also to be provided.
In the interim, on October 7, 2024, as a final offer for Maoists to shun violence and join the mainstream, Chief Minister Sai announced that his government would soon come up with a surrender policy incorporating the best practices implemented by different states. In the proposed policy, the surrendered Maoists would be housed together in a colony under central schemes such as the Pradhan Mantri Awas Yojana. Sai disclosed, further,
All surrendered Maoists could be housed together in such a colony, which could be in the district headquarters. They will be provided security in that place. It is still in a policy stage. Our deputy CM is visiting different states to study their surrender policy and incorporate the best practices. He has already been to Assam. They (surrendered Maoists) will be given jobs and training once the policy is introduced. We urge Maoists to join mainstream otherwise our forces from both Centre and state are fully prepared on the ground.
Meanwhile, on September 20, 2024, Union Home Minister (UHM) and Minister of Cooperation Amit Shah, while appealing to the Maoists to give up violence, lay down arms and surrender, set March 31, 2026, as the date to end Naxalism in the country. UHM Shah appealed to LWEs to abjure the path of violence and join the mainstream of society. Addressing 55 victims of Naxal violence 55 victims of Naxal violence , from Chhattisgarh under the aegis of Bastar Peace Committee at his residence in New Delhi on the same day, UHM Shah declared,
Prime Minister Narendra Modi has decided that Naxal violence and ideology will be wiped out from the country. March 31, 2026, has been fixed as the last day of Naxalism in this country and I ensure that we will finish Naxalism before that… I want to appeal to those who have picked up guns to surrender. In the Northeast and Jammu and Kashmir, many have surrendered and joined the mainstream. But if it does not happen, we will initiate operations and will ensure it is successful.
Meanwhile, as many as 3,752 Naxalites have been arrested and 1,608 have been killed in the state in the current year, thus far (data till November 10, 2024).
The number of surrenders of disillusioned Maoists are increasing gradually from the troubled Bastar division and erstwhile stronghold areas of the rebels in the state. With both the governments – state and union -comprehensively implementing the proposed surrender and rehabilitation policies, along with aggressive developmental initiatives, particularly in roads, infrastructure and communications, there is increasing likelihood that the remaining Naxalites may join the mainstream and lead a peaceful life in the state and across the country.
Weekly Fatalities: Major Conflicts in South Asia
November 4-10, 2024
Provisional data compiled from English language media sources.