India-Myanmar: Simmering Insurgency – Analysis
On December 3, 2024, the Yung Aung faction of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang (NSCN-K-YA) issued a demand of INR two million from Oil India Limited (OIL), a prominent petroleum company. The extortion note was delivered to the company’s office in the Manabhum Reserve in the Lohit District of Arunachal Pradesh, by Tha Aung, an NSCN-K-YA ‘major’. The note had set a deadline of December 10, 2024, for the payment. OIL Spokesperson Prankush Malla Buzarbaruah accepted that the company had received the extortion note from the outfit.
On November 24, 2024, two civilians – Vignesh Kumar Jha and Bishnu Chetry – were abducted by a heavily armed 10-member NSCN-K-YA group, from a bridge construction site located between Pongchau and Konnu villages in the Longding District of Arunachal Pradesh. Sources disclosed that the group was led by NSCN-K-YA leader Akham Konyak.
On October 25, 2024, a clash occurred between the Assam Rifles and NSCN-K-YA in Longding District, in which an NSCN-K-YA cadre was killed. The NSCN-K-YA initiated the attack by firing at the Assam Rifles personnel, while they were moving from Wakka towards the Indo-Myanmar border.
On February 18, 2024, 10 workers employed at the Finboro coal mine in Changlang District of Arunachal Pradesh, were abducted by suspected militants of NSCN-K-YA and the Independent faction of United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA-I), after a failure to meet extortion demands. Sources stated that a group of seven armed militants held the workers at gunpoint and transported them in a dumper truck towards Old Longtoi, a remote location within Arunachal Pradesh. Security forces (SFs) later rescued seven of the 10 miners. Three workers were rescued after several months.
According to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), there were three NSCN-K-YA-linked incidents of violence in 2024, which included one incident of killing and two of abduction (data till December 8, 2024), resulting in the death of one terrorist. In 2023, there were six such incidents, which included one incident of killing (one civilian), one incident of injury (one militant injured), and four abductions, in which seven persons were abducted. Since August 17, 2018, when the outfit ‘officially’ came into existence, there have been 27 such incidents, including 15 of killing, nine of abduction (24 persons abducted) and three of injury (two SFs, one civilian and one terrorist). The incidents of killing resulted in the death of 15 persons: two civilians, four SF personnel and nine militants.
Some of the incidents of killing, in addition to the one mentioned above, included:
December 28, 2023: NSCN-K-YA through a press release, claimed responsibility for the execution of former legislator Yumsen Matey on December 16, 2023, along the Indo-Myanmar border in the Tirap District of Arunachal Pradesh. NSCN-K-YA justified the execution, asserting that Matey was “awarded capital punishment on 16/12/2023 due to his active involvement in all sorts of anti-NSCN activities.” The insurgent group accused Matey of “masterminding anti-NSCN propagandas and slogans in Tirap District of Arunachal Pradesh” and of conspiring against the NSCN/Government of the People’s Republic of Nagaland (GPRN), the armed wing of the outfit.
July 28, 2021: Two NSCN-K-YA militants were gunned down during a search operation in the Kottam Forest area of Tirap District. The two militants fired at SFs when asked to surrender, and were shot dead in retaliatory firing.
NSCN was formed in 1980, initially under the leadership of Isak Chishi Swu, Thuingaleng Muivah, and S.S. Khaplang. The organization aimed to establish a “Greater Nagaland” or “Nagalim,” a territory that would encompass all Naga-inhabited areas, transcending state and even international boundaries. However, NSCN split in 1988, primarily over ideological and operational differences, giving rise to two factions: NSCN-IM (led by Isak and Muivah) and NSCN-K (under Khaplang).
The NSCN-K, with its base largely in Myanmar, pursued a different strategy from that of its India-based counterpart, the NSCN-IM. While the NSCN-IM eventually engaged in peace negotiations with the Indian government, resulting in the 1997 ceasefire and subsequent political dialogue, the NSCN-K maintained its militant stance under Khaplang’s leadership for some more time. NSCN-K’s militant opposition to compromise stemmed from Khaplang’s belief in Naga sovereignty that transcended borders, particularly given his own roots in Myanmar’s Naga-inhabited regions. However, Khaplang’s militant stance did not last longer and within a month of the Union Government’s announcement of a ceasefire with the outfit on November 14, 1998, the NSCK-N declared a ceasefire on December 18, 1998. The ceasefire continued thereafter, and a significant milestone was achieved in April 2001 with the formulation of a 15-point charter of cease-fire ground rules. The peace process culminated in September 2001 with formal talks in Kohima, emphasizing sustained dialogue and mutual cooperation for conflict resolution.
However, S.S. Khaplang, the leader of the NSCN-K, unilaterally withdrew from the ceasefire agreement with the Government of India on March 27, 2015. This decision surprised the Indian authorities, as there was no prior official communication. The ceasefire, established in 2001, had been periodically renewed, but Khaplang’s withdrawal marked a significant escalation in hostilities, including ambushes and attacks on Indian SFs.
Following S.S. Khaplang’s death in 2017, the NSCN-K saw internal divisions over leadership and ideological direction. In this environment, Yung Aung, a nephew of Khaplang, rose to prominence, leading a faction that upheld a radical vision for Naga independence. Finally, a splinter faction under Yung Aung – NSCN-K-YA – was formed in 2018. Unlike the faction that sought a ceasefire with the Indian government, Yung Aung’s group categorically rejected any peace accords, denouncing them as betrayals of the Naga cause. Yung Aung’s ascent reflects a generational shift in the NSCN-K, with younger leaders adopting an uncompromising stance, shaped by a narrative of unrelenting struggle and skepticism toward diplomacy.
The Yung Aung faction thus reflects a commitment to armed struggle, paired with its cross-border alliances and anti-establishment rhetoric. By rejecting any formal engagement with the Indian state, the faction seeks to assert its legitimacy and differentiate itself from the NSCN-IM, which it perceives as having “sold out” through negotiations.
Later, differences emerged within the NSCN-K-YA. This division was fueled by dissatisfaction with Yung Aung’s leadership, with allegations of mismanagement and policies contrary to the group’s principles and resulted in a split within the outfit. ‘Major General’ (Retd.) Ang Mai, who had previously been expelled from the faction in 2019, was elected as the leader of the new faction during an emergency meeting held on June 27, 2023. His faction criticized the Yung Aung group for isolationist policies, while Yung Aung accused Ang Mai of colluding with the Myanmar military, further straining Naga unity. The Ang Mai faction operates in the border areas between India and Myanmar, primarily in Tirap, Changlang, and Longding Districts of Arunachal Pradesh as well as Mon District of Nagaland in India whereas on the Myanmar side, the Ang Mai faction operates in the Sagaing Region.
The Yung Aung faction’s ideology is steeped in a sense of historical grievance and the demand for sovereignty. It contends that Naga aspirations cannot be fulfilled within the constitutional framework of India or Myanmar, both of which it views as “colonial” powers. Unlike the NSCN-IM, which has settled for an autonomy model under Indian federalism, the Yung Aung faction advocates complete secession.
Its ideological framework includes elements of nationalism, ethno-political identity, and an aversion to any form of “integration” with either the Indian or Myanmar state structures. This uncompromising vision is reflected in the faction’s modus operandi: maintaining an armed presence across the India-Myanmar border, targeting Indian security forces, and allying with other insurgent groups in the region, including the ULFA-I and the Manipuri insurgent group People’s Liberation Army (PLA).
Strategically, the faction leverages the geography of Northeast India and Myanmar, operating from remote, forested areas that are difficult for state forces to penetrate. The NSCN-K-YA reportedly has camps in Haukyat, Khanmoi, Lohan, Kamai and Pangsau in the Sagaing Division of Myanmar. These are areas falling along the main locus of operations of the militant group in India – the Tirap, Changlang and Longding Districts of Arunachal Pradesh and the Mon District of Nagaland. This approach enables the faction to sustain its activities and maintain connections with other ethnic armed groups in Myanmar, forming a network of mutual support.
The organizational structure of the Yung Aung faction is both hierarchical and decentralized. The leadership under Yung Aung maintains central authority over major decisions; however, field operations are often conducted by semi-autonomous local commanders. This setup allows for flexibility and adaptability in response to SF pressures. The faction’s operations frequently involve small, mobile units capable of conducting hit-and-run attacks, ambushes, and other forms of guerrilla warfare, minimizing large-scale confrontations with state forces.
A defining characteristic of the Yung Aung faction is its cross-border operational framework. The faction’s base in Myanmar allows it to evade Indian security forces, which face jurisdictional constraints. This cross-border refuge also facilitates its alliances with other insurgent groups, including ULFA-I and PLA. These alliances have enhanced its operational capabilities, with support in the form of logistical resources, intelligence, and mutual access to safe havens across borders.
The existence of the Yung Aung faction poses a significant challenge to the Naga peace process. While the NSCN-IM’s 2015 framework agreement with the Indian government represents a step towards reconciliation, the Yung Aung faction’s unyielding stance underscores the limitations of such agreements. As long as factions like NSCN-K-YA continue to operate outside the peace framework, the vision of a comprehensive Naga peace deal will remain elusive.
For India, the faction’s activities complicate counter-insurgency efforts in the Northeast. The faction’s cross-border operations require a coordinated response, involving both Indian and Myanmar authorities. However, the porous nature of the India-Myanmar border, combined with limited state presence in the border regions on Myanmar’s side, provide significant operational leeway for the insurgents. Further, the faction’s alliances with other militant groups contribute to an interconnected insurgent landscape in the Northeast, creating challenges for regional stability.
The NSCN-K-YA’s unyielding militancy underscores the fragile nature of the peace processes in Northeast India. Sustainable peace hinges on a unified strategy involving India and Myanmar, recognizing the complexities of the Naga identity and aspirations, and the conflicting ambitions of multiple stakeholders.