The Sino-Indian Border Deal And Eurasia’s Emerging Strategic Landscape – Analysis

The border accord between Beijing and New Delhi facilitates the advent of a multipolar Eurasia more robust against U.S. unilateralism and protectionism

The Sino-Indian border patrol agreement concluded in October brings an end to a four-year military standoff between Beijing and New Delhi. While only China and India are directly involved in the pact, the implications of it go beyond the boundaries of those two states. Deciphering the deal’s significance allows the EU to recalibrate its engagement with China and India, facilitating the emergence of a multipolar Eurasia. Multipolarity, in turn, enables European and Asian states to become more resilient against the second Trump administration’s probable unilateral and protectionist measures.

The border dispute has long been a thorn in the side of Sino-Indian relations. Tensions were at a high in the 1960s, when the two sides fought a deadly border war in 1962, followed by low-scale combats in 1967. The turbulent 1960s gave way to precarious stability, until the Galwan valley clash led to the death of at least 20 Indian and four Chinese soldiers in June 2020.

After four years of tensions, China and India reached an agreement in October that could enable troops to patrol the disputed border as they did before 2020. The two sides proceeded to withdraw soldiers in contentious areas and the process concluded at the end of October. High-level meetings followed the withdrawal, where Chinese and Indian leaders reiterated their commitment toward rebuilding trust in the relationship.

The border patrol agreement has consequences for Sino-Indian strategic, economic and diplomatic interests. With the boundary stabilized, India can reduce its strategic dependence on the U.S., making New Delhi more resilient against Washington’s pressure to align with its geopolitical designs. This serves Beijing’s strategic interests as well, because it puts distance between India and the U.S., preventing the establishment of a coalition against China. In the economic dimension, India has the opportunity to reembrace Chinese investments, while Beijing can double down on India’s 1.4 billion market. On the diplomatic front, both sides can present themselves as responsible powers promoting peace.

China and India are the two most populous nations of the planet with growing economic and military capabilities. Conflict and rapprochement between these two actors have profound implications for other major powers as well. Although the EU is not involved in the Sino-Indian border dispute, the border patrol agreement has strategic, economic and diplomatic implications for Brussels too.

To begin with, agreement introduces stability to China-India relations, facilitating European, Chinese and Indian efforts of promoting multipolarity. China and India consider Europe as a pole of power and a partner in advocating for a multipolar international system. At the same time, the EU, just as India, strives for strategic autonomy—the capacity to make policy decisions without reliance on external powers. By supporting the SinoIndian push for multipolarity, and pursuing its own strategic autonomy, the EU can contribute to the emergence of independent power nodes across Europe and Asia.

In the economic dimension, the agreement lays down the foundation for the normalization of SinoIndian economic relations. The EU could utilize economic ties with China and India to tackle the possible challenge posed by the upcoming second Trump administration. On his campaign trail, Presidentelect Donald Trump promised 10-20% tariffs on all U.S. imports and 60-100% of tax on products imported from China. He later threatened China with 10% of tariffs based on grievances about Beijing’s efforts of countering the flow of fentanyl precursors to the US. Trump subsequently also made a threat of a 100% tariff on all BRICS members—including China and India—if they establish a novel currency to compete the US dollar.

Although the EU was omitted from the list of Trump’s initial tariff targets, such punitive measures could have a major impact on Brussels’ economic posture, as it is a key trade partner of Washington. With the looming threat of U.S. protectionism, the EU faces the imperative of exploring alternative markets. China and India are among the ten biggest trade partners of the EU, with EU-China bilateral trade amounting to almost $783 billion and EU-India twoway trade reaching approximately $137 billion in 2023. The EU could utilize the momentum to recalibrate its engagement with both markets and mitigate the impact of Trump’s impending trade policies. By doubling down on its Asian trade partners and reducing dependence on the U.S. market, the EU could ensure that Eurasia’s emerging power nodes have solid economic foundations.

On the diplomatic plane, the border patrol agreement could enable EUChinaIndia cooperation on the Ukraine conflict. Until now, the Ukraine issue has been a source of contention between the EU and the two Asian states. The two Asian giants refrained from condemning Russia for its actions in Ukraine and they have maintained trade ties with Moscow amid international sanctions. Brussels, on the other hand, imposed sanctions on Chinese and Indian entities for their purported connections to Russia’s defense industry.

The border agreement, however, could bring a new momentum to EU-China-India approaches to the Ukraine conflict. The two Asian states’ close ties to Russia make them potential peace brokers. Russia identified China and India as possible mediators between Russia and Ukraine. The EU also attaches great importance to Beijing’s and New Delhi’s potential contribution to the return of peace in Ukraine. The military standoff on the border and subsequent China-India frictions undermined their bilateral ties and any chance of potential coordination on Ukraine. Now that SinoIndian relations are on the path of improvement, the opportunity is there to align EUChinaIndia attempts toward managing the Ukraine conflict.

In other words, the Sino-Indian border agreement is a bilateral matter, but it also shapes the Eurasian geopolitical landscape. A multipolar Eurasia that has independent poles of power, productive economic relationships and joint diplomatic endeavors could withstand the headwinds brought on by the upcoming second Trump administration.

As Brussels, Beijing and New Delhi strive for multipolarity, the U.S. will have to design a Eurasia policy that accounts for powers with self-directed strategic, economic and diplomatic agendas across Europe and Asia.

The EU and India are likely to double down on their own China policy instead of merely facilitating U.S. efforts of managing Beijing’s rise. With the possibility of the EU, China and India decreasing dependence on the U.S. market, Washington will probably face tough negotiations and countermeasures instead of intimated trading partners. The prospect of EU-China-India diplomatic coordination on the Ukraine question lessens the need for preponderant US involvement in the management of the conflict.

At the end of the day, the void left behind by an isolationist U.S. is unlikely to remain unfilled for long.