SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW Volume 23 No. 30
Balochistan: Unending Carnage
On January 8, 2025, Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) cadres seized control of the whole of Zehri town in the Khuzdar District of Balochistan for almost eight hours, and set fire to multiple Government buildings, including a Levies Force station, NADRA and municipal committee offices and a bank. According to local officials, around 80 cadres entered the area at about 11pm from the nearby mountains, deploying armed cadres around the Bazaar and other locations of Zehri town. Cadres set up checkpoints around the Zehri Bazaar and pickets on the mountains to resist any action from Security Forces (SFs). The cadres stormed the Levies Thana (Police Station), took the personnel hostage, ransacked the records, and set the building on fire, damaging part of the structure, furniture and other items. The cadres later attacked a private bank branch, took the staff hostage and looted over PKR 90 million from the strong room. “They remained in the area for at least eight hours,” Kalat Division Commissioner Naeem Khan Bazai later disclosed, adding that when SFs arrived and launched an operation, the cadres escaped, taking two Levies vehicles with them. The cadres also took away 20 AK-47 rifles, 4,000 rounds of ammunition and 10 motorcycles. Via its media channel Hakkal, BLA subsequently claimed responsibility. According to BLA ‘spokesperson’ Jeeyand Baloch, the group took full control of Zehri for more than ten hours, seized Government institutions and set fire to the local Police Station. According to the group, the operation served as a “military exercise” ahead of the second phase of ‘Operation Herof’ (Operation Dark Storm).
On January 6, 2025, five soldiers were killed and several others sustained injuries in an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) attack on a military convoy in the Poganzan area of the Zamuran tehsil (revenue unit) in Kech District. BLA claimed responsibility for the attack, saying, it targeted a convoy delivering supplies to the Sangwan post.
On January 4, 2025, at least 12 people, including 11 Frontier Corps (FC) personnel, were killed while another 56, including children, suffered injuries when a suicide bomber rammed an explosive-laden vehicle into a passenger coach in the New Behman area on the outskirts of Turbat town in the Kech District of Balochistan. The passenger coach, which was taking FC personnel from Karachi to Turbat, was part of a convoy of seven buses and six escort vehicles. Senior Superintendent of Police (Serious Crimes) Zohaib Mohsin, who hails from Turbat and was on leave, also sustained injuries in the blast as he was passing through the area along with his family in his vehicle. The official stated that 53 people were on the targeted bus, mostly FC personnel, and that another two FC vehicles were also damaged.
While claiming responsibility for the attack on its media channel Hakkal, BLA stated its Majeed Brigade carried out the blast in which it claimed 47 personnel were killed and more than 30 sustained injuries. BLA ‘spokesperson’ Jeeyand Baloch said the convoy included personnel from MI 309, FC SIU, FC 117 Wing, FC 326 Wing, FC 81 Wing, and retired Army Captain Zohaib Mohsin, who was serving as Turbat Senior Superintendent of Police (Serious Crimes). In the statement, BLA accused Pakistani forces of “torturing innocent Baloch people, opening fire, and forcibly disappearing many individuals. This attack is a clear message that the land of Balochistan will never be safe for the occupying state.”
In the first 12 days of the current year, Balochistan has recorded at least 19 Security Force (SF) fatalities in five terrorism-related incidents, so far (data till January 12, 2025), according to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP). During the corresponding period of 2024, the province had recorded eight SF fatalities in two terrorism-related incidents. Through 2024, 315 SF fatalities were recorded in the province, a rise of 69.35 per cent over year 2023, at 186 SF fatalities. In terms of SF fatalities, the 2024 tally was the highest since the SATP database started documenting fatalities in Pakistan. The preceding high in the province was 202 in 2022.
The overall fatalities in Balochistan in 2024 totalled 774 (273 civilians, 315 SF personnel and 186 terrorists) in 250 incidents of killing, as against 471 such fatalities (160 civilians, 186 SF personnel, and 125 terrorists) in 169 such incidents in 2023, registering an increase of 64.33 per cent. The number of deaths was the highest in over a decade. 975 fatalities were recorded in the province in 2013.
Incidents of killing increased from 169 in 2023 to 250 in 2024. Such incidents have been on an ascending trend since 2021. There were 148 such incidents in 2016, and dropped to 82 in 2017, 69 in 2018 and 48 in 2019, spiking to 76 in 2020, 111 in 2021, 160 in 2022 and 169 in 2023. Similarly, major incidents (each involving three or more fatalities) increased from 52 in 2023 to 74 in 2024, and the resultant fatalities from 299 to 539. The number of explosions and resultant fatalities increased from 92 and 162, respectively, in 2023, to 203 and 279, respectively, in 2024. Though the number of suicide attacks increased from five in 2023 to six in 2024, the resultant fatalities decreased in 2024 to 65, from 70 in 2023. The most lethal suicide attacks of 2024 included:
November 9: 31 persons, including 17 SFs personnel, were killed and more than 60, including 46 SF personnel, sustained injuries, when a suicide bomber blew himself up near the ticket counter of the Quetta Railway Station. The Majeed Brigade of BLA claimed responsibility for the attack.
February 7: At least 17 people were killed and 31 sustained injuries in a suicide attack at the campaign office of Asfandyar Kakar, an independent candidate of PB-47 for Balochistan Assembly, in the Khanozai Union Council of Pishin District.
January 29: Nine terrorists including three suicide bombers, four SFs personnel and two civilians were killed while four others, including two SF personnel and one child, sustained injuries when BLA cadres lunched three “coordinated attacks” on the Frontier Corps Headquarters, Railway Station and District Jail in the Mach town of Kachhi District. BLA ‘spokesperson’ Jeeyand Baloch claimed responsibility of the attack.
Even as all parameters of violence indicate that the overall security situation in Balochistan has deteriorated significantly in 2024, enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killing of ethnic Baloch by the security apparatus remain rampant. According to the Human Rights Commission of Balochistan (HRCB)’s preliminary report of January 6, 2025, on human rights violations in 2024, at least 801 cases of enforced disappearances were reported in Balochistan. The majority (99.88 per cent) of victims were male, with the Frontier Corps (FC) responsible for 72.03 per cent of the cases. House raids were the most common mode of abduction. According to the report, these incidents primarily target Baloch students, political activists, human rights workers, and ordinary citizens. Among the victims, students represented a significant proportion. The report claims that SFs, intelligence agencies, and their affiliated local militias – known as ‘death squads’ – were directly involved in these human rights abuses.
Authorities in Balochistan as well as at the Federal level have long adopted the policy of suppressing peaceful political and public protests with an iron hand. For years, protesting families of the victims of enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings have faced similar patterns of violence by the security establishment.
The Balochistan Government on September 9 put the names of a large number of people on the Fourth Schedule under the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA). Including a name in the Fourth Schedule means the person concerned has been proscribed. A Home Department official, while seeking anonymity, confirmed that dozens of names had been added in the Fourth Schedule, with around 300 people finalised for the list. “As many as 130 people belong to Quetta, who have been included in the Fourth Schedule,” he disclosed. National Party (NP) President Dr. Malik Baloch claimed that 3,000 people were to be included in the Fourth Schedule.
State sponsored enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings have led to a spiral of retaliatory attacks and violence targeting the SFs and state establishments in the province, by Baloch insurgents. Civilians, especially State-backed local militia members, locally known as ‘death squad’, believed to be siding with the state machinery, have also been targeted. In this environment of chaos, Islamist terrorist groups have also thrived and even joined the Baloch groups. The major active Baloch insurgent groups include the Baloch National Army (BNA), Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF), Balochistan Liberation Tigers (BLT) and United Baloch Army (UBA).
According to a January 6 report in The Balochistan Post, the Baloch insurgent groups collectively carried out 938 attacks, resulting in over 1,002 deaths, 689 persons injured, and at least 546 instances of property damage in 2024. Their operations spanned 25 Districts and covered 327 areas. Additionally, 76 Baloch insurgents were reported killed during these operations. Compared to 2023, the total number of attacks increased by 53 per cent, while reported fatalities rose by a staggering 80 per cent, indicating a heightened intensity in the insurgency. When compared to 2023, the year 2024 marked a significant escalation in the armed conflict in Balochistan. The number of attacks, according to the report, increased from 612 in 2023 to 938 in 2024, while fatalities surged from 557-plus to over 1,002. Cases of injury also rose sharply, from 423-plus to 689, and incidents of property loss increased from 340 to 546. The areas of operation expanded from 134 locations in 26 Districts to 327 locations across 25 Districts. The data highlights the growing reach and operational capacity of Baloch insurgent groups, despite continued counter-insurgency efforts by the State.
According to SATP data, the BLA remained the most active group in 2024, carrying out 302 attacks that reportedly led to over 580 fatalities and more than 370 persons injured, and at least 171 incidents of property damage. The group claimed to operate across 240 areas in 21 districts, demonstrating an extensive geographic reach and operational capacity. BLA lost at least 52 cadres during the year – many of them belonging to the Majeed Brigade, known for its high-profile suicide operations. The BLA claimed 37 cadres of the Majeed Brigade carried out six major operations in 2024, allegedly inflicting significant losses among SFs.
BLF followed BLA in terms of numbers, executing 284 attacks in 2024, maintaining its prominence as one of the most active groups in the region. These attacks led to over 280 fatalities and over 167 persons injured, with property losses reported in 90 attacks. The group reported activity in 15 Districts and 189 areas, targeting both urban and rural locations. Despite its widespread activities, BLF reported comparatively lower fighter losses, with 16 cadres killed during the year.
Baloch Raj Aajoi Sangar (BRAS), a coalition of “pro-independence” armed groups, conducted 204 attacks in 2024, that reportedly resulted in at least 41 fatalities and over 30 persons injured. BRAS reported 190 cases of property damage, with activities spanning 16 Districts and 189 areas. Other insurgent groups – including BRG, BRA, and UBA – collectively carried out 148 attacks in 2024. These operations caused 101 fatalities, 122 persons wounded, and 95 cases of property damage. While operating on a smaller scale, these groups remained active in 13 Districts and 103 areas, with a focus on targeting infrastructure and state assets.
Apart from SFs, ‘non-locals’, especially persons of Punjabi ethnicity who are thought to be Army collaborators, faced the wrath of the Baloch insurgents. These non-locals allegedly work as spies for SFs, and are also believed to be part of a systematic effort to deny work and benefits to the Baloch population. According to partial data compiled by the SATP, a total of 309 non-locals have been killed in Balochistan since August 26, 2006, (data till December 31, 2024). Of these, 254 were Punjabis. The other non-locals who fell to the ethnic collateral damage included 38 Sindhis. The major attack on Punjabis in 2024 was in the morning of August 26, when 24 Punjabi travellers were killed in the Rarasham area of Musakhail District in Balochistan, when BLA cadres offloaded passengers from trucks and buses and shot them after checking their identities.
This anti-Punjabi and anti-non-local sentiment among Baloch insurgent groups has been brewing since the military action in which Nawab Akbar Bugti, leader of the Bugti tribe and President of the Jamhoori Watan Party (JWP), was killed in a military operation in the Chalgri area of the Bhamboor Hills of Dera Bugti District, on August 26, 2006. Further, many ‘outsiders’ are engaged on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) projects and are targeted because Baloch insurgents fear that CPEC will convert the Baloch people into minorities in their own homeland. Indeed, CPEC projects principally employ workers brought in from outside the province, overwhelmingly from Punjab.
The CPEC projects in the province have been a major bone of contention between the Pakistani state and Baloch insurgents. Baloch resentment towards CPEC dates back to its inception in 2013, and is based on the widespread belief among both the civilian population and insurgents, that CPEC is part of a ‘strategic design’ by China to loot the resources of the province. The USD 62 billion CPEC is a massive series of projects that includes a network of highways, railways and energy infrastructure, spanning the entire country. CPEC is a flagship project in China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
Baloch groups have carried out attacks directly targeting Chinese nationals engaged in economic activities. According to partial data compiled by SATP, since July 19, 2007, at least 20 attacks directly targeting Chinese nationals have been recorded in Pakistan (15 in Balochistan, three in Sindh and two in KP), resulting in 88 deaths (data till December 31, 2024). The dead included 19 Chinese nationals, 13 Pakistani SF personnel, 42 Pakistani civilians and 14 attackers. Another, 66 persons, including six Chinese nationals, were injured in these attacks. Most recently, BLA’s Majeed Brigade orchestrated a vehicle-borne suicide attack on a convoy of Chinese engineers on a road near the Jinnah International Airport in Karachi, the provincial capital of Sindh, in the night of October 6, 2024, in which three Chinese engineers were killed and 13 persons sustained injuries.
As part of efforts to stem the tide of growing unrest in Balochistan, the Federal Government was expected to give the go-ahead to a proposal for the establishment of “internment centres” for terrorism suspects in the province. According to a September 8 media report, the Government decided to give special powers to law-enforcement authorities as well as the Army, for the preventive detention of terrorism suspects for three months without a First Information Report (FIR) or court orders. Those powers had a sunset clause of two years. The Government has now decided to introduce similar amendments to the ATA, 1997, to give the special powers to law-enforcement agencies for Balochistan.
While the violence in the province has social and developmental causes, instead of exploring possibilities of dealing with the Baloch insurgency through constructive measures such as peace-talks, negotiations or economic and relief measures, the Pakistan establishment has adamantly followed a ruthless approach of suppression of the Baloch people. On August 22, 2024, the Government approved PKR 60 billion to carry out Operation Azm-e-Istehkam (Commitment for Stability) to fight militancy in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The Central Apex Committee on the National Action Plan (NAP), chaired by Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, launched the Army Operation Azm-e-Istehkam on June 22. In response, the BLA-led BRAS, an umbrella organization of Baloch ‘pro-independence’ groups, issued a statement on July 8, 2024, against Pakistan’s military campaign. In a media release, BRAS ‘spokesperson’ Baloch Khan condemned the operation as a blatant intensification of the ongoing ‘genocide’ against the Baloch people. He asserted that BRAS and its allied organizations were prepared to defend their land and people against any form of military action, promising to defeat the ‘invading’ forces.
While the Baloch people in general and insurgents in particular has been resisting and fighting years of neglect and injustice by the Pakistani States, Islamabad’s policy of suppression and neglect of the demands and protests of the Baloch people remains unchanged. The use of extreme, often indiscriminate force, ‘disappearances’ and the targeting of people through ‘death squads’, have fed the anger of local populations, compounded further by skewed economic policies and a denial of benefits to the Baloch people of the various ‘developmental’ initiatives in the province, including CPEC. There is little reason to believe that Balochistan can escape the cycles of bloodshed and destruction that have afflicted the province for decades.
Chhattisgarh: Final Battle?
On January 12, 2025, at least five Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) cadres, including two women, were killed in an encounter with the Security Forces (SFs) in a forest in the Indravati National Park area of Bijapur District in the Bastar Division. Based on specific inputs about the presence of Maoists in the jungle area of the National Park, a team of SFs launched an anti-Maoist operation during which there was an intermittent exchange of fire between the forces and the Maoists. SFs recovered five dead bodies of the Maoists (identities are yet to be ascertained) in uniform, along with a Self-Loading Rifle (SLR), two rifles, a 12-bore gun, a grenade launcher, country made guns and explosives, from the encounter site. No security personnel sustained injuries in the gun battle.
On January 9, 2025, SFs, aided by drones, killed three wanted CPI-Maoist cadres in an encounter in the hilly terrains between the Paliguda and Gundarajgudem villages in Sukma District in the Bastar Division. The bodies were recovered by SFs along with a huge cache of arms and ammunition, including two Barrel Grenade Launchers (BGLs), a 12-bore rifle, three tiffin bombs, five BGL shells and a cache of explosives and Maoist-related items from the site. Police said that among the three killed in Sukma was IED expert Mahesh Korsaz, a Maoist ‘deputy commander’ in platoon no. 30, who was earlier a part of the People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA) Battalion 1 – the strongest armed group of the Maoists. Superintendent of Police (SP) Kiran G. Chavan disclosed that Korsaz was a mastermind in the 2023 Bedre attack [December 17, 2023, in which a Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) sub-inspector (SI) was killed and a constable was seriously injured] and the 2024 Jagargunda attack [November 3, 2024, in which two security personnel sustained injuries and their weapons looted]. Mahesh carried a bounty of INR 800,000 on his head. The two others, Madvi Naveen and Avlam Bheema, were ‘area committee members (ACMs)’ and carried a bounty of INR 500,000 each.
On January 6, 2025, eight security personnel of the District Reserve Guard (DRG) and a driver were killed on the Kutru-Bedre route in Bijapur District of the Bastar Division, when CPI-Maoist cadres triggered an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) blast and blew up their vehicle. The SFs were returning from an operation when the IED blew up the Scorpio SUV at Kutru in the Bastar region at around 2:15 PM [IST].
On January 5, 2025, five CPI-Maoist cadres in uniform and one SF trooper were killed during an encounter in the Abujhmadh area of Narayanpur District in the Bastar Division. Bodies of five Maoists were recovered along with automatic weapons, including an AK-47 rifle and an SLR, from the encounter site. Police suspect that senior cadres of the CPI-Maoist’s PLGA platoon number 32 of the Dandakaranya Special Zonal Committee (DKSZC) were among the deceased, though definitive identification was still to be made at the time of writing. Head Constable Sannu Karam of the Dantewada DRG was also killed.
On January 3, 2025, a CPI-Maoist cadre was shot dead in the Sornamal Forest area of Gariabandh District, in a joint interstate operation launched by the Chhattisgarh and Odisha Police. The body of the slain Maoist and automatic weapons were recovered from the site of the encounter.
Since the beginning of 2025, at least five incidents of clashes between the Maoists and SFs have already been recorded in Chhattisgarh, yielding 24 fatalities (one civilian, nine SF personnel, and 14 Maoists), where the ongoing battle to end Naxalism [Left Wing Extremism, LWE] is going on (data till January 12).
According to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), Chhattisgarh registered 313 fatalities, including 57 civilians, 21 SF personnel, and 235 Maoists, in Maoist-related violence in 2024. In 2023, there were a total of 86 fatalities, including 37 civilians, 26 SF personnel, and 23 Maoists. Thus, a spike of a whopping 263.95 per cent was documented in terms of overall fatalities in the state. Moreover, in 2024, Chhattisgarh continued to hold its top spot in terms of fatalities (313 out of a total of 400 nationwide) registered in a state during the course of a year, with Maharashtra a distant second, with 27 fatalities, and Jharkhand at third, with 26. Chhattisgarh has been in the top spot since 2014. Jharkhand secured the top spot in 2013, with 130 fatalities, as compared to 125 in Chhattisgarh, in second place.
Despite tremendous gains, civilians remain vulnerable to Maoist depredations, and faced an increased threat in the State in 2024, with fatalities in this category increasing from 37 to 57, or 54.05 per cent, in comparison to 2023. Civilian fatalities in 2024 were the highest recorded in the state since 2018, when they stood at 59. The 2024 civilian fatalities are the sixth highest recorded since March 6, 2000, when SATP started compiling data on LWE-linked insurgency in the state as well as in the country. A maximum of 186 fatalities was recorded in 2006. A low of six civilian fatalities was recorded in 2001. Civilian fatalities in Chhattisgarh have registered a cyclical trend, on year-on-year basis, since then.
In the fight against the extremists, there has been a sharp improvement in SF dominance on the ground in Chhattisgarh, with the SF:Maoist kill ratio in 2024 at 1:11.19, as compared to 1.13:1 in favour of the Maoists in 2023. Over the past quarter century, since 2000, the ratio has been in favour of SFs for 13 years and has favoured the Maoists in nine, while it was at par twice (2015 and 2021). No fatality was recorded in either category in 2000. The most positive ratio in favour of SFs was 1:20, in 2004. The overall kill ratio since 2020 has favoured the SFs at 1:1.32.
Meanwhile, at least 265 Maoists were arrested in the State in 2024, in addition to 134 in 2023. At least 76 Maoists were arrested in 2022, 132 in 2021, and 99 in 2020. In addition, 332 Maoists surrendered in 2024, in addition to 201 in 2023. There were 184 surrenders in 2022, 328 in 2021, and 238 in 2020.
The State recorded 24 major incidents (each involving three or more fatalities) in 2024, in addition to four in 2023. There were 76 exchanges of fire between SFs and the Maoists in 2024 in Chhattisgarh, as against 44 in 2023. The Maoists also orchestrated 32 incidents of IED blasts in 2024, in addition to 31 in 2023.
In total, 288 Maoist-linked incidents were reported in 2024 as compared to 246 such incidents in 2023.
Violence in the ‘Bastar Division’ which remained the major challenge for the State in particular and the country at large, also registered a spike of 287.34 per cent (from 79 fatalities in 2023 to 306 in 2024). The Bastar Division comprises seven of Chhattisgarh’s 33 Districts – Bastar, Bijapur, Dantewada, Kanker, Kondagaon, Narayanpur, and Sukma – in the southernmost region in the State.
According to the SATP database, Maoist-linked fatalities were reported from nine districts in 2024: Bijapur (102), Narayanpur (101), Sukma (39), Kanker (37), Dantewada (26), Dhamtari (two), Kondagaon (one), Mohla-Manpur-Ambagarh Chowki (one), and Raipur (one). Six of these nine Districts (excluding Dhamtari, Mohla-Manpur-Ambagarh Chowki and Raipur) fall in the troubled ‘Bastar Division’.
Fatalities were reported from 10 Districts in 2023: Bijapur (18), Dantewada (18), Sukma (17), Kanker (14), Narayanpur (12), Gariabandh (three), Kondagaon (two), Rajnandgaon (two), Mohla-Manpur-Ambagarh Chowki (one), and Dhamtari (one).
An analysis of underground and over-ground activities of the Maoists in 2024, indicated that two Districts (Bijapur and Narayanpur) remained extremely affected; three Districts (Dantewada, Kanker, and Sukma) were highly-affected; four (Dhamtari, Kondagaon, Mohla-Manpur-Ambagarh Chowki, and Raipur) were moderately affected; while Bastar, Gariabandh, Kabirdham, Jashpur, and Rajnandgaon, remained marginally affected. By comparison, in 2023, five Districts (Bijapur, Dantewada, Kanker, Narayanpur, and Sukma) were highly-affected; five (Dhamtari, Gariabandh, Kondagaon, Mohla-Manpur-Ambagarh Chowki, and Rajnandgaon) were moderately affected; and four (Bastar, Balrampur, Jashpur, and Khairagarh-Chhuikhadan-Gandai), were marginally affected.
The all-out fight against the Maoist rebels under the Vishnu Deo Sai Government has seen technology driven interventions, such as aerial surveillance and tracking mechanisms, as well as the setting up of security camps in hitherto inaccessible areas, as well as the facilitation of development projects in areas of erstwhile Maoist dominance. Most recently, on January 9, 2025, SFs launched a massive offensive against the Maoists, aided by drones. An unnamed security official attached to the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (UMHA) observed,
The UAVs are being used to launch offensives against the Maoists and also to keep an eye on the personnel conducting operations and area-domination exercises in rebel strongholds… But it’s still a big challenge as the rebels have total control inside the jungle.
Meanwhile, according to a December 9, 2024, report, the Chhattisgarh Government established a new security camp, Zidpalli 2, in the PLGA core zone of Zidpalli village in Bijapur District. The move is part of Chief Minister Sai’s flagship scheme, Niyad Nellanar (Your Good Village), aimed at enhancing security, infrastructure, and public services in Maoist-affected areas. Under the scheme, essential services such as medical care, ration outlets, schools, and electricity are being provided in insurgency-hit districts.
The National Investigation Agency (NIA) also took proactive action on 14 occasions against the Maoist rebels to contain their activities and influences. Most recently, on December 20, 2024, the NIA chargesheeted three CPI-Maoist cadres in Chhattisgarh for the murder of Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) leader Ratan Dubey (November 4, 2024). The trio, Sainuram Korram, Laluram Korram, and one armed cadre, were charged under sections of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA) in the supplementary chargesheet filed before the NIA Special Court at Jagdalpur in the Bastar District. The accused were found actively involved in the criminal conspiracy to kill Dubey. Sainuram Korram and Laluram Korram were arrested on June 27, 2024.
Earlier, on March 8, 2024, NIA took over the probe into approximately eight cases of violence associated with the CPI-Maoist, including the January ambush on a CRPF camp in Bijapur District, an IED blast in Kanker, and the killing of Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) leader Ratan Dubey in Narayanpur District. An official disclosed that NIA would also investigate the role of supporters of Madvi Hidma, the ‘commander’ of Battalion-I of the PLGA, who carries a reward of close to INR 4 million.
Moreover, on August 10, 2024, the Chhattisgarh Police arrested five so-called ‘urban Naxals’ – alleged overground supporters – identified as Sonaram Farsa (28), Vijay Jurri (32), Ramlal Karma (35), Vivek Singh (35), and Rajendra Kadti (30), for involvement in a CPI-Maoist extortion racket that collected at least INR 6 million for the insurgent network from the Bijapur and Mohla-Manpur-Ambagarh Chowki Districts. This money was used to buy supplies and also to book flight tickets for ‘tribal leader and Maoist sympathiser’ Sarju Tekam. Tekam was arrested from his home in Mohla-Manpur-Ambagarh Chowki on April 2, 2024, and charged under UAPA and the Explosives Act for possession of explosives, detonators and Maoist material. Jurri is from Raipur and the others are residents of Bijapur. They were arrested from various parts of the Mohla Manpur region, their area of operation. Police kept a watch on Vivek Singh and found that he was engaged in continuously supporting and strengthening the Naxalites’ urban network. According to Police, the Maoists had threatened tendu leaf contractors in the Bhairamgarh area (Bijapur district) in 2022 and demanded INR 10 million. Farsa, Jurri, Karma and Kadti were deputed to collect this extortion money and managed to extract INR 6 million from an officer. This cash made its way into the Maoist coffers.
On August 24, 2024, at a press conference after chairing a key security meet on anti-Naxalite operations in Chhattisgarh, Union Home Minister (UHM) Amit Shah proclaimed,
We will free India from Naxal violence by March 2026. The time has come for the final assault on Left Wing Extremism.
Again, on December 15, 2024, while addressing the President’s Police Colour Award function at the Police Parade Ground in Raipur, UHM Shah reiterated,
The state leadership, the chief minister, the home minister of the state, have taken a pledge and the Government of India is also committed to your pledge. Together, we will completely eradicate Naxalism from Chhattisgarh before March 31, 2026. We all are committed to free Chhattisgarh from the clutches of Naxalism before March 31, 2026.
The imposed deadline – to eradicate the menace of Naxalism from the state before March 31, 2026 – has resulted in over-reach and produced disasters such as the January 6, 2025, incident. Time and again, unforgivably, the same excuses have been given in the past past, after each tragedy. The state and its forces must, of course, be given a defined objective and target, but one that is aligned to the realities of the ground. The ‘complete eradication’ of the Maoist movement is not such as objective. While the movement is likely to be substantially contained over the coming year, occasional incidents by survivors cannot be discounted.
Moreover, Chhattisgarh continues to suffer critical gaps in the strength and quality in the State Police Force, which constitutes the first line of defence against any kind of internal challenge. According to the latest Bureau of Police Research and Development (BPR&D) data, as on January 1, 2023, there was a vacancy of 19.50 per cent in the State Police Force (sanctioned 80,135; actual 64,502). Police personnel per 100,000 population in Chhattisgarh currently stand at a sanctioned 266.79, while those actually available are 214.74. Worse, with an extraordinarily challenging terrain in large parts of state, the critical Police/Area Ratio (number of policemen per 100 square kilometres) is just 47.71, as against the national average of 65.14. Both the State and national averages on the Police/Area ratio are well below their sanctioned strength, at 59.27 and 82.82, respectively. Further, of a sanctioned strength of 142 apex Indian Police Service (IPS) Officers in the State, 23 posts, i.e., 16.19 per cent remained vacant, considerably weakening executive command of the Force. As against a sanctioned strength of 482 Police Stations, there were 474 in the State and, inexcusably, at least 24 of these had no telephones.
Despite suffering heavy losses, the Maoists have persevered, demonstrating significant fighting capabilities whenever there is any neglect on the part of the state’s Forces and administration. The rebels have, moreover, demonstrated significant endurance and capacities for revival, even in the face of near-comprehensive defeat. While the objective of their containment is rational and attainable, a measure of haste and artificial deadlines can only push the state’s Forces into sometimes ill-considered deployments and operations. Moreover, at a time when the SFs have established dominance across wide areas of past Maoist influence, it is necessary not to completely exclude the possibilities of a political outreach to end this enduring insurgency.
Weekly Fatalities: Major Conflicts in South Asia
January 6-12, 2025
Provisional data compiled from English language media sources.