Behind The India-China Talks: Unravelling Beijing’s Deceptive Long-Term Strategy – Analysis
Sun Tzu’s treatise on war offers many stratagems to deal with the enemy. He emphasises deception and patience, cautioning that the general who makes many calculations like a chess player is more likely to win. Unfortunately, endurance is in short supply when it comes to India-China dynamics, especially in the era of 24/7 news cycles.
In December 2024, the 23rd meeting of the Special Representatives (SRs) between India’s National Security Advisor, Ajit Doval, and China’s Foreign Minister, Wang Yi, took place after a hiatus of nearly five years. The SRs mechanism was constituted in an agreement in 2003, which mandated that ways to resolve the boundary question should be looked into from a political perspective. In the Indian readout, both Doval and Wang Yi underscored the overall India-China bilateral relationship was dependent on the maintenance of peace and tranquillity in border regions. Decks are being cleared for the Kailash Mansarovar pilgrimage in Tibet, trade in border areas, and data sharing on trans-border rivers.
The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs communique refers to the “six consensus”—developments related to the disengagement along the border—as a “solution”. It states that the border issue should be “handled appropriately”, and should not affect the development of bilateral relations. It cites efforts on both sides to arrive at a “mutually acceptable package solution” to the border issue, based on the SR accord on the boundary issue reached in 2005.
The Chinese readout also pledges that the two nations must empower the SRs framework, and strengthen coordination and cooperation in diplomatic and military negotiations. It also refers to the continuation of the SRs mechanism through a meeting in the next year, underlining that a stable China-India relationship is key to peace in Asia. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs assesses the SR mechanism’s revival as “hard-won”, giving an impression that it values efforts to normalise ties after the tense military standoff. Yet, like the generals listening to Sun Tzu’s counsel, Beijing had other calculations up its sleeve. While all along, China’s actions were classified as grey-zone warfare, academics are now increasingly debating the use of the term “ICAD”, denoting “illegal, coercive, aggressive and deceptive” behaviour, to explain Beijing’s tactics.
China is building on its ICAD strategy, as evidenced by its large hydro-power project on the Yarlung-Tsangpo river in Tibet, which becomes the Brahmaputra after it enters Arunachal Pradesh. New Delhi has conveyed its concerns to Beijing, insisting that the interests of lower riparian states like Bangladesh be protected. Furthermore, the Xinjiang Autonomous Region announced the formation of two counties in the Hotanprefecture, subsuming territory in Ladakh. This is in line with the cartographic-onslaught strategy under which China earlier unilaterally renamed towns in Arunachal Pradesh, to which it lays claims. Beijing has also published an official map showing large parts of Indian territory as part of China.
This renewed belligerence might be propelled by China’s calculations that New Delhi was too eager to reduce tensions with Beijing, and due to the important divergences in New Delhi and Washington D.C.’s strategic interests. Liu Zongyi, Director of the South Asia Research Center of the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, assesses that India’s motivation to mend fences with China is influenced primarily by financial and economic considerations.
First, he points to the fact that the military standoff in eastern Ladakh has drained India’s finances due to heightened investments in weapon purchases and physical infrastructure development, diverting New Delhi’s focus from the Indian Ocean.
Second, he adds that Western-led containment alliances around China had led to strategic competition between Washington and Beijing and that India was keen to use this opportunity to develop its economy, for which it needed China as a development partner.
Third, there is also a belief that India was relenting on its “xiè mò shā lǘ” [卸磨杀驴] attitude towards Chinese corporates, which roughly translates ‘to kill the donkey after the grinding is done’. The implication here is that New Delhi unjustly curbed Chinese firms doing business in India. Yuan Jirong, who covers India, as a correspondent for a Chinese media outlet, believes India-US compact is fraying due to divergent strategic interests.
First, he makes this argument based on an assessment by Washington that India was a “big country” pursuing its own interests, and it would never formally become an ally of the US, thus circumscribing US-India cooperation. Second, he also argues that India’s aspiration for global leadership will mean that it may challenge the US. Conversely, he also suggests that Washington’s goal is to encourage competition between the two developing powers that are rising parallelly, thus letting its global hegemony continue.
This pessimistic outlook on India-US relations does not seem to be rooted in reality, given that US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan visited Delhi in January 2025, meeting the Indian leadership to take stock of the “Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership” between the two nations in sectors like technology, defence, space, civil nuclear, clean energy, semiconductors, and artificial intelligence (AI). Washington has also announced its intent to remove hurdles to cooperation in the field of civil nuclear, including removing regulations for Indian scientific establishments, under which they are subjected to export restrictions with respect to specific goods and know-how.
During Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping at the October 2024 BRICS summit in Russia, Modi affirmed that stable India-China relations would contribute to a multi-polar Asia and a multi-polar world. Chinese strategists feel that India’s conceptualisation of a “multipolar Asia” as the basis of a “multipolar world”, places India on an equal footing with China in Asia, thereby hindering Chinese ambitions to become the dominant power in Asia. Beijing feels that given the power differential between the two, India would be incentivised to join other countries to check and balance China. Thus, China would prefer to keep the border issue alive, and its projection of a rapprochement is only a ruse to further its ICAD strategy.