Arakan Army’s Growing Influence In Myanmar: Implications For The Rohingyas – Analysis
In a significant turn of events, after days of relentless battles, the Arakan Army (AA) seized control of the Maungdaw and Taungup townships, securing a 270-kilometre (km) stretch along Myanmar’s border with Bangladesh last month. This victory cements the dominance of the AA and its political wing, the United League of Arakan (ULA), in Rakhine State, and shifts the region’s dynamics, putting the junta on the back foot. The capture of hundreds of soldiers, weapons, and the infamous Brigadier General Thurein Tun marks a significant blow to the junta.
The subsequent fall of Ann, the Western Military Command headquarters, was yet again a historic setback. It marks the second military command being taken over by resistance forces, after the capture of the Northeastern Command in August last year. With AA gaining control of 14 of Rakhine’s 17 townships, and the junta scrambling to retain its grip, the resistance forces now control a total of over 93 towns and cities, six critical border trading posts, two key airports, Thandwe in Rakhine and Lashio, and several key connectivity projects with neighbouring nations. The fighting to capture the remaining territories is still ongoing.
As the AA solidifies its hold over Rakhine, its relationship with the Rohingya community remains fraught. The junta’s practice of forcibly conscripting Rohingyas into its fight against the AA has worsened tensions. Many Rohingya conscripts have been captured or killed, further entangling the displaced people in a conflict that they did not initiate. For the stateless and marginalised Rohingya, the AA’s rise presents new uncertainties—whether it will lead to coexistence or deepen divisions is an open question in Rakhine’s turbulent future.
Rise of the AA
Rakhine State, a region marked by economic underdevelopment and ethnic diversity, has long been a focal point of Myanmar’s complex political and social landscape. Among the various forces shaping its future, the AA has emerged as a key player, commanding significant territorial control and public confidence.
Formed in 2009, the AA has grown into one of Myanmar’s most powerful ethnic armed groups, with an estimated 30,000 soldiers. There are three reasons for this growth. First is the group’s dynamic leadership, with figures like Major General Twan, Mrat Naing, and Brigadier General Nyo Twan Awng, who have built a cohesive team, incorporating leaders from earlier revolutionary movements, thus making the AA more unified than its predecessors.
Secondly, its “Arakan Dream 2020” and the “Way of Rakhita” vision for self-governance have rallied public support, positioning the AA as a symbol of hope for Rakhine nationalism. Frustration with political suppression, such as the marginalisation of Rakhine aspirations by the National League for Democracy Party (NLD), and incidents like the 2018 Mrauk U protests have further fuelled AA’s rise as an alternative to traditional political avenues.
Thirdly, the AA has also gained strength through alliances. Early Kachin Independence Army (KIA) support provided training and combat experience to the paramilitary group. At the same time, ties with the Northern Alliance and backing from the United Wa State Army (UWSA) have bolstered its resources and operations.
Stance towards Rohingyas
The AA has a complicated stance towards the Rohingya. While it doesn’t openly target or blame the Rohingya in most of its statements, it has historically expressed strong resentment towards them, reflecting broader tensions in Rakhine State.
Initially, the AA referred to Rohingya militants as “terrorists” and criticised them after attacks in 2016, vowing to protect Rakhine State. However, over time, the AA shifted its tone to avoid being seen as anti-Rohingya or promoting religious or ethnic hatred. For example, in 2020, the AA stated that it represents all people in Rakhine, regardless of religion or ethnicity, and emphasised its respect for human rights and religious freedom.
At the same time, the AA denies accusations from the Myanmar military that it collaborates with the Rohingya armed group, the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA). The AA instead focuses on its fight against the military forces and has always blamed the central government for creating divisions between Rakhine communities and the Rohingya.
Overall, the AA has avoided overt hostility toward the Rohingya and it maintains a cautious attitude. Its actions and rhetoric are shaped by both local tensions and the need to maintain an international reputation, as any violence against the Rohingya could harm its standing globally.
Following the coup and Operation 1027, the ULA has demonstrated goodwill, and its decision to lift travel restrictions for the Rohingya in central Rakhine State and Paletwa has earned support from some quarters. Concerns, however, about the well-being of the Muslim community have intensified, particularly amidst ongoing violence in Rakhine. Reports indicate counter-attacks on Rohingya households by the AA, allegedly instigated by the military junta, which has reportedly used the Rohingyas to target the AA. The heightened hostility of the ethnic armed organisation (EAO) toward the Rohingya can be partly attributed to a shifting military dynamic. Specifically, three prominent Rohingya armed groups—ARSA, the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO) and the Arakan Rohingya Army (ARA)—are reportedly aiding the junta in its conflict with the AA, and are accused of forcibly recruiting youth from Myanmar and even Bangladesh refugee camps, worsening the already fragile situation and amplifying humanitarian concerns in the region.
Adding to the complexity, the AA’s recent use of the derogatory term “Bengali Muslim” to describe the Rohingya in its August 2024 statement denying allegations of harming the Rohingya with arson attacks echoes rhetoric historically used to delegitimise the Rohingya, by framing them as foreign immigrants. This narrative has been instrumental in denying them citizenship and perpetuating their marginalisation, deepening mistrust and complicating efforts for peace in Rakhine.
Situation in Bangladesh
Bangladesh has been hosting the Rohingya population since 1978. It has always maintained a strict policy of repatriation to Myanmar through negotiation with the Myanmar regime in power, despite its shortsightedness in looking into the welfare of the displaced people. However, the current political changes within Bangladesh and the civil war situation at Rakhine, with no progress on fundamental issues of citizenship, safety, and the repatriation of a million displaced people sheltered in Bangladesh (who the Bangladesh government refers to as Forcibly Displaced Myanmar Nationals), there seems no viable resolution in sight.
Amid declining donor funding, conditions in Rohingya camps have worsened, with only 53 percent of the US$852.4 million required for 2024 raised by September. Reduced food rations, deplorable living conditions with landslides, fires, and limited opportunities have pushed many into illegal activities, whether knowingly or unknowingly, raising security concerns.
Bangladesh’s interim government, led by Muhammad Yunus, is reevaluating its Rohingya policy after seven years of failed repatriation attempts. Faced with the arrival of 60,000 additional displaced people and shifting dynamics in Myanmar and Rakhine, the interim government has indicated an interest in semi-formal engagements with non-state actors like the AA while maintaining diplomatic ties with Myanmar’s regime and seeking regional cooperation from India, China, Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia.
Khalilur Rahman, the High Representative for the Rohingya crisis and Priority Issues, plans a UN-backed conference later this year to mobilise funds, refocus global attention, and explore a UN-guaranteed safe zone in Rakhine for repatriation. This dual approach reflects the complexity of balancing humanitarian needs with geopolitical realities.
Road ahead
For the Rohingya, caught between a repressive military regime and an ascendant AA, the future remains uncertain. The AA’s rise may offer a glimmer of hope for better governance in Rakhine, but the group’s relationship with the Rohingya has been marked by mistrust and sporadic violence. Whether this new power dynamic will lead to coexistence or further conflict depends on whether the AA can embrace inclusivity and recognise the rights and aspirations of the Rohingya community in a post-junta Rakhine. For now, the region’s destiny hangs in a delicate balance, with the Rohingya still searching for a place to call their own in a land long shadowed by strife.