SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Jharkhand: Insurgency Interrupted
On January 22, 2025, two Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist), cadres, including one female, were killed in an encounter with Security Forces (SFs) during a joint search operation by the Bokaro District Police and the 209th Battalion of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF)’s elite CoBRA (Commando Battalion for Resolute Action) unit in the Tejnarayanpur Police Station area of Bokaro District. Acting on specific intelligence about the presence of an armed Maoist gang in the Jarwa and Banshi Forests of Upar Ghat, the SFs cordoned off the area. As the search progressed, the Maoists opened fire, which led to retaliation from the SFs. Following the operation, SFs recovered a cache of weapons, including one AK-47 rifle and two INSAS (Indian Small Arms System) assault rifles, and other items belonging to the Maoists. The slain Maoists were later identified as Shanti and Manoj Baske. Shanti, a resident of Dhawaiyatand village under Khukhara Police Station in the Giridih district, was a CPI-Maoist ‘area commander’, while Manoj hailed from the Pirtand Police Station area in the same district. The operation also followed the arrest of Shanti’s husband, Ranvijay Mahato, a wanted Maoist with a bounty of INR 1.5 million on his head, from the Chandrapura Police Station area. His interrogation provided crucial information about the Maoist gang’s movements in the region.
On January 7, 2025, a minor girl was killed in an improvised explosive device (IED) blast allegedly carried out by the CPI-Maoist in the Saranda Forest area at Jareikela in West Singhbhum District. The incident occurred when the seven-year-old girl went into the forest near Tirilposi and Thalkobad villages to collect firewood and accidentally stepped on the IED planted by the Maoists. The minor girl’s aunt also sustained injuries in the explosion. Superintendent of Police (SP) Ashutosh Shekhar disclosed that the IED was planted by Maoists to target SFs.
Thus, three fatalities, including one civilian and two Naxalites (Left Wing Extremists, LWEs), have been registered in the State in 2025, thus far (data till January 26). During the corresponding period of 2024, one fatality (civilian) was recorded.
According to partial data collated by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), at least 26 fatalities, including 12 civilians, three Security Force (SF) personnel and 11 Naxalites, were registered in Jharkhand in LWE-linked violence in 2024, as against 33 such fatalities, including 14 civilians, five SF personnel and 14 Naxalites, in 2023. This was the third lowest number of overall fatalities registered in the State since March 6, 2000, when SATP started compiling data. A previous low of 21 was recorded in 2022, and 25 in 2021. Overall fatalities in the State have been declining since 2019, barring 2023. A total of 64 fatalities was recorded in 2019, 28 in 2020, 25 in 2021, and 21 in 2022. There were 33 fatalities in 2023, declining to 26 in 2024. A maximum of 200 fatalities was registered in 2009.
Providing a sense of respite, the number of civilian fatalities declined, though marginally, from 14 in 2023 to 12 in 2024. Civilian fatalities have been following a cyclical trend, and killings in this category have remained below 20 since 2019. There were eight fatalities in in this category in 2020, increasing to 11 in 2021, dropping to six in 2022, up again to 14 in 2023, and down at 12 in 2024. A maximum of 79 civilians killed was recorded in 2011.
Losses among SFs also declined marginally: from five in 2023 to three in 2024, yielding a positive SF:Naxalite kill ratio of 1:3.66 in 2024, as against the relatively modest 1:2.8 achieved during 2023. There has been no fatality in the SF category in 2025, so far. Significantly, a positive overall kill ratio of 1:1.44 has been maintained in favour of SF since 2000.
LWE fatalities in 2024 fell by 21.42 per cent, as compared to 2023, from 14 to 11. LWE fatalities in 2024 were the second lowest number in the State during the course of a year, since 2000. 11 LWE cadres were also killed in 2000. A previous low of eight was registered in 2021. A maximum of 61 fatalities in this category was recorded twice, in 2008 and 2009.
Meanwhile, at least 79 LWEs were arrested in 2024 as against 114 such arrests in 2023. At least 195 LWEs were arrested in 2022 and 141 in 2021. One arrest has already been recorded in 2025. Mounting SF pressure also resulted in the surrender of 26 LWEs in 2024, as against 33 in 2023. There were 18 surrenders in 2022 and 17 in 2021. No surrender has been recorded in the current year, as yet.
The fall in overall fatalities from 33 to 26 was also reflected in the decline in the incidents of killing, which fell from 28 to 18. Other parameters of violence also followed a declining trend. At least eight incidents of arson carried out against civilian construction companies were recorded in 2024, as against 13 in 2023. Moreover, just four incidents of explosion were orchestrated by the rebels in 2024, as against 26 in 2023. Furthermore, the Maoists issued bandh (general shut down strike) calls on one occasion in 2024, as against three such occasions in 2023. One major incident (involving three or more fatalities) was registered in 2024, as well in 2023.
Significantly, the number of Districts from where killings were reported also declined. Out of a total of 24 Districts in Jharkhand, fatalities were reported from five in 2024: West Singhbhum (17); Chatra (six); and Hazaribagh, Latehar, and Lohardaga (one each). Eight Districts recorded such fatalities in 2023 – West Singhbhum (19); Chatra (six); Gumla and Palamu (two each); Bokaro, Hazaribagh, Latehar and Ranchi (one each).
According to SATP data for 2024, based on assessments of underground and over-ground activities of the Naxalites, one district – West Singhbhum – remained highly affected; while, four – Chatra, Hazaribagh, Latehar, and Lohardaga – were moderately affected; and, eight – Bokaro, Garhwa, Giridih, Gumla, Khunti, Palamu, Ramgarh, and Ranchi – were in the marginally affected category. By comparison in 2023, West Singhbhum had been flagged as highly affected; while, seven districts – Bokaro, Chatra, Gumla, Hazaribagh, Latehar, Palamu, and Ranchi – were moderately affected; and, nine districts – Dumka, East Singhbhum, Garhwa, Giridih, Khunti, Koderma, Lohardaga, Simdega, and Ramgarh – were marginally affected.
The State also saw a declining impact of the People’s Liberation Front of India (PLFI), Tritiya Prastuti Committee (TPC), Jharkhand Jan Mukti Parishad (JJMP) and other lesser-known CPI-Maoist splinters.
The National Investigation Agency (NIA) has taken several steps against LWE elements in Jharkhand. Most recently, on January 4, 2025, the NIA conducted searches at nine locations in West Singhbhum District, targeting CPI-Maoist overground workers (OGWs). The raids led to the seizure of mobile phones, memory cards, SIM cards, and other incriminating materials. The investigation stems from an earlier recovery of INR 105,000 in cash and various items belonging to Maoist ‘politburo’ member Misir Besra. The recovered items, found buried between Husipi and Rajabhasa villages, included a walkie-talkie, a tablet, a power bank, a radio set, a ‘levy’ (extortion money) collection receipt, gelatin sticks, and other materials.
On the same day, elsewhere in the Bokaro District, the NIA conducted a search operation at eight locations in connection with the February 2024 attack on SFs by Maoist cadres and recovered digital devices such as laptops, mobile phones and memory cards, along with SIM cards, pocket diaries and incriminating documents. The targeted suspects used to provide logistical support and facilitate extortion of ‘levy’. The case RC-01/2024/NIA-RNC related to the unlawful activities of CPI-Maoist leaders/cadres and the attack unleashed by the outfit on SFs in the forest area under the Chatro-Chatti Police Station in Bokaro District. On the day of the incidents, ‘commanders’ of the banned organisation camped in the forest area (Sundaro Pahari) along with 15-20 rebel cadres to conspire to commit crimes, recruit youth, collect ‘levies’, and attack SFs.
On January 3, 2025, NIA arrested Bachha Singh aka Bachha Babu Singh from Govindpur (B) in Bokaro District, a key accused involved in collecting money to promote the CPI-Maoist ideology and strengthen its activities in Jharkhand and other places. NIA, which took over the case from the Anandpur Police in Jharkhand in August 2023, found that Singh was the ‘secretary’ of the Majdoor Sanghatan Samiti (MSS), an organisation proscribed by the Jharkhand state government. The case was originally registered by the local Police in July 2022 following the arrest of three CPI-Maoist cadres in the Chaibasa District of Jharkhand, when they were on their way to meet Misir Besra, the CPI-Maoist ‘politburo’ member, to deliver letters written by Maoists Lajim Ansari and Saurabh.
More significantly, on January 15, 2025, in order to ensure strict action against the Naxalites, Jharkhand Director General of Police (DGP) Anurag Gupta directed officials to confiscate the properties of the members of CPI-Maoist or its splinter groups, who were absconding in various cases, and also to ensure action is taken after identifying properties acquired through illegal sources. DGP Gupta directed all SPs to review Naxal-related cases and ensure that FIRs (First Information Reports) were lodged in every case where a victim complained of any threat by the Maoists or other criminal groups. He also instructed SPs to review the cases registered in a Maoist affected districts related to arson and vandalism by the red rebels or any criminal groups and ensure prompt action. Gupta stated,
All SPs will prepare a profile of each member of Maoists and criminal groups and ensure to inform their subordinate officers and personnel on the basis of ‘Know Your Enemy and Know Your Friend’.
Despite a significant drop in rebel activities in the State, the extremists have not given up their efforts to engineer a revival. To keep themselves relevant and make their presence felt, they pasted posters on the walls of Somar Mahali’s ration shop near Giddi Basti Tehratad turn in Ramgarh District, on November 6, 2024. The CPI-Maoist posters declared, “Establish your rights on water, forest, and land through armed struggle and not votes.” On one side of the poster was the declaration of Adivasi Gaurav Diwas (Tribal Pride Day); on the other side, the poster declared that the tribals would be massacred under the Centre’s Operation Kagar and reiterated that the death penalty would be given to ‘police informers.’ In another poster, the Naxalites stated that the election season was in the air, [Jharkhand Assembly elections were held in November 2024 – the first phase on November 13 and the second on November 20], the ‘election frog’ had come, there was a counter-revolutionary war against the people, so the people’s resistance movement must be intensified and expanded, and the work of strengthening the PLGA joint front on a large scale must be intensified, as the Maoists would fight, arms in hand, for true respect and people’s rights. The Maoists demanded that the people boycott Jharkhand’s sixth Assembly elections, and also that the government ensure that 90 per cent of jobs in coal mining companies go to locals. They declared that ‘New India’ and ‘Developed India’ were lies, and that, in order to build a new democratic India, a large number of young men and women should be recruited into the PLGA. The Maoists demanded, further, that coal mining should be stopped until proper compensation and permanent employment was given to the landowners; that the Bhartiya Janata Party’s (BJP’s) conspiracy to build a fascist Hindu nation under the guise of the slogan ‘New India’ and ‘Developed India’ be politically exposed; and that the class struggle and guerilla war should be expanded and intensified.
Some of the LWE leadership elements are still on the Jharkhand Police-rewarded Naxalite list Naxalite list Jharkhand Police. These elements have managed to evade the Police dragnet till now. Of the 71 fugitive extremists who find their names in the list, at least four top-ranking Maoist leaders (Misir Besra aka Bhaskar aka Sunirmal ji aka Sagar; Prayag Manjhi aka Vivek aka Phuchna aka Nago Manjhi aka Karan Da aka Letra; Asim Mandal aka Akash aka Timir; and Anal da aka Tufan aka Patiram Manjhi aka Patiram Marandi aka Ramesh, carry head bounties of INR 10 million; another six have a head bounty of INR 2.5 million; 12 with INR 1.5 million; nine with INR 1 million; 16 with INR 500,000; 13 with INR 200,000; and 11 with INR 100,000.
Significant deficits in the State Police Force persist in terms of strength and quality. According to Bureau of Police Research and Development (BPR&D) data, as of January 1, 2023, there was a vacancy of 20,937 personnel (25.26 percent of the sanctioned strength of 82,854) in the state. The state police-population ratio (policemen per hundred thousand population) was also significantly lower than the sanctioned strength of 211.04, at 157.71, though slightly higher than the national average of 154.84. The sanctioned national average was 196.88. Of a total of 564 police stations in the state, 211 had no telephones, 31 had no wireless/mobiles, and 47 had no vehicles. Further, of a sanctioned strength of 149 apex Indian Police Service (IPS) officers in the state, 36 posts (24.16 per cent) remained vacant, considerably compromising the executive direction of the force.
The Jharkhand Police has been able to engineer a noticeable improvement on the ground, in containing the LWE challenge. Nevertheless, a significant combat zone remains in the state, where the Naxalites continue to struggle to regain their lost areas of dominance.
Meghalaya: Contentious Path
On January 22, 2025, the Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council (HNLC) accused the Meghalaya Police of using the surrendered cadres as weapons against it. In a statement, HNLC ‘general secretary-cum-publicity secretary’ Sainkupar Nongtraw claimed the government’s actions during and after the peace talks with the HNLC demonstrate “bad faith diplomacy.” He added,
Summoning our leaders during negotiations was not a step toward peace but an act of coercion, proving they sought control, not dialogue. Now, targeting lower-ranking members is a deliberate attempt to intimidate and fragment our movement – a textbook example of the divide-and-rule strategy.
Earlier, on January 20, 2025, HNLC issued a new ‘manifesto’ demanding recognition of a ‘semi-sovereign status’ for the Hynniewtrep people, while accusing the Indian government of violating decades-old agreements. The 10-chapter ‘manifesto’ focuses on violations of the 1947 Standstill Agreement and claims the Instrument of Accession (IOA) was signed under coercion. “These agreements, intended to safeguard our autonomy, were signed under coercion and amidst grave injustices perpetrated by the Government of India,” the manifesto states. The HNLC presented four key demands to the central government, including acknowledgement of the IOA violations and direct dialogue for autonomy restoration. The manifesto further outlines a vision for self-governance, including control over land resources and cultural practices.
Before issuing a new manifesto, on January 12, 2025, the HNLC condemned the Meghalaya Government’s plan to establish land banks under the Investment Meghalaya Agency (IMA). In a statement, the HNLC alleged that the Meghalaya government’s assurances regarding the protection of indigenous land rights are misleading and pose a serious threat to the autonomy and territorial rights of the Hynniewtrep people. It expressed concern that the IMA’s mandate to purchase and manage land directly undermines the Land Transfer Act, which aims to protect indigenous lands from encroachment. The HNLC urged all indigenous communities, traditional leaders, and well-wishers to stand united in defense of their ancestral lands, asserting that they will not surrender their rightful control over their land to the highest bidder.
On November 14, 2024, the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (UMHA) declared HNLC, an insurgent outfit based in Meghalaya, a banned organisation for five years due to its involvement in violent activities and actions that threaten India’s sovereignty and integrity. The UMHA notification declared that the Union Government was of the view that the insurgent group had declared its aim for the secession of areas in Meghalaya primarily inhabited by the Khasi and Jaintia tribes, and that the group continued to intimidate civilians to extort funds on behalf of the organisation. “The HNLC, along with all its factions, wings, and front organisations of Meghalaya, has been involved in such activities that are prejudicial to the sovereignty and integrity of India,” the notification read. Later, on December 8, 2024, the UMHA established a judicial tribunal to review the ban on HNLC. The group was designated as unlawful under the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA), 1967, due to its violent actions, links with other insurgents, and 48 criminal cases, including bombings, between November 2019 and June 2024.
It is pertinent to recall here that, on June 24, 2023, tripartite peace talks between the Centre, the Meghalaya Government and HNLC began at Umiam near Shillong in the Ri Bhoi District of Meghalaya. HNLC demanded the withdrawal of all criminal charges and sought amnesty for its cadres, to pave the way for successful talks. Sadon Blah, representing HNLC, asserted,
The general amnesty demanded includes withdrawal of all cases against the cadres, including a case against four top HNLC leaders who have been charge sheeted by the NIA. The general amnesty will pave the way for the peace negotiations to move forward.
However, within a few months, on August 12, 2023, HNLC threatened to withdraw from ongoing peace talks with the Meghalaya Government if attempts were made to impose terms on them. The outfit asserted that it operated independently and was not subject to governmental authority. Later, on December 31, 2023, HNLC withdrew from the tripartite peace talks. HNLC’s ‘general secretary cum publicity secretary’ Sainkupar Nongtraw declared, “The purpose of this communication is to formally announce the decision of the HNLC to withdraw from the negotiation table. This decision has been made in response to the government’s lack of seriousness in addressing our core demands.” Days later, on January 8, 2024, the Meghalaya government spokesperson and Cabinet Minister Ampareen Lyngdoh reiterated that the state government remained committed to peace talks with HNLC, though no positive developments emerged, and ultimately UMHA banned the outfit.
Despite significant government efforts to foster peace, including dialogue and conditional amnesty offers, HNLC’s withdrawal from negotiations highlights deep-rooted grievances and mistrust.
The outfit, however, has failed to create significant disturbances in the state over the past couple of years. Other prominent insurgent groups in Meghalaya – the Garo National Liberation Army (GNLA), Achik National Volunteer Council (ANVC) and Achik National Volunteer Council-Bilash Marak (ANVC-B) – have also become inactive on the ground. While GNLA had more or less been neutralised in the aftermath of Operation Hill Storm between July 2014 and September 2016, ANVC and ANVC-B signed Memorandums of Settlement (MoS) with the Government in 2014 and dissolved themselves. The last killing linked to GNLA was reported on February 24, 2018, when the group’s then ‘commander-in-chief’, Sohan D. Shira, was killed in an encounter by Meghalaya Police at Dobu A’chakpek in the East Garo Hills District.
Indeed, the security situation in the state has improved considerably. According to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), Meghalaya has not recorded any insurgency-related fatalities since September 14, 2021, when an Over Ground Worker (OGW) of the United Achik Liberation Army (UALA) and A’chik Songna An’pachakgipa Kotok (ASAK) was killed near Tura in West Garo Hills District. The last civilian fatality occurred on May 12-13, 2019, when a villager near the Indo-Bangladesh border in Lapalang village, East Khasi Hills District, was killed by insurgents. The most recent Security Force (SF) fatality was on February 18, 2018, when Jonathone N. Sangma, a National Congress Party (NCP) candidate, and two security personnel were killed in an ambush involving an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) at Samanda, East Garo Hills.
Meghalaya experienced its peak insurgency in 1997, recording 495 fatalities. There was a peak of 266 civilian deaths in 1993 and 111 SFs fatalities in 1997. Fatalities remained in triple digits between 1992 and 2000, but dropped into double digits between 2001 and 2016.
Over the past eight years, between 2017 and 2024, there were no fatalities in four years – 2020, 2022, 2023 and 2024, while there were eight in 2017, seven in 2018, one in 2019 and two in 2021. Of the total of 18 fatalities during this period, GNLA was linked to 13, HNLC and UALA to two each, and one to the National Democratic Front of Bodoland-Saraigowra (NDFB-S).
However, HNLC was suspected to be responsible for at least six of the 21 IED blasts that occurred in Meghalaya between 2017 and 2024. GNLA was responsible for one of these, while the perpetrators of the remaining 14 IED detonations are yet unidentified. The last explosion took place, on March 14, 2024, at Shillong City Bus Syndicate near the Harijan Colony in Them Lew Mawlong in East Khasi Hills District. The HNLC statement read, “We claim responsibility for the IED blast at Them Metor (Harijan Colony) on the night of March 9. The Budnar Shadow Squad (BSS), which operates as the special forces of the HNLC, was responsible for carrying out this blast.” One civilian was injured in the incident.
While HNLC thus remains a contentious entity in Meghalaya, the unfenced Indo-Bangladesh border compounds security concerns. Disputes over fencing have delayed border management, allowing for illegal infiltration.
Meghalaya’s history of insurgency, ongoing challenges with banned groups such as HNLC, and the vulnerable border collectively underscore the need for robust governance, sustained dialogue, and effective security strategies, to ensure long-term stability.
Weekly Fatalities: Major Conflicts in South Asia
January 20-26, 2025
Provisional data compiled from English language media sources.