AMAN 2025: Pakistan’s Naval Diplomacy Or China’s Strategic Chess Move? – Analysis

As the Pakistan-led AMAN 2025 multinational naval exercise concluded this week in the Arabian Sea, its significance extends far beyond the official narrative of “Together for Peace.” While the exercise brought together over 60 participating nations, including the United States, China, and Bangladesh, its deeper geopolitical ramifications highlights China’s growing influence in South Asia’s maritime security architecture.

At first glance, AMAN appears to be a multilateral confidence-building initiative, fostering international naval cooperation. However, the increasing dominance of China within the exercise, coupled with Pakistan’s economic and military dependence on Beijing, raises pressing questions about AMAN’s true strategic intent. Rather than serving as a neutral forum for maritime collaboration, AMAN 2025 exemplifies how Pakistan is enabling China’s steady encroachment into the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).

AMAN’s Evolution: From Maritime Cooperation to Strategic Instrument

The AMAN series, first launched in 2007, was initially conceived as a platform to address maritime security challenges, anti-piracy operations, and humanitarian assistance coordination. Over time, however, the exercise has evolved into a geopolitical tool that reflects Pakistan’s shifting alliances and growing dependence on China. This year’s exercise witnessed the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) making its strongest showing yet, sending a naval formation including the Type 052D guided-missile destroyer Baotou and the Type 903A replenishment ship Gaoyouhu. Pakistan’s Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral Naveed Ashraf, personally visited the Chinese warship, reinforcing the symbolism of deepening China-Pakistan naval cooperation.

While Pakistan portrays AMAN as an inclusive platform, highlighting the participation of NATO members such as the United States and Turkey, the reality is more complex. The increasing presence of the PLAN in AMAN exercises demonstrates Beijing’s ability to institutionalize its role in South Asian naval affairs under the pretense of regional cooperation. In AMAN 2025, PLAN fielded one of the largest contingents, second only to Pakistan, signaling China’s determination to integrate itself into regional security mechanisms.

Pakistan’s Maritime Dependence on China

Pakistan’s financial and military reliance on China has grown dramatically in recent years, with Beijing serving as Islamabad’s largest arms supplier and principal economic backer through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Over 75% of Pakistan’s defence imports between 2018 and 2022 came from China, including advanced warships, submarines, and missile systems.

Chinese-built warships dominate Pakistan’s navy, including the Type 054A/P frigates and Hangor-class submarines, which significantly enhance Pakistan’s naval capabilities while fostering greater PLAN-Pakistan Navy interoperability. The recent induction of Chinese-made J-10C fighters into Pakistan’s Air Force further underscores the growing military dependence on Beijing.

Gwadar Port, a flagship project under CPEC, is quietly transforming into a strategic outpost for Chinese maritime operations, offering Beijing a foothold in the Arabian Sea. With over $62 billion invested in CPEC projects, China has effectively locked Pakistan into a long-term strategic partnership that extends beyond infrastructure and into military cooperation. Pakistan’s economic crisis has further tightened Beijing’s grip, forcing Islamabad to accommodate China’s strategic ambitions in the Indian Ocean in return for financial lifelines. By serving as a willing host for China’s naval expansion in AMAN 2025, Pakistan effectively cements its status as Beijing’s key partner in counterbalancing India’s regional influence.

Strategic Implications for India and the Indo-Pacific

For India, the growing China-Pakistan maritime nexus poses a direct challenge to its strategic position in the IOR. While New Delhi has traditionally dominated South Asian waters, China’s systematic expansion through AMAN exercises, naval bases in Djibouti, Hambantota, and Gwadar, and regular submarine deployments in the IOR signals a shift in regional power dynamics.

The participation of Bangladesh’s BNS Samudra Joy in AMAN 2025 is particularly significant. This marks the first time in over a decade that Dhaka has sent a major warship to a Pakistan-hosted naval exercise. Given China’s role as Bangladesh’s largest defense supplier, accounting for nearly 74% of Dhaka’s arms imports, Bangladesh’s involvement in AMAN signals a growing tilt towards Beijing’s regional security architecture.

Bangladesh’s decision to join the exercise raises concerns about China’s long-term influence over smaller South Asian navies, potentially drawing them into Beijing’s strategic orbit at India’s expense. For the broader Indo-Pacific, AMAN 2025 exposes the limitations of the U.S. and its allies in countering China’s soft power in multilateral naval diplomacy. While the U.S. Navy participated in the exercise, Washington risks legitimizing China’s growing influence by engaging in events that subtly reinforce Beijing’s leadership in regional security frameworks.

China’s Long-Term Maritime Strategy in the IOR

AMAN 2025 is not an isolated event; it fits within China’s broader strategy of establishing a permanent maritime presence in the IOR, where it has historically had limited operational reach. Since 2008, China has steadily expanded its presence in the Indian Ocean under the pretext of anti-piracy operations. Djibouti, Sri Lanka’s Hambantota Port, and Pakistan’s Gwadar Port provide Beijing with a “String of Pearls” for logistical support and power projection. PLAN submarines have made periodic appearances in the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea, signaling an intent to challenge India’s maritime dominance.

A lesser-known but significant aspect of China’s strategy is its seabed mapping operations in the Indian Ocean. Over the past decade, China has deployed multiple research vessels, such as Xiangyanghong 06 and Shiyan 6, to conduct detailed hydrographic surveys. These surveys, conducted under the pretext of scientific research, are crucial for China’s submarine operations, as they help map underwater topography, identify potential submarine routes, and enhance PLAN’s anti-submarine warfare capabilities. The Xiangyanghong series vessels alone have conducted over several missions in the Indian Ocean, including unexplained surveys near India’s Andaman and Nicobar Islands. By embedding itself into Pakistan-led naval initiatives, China is creating a low-cost, high-impact mechanism to integrate South Asian navies into its sphere of influence while using exercises like AMAN to familiarize itself with regional waters and potential conflict zones.

What’s Next?

As AMAN 2025 concludes, its legacy is less about maritime security and more about China’s strategic maneuvering in South Asia. While Pakistan continues to project the exercise as a symbol of inclusive naval diplomacy, it is increasingly clear that Beijing is the real winner. By leveraging Pakistan’s economic and military dependence, China has successfully expanded its footprint in the IOR under the guise of multilateral naval cooperation.

For India, the challenge is no longer just about countering China’s presence in the South China Sea but about confronting an assertive Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean. The broader Indo-Pacific, including the U.S. and its allies, must recognize that China’s engagement in AMAN is not merely symbolic but part of a long-term strategy to reshape South Asia’s maritime order. AMAN 2025 serves as a stark reminder that China is no longer just a distant maritime power; it is now a direct actor in shaping South Asia’s naval future.