Internal Rifts And External Threats: The Taliban’s Growing Crisis – Analysis
The assassination of Khalil ur-Rehman Haqqani, the Minister for Refugee and Repatriation in the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA), on 11 December 2024 in Kabul, marked the first high-profile killing of a Taliban official since the Taliban’s return to power in August 2021.
The key figure of the Haqqani Network died in a suicide attack on ministry premises as he was exiting his office after offering afternoon prayers. The attack, claimed by the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) via its Telegram channel, highlights ISKP’s capacity to target senior Taliban leadership. The killing not only underscores the growing security threats posed by the ISKP but also raises questions about the Taliban’s ability to maintain internal stability and security.
Since the Taliban’s return to power, the Emir, Mullah Habiatullah Akhundzada, has been issuing decrees to expand his control over the group and consolidate power within the government. Recurring instances of Taliban ministers voicing their opposition to the Emir’s policies have exposed internal fractures, creating opportunities for other groups to exploit these divisions. Though the Taliban officially mourned Haqqani’s death as “martyrdom”, Haibatullah was not reported to have attended the condolence prayers. The assassination is critical to understanding the internal dynamics between the Kandahar-based leadership and the Kabul-based Haqqani faction.
The Haqqani Network
The Haqqani Network, founded by Jalaluddin Haqqani during the anti-Soviet jihad, has been a pivotal component of the Taliban’s military and political machinery. After Jalaluddin Haqqani’s death, his son Sirajuddin Haqqani assumed leadership and became the Islamic Emirate’s Interior Minister in 2021. The network, predominantly composed of members of the Zadran tribe, has long been associated with insurgent tactics, including the introduction of suicide bombing as a core operational strategy during their jihad in Afghanistan. In 2012, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) designated the Haqqani Network as a sanctioned entity, reflecting its global notoriety.
The relationship between the Taliban and the Haqqanis has been transactional. The Taliban has the decision-making power, while the Haqqanis have always held a nominal status in the cabinet and operated independently according to their agenda. The Haqqanis also have financial sources independent of the Taliban. The network is perceived as an “autonomous but integral” part of the Taliban hierarchy due to the necessity of coexistence for survival and expansion.
Countries such as Qatar, Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan also condemned the killing of Haqqani. Hamid Karzai, the former Afghan president known for his long-standing opposition to the Taliban, also condemned the attack and referred to Khalil Haqqani as a “member of a prominent jihadi family”, extending condolences during a visit to Haqqani’s hometown, where he engaged with senior members of the group.
After Haqqani’s death, the ARG palace organised condolence prayers, which were conducted in the presence of senior Taliban leadership. Sirajuddin Haqqani organised condolence prayers, which drew thousands of attendees from several countries over a period of nearly two weeks. This strategic move underscored Sirajuddin Haqqani’s extensive network of connections with various countries’ officials, demonstrating his diplomatic reach and influence.
Reports about possible infiltration or internal support to facilitate the attack have also emerged, potentially stemming from ideological divisions and power struggles within the Taliban-led administration. The Haqqani Network has expressed continuous dissent, with Sirajuddin Haqqani increasingly challenging the Emir’s authority and openly criticising his policies and governance. Major topics like women’s education and the forceful enforcement of some edicts in southeastern strongholds have been strongly criticised by senior members of the administration—driven less by personal reform and more by pragmatic politics, which could help attract Western support. More recently, Haibatullah announced the distribution and use of military equipment under his direct command, further signalling the deepening distrust in his subordinates. This move has antagonised several key members of his cabinet, including Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs AK Stanekzai, and Defense Minister Mullah Yaqoob.
The ISKP’s growing threat
A day after the death of Khalil Haqqani, the ISKP took responsibility for the blast through its Telegram channel. This is one of the most prominent additions to the ISKP’s list of attacks in Afghanistan. Established in 2014, the ISKP has consistently sought to undermine the legitimacy of the Taliban government. Emerging from defections within the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), al-Qaeda, and Taliban ranks, the ISKP aims to establish a transnational caliphate governed by strict Islamic jurisprudence. Its narrative portrays the Taliban as compromised, accusing them of deviating from Islamic principles by seeking international recognition.
The growing foothold of the ISKP in Afghanistan and Central Asia poses a direct threat to regional stability. The group’s ambitions extend beyond Afghanistan, and it aims to establish influence across Central and South Asia. By targeting prominent figures, the ISKP seeks to reinforce its narrative of the Taliban as an ineffective leader while expanding its own operational influence. This may push some Taliban fighters to join the ISKP. Additionally, the Taliban’s harsh treatment of ethnic minorities has aided the ISKP’s recruitment efforts. Afghanistan’s porous borders and the Taliban’s limited governance capacity further enable the ISKP to recruit, train, and launch attacks with severe regional implications.
The assassination of Khalil Haqqani underscores not only the escalating security challenges for members of Afghanistan’s interim government but also the growing vulnerability of the Taliban to internal dissent, which outfits like ISKP could exploit. The killing underscores the ISKP’s strategic approach, exploiting the Taliban’s divisions to reinforce the narrative of the group’s weakening grip on power and inability to govern. It also suggests potential internal complicity, as evidenced by the security breach within heavily fortified government facilities.
As attacks escalate, the region faces heightened risks, necessitating a robust response to prevent further destabilisation and violence in Afghanistan and beyond. In this context, it remains to be seen how long the Taliban can maintain its authority when its leadership appears to be divided on the country’s developmental policies. Haibatullah’s strong grip over his subordinates and his authoritative image within the group make an internal uprising against him unlikely in the near future.