SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Sindh: Criminal surge
On March 8, 2025, six members of the Ahmadi community were arrested by the Khawaja Ajmer Nagri Police Station in the Surjani Town of Karachi city, after being taken into “protective custody” following threats from a sectarian group, Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP). On the previous day, at least 25 members of the Ahmadi community, including children, had been taken into “protective custody” by the Police, as a mob gathered outside an Ahmadiyya place of worship in Surjani Town. West Zone Deputy Inspector General of Police (DIG) Irfan Ali Baloch noted, “several workers of the Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP) gathered outside the Ahmadi place of worship in Surjani Town. They demanded to prevent (sic) the Ahmadis from offering Friday prayers and using symbols of Islam.” Following their ‘protective custody’, Police registered cases against six members of the community.
The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) report, released on February 26, 2025, observed a growing trend of mob-led attacks on homes of families belonging to religious minorities, as well as their places of worship. The report, Under Siege: Freedom of Religion or Belief in 2023-24, observed that over 750 persons were in prison on charges of blasphemy, as of October 2024. It documented at least four faith-based killings, three of which targeted the Ahmadi community. HRCP also spoke of Ahmadis’ “arbitrary detention”, “desecration of their graves”, and the “vulnerability of Hindu and Christian women” to forced conversion. A key finding of the report is that disinformation on social media was the spark behind most of the registered blasphemy cases. It narrates that members of the TLP played a role in filing blasphemy cases against Ahmadis, orchestrating campaigns to stop them from celebrating Eidul Azha, and even accompanying Police during raids to confiscate sacrificial meat. Videos circulating on social media show TLP activists, alongside law enforcement personnel, raiding Ahmadi households, lending credence to allegations about the complicity of state actors in religious persecution. Desecration of graves remains a recurring violation against the community, according to the HRCP. The report documented numerous Ahmadi cemeteries were attacked across Punjab and Sindh in 2023 and 2024, with “police and district authorities participating” in some instances. “A total of 42 attacks on Ahmadis’ places of worship were recorded, with nearly 60 per cent of these either conducted or supervised by law enforcement agencies,” HRCP said.
While religious extremism has evidently been growing in the province, Islamist terrorism took a back seat in the initial days of the current and as well as the corresponding period of previous year. According to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), the first 80 days of 2025 have, recorded only four fatalities, including three Security Force (SF) personnel and one civilian, in three terrorism related incidents, in comparison to nine fatalities, including seven civilians and one SF trooper and terrorist, each, in six terrorism related incidents over the same period in 2024. Terrorism related incidents through 2024 also saw a marginal decrease of eight per cent, from 41 fatalities (17 civilians, 12 Security Force personnel and 12 militants) in 28 terrorism related incidents in 2023, to 38 fatalities (15 civilians, 14 Security Force personnel and nine militants) in 24 terrorism related incidents in 2024. While Sindh recorded ups and down in annual fatality figures since 2017, the highest terrorism-related fatalities in the province were reported in 2013, at 1,656.
Other parameters of terrorism remained low, with 64 terrorism related incidents in 2024, as compared to 79 such incidents in 2023. Though there was an increase in the number of explosions in 2024, at 12, up from 10 in 2023, the resultant fatalities decrease to 10 in 2024 from 12 in 2023. Meanwhile, both years recorded one suicide attack each, but the resultant fatalities decrease from nine in 2023 to four in 2024.
Meanwhile, out of 30 Districts in Sindh, the capital city, Karachi, remained the epicentre of terrorism. Out of 38 fatalities reported in the Province in 2024, Karachi alone recorded 27. The remaining 11 fatalities were reported from Ghotki (5), Kashmore (2), Shikarpur (2), Jacobabad (1) and Jamshoro District (1).
While, other parameters of terrorism also remained low in 2024, the number of major incidents, each involving at least three fatalities, increased from two in 2023 to four in 2024. The resultant fatalities also increased to 13 in 2024 from 12 in 2023. Two of the most prominent attacks of 2024 were on foreign nationals:
October 6, 2024: Three Chinese engineers and two civilians were killed while 13 persons sustained injuries when the Majeed Brigade of the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) orchestrated a Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED) attack on a convoy of Chinese engineers on a road near Jinnah International Airport in Karachi. The Majeed Brigade claimed responsibility for the attack, stating that it was a suicide bombing carried out using a VBIED. While providing details of the suicide attack, the BLA ‘spokesperson’ Jeeyand Baloch claimed at least 15 military personnel were killed.
April 19, 2024: Two persons were killed in a suicide attack on Japanese nationals in the Landhi area of Karachi in the morning. Two terrorists fired at a van carrying Japanese nationals, after which one of them blew himself up, while the other was shot dead by security personnel in an exchange of fire. A driver and guard protecting the foreigners were killed. All five Japanese nationals, who were working at Port Qasim, remained unhurt. Though no group claimed responsibility for the attack, security officials suspected TTP involvement.
Apart from Islamist terrorist groups, including TTP and Baloch separatist groups, Sindhi separatist formations such as the Sindhudesh Revolutionary Army (SRA) and Sindhudesh Liberation Army (SLA), remained violently active in the region. In the night of January 2, 2024, Sindhudesh Revolutionary Army (SRA) cadres ambushed a Pakistan Rangers (Sindh) vehicle in Dadu town (Dadu District) of Sindh, injuring two Rangers personnel. In a media statement, SRA claimed that two Rangers personnel, including a Lance Naik, were killed and three were seriously injured. Similarly, on February 2, SRA orchestrated an explosion near the Election Commission office in Karachi, though there was no loss of life. SRA claimed responsibility for the attack.
In coordination with the Baloch separatist groups, the Sindhi outfits have been teaming up to counter Punjabi hegemony in the region. On June 23, SRA ‘chief’ Syed Asghar Shah issued a media statement declaring China as the biggest enemy of the Sindhis and ally of the Punjabis, who he claimed had enslaved the Sindhi people. Shah emphasized that the “conscious” people of the Sindhi nation and the workers of the Sindhi national movement understood that a friend of their foe cannot be their friend. Shah stated that, for the past 77 years, China had been a close ally of Punjab, the oppressor of the Sindhi people. He alleged that China aimed not only to capture and exploit the mineral wealth, coastal waters, and transportation routes of the Sindhi and Baloch nations, but also to establish itself as a challenger to the global order. Further, he asserted that China was providing financial and military aid to Punjab, the enemy of the Sindhi people.
A March 2, 2025, media report noted that SRA had joined the Baloch Raji Aajoi Sangar (BRAS), an alliance of “pro-independence” insurgent groups of Balochistan, to intensify operations against Pakistan and China. In a statement, BRAS ‘spokesperson’ Baloch Khan disclosed that a high-level meeting was held with senior delegates from the BLA, Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF), Baloch Republican Guards (BRG), and SRA.
The result of this alliance was reflected in the attack on March 4, 2025, when SRA cadres ambushed National Logistics Cell (NLC) vehicles on the Sujawal-Mirpur Bathoro Road in the Sujawal District (previously in Thatta District) of Sindh, inflicting injuries on two drivers. In a statement shared with local media, SRA ‘spokesperson’ Sodho Sindhi claimed that the drivers were severely injured and the vehicles were damaged. Sodho Sindhi accused the Pakistani state of “occupying Sindh” and exploiting its resources “without restraint.” He alleged that Sindh’s land and resources belonged to future generations of the Sindhi people and would be defended “at all costs… we will continue our resistance until the complete national independence of Sindh is achieved.” Significantly, SRA attacked the NLC vehicles on March 4, just two days after the high-level meeting of BRAS on March 2. The modus operandi of the attack by SRA also followed the pattern of Baloch insurgent attacks.
Earlier, on February 15, the SRA cadres attacked NLC tankers near the Mirpur Mathelo area of Ghotki District. SRA ‘spokesperson’ Sodho Sindhi stated that the attack was a response to what he described as the Pakistani state’s exploitation of Sindh’s resources: “The state diverts water from the Indus River through six canals, economically devastating and systematically oppressing the Sindhi nation.” He further alleged that under the “Green Pakistan Initiative,” the Pakistani military was occupying hundreds of thousands of acres of land in Sindh.
SRA’s statements reflect the resentment against Punjabis and the ongoing protest in Sindh against the diversion of Indus River water through a network of six newly developed canals under the “Green Pakistan Initiative” (GPI). On February 15, 2025, Punjab Chief Minister Maryam Nawaz Sharif and Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Asim Munir inaugurated an ambitious agriculture initiative to irrigate barren land in Punjab’s Cholistan area. Leaders and workers of various nationalist parties and groups launched protests across the Sindh province, provoking a heavy-handed crackdown by state Forces.
Similarly, during the “Sindh Rawadari March” of October 2024, a heavy crackdown had been launched against leaders and workers of various nationalist parties and groups in many of Sindh’s districts. The “Sindh Rawadari March protest was launched to condemn the extrajudicial killing of Dr. Shahnawaz, who had been accused of sharing blasphemous posts on social media and was shot dead under mysterious circumstances during a gun battle with the Police in Mirpurkhas on September 19. Following an inquiry into the killing, Sindh Home Minister Ziaul Hassan Lanjar acknowledged, on September 25, 2024, that the Police had “staged the encounter.”
While the state authorities have been busy suppressing the voice of Sindhi nationalists, criminals run rampage in the province, especially in Karachi. As in preceding years, the crime wave continued through 2024, claiming the lives and properties of 1,503 people, including women, children and law-enforcement officials, according to a January 1, 2025, report quoting the Karachi Police. Robbers killed 106 people, including an Army officer, a retired commando, Police officials, engineers, security guards and women. Around 300 others were wounded in firing during robberies. Though the City Police claimed a 21 per cent reduction in crimes in 2024 compared to the previous year, street crime was rampant. The Citizens-Police Liaison Committee’s (CPLC) statistics for January to November 2024 recorded 66,530 street crimes in Karachi alone, an average of 6,048 crimes a month or 199 a day. These included the theft and snatching of 1,913 cars: an average of 174 a month and six a day. In the same period 46,404 motorcycles were stolen or snatched: an average of 4,219 a month and 139 a day; and 18,213 phones were also snatched: an average of 1,683 a month or 55 a day. Meanwhile, frustrated by the increasing crime, some Karachi residents took matters into their own hands and confronted the criminals, killing 21 and injuring 65.
According to a Karachi Police report of March 4, 2025, Karachi records more than ten thousand street crime incidents in the first two months of the year. Despite a 28.18 per cent decline compared to the same period in 2024, Karachi recorded 10,356 street crimes, in which twelve citizens were killed and 41 injured. As many as 2,806 mobile phones, 306 cars and 7,244 motorcycles were stolen or snatched. This yielded averages of 48.4 incidents of mobile phone snatching, five cars thefts and 125 motorcycle thefts a day.
While Karachi has seen a significant containment of terrorist violence, the security environment remains fraught, with authorities struggling against sectarian assertions and a sustained crime wave. Within the wider environment of political and economic crisis in the country, negative security trends can be expected to amplify.
Odisha: Maoist eclipse
On March 10, 2025, Odisha Chief Minister Mohan Charan Majhi informed the Assembly that Security Forces (SFs) had eliminated 118 Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) cadres in the state over the past decade. Chief Minister Majhi was responding to a written question of Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) Member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA) Kanhai Charan Danga, and stated that, between 2015 and January 25, 2025, security operations resulted in the deaths of 118 CPI-Maoist cadres. Over the same period, SFs arrested 315 individuals linked to Maoist activities, while 238 militants and militia members surrendered. The Chief Minister emphasized that the state aims to eradicate the Maoist threat by 2026.
According to partial data collated by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), 147 CPI-Maoist cadres have been killed between 2015 and January 25, 2025, while 206 Maoists were arrested, and 5,747 Maoists and ‘militia’ (people’s army of the Maoists) members surrendered in Odisha.
Odisha recorded 10 fatalities, including three civilians and seven Naxalites (Left Wing Extremists, LWEs), in LWE-related violence in 2024. In 2023, there were nine such fatalities, including three civilians, and six Maoists.
It is significant to note here that the trend of overall fatalities on a year-on-year basis in LWE-linked violence in the state has been cyclical in nature 2016, when 72 fatalities were recorded. Declines were registered for three consecutive years thereafter: 2017 to 38, 2018 to 32, and 2019 to 19. 2020 recorded an increase to 23, with a sharp drop the next year, to 11 in 2021. The trend reversed again, to 17 in 2022, down again to nine in 2023. 10 fatalities were recorded in 2024.
Three civilian fatalities were recorded in 2024 as well as in 2023. There were seven fatalities in this category in 2022, three in 2021, and four in 2020. For 13 consecutive years, between 2007 and 2019, Odisha recorded double-digit civilian fatalities, the highest March 6, 2000, when SATP started compiling data on LWE in India, in the State, in 2010, at 62.
Significantly, SFs did not lose any personnel for a second consecutive year, in 2024 as well as in 2023. Three fatalities were recorded in 2022. On the other hand, SFs neutralised seven Maoists in 2024 in addition to six in 2023. The overall kill ratio since March 6, 2000, favours the SFs at 1:1.48.
Meanwhile, at least seven Naxalites were arrested in 2024, as against five in 2023. Mounting pressure also resulted in the surrender of at least 21 Naxalites in 2024, in addition to five in 2023.
Other parameters of violence registered a considerable decline in 2024 as compared to 2023, even though the influence and impact of the rebels continued to be felt in the State. No major incident (resulting in three or more fatalities) was carried out by the Maoists in 2024 or in 2023. The last major incident was recorded on June 21, 2022, when three Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) personnel were killed in a CPI-Maoist attack in the Patadhara Reserve Forest of the Bheden Block (administrative division) in Nuapada District. The Maoists were not involved in any incidents of arson in 2024, as compared to three such incidents in 2023. The Maoists did not issue any bandh (shutdown) call in 2024, while three such calls were issued in 2023.
However, the total number of LWE-linked incidents marginally went up to 50 in 2024 from 48 in 2023. Two such incidents have already been recorded in the current year: On February 26, 2025, the BSF personnel unearthed a huge cache of cannabis and arrested at least 24 ganja peddlers in the Kantamal and Matakupa Forests in Boudh District A syndicate of cannabis peddlers was unearthed, and 672 kilograms of ganja and seven cell phones were seized. An unnamed Police officer told the media on January 6, 2025, “Maoists are the biggest promoters of ganja cultivation in Odisha as they get huge commission from the illegal business. Maoists often instigate villagers to cultivate ganja and provoke them to attack enforcement officials during raids.” Indeed, a January 21, 2024, report also revealed that as ganja smuggling is a highly profitable business, Maoists have been promoting ganja cultivation and taking a huge ‘levy’ (extortion) from villagers in Koraput, Malkangiri, Gajapati, Rayagada, Boudh and Kandhamal districts, where Ganja is cultivated under their patronage. Further, on November 4, 2021, in a two-page letter written in Telugu, Ganesh, the ‘secretary’ of the CPI-Maoist Andhra Odisha Border Special Zonal Committee (AOBSZC) had accepted that, in the absence of any alternative source of income, Ganja cultivation has become the mainstay for the tribals.
In the second incident this year, on February 6, 2025, an exchange of fire between security personnel and CPI-Maoist cadres took place in the Gandhamardan Hills near Hanupali village under the Bhanupur Panchayat (village level local self-Government institution) in Bolangir District, following credible tips about the presence of Maoist elements hiding in the area. No casualties were reported in the confrontation.
Meanwhile, an analysis of overground and underground Maoist activities in Odisha suggests a decline in the ‘moderately affected’ category as well as in the ‘marginally affected’ category. According to SATP, in 2024, Maoist activities were reported from five of Odisha’s 30 districts. One district, Kandhamal, fell in the ‘moderately affected’ category, while the remaining four districts, Bargarh, Boudh, Malkangiri and Nabarangpur, were ‘marginally affected’. By comparison, in 2023, Maoist activities were reported from nine districts, Boudh, Kandhamal, Koraput, Kalahandi, Malkangiri, Nabarangpur, Nuapada, Rayagada, and Sundargarh, each of them ‘marginally affected’.
Further, according to the latest available Government data (December 10, 2024), seven of Odisha’s Districts, Kalahandi, Kandhamal, Bolangir, Malkangiri, Nabarangpur, Nuapada, and Rayagada, are among the 38 districts from nine States affected by Left Wing Extremism (LWE) in the country, as classified by the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (UMHA). Significantly, according to this data, eight of Odisha’s districts, Angul, Bargarh, Boudh, Deogarh, Koraput, Nayagarh, Sambalpur, and Sundargarh, have been progressively excluded from LWE-affected districts list over the preceding 5 years (Between 2018 and 2024).
Interestingly, on February 27, 2025, amid a visible decline in Maoist activities in the Sundargarh District near the Odisha-Jharkhand border, the process to move the headquarters of the 19th CRPF Battalion out of Rourkela is underway. The 19th CRPF Bn shifted to Nuapada almost 17 years after it was established in Rourkela in 2008. Seven companies of the battalion have already been relocated from Sundargarh. With this, the responsibility of controlling Naxalite movement in bordering areas of the erstwhile Maoist-hit pockets of Sundargarh rests solely on the Special Operations Group (SOG) and District Voluntary Force (DVF) under the disposal of Rourkela Police.
Taking action against Maoist activities in the State, on December 12, 2024, a National Investigation Agency (NIA) team raided a location in Anantapalli village under Motu Police 12 limits in Malkangiri District, over suspected CPI-Maoist activities. The team from Hyderabad reached the village at around 3 A.M. [IST] and carried out the raid at the house of Mantosh Mandal. According to an NIA statement, the operation was linked to Maoist activities, specifically related to the supply of weapons. NIA sources stated, “The NIA raided the residence of a man named Mantosh Mandal at Motu as well as two of his associates. Incidentally, properties belonging to this suspect were also searched before, with crude weapons and explosives being seized then.”
SFs also recovered caches of arms, ammunition, and explosives on 29 occasions in 2024, in addition to 31 such incidents in 2023.
Meanwhile, on February 13, 2025, the Border Security Force (BSF) unearthed multiple CPI-Maoist dumps from four different sites in the Silakota Reserve Forest near Silakota village in Bapanpalli Panchayat under Podia Police Station limits in Malkangiri District. The operation led to the discovery of four Maoist dumps, three hidden beneath stone cavities and one buried under a twin tree, all located within a 50-meter radius. A large cache of arms, ammunition, and explosives, including Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), detonators, electric wires, power banks, and Single Barrel Muzzle Loading (SBML) guns, was recovered from the dumps. The seized items include a pressure cooker IED (5 litres) with an electric detonator, a tiffin IED (5 litres) with an electric detonator, a tiffin IED (3 litres) (approx. 3 kilograms), a tiffin IED (2 litres), three electric detonators, 11 metres of electric wire, a mobile phone, a power bank, and three SBML guns.
Further, on February 6, 2025, an exchange of fire between security personnel and CPI-Maoist cadres took place following credible tips about the presence of Maoist elements hiding in the Gandhamardan Hills near Hanupali village under the Bhanupur Panchayat in Bolangir District. However, no casualties were reported in the confrontation.
On November 30, 2024, BSF Inspector General (Frontier HQ – Special Ops) C.D. Aggarwal stated that Maoist activities had come down substantially in Odisha over the years, and only 60 to 70 members of the proscribed organisation remained active in the state. He added, further,
While significant progress has been made, challenges remain, particularly in the dense forests of Kalahandi, Kandhamal and Boudh, where IED threats persist. Additionally, the socio-economic impact of Naxal-linked narcotics trafficking, especially Ganja cultivation, poses new hurdles.
While the Maoist rebels cannot yet been written off, the Odisha Police continues to face acute deficits in terms of capacities. According to the latest Bureau of Police Research and Development (BPR&D) data, as of January 1, 2023, Odisha had 120.58 Police personnel per 100,000 population, significantly below the inadequate national average of 154.84. The Police/Area Ratio (number of policemen per 100 square kilometres) is just 35.74, against the national average of 65.14. Both the State and national averages on the Police/Area ratio are below the sanctioned strength, at 44.76 and 82.82, respectively. The sanctioned strength for the States’ Police is 69,690, but only 55,656 personnel were in position, a deficit of 20.13 per cent. In addition, the sanctioned strength of the apex Indian Police Service (IPS) Officers in the State is 195, but just 120 officers were in position, a deficit of 38.46 per cent, which considerably weakens the executive supervision of the force. Besides, out of the sanctioned strength of 679 Police Stations, at least 17 Police Stations in the State had no wireless or mobiles.
Maoist activities in Odisha have been contained to a large extent, barring a few areas where the Maoists continue to struggle to make their presence felt. Addressing the critical capacity deficits in the Odisha Police will create the permanent resource within the state to ensure that the rebels are not able to recover ground at any stage in the foreseeable future.
Weekly Fatalities: Major Conflicts in South Asia
March 17-23, 2025
Provisional data compiled from English language media sources.