South Asia Intelligence Review
Balochistan: Brutality fuels insurgency
On April 17, 2025, the dead body of ‘forcibly disappeared’ Baloch youth, Sher Khan Nazar, a resident of Pasni, was recovered in the Turbat District of Balochistan. The victim had been forcibly disappeared from the Jusak area of Turbat on April 15.
On April 16, 2025, the tortured body of a Baloch youth, Farooq Ahmed, who was the younger son of Balochistan National Party-Mengal (BNP-M) leader Noor Ahmed Mengal, recovered from the Nall area of Khuzdar District. Farooq Ahmed had reportedly been forcibly disappeared on April 14. Noor Ahmed Mengal is the BNP-M’s vice president in Khuzdar District. BNP-Mengal stated that Farooq’s father, Noor Ahmed Mengal, had been actively participating in the protest sit-in near Lakpass in recent days, which was held in opposition to the arrest of Baloch Yakjehti Committee (BYC) leaders.
On April 15, 2025, the tortured dead body of a forcibly disappeared’ person, Nizam, son of Mohammad, who had been abducted earlier in the month from Babbar Shor, was discovered in the Pasni area of Gwadar District.
On April 15, 2025, the dead body of a forcibly disappeared Baloch man, Abu Bakar, was recovered in the Buleda area of Kech District.
On April 7, 2025, three bullet-riddled dead bodies of forcibly disappeared persons were recovered from the Mehma Samand Khan area of Barkhan District. The deceased were identified as Haq Nawaz Buzdar, Shero Buzdar, and Gul Zaman Buzdar, all from the Buzdar tribe. Local sources said Haq Nawaz was picked up from his home in Musakhel District on April 5, while Shero had been missing for the past nine months.
On April 7, 2025, the dead body of forcibly disappeared Nadir Baloch was recovered from the Kandhari area of Mashkay in the Awaran District. Nadir Baloch, was allegedly ‘disappeared’ by SFs on April 6, and his bullet-riddled body was found dumped in a remote area a day later.
On April 6, 2025, two Baloch men, Mehrab s/o Rehamdil and Khan Mohammad s/o Haibtan, were tortured to death after their alleged “enforced disappearance” from their homes in the Gardank area of Buleda tehsil (revenue unit) in Kech District.
On April 5, 2025, three bullet-riddled bodies of forcibly disappeared persons were recovered in Mashkay area of Awaran District. The victims were identified as Zahoor s/o Huzoor, Shah Nawaz s/o Jalal, and Habib s/o Eido.
On April 17, 2025, while strongly denouncing the recent resurfacing of dead bodies of forcibly disappeared persons, the Baloch Women Forum (BWF) raised serious concerns about the resurgence of the infamous “Kill and Dump” policy in Balochistan, stating that it casts serious doubt on the State’s commitment to international human rights standards. According to a BWF spokesperson, this development only reinforces the Baloch people’s ongoing feelings of exclusion from the federation.
According to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), based on open media sources, at least 13 bullet-riddled bodies have recovered in Balochistan during the first 18 days of April (data till April 20, 2025). According to a report by Paank, the human rights wing of the Baloch National Movement (BNM), 12 extra-judicial killings were reported across Balochistan in March. Similarly, Paank reported 18 extra-judicial killings in February, and eight in January. With 51 extra-judicial killings, the cumulative figure of extra-judicial killings till April 20 in the current year is already approaching the total number of extra-judicial killing in the entirety of the previous year, at 68 cases. 75 persons were extra-judicially killed in 2023, and 195 in 2022.
Extra-judicial killings are the final stage of the State’s systematic human rights abuses, which start with abduction or arbitrary arrest, followed by torture. According to the Voice for Baloch Missing Persons (VBMP), Balochistan has around 7,000 missing persons. However, the Pakistan Government’s Commission of Inquiry on Enforced Disappearances (COIED) report claimed that there were only 454 active cases in Balochistan, as of October 2023, an assertion that created deep resentment among the Baloch people.
Disappeared persons’ bodies are often dumped by the roadside, with marks of severe physical torture and riddled with bullets. This pattern of systematic abuse has been adopted by Pakistan’s security agencies and State backed ‘death squads’, to suppress the Baloch insurgency. ‘Death squads’ are locally armed militia of criminals in Balochistan who are patronized by the Army, to carry out enforced disappearances and realize the state’s ‘kill-and-dump policy’. These groups often accompany SFs during raids on the homes of political activists, dissidents and ‘pro-independence’ leaders. In exchange for their services, the SFs have given the death squads a free hand to operate throughout Balochistan, to engage in a range of illegal activities, including drug dealing, smuggling of weapons, and to run terrorist training camps and private jails, under the patronage of the intelligence agencies.
Apart from Islamist and sectarian extremism-related fatalities in the province, the ‘death squads’ alnd SFs have been the main executors of unattributed extrajudicial killings in Balochistan. According to the SATP database, of the 5,073 conflict-linked civilian fatalities recorded in Balochistan since 2004 (data till April 20, 2025), at least 1,665 are attributable to one or other terrorist/insurgent outfit. Of these, 654 civilian killings (363 in the South and 291 in the North) have been claimed by Baloch separatist formations, while Islamist and sectarian extremist formations – primarily Islamic State, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Ahrar-ul-Hind (Liberators of India) – claimed responsibility for another 1,011 civilian killings, 928 in the North (mostly in and around Quetta) and 83 in the South. The remaining 3,408 civilian fatalities – 1,920 in the South and 1,488 in the North – remain ‘unattributed’, and are largely believed to have been the handiwork of the SFs and their death squad proxies.
Shafiq-ur-Rehman Mengal formed the first death squad in Balochistan in 2008 – the Musallah Defah Tanzeem (MDT) – with the purported mission of ‘defending’ the public from pro-independence groups. Mengal had the support of the Pakistan Army, and his powerful connections helped him raise his militia. Mengal initiated a reign of terror in Balochistan, killing not only suspected nationalists but also political, non-political and tribal rivals. Mengal is also ‘credited’ with the mass graves discovered in 2014 in Tootak, a rural area 55 kilometres to the north of Khuzdar, where 169 bodies were recovered.
Several other local militia groups in Balochistan were raised as death squads, including the Zakaria M. Hasni-led death squad in Khuzdar; the Deen Muhammad Deenu-led group in Awaran; another led by Samir Sabzal, Rashid Pathan and Sardar Aziz in Kech; the Maqbool Shambezi group in Panjgur and the Siraj Raisani group in Mastung. Siraj Raisani was killed on July 13, 2018, when a suicide bomber targeted a Balochistan Awami Party (BAP) political rally, killing at least 128 people and injuring more than 200 at Dringarh village in Mastung District.
An investigative report by exiled Baloch journalist Taha Siddiqui published in the South Asia Press on 27 April, 2021, claimed that, since 2010, the practice of using ‘death squads’ had been intensified and institutionalized, especially in the south-western parts of Balochistan where a full-fledged insurgency has been going on since the killing of Baloch leader Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti on August 26, 2006.
Cases of disappearance are not new to Balochistan, commencing during the 1973-1977 insurgency, and it continuing thereafter. The first case of disappearance was of Asad Mengal, son of the former Chief Minister of Balochistan Atta Ullah Mengal, and his friend Ahmed Kurd in 1976. After Zulfikar Ali Bhutto dissolved the Provincial Assembly of Balochistan in 1973, which provoked the insurgency, people disappeared without trace and were detained without fair trial.
Protests by civil society groups and family members of the abductees against State-sponsored ‘enforced disappearances’ and extra-judicial killings are not new. In November 2023, a protest march was sparked by the death of Balaach Mola Bakhsh on November 20, 2023, in an allegedly fake encounter by the Counter Terrorism Department (CTD). On December 6, 2023, hundreds of Baloch walked from Kech District in Balochistan to Islamabad, to protest the killing. On July 28, 2024, the Baloch Yakjehti Committee (BYC) organised a Baloch Raaji Muchi (Baloch National Gathering) against the Baloch genocide. A permanent protest camp set up by VBMP in Quetta, has been a sign of resistance for last 15 years. However, on April 17, the Police dismantled the protest camp set up by the families of political prisoners who had been arrested during the March 2025 protests under the leadership of activist Dr. Mahrang Baloch. The BYC issued a strong condemnation of the Police dismantling the peaceful protest camp set up by families of political prisoners — including Dr. Mahrang Baloch, Shahji Sibghatullah, Bebarg Baloch, Gulzadi Baloch, and Beebow Baloch — all of who remain in custody under the Maintenance of Public Order (MPO) ordinance. A BYC statement called the Police action “a grave display of authoritarianism.”
Earlier, on March 21, 2025, a large protest was organised in front of the Balochistan University in Quetta against enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings under the BYC banner, led by Mahrang Baloch. SFs used force to disperse the crowd. The protest had been triggered by the enforced disappearances of Beebagr Baloch, one of BYC’s central leaders, and his brother Dr. Hammal Baloch, on March 20, 2025. Beebagr Baloch, a wheel-chair bound activist and a key BYC leader, has been an outspoken critic of human rights violations in Balochistan, mobilising youth and organising protests, despite his physical disability. Though media reporting was curtailed, the videos surfacing on the social media depicted the Police pushing and dragging protesters into police vans, firing blank shots and using tear gas and water cannons to disperse the demonstrators. The protests resulted in a violent confrontation between the protesters and the Police, resulting in casualties among protesters and injuries to some Policemen. BYC claimed that three of its members were killed and another 13 were injured. Balochistan Government authorities claimed that 10 Policemen sustained injuries during the clashes.
In response to this clash, Mahrang Baloch, BYC key leader, called for a province-wide shutter-down strike to protest against state brutalities and planned another sit-in protest on Sariab Road in Quetta with the bodies of the dead. Later, on March 22, 2025, a pre-dawn raid led to the arrest of Mahrang Baloch and another 16 activists, while also seizing the bodies of those killed. Despite Mahrang’s arrest, the Province saw a complete shutter-down strike on March 23, with shops closed, tyres burnt, roads and major highways closed for traffic, and the region brought to a standstill, disconnected from the rest of the world.
On March 22, the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) issued statements condemning the Police crackdown against protesters and the arrest of BYC leaders. They demanded the immediate release of all the detainees and called on “all political parties, including those with legitimate support in Balochistan” to “take the lead and engage with all stakeholders in the province, including civil society and academia.”
However, the state remained adamant in its authoritarian approach to supressing legitimate Baloch voices. The sister of Mahrang Baloch, Nadia Baloch, during a press conference on March 26, 2015, alleged that the Pakistan Army was subjecting Dr. Mahrang Baloch to extreme torture in jail. Her family was not being allowed to meet her despite court orders and Mahrang’s health had deteriorated due to unhealthy food.
The judiciary in Pakistan also remains subservient to the Army. On April 15, 2025, the Balochistan High Court refused to rule on Mahrang Baloch’s detention, a decision her lawyers said would delay her case and keep her behind bars. The Balochistan High Court refused to hear an appeal against her detention, instead referring her case to the Federal Ministry of Interior.
While, state security agencies have been busy orchestrating enforced disappearances under their ‘kill-and-dump policy’, the state itself has been committed to thoroughly supressing the Baloch right to protest. This systematic repression and the complete neglect of Baloch grievances can only fuel the Baloch insurgency further.
Naxalism: End of the road
On April 15, 2025, two wanted cadres of the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist), carrying a collective bounty of INR 1.3 million, were killed in an encounter with Security Forces (SFs) in the forest of the Kilam-Bargum villages of Kondagaon District in the Bastar region of Chhattisgarh. The killed Maoists have been identified as Haldar, a dreaded Maoist ‘commander’ and member of the Maoists’ east Bastar division, who carried a reward of INR 800,000, and Rame, an ‘area committee member (ACM)’, who carried a reward of INR 500,000. The bodies of the Maoists, along with one AK-47 rifle and other weapons and explosives, were recovered from the spot.
On April 12, 2025, three CPI-Maoist cadres were killed in an encounter with SFs on an anti-Maoist operation in a forest in the Indravati National Park area in the Bijapur District of the Bastar Division of Chhattisgarh. One of the slain Maoists was identified as Anil Punem, the Local Operations Squad (LOS) ‘commander’ and Maoist ‘area committee member (ACM)’, who carried a bounty of INR 500,000. Anil was the alleged mastermind of the killing of eight jawans and the driver of the vehicle in which they were travelling, at Ambeli in Bijapur District on January 6, 2025. The identities of the other two slain Maoists are yet to be confirmed.
On April 8, 2025, the Special Task Force (STF) of Bihar killed a CPI-Maoist ‘area commander’, carrying a reward of INR 100,000, during a combing operation in the forest areas near the Jharkhand border, in Kalothar Forest under Katoria Police Station limits in the Banka District of Bihar. The body of the Maoist Ramesh Tuddu alias Tetua (45), in ‘uniform’, and a carbine were recovered from the spot. Tuddu was a native of the Budhi Ghat locality under the Katoria Police Station and faced over 11 criminal cases registered in Jamui and Deoghar Districts.
On April 2, 2025, two women CPI-Maoist cadres, Mamta aka Ramabai, who hailed from the Gadchiroli District of Maharashtra, and Pramila aka Mase Mandavi, from the Sukma District of Chhattisgarh, were killed in an encounter with the Police in the jungles of Mundidadar and Ganheridadar under the Bichhiya Police Station in the Mandla District of Madhya Pradesh. Along with the bodies of the slain Maoists, weapons, including Self-Loading Rifles (SLRs), and wireless sets, were recovered from the encounter spot.
According to partial data collated by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), at least 161 Naxalites [Left Wing Extremists, LWEs] have been killed by SFs since the beginning of the current year, 2025 (data till April 20). During the corresponding period of 2024, SFs had killed 91 Naxalites. Through 2024, SFs killed 296 LWEs, while 56 were killed in 2023.
Meanwhile, SFs arrested 439 Naxalites in 2024, in addition to 401 in 2023, according to partial data compiled by SATP. In the current year, as on April 20, 2025, 151 arrests had been recorded. A total of 16,862 arrests has been recorded since March 6, 2000.
The mounting pressure on the Maoists has resulted in a large number of surrenders over the past few years, with an acceleration since the declaration that the country would be free of Naxalism before March 2026. According to SATP, at least 475 Naxalites surrender through 2024, in addition to 268 in 2023. During the current year, as on April 20, 2025, at least 600 had already surrendered. Since March 6, 2000, a total of 17,827 LWEs have surrendered across the country.
On April 18, 2025, Union Home Minister (UHM) Amit Shah, reiterating the March 2026 deadline for eradicating Naxalism from the country, asked all underground LWEs to surrender as soon as possible and join the mainstream. UHM Shah wrote on ‘X’.
I appeal to the hiding Naxalites to lay down their arms as soon as possible and join the mainstream by adopting the surrender policy of the Modi government. We are determined to free the country from the scourge of Naxalism before 31 March 2026.
It is useful to recall that, on January 21, 2024, UHM Shah asserted that the country would be freed of the menace of Naxalism within the next three years, and directed states to expedite development activities in remote areas affected by the ultras.
Considering the March 2026 deadline, aggressive SF dominance on the ground greatly improved the overall security situation through 2024. The trend of declining overall fatalities, on a year-on-year basis, in Left Wing Extremism-related violence, established since 2018, witnessed a marginal reversal in 2023, at around 9.62 per cent (from 135 killed in 2022 to 148 in 2023), surged enormously, by over two and a half fold (from 148 in 2023 to 397 in 2024). According to SATP data, a total of 397 fatalities (80 civilians, 21 SF personnel and 296 Naxalites) were killed in LWE violence through 2024, as against 148 fatalities (61 civilians, 31 SF personnel and 56 Naxalites) recorded in 2023. During the current year, as of April 20, 2025, the total number of such fatalities stood at 161 (17 civilians, 15 SF personnel and 161 Naxalites), as against 129 such fatalities (27 civilians, 11 SF personnel and 91 Naxalites) reported during the corresponding period of 2024.
A matter of concern was the spike in the number of civilian fatalities (80) recorded through 2024, as compared to 61 in 2023, about 31.14 per cent. Nevertheless, civilian fatalities recorded in 2024 were the fourth lowest since 2018, according to SATP data. Three other previous lows were recorded at 53 in 2022, 58 in 2021 and 61 (twice) in 2020 and 2023. The maximum number of civilians killed in such violence since 2018, 108, was in 2018. The maximum number of fatalities recorded in this category since March 6, 2000, was 630, in 2010,.
Meanwhile, the number of fatalities among SFs decreased from 31 in 2023 to 21 in 2024, according to SATP data, and the number of fatalities in 2024 was the second lowest in this category since 2018. A previous low of 15 was recorded in 2022. The maximum number of SFs killed in such violence, 73, was in 2018. The maximum of such fatalities since March 6, 2000, was 319 in 2009.
The SF:Maoist kill ratio greatly favoured the SFs in 2024, at 1:14.09, significantly improving the ratio in favour of the SFs in 2023, when it was at 1:1.80. The 2024 ratio was the best since March 6, 2000, and surpassed the previous best of 1:4.46 in 2022. The ratio favoured the Maoists only thrice: 1:1.2 in 2007, 1:1.01 in 2009 and 1:1.007 in 2010. Since March 6, 2000, the overall kill ratio has been in favour of the SFs (1:1.76). In the current year, the kill ratio remains in favour of the SFs at 1:10.73 and is the second most positive, thus far (data till April 20, 2025).
Other parameters of violence also point to significant improvement in the security situation relating to LWE activities across the country. Due to aggressive SF dominance, the Maoists have hardly been able to carry out their disruptive activities. At least two major incidents (each involving three or more fatalities) were carried out by the Maoists in 2024, compared to three such incidents in 2023. The Maoists orchestrated at least 42 incidents of Improvised Explosive Device (IED) blasts in 2024, compared to 62 such incidents in 2023. Further, the Maoists were involved in 12 incidents of arson in 2024, as compared to 32 such incidents in 2023. However, there were 116 incidents of exchange of fire between SFs and Maoists in 2024, compared to 89 such incidents in 2023.
Through 2024, SFs recovered arms and ammunition from the Maoists on 205 occasions, in addition to 222 such recoveries in 2023. During the current year, as on April 20, 2025, the number of such recoveries stands at 68. Since March 6, 2000, a total of 5,131 occasions of arms recovery have been documented.
Meanwhile, according to the SATP database, Maoist activities were reported from 10 States in 2024, in comparison to 11 States in 2023. (India has a total of 797 Districts in 29 States and nine Union Territories). The 10 affected States had 35 Districts which recorded a Maoist presence, out of a total of __ Districts in these States. Of these, two districts fell in the ‘highly affected’ category; nine in the ‘moderately affected’ category; and 24 were ‘marginally affected’. By comparison in 2023, of 50 affected districts from 11 states, six districts fell in the ‘moderately affected’ category, and 44 were ‘marginally affected’.
Indeed, sharing a similar analysis on the remaining LWE-affected districts, on April 10, 2025, the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (UMHA) through a Press Information Bureau (PIB) release, stated that the number of LWE-affected districts had reduced from 126 to 90 in April 2018, 70 in July 2021 and further to 38 in April-2024. Of the total number of LWE-affected districts, the “most affected districts” had come down from 12 to six, which include four districts from Chhattisgarh (Bijapur, Kanker, Narayanpur, and Sukma), one from Jharkhand (West Singhbhum), and one from Maharashtra (Gadchiroli). Likewise, out of the total 38 affected districts, the number of “Districts of Concern”, where additional resources needed to be intensively provided (beyond the severely affected districts), had reduced from nine to six. These six districts were: Andhra Pradesh (Alluri Sitarama Raju), Madhya Pradesh (Balaghat), Odisha (Kalahandi, Kandhamal, and Malkangiri), and Telangana (Bhadradri-Kothagudem). Due to persistent action against the Maoists, a number of “Other LWE-affected” Districts had also decreased from 17 to six. These include districts from Chhattisgarh (Dantewada, Gariabandh, and Mohla-Manpur-Ambagarh Chowki), Jharkhand (Latehar), Odisha (Nuapada), and Telangana (Mulugu).
Manifestly, analysis of all LWE-affected states across the country indicated an overall declining trend in Maoist violence and activity, and a substantial improvement in the security situation in the affected regions. The annual assessments of the affected states stands testimony to the diminishing influence of the rebels in Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Odisha, and Telangana.
Meanwhile, according to a January 21, 2025, report, as part of a continued offensive against the CPI-Maoist, the Central Security Forces and the State Police Forces aim to establish 88 additional security camps in LWE-affected states this year. An unnamed senior official of the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (UMHA) disclosed that, since 2019, a total of 290 security camps had been set up in LWE-affected states, mostly in Chhattisgarh and Odisha. In 2024, 48 such camps were established. The significance of such camps is to help the SFs in planning operations against armed Maoist cadres and to fill the security vacuum in areas of erstwhile Maoist dominance. Since 2017-18, INR 35.0329 billion has been released by UMHA under the Special Central Assistance (SCA) scheme for the 12 most LWE-affected districts. The main objective of the scheme is to fill critical gaps in public infrastructure and services in the worst LWE-affected districts. Of the 12, seven worst LWE-affected districts are in Chhattisgarh: Bastar, Bijapur, Sukma, Kanker, Narayanpur, Dantewada, and Mohalla-Manpur-Ambagarh Chowki; two districts are in Odisha: Kalahandi and Kandhamal; and one each in Jharkhand (West Singhbhum), Madhya Pradesh (Balaghat), and Maharashtra (Gadchiroli).
A February 25, 2025, report revealed that around 2,500 additional security personnel had been deployed in Chhattisgarh to help encircle the rebels inside the Abujhmadh Forest, before stepping up the offensive against them. The security establishment indicated that the 2,500 additional personnel had been brought in from Odisha and Bihar. An unnamed security official attached to UMHA observed,
They have been deployed in the core areas of Abujhmadh forest, which was earlier considered an impregnable rebel fortress. Besides, the forces are setting up more forward bases deep inside the Maoist strongholds in the state.
As the government intensifies operations in Chhattisgarh’s CPI-Maoist strongholds, the Maoists have offered conditional peace talks, though the State government responded be declaring that any talks must be unconditional. On March 28, 2025, through a press release in Telangana, the CPI-Maoist ‘central committee (CC)’ stated that it was ready for peace talks on the condition that the government halts its anti-Maoist operations in the region and stops the establishment of new camps of armed forces in various States, including in Chhattisgarh. The Maoist statement read,
We are always ready for peace talks in the interest of the public. Therefore, on this occasion, we are proposing to create a positive atmosphere for peace talks in front of the Central and State governments.
Responding to the offer, according to an April 3, 2025, report, State Deputy Chief Minister Vijay Sharma stated that the government was ready for talks and for the Maoists to return to the mainstream, but it could not be subject to conditions laid down by the Maoists. He added that the government was not going to form any committees for peace talks and reiterated that the Maoists could initiate negotiations through any channel of their choice. Sharma stated,
They have written themselves that the last time they had said that they would discuss if [security forces] should not leave their camps for six months, there should be a reduction in the number of troops, the weapons should remain unused or be deposited. Back then, we had made it clear that with these conditions, there will be no talks. Talks will be without any conditions and we are still ready for that, our Central leadership is ready, Hon. [Chief Minister] Vishnu Deo Sai ji is ready, there is no problem with talks. But the government will not form any committee. They should make one if they want or use the channel they like, we are ready.
In the meantime, in view of the situation prevailing in Dandakaranya, Chhattisgarh, the CPI-Maoist, in a letter released on April 18, 2025, in the name of Rupesh, the ‘spokesperson’ of the party’s North and West Sub-zonal Bureau, announced that they want a ceasefire from both sides for at least a month. According to the letter, Rupesh thanked Chhattisgarh Deputy Chief Minister (CM) Vijay Sharma for responding to their first statement on April 8. They stated that the ongoing massacre in the name of Operation Kagar would stop only through talks. They clarified that there was no strategy behind their first letter on the same issue, and that their colleagues need to meet the members of the ‘Central Committee (CC)’ and the Special Zonal Committees (SZC) to resolve the issue. They explained that they needed security assurances to meet their colleagues, along with the delegation representing them in the talks. For this, they appealed for a suspension of SF activities for a month. They added that they had already instructed their colleagues not to open fire on the armed forces during the talks, and asked the government to respond in kind, and observe a ceasefire. Despite having issued their cadres not to attack, they alleged that central forces continued to carry out encounters, adding that, if the massacre continued, no negotiations for a permanent solution could go smoothly.
Responding to Rupesh’s statement, Inspector General of Police (IGP), Bastar range, Sundarraj P, declared that the government had categorically announced that the Maoists should shun violence and come forward to join the national mainstream, and further,
In that situation the government is always ready to accommodate and rehabilitate each and every Maoist cadre starting from central committee/polit bureau level cadres to militia level cadres. It would be in the interest of all the stakeholders if Maoists dissociate themselves from violent activities and come forward to integrate into the social mainstream.
Clearly, the Maoist movement is under tremendous pressure due to increasing SF dominance over the erstwhile rebel strongholds. However, capacity deficits continue to put an inordinate burden on the SFs, particularly the State Police Forces. According to Bureau of Police Research and Development (BPR&D) data, as on January 1, 2023, there were 233,857 vacant posts in the Police Forces of the 10 affected States, against a sanctioned strength of 1,100,919 (actual strength: 867,062). Significantly, these constituted 40.22 per cent of the 581,364 vacant posts across India. Moreover, there were 365 (18.06 per cent) vacancies against a sanctioned strength of 2,020 (actual strength: 1,655) in the apex Indian Police Service (IPS) in the 10 affected States, considerably weakening executive direction of the Force.
Further, in the worst Maoist-afflicted State, Chhattisgarh, there were no telephones in at least 24 Police Stations, as on January 1, 2023. In Jharkhand, considered to be the second worst afflicted State, 47 Police Stations had no vehicle, 211 had no telephone, and 31 had no wireless/mobile connectivity. In Odisha, 17 Police Stations had no wireless/ mobiles.
Despite the comprehensive reverses suffered by the Maoists, apprehensions refuse to die. According to a March 28, 2025, report, a CPI-Maoist handwritten letter in Telugu, found at a recent encounter site in the Abujhmarh forest in Bijapur, Chhattisgarh, claimed that the banned outfit had recruited 130 cadres from the Maad region, 80 of them minors, including children aged nine. The letter indicated that the raw recruits were undergoing training in “guerrilla warfare, weapons handling and IED-making”. According to the Police, the document is believed to be a CPI-Maoist “review report” from an internal meeting, and was found after the encounter in which Maoist ‘commander’ Sudheer alias Sudhakar was shot dead on March 25, 2025. Sudheer carried a bounty of INR 2.5 million and was responsible for training new recruits in weapons and guerrilla tactics. Privy to the development, an unnamed senior officer of Bastar Range thus noted,
Earlier, teenagers were recruited into the Maoist cultural wing, called Chetna Natya Manch (CNM), and later given combat training. If the review report is to be believed, then it indicates a dangerous trend of Maoists recruiting children as ‘child soldiers’ for the battlefield at a tender age. It would be soldiers vs children. But we will run campaigns to stop this recruitment.
Moreover, the Maoist ‘review’ noted that it was a “report on the experiences of newly recruited comrades” and had been compiled from ‘North Bureau directives and ground-level accounts’ since January 2023. According to the letter, Maoist leaders conducted a gram sabha (village assembly) in the Maad region and recruited 130 cadres – 50 aged 18-22, 40 aged 14-17 and, alarmingly, 40 aged between nine and 11 years. Senior Maoists admit in the letter that the younger recruits are not yet ready for combat and are in need of “more education and preparation”. The letter includes a detailed account of the ongoing challenges faced by the Maoist leadership, particularly the difficulty in recruiting new members. Maoist ‘commanders’ expressed concern about the “growing reluctance” among young people to join their cause and realised that future recruitment efforts might be even more challenging.
The Maoists are facing severe losses in their remaining ‘havens’ across the country, particularly in their heartland, the Dandakaranya region of Chhattisgarh. The Maoist offer of ‘peace talks’ and appeal for a ceasefire for a month has been met with scepticism, in view of the past ‘failed talks’ more than 20 years ago, when Maoists had come out of the jungles to hold talks with the Andhra Pradesh government amid much fanfare. Regrettably, the talks failed, even as the Maoist exploited the ceasefire to propagate their ideology, recruit more cadres, and extend areas of influence. The Maoist leaders and cadre soon went back into the forests, and the movement saw a dramatic escalation thereafter.
The past must, of course, guide the future, but it cannot be the decisive determinant of current policy. The enveloping circumstances have changed dramatically over the intervening decades, and the state would now be negotiating from a position of overwhelming dominance. India has negotiated with numerous insurgencies in multiple theatres, with positive outcomes, and there is no reason to make an exception out of the Maoists. A measure of scepticism is warranted, of course, but avenues for a negotiated settlement need also to be actively explored.
Weekly Fatalities: Major Conflicts in South Asia
April 14-20, 2025
Provisional data compiled from English language media sources.