Moscow’s Taliban Rapprochement: High-Risk Realpolitik

• The Russian Supreme Court annulled the Taliban’s designation as a terrorist organization, eliminating legal barriers to establishing formal relations between Moscow and the de facto Afghan government.
• The Kremlin aims to leverage its Taliban ties to bolster its geopolitical and economic posture in the Central Asian region.
• While Moscow seeks to curb the threat of Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISK), the Taliban continues to give free rein to designated terrorist groups like al-Qaeda and others of its ilk.
• The potential recognition of the Taliban by Moscow may further embolden ISK, which has leveraged Kabul’s international outreach as propaganda fodder.

Late last week, the Russian Supreme Court lifted the ban on the Taliban’s activities in Russia and annulled the group’s terrorist designation, which had been in place since 2003. The Kremlin’s special envoy for Afghanistan, Zamir Kabulov, affirmed that the court decision eliminates legal barriers to establishing formal relations between Moscow and the Taliban. In response, the Taliban, which has served as the de facto government of Afghanistan since the takeover of Kabul in August of 2021, expressed its interest in establishing full economic and diplomatic relations with Moscow. For observers of Russia-Afghanistan relations, this most recent development is but the latest step in Russia’s pragmatic partnership with the Taliban, forged years before the group’s takeover of Kabul and the subsequent U.S. military withdrawal. Russia’s primary aim is to strengthen its foothold in Central Asia, capitalize on the strategic importance of the region and cement its sphere of influence, curb the continued threat of Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISK), and establish new transit routes. Meanwhile, Afghanistan’s cash-strapped and politically isolated de facto government is seeking relief from sanctions by taking steps towards international recognition.

Russia’s relationship with the Taliban has evolved dramatically over the past several decades. In the mid-to-late 1990s, the Taliban’s recognition of Chechnya’s independence and alignment with anti-Russian militants fueled hostility and guided the Kremlin’s approach to isolating the group. After the al-Qaeda attacks of 9/11, which the Taliban played a major role in given the sanctuary the group offered to Osama bin Laden and his organization, Moscow supported the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan but gradually recalibrated its approach to the conflict as tensions with the West intensified. By 2014, as Moscow’s relations with the West unraveled over the annexation of Crimea, Russia began covertly engaging the Taliban, later going on to view the group as a potential bulwark against ISK after its emergence and a tool to undermine NATO and its expanding influence. The 2021 Taliban takeover accelerated this shift: Russia kept its embassy open in Kabul as most nations shuttered their diplomatic outposts, accredited a Taliban diplomat in 2022, and signed provisional trade agreements with the group.

Russia’s engagement with the Taliban, albeit largely symbolic currently, is driven by its realpolitik and has deepened in lockstep with its fraying relationship with the West. The Kremlin primarily aims to leverage its Taliban ties to firm up its posture in the Central Asian neighborhood, where it seeks to be the primary security guarantor of the post-Soviet republics.

Relatedly, the Kremlin’s most blatant overture to the de facto Afghan government occurred just a year after the deadliest attack on Russian soil since 2004, the March 2024 Crocus City Hall attack carried out by ISK, which Russian authorities alleged had Kyiv’s involvement, though there is no evidence to support this allegation. Most believe that a more robust relationship with the Taliban won’t do much to help curb ISK in Afghanistan and its recruitment efforts in neighboring countries. Data from the Global Terrorism Index and the UN Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team show the extent to which terrorist groups leverage Afghanistan as a haven, dotting it with training camps, safehouses, madrasas, and launching cross-border attacks. Additionally, the Taliban’s active support for al-Qaeda and Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP) militants could signal a death knell for any meaningful counterterrorism partnership with the Kremlin before it even develops. While short-term gains to curb ISK influence may be possible through the provision of resources to the Taliban, the long-term effects may very well be the armament of other terrorist groups that will target Russian interests.

There are also geoeconomic imperatives that have prompted the Kremlin to look for greater access to Afghanistan. The sanctions that were imposed on Moscow in the aftermath of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 propelled Russia to seek alternative trade routes, including through Afghanistan to South Asia. Afghanistan also boasts a rich mineral stockpile, estimated to be worth around $3 trillion, which countries have vied to exploit, primary among them the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In December, the Russian Business Centre in Afghanistan announced the launch of a detailed survey of Afghanistan’s mineral resources to aid their extraction. While the current security landscape and lack of functioning state institutions leave a lot to be desired for sustainable economic exploitation and investments, Russia may consider this a long-term hedge, and economic motives will undoubtedly continue to feature in the Kremlin’s maneuvering in Afghanistan.

Meanwhile, the de facto Taliban authorities are cash-strapped and isolated on the international stage. While the Taliban seems to reason that normalization with Moscow may lead to wider recognition and the eventual annulment of the crippling economic sanctions regime, it is unlikely that the regime will gain recognition outside of its neighborhood, at least in the near term. Additionally, ISK has wielded the Taliban’s engagement with so-called apostate countries such as Russia and the PRC as an important propaganda tool to recruit and garner support. For instance, the group’s flagship Voice of Khorasan magazine has highlighted Moscow’s support for the Assad regime, as well as Beijing’s human rights abuses against the Muslim Uyghur minority in Xinjiang Province.

Moscow is not alone in engaging with de facto authorities. Tehran has also stepped up its outreach, contrasted with decades of sectarian tension over the persecution of Shia Hazaras by the Taliban. Although Tehran has also not yet granted formal recognition, its engagement is driven by the need to manage cross-border threats, secure economic interests like access to the Chabahar port, and limit the influence of rivals such as Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. During the two decades that U.S. forces fought in Afghanistan, Iran provided material support to the Taliban and members of a terrorist syndicate, including al-Qaeda and the Haqqani Network, which was used to kill and maim American troops.

Meanwhile the Trump administration’s engagement with the Taliban has been marked by limited, targeted interactions. In March 2025, U.S. officials made their first known visit to Kabul since 2021, coinciding with the release of an American hostage by the Taliban, accompanied by the symbolic removal of bounties on several Taliban leaders. Pragmatic engagement focused on counterterrorism and asset recovery may yield results, but the risks of normalizing a regime that shelters U.S.-designated terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda remain. While the administration may seek to step up engagement as a means to counter Chinese and Iranian inroads, this risks legitimizing the Taliban without enforceable human rights guarantees, entrenching a regime that systematically oppresses women – which some have described as gender apartheid – minorities, and political dissent, and giving free rein to designated terrorist groups.