India-Pakistan Tensions After Pahalgam: A Kautilyan Perspective – Analysis
The terrorist attack in Pahalgam in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), killing and severely injuring many civilian tourists, serves as the most recent reminder of the perpetual threat posed by India’s ‘natural enemy’. This threat is compounded by local support that Pakistan-backed terrorism has managed to garner across the border. Among the Pahalgam attackers, two of the six men are allegedly local Kashmiris. Addressing both the external and internal enemy needs nuance and calibration—perhaps, following the template of a reasoned and sophisticated approach which the ancient Indian treatise on statecraft, Kautilya’s Arthashastra, expounds.
Kautilya can teach many lessons to India for its long-drawn problem of Pakistan and terrorism in Kashmir. Themes such as duties of kingship (Rajadharma), decision-making based on sound intelligence and analysis (Anvikshiki), welfare and security of the people (Yogakshema), just use of force (Dandaniti), employment of four methods of politics (Upayas), and the six measures of foreign policy (Sadgunyas), among others, can help contextualise the problem holistically. This essay will particularly discuss the nature of the enemy and the associated challenge of internal security.
The Natural Enemy and the Use of Upayas
Among the different categories of states in the Rajamandala (concentric circles of states—the interstate realm), neighbours who exhibit the disposition of an ‘enemy’ are the most important. For India, Pakistan is a natural enemy with an immediately contiguous territory. They match the qualities of an enemy listed by Kautilya perfectly –
“Not of royal descent, greedy, with a mean council (of ministers), with disaffected subjects, unjust in behaviour, not applying himself (to duties), vicious, devoid of energy, trusting in fate, doing whatever pleases him, without shelter, without a following, impotent, ever doing harm (to others) – an enemy of this type becomes easy to exterminate” (KA, VI, 1, 13-14)
Arguably, India has addressed the Pakistan challenge through the lens of Upayas—sama (conciliation), dana(gift giving), bheda (dissension) and danda (use of force). India has employed the Upayas in all permutations—exclusive (one method at a time); alternate [sama-dana (remedial), followed by bheda-danda (repressive)] and a combination (all four deployed simultaneously).
India’s overtures of conciliation (sama) have only had short-term and modest outcomes, almost invariably followed by a breach of trust on Pakistan’s part. The ‘dialogue-disruption-dialogue’ cycle alluded to by Shyam Saran in his book, How India Sees the World: From Kautilya to the 21st Century, is an admission of a bleak possibility of a grand reconciliation with Pakistan. The Indus Water Treaty, held in ‘abeyance’ by India as a response to the Pahalgam attacks, was a measure of ‘dana’ or gift-giving. Possibly, India has exploited the various ‘pressure points’ (bheda) and resorted to force (danda) when all other means have failed to bring the desired outcome.
India has struggled to find the ‘right mix,’ and it is partly because of Pakistan’s single-mindedness and irrationality in conduct. In an interesting analysis of India’s conflict resolution of counter-insurgencies, Dr Michael Liebig, former Fellow at the University of Heidelberg, argues that there is an ‘Indian way’ of internal conflict resolution which encapsulates a composite approach of remedial and repressive measures (Upayas). For each concrete situation, a specific configuration of methods is adopted, and there exists a dialectical interrelationship between the actions and responses it evokes. This consequently affects ‘phase-changes’ when the relative weight of the four methods is altered. After successive phase-changes, a ‘tipping point’ is reached when ‘qualitative policy change becomes an inescapable necessity, because there is a clear and present threat of unacceptable losses in state-capacity.’ This theoretical frame is equally applicable in the realm of foreign policy. With the recent Pahalgam attacks, perhaps a ‘tipping point’ has been reached with Pakistan. Kautilya would advise resort to force against a natural, inveterate enemy, even at the cost of men and material.
The Treasonable Within
All internal security problems in the Arthashastra are discussed in the format of ‘associations’ between the instigator and the respondent in both the ‘outer’ and ‘inner’ regions, and calibrated measures are suggested to deal with each unique combination. There can be no abetment without a response.
It is also important to state that, for Kautilya, any internal security disorder is the result of a wrong policy measure. Employing a peace pact and the like, contrary to what is prescribed, is a bad policy that leads to a rise in dangers.
“Subjects, when impoverished, become greedy; when greedy, they become disaffected; when disaffected, they either go over to the enemy or themselves kill the master. Therefore, he [the ruler] should not allow these causes of decline, greed and disaffection among the subjects to arise, or, if arisen, should immediately counter-act them.” (KA VII, 5, 27-28)
The problem in Jammu and Kashmir is decades-old, and attempts to correct the ground situation are fervently underway. However, it may be fair to say that it is a long road ahead before the dosa (i.e. the basic flawed condition on the ground that leads to treason) is rooted out. In this context, the dusya (traitor) and dusyayati (incitement to treason) will continue, albeit with less intensity and pervasiveness, as the socio-economic conditions improve.
The Kautilyan playbook is extremely nuanced in its advice to address dangers from within, and may hold important lessons for India today. The following quote from the Arthashastra demonstrates the importance of right calibration in using the Upayas,
“In the case of unmixed danger from the treasonable [rebellion], the ruler should use against the citizens and the country people the various means [conciliation, gift and dissension], but not force. For, force cannot be used against a multitude of people. If used, it might not achieve its object and at the same time might bring on another disaster. But against the leaders of them [rebels], he should act as in ‘the infliction of secret punishment’”.
The Domestic-International Interlinkage
The ‘association’ at two ends, between the enemy and the treasonable, demands a multi-pronged response. No amount of lethal kinetic action against Pakistan will serve India’s purpose unless it is backed by and accompanied by hunting down the rebellious leaders, and squeezing the potential support base that terrorism from across the border seeks in Kashmir. Kautilya is categorical about having the house in order before embarking on war. There is a vital link between political legitimacy, domestic order, and relative strength in the Rajamandala. After all, an important component of the text’s political end goal (Yogakshema) is to bring about the welfare of a state by ensuring its security within its existing boundaries.