The New Great Game In Southeast Asia – OpEd
While Washington remains consumed by tariff debates and political theatrics, Chinese President Xi Jinping is quietly redrawing the strategic map of Southeast Asia. His high-profile tour of Vietnam, Malaysia, and Cambodia was more than just a charm offensive. It was a strategic declaration. Backed by infrastructure promises, trade incentives, and carefully orchestrated symbolism, Xi’s visit signals Beijing’s growing confidence in reshaping the region’s future and sidelining American influence.
In stark contrast, the United States appears to be retreating from the region, scaling back USAID funding and withdrawing from critical multilateral dialogues. Xi’s visit to Vietnam alone produced 45 cooperation agreements, spanning artificial intelligence, maritime patrols, railway connectivity, and agricultural trade. China is even underwriting feasibility studies for major rail links between its southern cities and Vietnam’s industrial corridors. The subtext is clear: Beijing is no longer content to compete. It is consolidating.
Optics matter. Xi’s meeting with Vietnam’s newly appointed Communist Party chief, To Lam, wasn’t lost on former President Donald Trump, who mocked the encounter: “How do we screw the United States of America?” he quipped. The offhand comment carried an uncomfortable truth. The United States is increasingly playing the role of an absent protagonist in a region it once led.
China’s regional strategy goes far beyond trade. In Malaysia, Xi praised “strategic cooperation” and accelerated talks on the China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement 3.0, a tangible counterweight to the U.S.-backed Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, which still lacks clear deliverables. Meanwhile, in Cambodia, Beijing is pouring investment into infrastructure projects, including upgrades at the Ream Naval Base.
The symbolism is unmistakable. Where the United States steps back, China steps in, with cash in hand and plans in place.
As the Trump administration curtails foreign assistance and guts elements of U.S. diplomacy, Beijing is embedding itself as an indispensable partner with statecraft powered by infrastructure and underwritten by long-term ambition. And it’s reshaping the post-Cold War balance in the Indo-Pacific, where local governments are seeking economic stability in uncertain times. China is ready with solutions, investments, and—most importantly—consistency.
Consider the numbers. In the last fiscal year alone, USAID allocated roughly $837 million to Southeast Asia. Myanmar received $237.6 million, Indonesia $151.3 million, Vietnam $135.4 million, and Thailand $20.45 million. These funds supported mine clearance in Cambodia, public health in Thailand, and infrastructure development across the region. That momentum is now faltering. China, once trailing, is now leading.
Tensions remain, especially over Taiwan and the South China Sea. But these frictions haven’t derailed Beijing’s broader strategy. On the contrary, China is doubling down by deploying economic cooperation and cultural diplomacy to cement its role as Southeast Asia’s indispensable partner.
Xi’s trip wasn’t an isolated show of goodwill. It was the culmination of years of groundwork, much of it laid through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). From high-speed rail in Laos to port expansions in Malaysia, China has become a permanent fixture in the region’s infrastructure, both physical and political. More recently, Beijing has begun flexing its soft power. Visa-free travel for citizens of Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore isn’t just boosting tourism, it’s fostering people-to-people ties and a new generation of regional affinity with China. At the same time, Beijing is promoting alternative governance structures through forums like the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation mechanism, which form parallel institutions to existing Western-backed multilateral systems.
Southeast Asian nations are not embracing China out of ideological alignment. They’re making pragmatic choices, opting for certainty, capital, and presence. The U.S. promise of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” rings hollow without the diplomats, funding, and sustained engagement to back it up. To retain influence, Washington should restore USAID funding, revitalize the State Department’s public diplomacy efforts, and reengaging with regional trade frameworks.
The image of Xi Jinping walking red carpets in Hanoi and Phnom Penh while U.S. foreign aid officers shutter their operations tells a story more powerful than any white paper. This is no longer about power in the abstract. It’s about who shows up, who invests, and who stays. The Great Game is no longer theoretical. It’s being played now, and America’s seat at the table is empty.