‘Operation Sindoor’ And The Indian Response To Pahalgam: Between Retaliation And Reconciliation – OpEd

Sixty years after ‘Operation Desert Hawk’ signalled the onset of Pakistan’s aggressive manoeuvres in the Rann of Kutch—and was soon followed by ‘Operation Gibraltar’ in Kashmir in 1965—history appears to be returning with renewed vengeance. On April 22, 2025, the tranquil valley of Pahalgam was shaken by a brutal terrorist attack that claimed the lives of 26 civilians. The strike, claimed by The Resistance Front, a proxy of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), stirred up long-standing animosities in South Asia, dragging India and Pakistan back into the vortex of confrontation. In a dramatic and calculated response, India launched ‘Operation Sindoor’ on May 7—a pre-dawn offensive involving 24 precision-guided missile strikes on nine terror camps across Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK). This was more than a military reprisal.

t marked a declarative shift in India’s national security doctrine

Operation Sindoor hit deep. From the LeT stronghold of Muridke near Lahore to the JeM base in Bahawalpur, and from launch pads in Kotli and Muzaffarabad to radicalisation hubs in Chakwal, the strikes are claimed to have dismantled infrastructure critical to anti-India operations. Over 70 terrorists were killed and 60 injured, according to reports. What distinguished this strike from earlier retaliatory actions, such as the Balakot airstrike of 2019, was the unprecedented depth, coordination, and clarity of intent. Specifically, Indian forces avoided civilian and military targets, upholding a “measured and proportionate” approach. But the scale of the strikes and the symbolism of targeting the very heart of terror networks spoke volumes. India also followed up militarily with a set of policy responses: suspension of the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty, stopping of imports and exports, closure of the Attari border, cancellation of all SAARC visa exemptions for Pakistani nationals, diplomatic downsizing, and a push for Pakistan’s international isolation.

Strategic Strike Zones and Their Histories

Operation Sindoor was meticulous in its targeting. Bahawalpur, the ideological epicentre of Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), has long been a site of jihadist indoctrination. The targeted Jamia Masjid Subhan Allah there had previously escaped international scrutiny, despite intelligence linking it to the 2019 Pulwama attack and 2001 Parliament attack. Muridke, the headquarters of Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jamaat-ud-Dawa, is a sprawling complex where ideology and logistics converge. By striking Markaz-e-Taiba, India aimed to disrupt a nexus of radicalisation, arms training, and international recruitment.

PoK targets like Muzaffarabad, Kotli, and Rawalakot function as infiltration hubs, transit bases, and command centres. Neelum Valley and Chakswari are frequently used for cross-border movements, especially during elections in J&K, while Bhimber is a logistics node close to the Line of Control. Perhaps most significant was the targeting of Chakwal, a new radicalisation node far from the LoC, a symbolic warning that depth of sanctuary will no longer guarantee immunity.

All these locations had historically survived due to their integration with civilian zones, their religious facades, or their distance from traditional battlefronts. India’s decision to hit these sites simultaneously, using satellite-guided and laser-designated munitions, demonstrated not just intelligence lead but a new doctrine of forward-leaning deterrence.

Nuclear Overhang and the Anatomy of Escalation

Pakistan’s immediate reaction was predictably severe. Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif denounced the strikes as an “act of war” and convened the National Security Committee, placing armed forces on high alert. Missile tests followed within 48 hours, and retaliatory shelling escalated along the LoC. The most worrying element, however, remains the nuclear shadow that looms over every Indo-Pak confrontation.

Both countries have significantly modernised their nuclear arsenals. India now fields 172 warheads, including 48 air-based, 80 land-based, and 16 sea-based systems, with an additional 28 warheads in storage. Pakistan maintains 170 warheads, heavily reliant on land-based delivery but actively developing sea-based capabilities like the Babur-3 SLCM. This build-up, combined with absence of real-time de-escalation protocols and the presence of tactical nuclear weapons in Pakistan, increases the chances of miscalculation.

The spectre of nuclear use, while still remote, is more pronounced than at any time since Kargil. In the current climate of hardened rhetoric and doctrinal ambiguity, even a conventional engagement risks triggering a spiral with catastrophic potential. India’s “No First Use” policy stands in stark contrast to Pakistan’s deliberately ambiguous stance, adding to the unpredictability.

International Reactions and the Search for Restraint

The international community responded with familiar concern. China called for restraint, worried more about regional destabilisation than any sympathy for Pakistan. Russia voiced alarm, while Turkey predictably backed Pakistan. The UK’s Foreign Secretary, David Lammy, warned that further escalation would serve no one, citing Britain’s close ties with both nations. The US, under pressure from both domestic constituencies and South Asian allies, urged both sides to step back but remained silent on Pakistan’s terror links.

This episode also indicates the limits of third-party mediation in Indo-Pak conflicts. While there is broad condemnation of terrorism, there is little desire to penalise Pakistan unless escalation threatens global security or economic interests. India’s structured strike doctrine is therefore designed not only to punish but to appeal to global sensibilities by avoiding civilian harm. Yet the burden of pushing for peace must lie with these same powers, particularly in pressing Pakistan to dismantle its terror networks and sever ties between its military, intelligence agencies, and militant proxies.

Between Deterrence and Dialogue

South Asia stands at a precipice. The history of India-Pakistan hostility is long, bloody, and unresolved. From the 1947 attack in Kashmir, Operation Desert Hawk in 1965 to Operation Sindoor in 2025, the sweep of escalation has remained unbroken. Yet amid this unpredictability lies a fragile hope – the possibility of a different path. India has demonstrated strength, but the challenge is not to substitute dialogue with deterrence. Peace cannot be brokered through missiles alone. Pakistan’s military and intelligence establishments must make a decisive break from terrorism as statecraft.

For India, the responsibility lies in resisting the temptation of permanent confrontation. Strategic sway must be tempered with strategic patience. Civil society on both sides continues to bear the cost of this enduring enmity. Trade is suspended, borders are closed, people are silenced. In Kashmir, the promise of post-370 integration is endangered by the return of violence and the erosion of trust.

What is urgently needed is a strategic reset—one that moves beyond the familiar cycle of retaliation and denial, and returns to structured dialogue grounded in realism, mutual respect, and historical clarity. Without engagement, India and Pakistan risk remaining trapped in a permanent prisoner’s dilemma, where every move is guided by distrust and every silence mistaken for weakness. Dialogue does not imply concession. It is the only rational alternative to a costly stalemate that has drained resources, stifled regional cooperation, and imperilled millions. Kashmir is not merely a battleground. It is a lived and suffering space, home to people with histories, identities, and aspirations long eclipsed by geopolitical posturing. As the world watches, the choices made today will determine whether South Asia reclaims the possibility of peace, or slides irreversibly into another preventable tragedy. The urgency is real. The responsibility is shared. And the time to act is now.