Courting Both Sides? The Taliban’s Tightrope Between India And Pakistan – Analysis
In a significant diplomatic development, India’s External Affairs Minister Dr S. Jaishankar held a telephonic conversation with the interim Foreign Minister of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) Amir Khan Muttaqi, on May 15.
Coming on the heels of Operation Sindoor – India’s retaliatory strikes against terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan in response to the Pahalgam attack – the EAM reiterated India’s commitment to the Afghan people and thanked his counterpart for his condemnation of the terror attack in Pahalgam. He also acknowledged the Emirate’s “rejection of recent attempts to create distrust” between the two countries – a reference to Pakistan’s attempts to draw Afghanistan into the latest India-Pakistan conflict.
In Pursuit of a Balanced Foreign Policy
On May 10, India and Pakistan reached an understanding on the cessation of all forms of military action— on land, in the air and at sea. As Operation Sindoor concluded, India redefined its doctrine vis-a-vis Pakistan’s support for state-sponsored terrorism. On the same day, the Director General of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) accused India of threatening the subcontinent with full-scale war, claiming that a missile fired by New Delhi had targeted Afghanistan. This statement was categorically refuted by a spokesperson of the IEA’s Defence Ministry. India’s Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri also rejected the claimand quipped that “the Afghan people don’t need to be reminded which country has recurrently targeted their civilian infrastructure and killed civilians.” This remark was a reference to Pakistan’s air strikes in Afghanistan in December 2024, which killed several civilians. Over the last three years, as ties between Pakistan and Afghanistan regressed from bad to worse, the Taliban has sought to diversify its diplomatic engagements, with India emerging as an important partner in its outreach.
In the aftermath of the terror attack in Pahalgam, the IEA released a statement condemning the incident and highlighting its adverse impact on “regional security and stability ”. Two weeks later, when India launched Operation Sindoor, the emirate again condemned the escalation and called on both sides to “exercise restraint and resolve issues through dialogue and diplomacy ”.
The Taliban’s messaging vis-à-vis the latest conflict stressed Afghanistan’s “balanced and economy-oriented foreign policy”. Kabul has attempted to project itself as a responsible regional power, committed to maintaining relations with all neighbouring countries and opposing conflict in the region. In the case of India and Pakistan, the Taliban claims to have “commonalities and positive interactions” with both. These statements are part of the group’s efforts to redefine its image before the international community, strengthen its case for international legitimacy, and extract benefits through engagement with all countries.
Perceptions of Pakistan
Pakistan’s hopes of reaping the benefits of its support to the Taliban’s insurgency have come to nought. The ties between the two sides have been at their lowest since the Taliban’s return to power. While Islamabad has urged the Taliban to restrain the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and withdraw its support for the group, the Taliban has refuted these allegations. Instead, the Taliban accuses Pakistan of deflecting responsibility for its domestic difficulties. The tensions have turned violent, with Pakistan launching air strikes against suspected TTP hideouts in December 2024. There have also been instances of armed clashes and cross-border shelling. Pakistan’s decision to deport Afghan refugees beginning last year further dented the ties.
The Taliban now position Pakistan much as India has long done— a sponsor of proxy terror groups aimed at keeping Afghanistan subservient. In its annual report for the Central Commission for Security and Clearance Affairs, released early this year, the Taliban blamed certain ‘elements’ in Islamabad for shelteringmilitants in Balochistan and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa provinces. These militants, according to the report, are “regrouping with the tacit approval, tolerance and indirect support of certain parties,” and may be used to plan attacks on other countries in the region. When the Trump administration acknowledged Islamabad’s role in the arrest of the mastermind behind the Kabul Airport attack of 2021, the Taliban responded by suggesting this confirmed the existence of Islamic State – Khorasan Province (ISKP) camps in Pakistan. The group further argued that Islamabad was attempting to curry favour with the United States, even though the real mastermind had already been “neutralised”.
Despite these differences, the last few months have seen both sides attempt to re-engage. Last month, the Joint Coordination Committee met, followed by a visit from Pakistan’s Foreign Minister, Mohammad Ishaq Dar, to Afghanistan for a meeting with his counterpart. A day before the launch of Operation Sindoor, the two foreign ministers held a follow-up call to review the outcomes of their meeting and take stock of the evolving situation between India and Pakistan.
Tryst with New Delhi
As ties between the two countries plummeted over the last three years, the Taliban regime intensified its outreach to India. The decline in Pakistan’s influence also created more space for India to engage. On April 27, five days after the Pahalgam attack, an Indian delegation led by the Joint Secretary of the Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran (PAI) division of the Ministry of External Affairs visited Afghanistan and met Muttaqi. According to a statement released by the Emirate’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), the two sides discussed the rising tensions between India and Pakistan and the need to expand India’s role in Afghanistan. The timing of the meeting—in the aftermath of the terror attack and India’s punitive actions against Pakistan— sent a strong political message about how India perceives the Emirate vis-à-vis its conflict with Pakistan.
Since usurping power in August 2021, the IEA has been trying to get India to increase its engagement. Its demands have centred around facilitating the movement of people between the two countries, issuing visas to businessmen and students, resuming infrastructure projects and encouraging Indian investment in the country. At the most recent meeting, the closure of the Attari-Wagah border crossing was raised. The border, a critical one-way trade route for the export of Afghan goods to India, was closed after India held Pakistan responsible for the 22 April terror attack and subsequently took a slew of punitive diplomatic measures against Islamabad. Following the meeting, India approved the entry of 160 Afghan trucks through the border in a “special gesture”.
India has gradually increased its engagement with the Taliban, focusing on humanitarian aid while securing acknowledgement of its security concerns. In December 2024, when Pakistan launched strikes against Afghanistan, India ‘unequivocally condemned’ the action and criticised Pakistan for externalising its internal problems. Foreign Secretary Misri also met the Emirate’s interim Foreign Minister in January 2025 – the highest-level meeting between the two sides to date. In the call with the EAM, the Taliban once again raised the issue of visa facilitation and asked for the release of Afghan prisoners in Indian jails.
Growing India-Afghanistan ties create a sense of unease in Pakistan as Islamabad witnesses the unravelling of its hopes of gaining strategic depth in the country. On the other hand, the Taliban sees growing ties with India as an effective leverage against Pakistan, allowing the group to operate independently from Islamabad.
A trilateral of significance?
As the ceasefire was being mediated between India and Pakistan, representatives from China and Pakistan convened in Afghanistan for the fifth edition of the trilateral consultations between the three countries. The special envoys from China and Pakistan also met Afghanistan’s interim Interior Minister, Sirajuddin Haqqani and discussed issues of mutual interest.
While official statements from Afghanistan and Pakistan made no reference to this point, several Pakistani and Afghan newspapers highlighted that the three sides were committed to ensuring that India’s role in Afghanistan remained restricted only to the diplomatic front, and that the IEA remained neutral on the question of the Pahalgam terror attack. This ‘regional realignment’, as termed in the reports, reflects a certain anxiety as Pakistan grapples with the aftermath of India’s military action. Some reports also noted Afghanistan’s reticence in accepting these demands.
Conclusion
In the aftermath of Operation Sindoor and the delicate stitching of a ceasefire, New Delhi remains on high alert. The growing leeway with the Taliban, as the group’s ties with Islamabad deteriorate, places India in a favourable position. However, the challenges remain. The Emirate’s self-projection as a neutral power, its willingness to foster ties with all neighbouring countries, and the resumption of dialogue with Pakistan indicate that the Taliban is hedging its bets. Muttaqi is also scheduled to be in China on May 20 to meet his counterparts from Beijing and Islamabad for another trilateral meeting. The growing cooperation between China and Pakistan poses a significant challenge to New Delhi’s strategic interests in Afghanistan. While India will continue its engagement with the Taliban, as evidenced by the recent call, it must also take cognis ance of the evolving risks.