China-Taiwan Weekly Update, May 30, 2025

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) condemned the US Golden Dome space defense project for undermining global stability, despite the fact that the PRC has similarly invested in developing its military capabilities in space. Russia and North Korea issued similar criticisms, and altogether, space programs from these three countries may deny US access to space and space capabilities. The United States announced on May 20 that it will build a space-based defense system—called the Golden Dome—that would involve a constellation of sensors and interceptors to defend the US homeland from missile threats.[1] The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) criticized the project for militarizing space and called for the US to abandon the project. The North Korean Foreign Ministry also condemned the decision for potentially causing “a global nuclear and space arms race.”[2] The Russian Foreign Ministry issued a similar statement on May 27 and highlighted the joint PRC-Russia statement from May 8 directly opposing the Golden Dome program on the grounds of opposing “outer space as a ‘combat space.’”[3]

The PRC is nevertheless building its own military power in space. The US vice chief of space operations said in March 2025 that the United States had observed “five different [PRC] objects in space maneuvering in and out and around each other in synchronicity and in control.”[4] The senior officer described the movements as “dogfighting” in space and said that the PRC is “practicing tactics, techniques, and procedures to do on-orbit operations from one satellite to another.” The US chief of space operations similarly said in April 2025 that the PRC is developing space-based and counter-space capabilities and “has grown its on-orbit capability by approximately 620 percent” over the past decade.[5]

The United States Space Command Commander, General Stephen N. Whiting, stated in February 2024 that the PRC, Russia, North Korea, and Iran’s actions indicate “they are committed to denying American and allied forces the benefits of our space assets.”[6] The PRC, Russia, and North Korea have collaborated on projects that may challenge US control in that domain. Russia and the PRC founded a project in 2021 to construct the International Lunar Research Station (ILRS).[7] They signed a memorandum of cooperation in early May to build a nuclear power station on the moon by 2035 to power this station.[8] This project directly competes with a NASA project with the same objective.[9] Then-US Secretary of State Antony Blinken also stated in January 2025 that there were “reasons to believe that Moscow intends to share advanced space and satellite technology with Pyongyang.”[10] Russia has assisted North Korea’s satellite program in the past, including on the successful November 2023 launch of a reconnaissance satellite.[11]

The PRC has continued to exploit US tariffs to portray itself as a global champion of multilateralism and to build its own economic relations. On May 21, the PRC accused the United States of undermining the global trading system and called on members of the World Trade Organization to stabilize international trade amid this challenge.[12] PRC state media lauded that Russia, Brazil, and Pakistan supported the PRC rhetoric, highlighting PRC efforts to frame itself as the advocate for the Global South.[13]

The PRC has meanwhile engaged multinational blocs to promote economic cooperation and reduce US global influence amid global frustrations about US tariffs. PRC trade officials have met with their EU counterparts in recent months to discuss expanding ties as part of the PRC’s effort to exploit the US imposition of tariffs.[14] The EU ambassador to the PRC said on May 23 that trade negotiations have stalled, nevertheless.[15] The PRC has similarly engaged the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) on May 27 and 28 to deepen economic collaboration.[16] PRC Premier Li Qiang called on the parties to build an “inter-regional financial ecosystem” to jointly combat US “unilateralism.”[17] ASEAN trade with the PRC and GCC has steadily increased in recent years, exceeding 900 billion US dollars in 2024 (almost double United States-ASEAN trade)[18]

Key Takeaways

PRC: The PRC condemned the US Golden Dome space defense project for undermining global stability, despite the fact that the PRC has similarly invested in developing its military capabilities in space.
PRC: The PRC has continued to exploit US tariffs to portray itself as a global champion of multilateralism and to build its own economic relations, including with major multinational blocs, such as the European Union.

Cross-Strait Relations

Taiwan

Thirty-one Kuomintang (KMT) legislators will very likely face special recall elections in Taiwan. The ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has forecasted that it could flip over 10 legislative seats, giving it a majority. The recall campaign against KMT legislator Lin Pei-hsiang of Keelung submitted its signatures to the Central Election Commission (CEC) on May 23, bringing the total number of submitted petitions to 31.[19] This was the last recall petition against a KMT legislator still collecting signatures in the second stage of the recall process.[20] Four petitions against KMT and KMT-aligned legislators failed to reach the signature threshold by the deadline. There are 15 recall petitions targeting DPP legislators that are in the second stage and collecting signatures. The submission deadlines for most of these recall petitions are in June. The CEC will validate the signatures for all submitted petitions and schedule recall elections within 20–60 days of approving each petition.[21]

Taiwanese media reported that the DPP has forecasted that voters will likely recall 20 KMT legislators and that the DPP will win over 10 seats in the subsequent special elections. A previous DPP assessment forecasted that 12 KMT legislators would be recalled and that the DPP would flip seven seats. The new, more optimistic assessment reflects DPP perceptions that it has significantly overperformed in the ongoing mass recalls and the fact that 18 petitions against KMT legislators were submitted with 130 percent or more of the signatures required.[22] DPP-aligned civil society groups initiated mass recalls against the KMT early this year after the KMT-led coalition in the Legislative Yuan (LY) used its majority to pass record-high, highly controversial budget cuts. The DPP needs to flip six seats to gain a majority in the LY.

Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration (CGA) stated that an increase in illegal border crossings by PRC nationals may be a form of cognitive warfare to undermine Taiwanese confidence in its coastal defenses. The CGA is investigating four separate cases in which PRC nationals illegally tried to enter Taiwan by sea from May 16 to 23. Two of these cases occurred on Guanyin beach — a “red beach” designated as a likely location for an amphibious People’s Liberation Army (PLA) invasion of Taiwan. The other two cases were attempts to land on Erdan and Dadan islands — two small garrison islands off Kinmen Island with little to no civilian population.[23]

The CGA requested more funding for coastal surveillance in response to the incidents. CGA deputy head Hsieh Ching-chin said that small boats, such as rubber dinghies, were almost impossible to detect by radar. He said that the CGA had developed a coastal surveillance plan that required special budget approval by the legislature to deploy artificial intelligence (AI)-enhanced networks of early warning systems, drones, and infrared imaging.[24]

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The CGA stated that these illegal crossings could be a form of cognitive warfare — a low-cost way to undermine public confidence in Taiwan’s coastal defenses. The timing of the four incidents may be related to the anniversary of Taiwanese President William Lai Ching-te’s inauguration on May 20. Two previous cases of PRC illegal transits to Kinmen over the past year both coincided with major PLA exercises and politically significant moments in cross-strait relations, suggesting that they are part of a concerted campaign.

Not every recent case of illegal PRC entry by sea occurred around the time of major exercises, however. The CGA arrested a retired PRC navy captain who sailed a speedboat into the mouth of the Tamsui River in Taipei in June 2024. Another man landed in an inflatable boat in northern Taiwan in September 2024, with oceanographic data on his phone. Another man entered Taiwan in October 2024 as a stowaway aboard a Tanzanian-flagged PRC cargo ship and stayed for two months before submitting himself to authorities.[26] Such small-scale landings can test Taiwan’s coastal surveillance and response even when they are not related to PRC signaling. Ocean Affairs Council Minister Kuan Bi-ling noted that there have been 27 such illegal entries into Taiwan over the past two years. She said that the patterns in the individuals’ testimonies and items in their possession followed a pattern that suggested a coordinated PRC operation.[27]

Taiwan expanded its investigation into Taiwanese nationals holding PRC identification cards to include a broader range of civil servants and public-school teachers, reflecting ongoing Taiwanese efforts to crack down on PRC infiltration and “passportization.” The Taiwanese government is vetting thousands of former PRC nationals by asking them to submit documentation proving that they no longer possess PRC household registration.[28] The government requested information from 12,000 PRC-born spouses of Taiwanese nationals, but over 8,000 have yet to respond as of May 23.[29] This identification card investigation follows a series of related measures meant to combat PRC infiltration within Taiwan’s military and government, including a first wave of similar identification card investigations earlier in spring 2025.

Taiwanese President Lai announced “17 measures” for combatting PRC infiltration in March 2025.[30] These measures target PRC “United Front” work aimed at infiltrating Taiwan’s government and media space, as well as potential spies within Taiwan’s military. Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense announced on May 25 that Taiwanese military personnel will be barred from eight categories of military work, including intelligence and attaché work, if they originate from the PRC, hold PRC citizenship, or have studied at institutions affiliated with the PLA or various PRC state organs. It said that 387 Taiwanese conscripts — about 0.46 percent of the total — who served their mandatory service in 2024 fell into one of these categories.[31] The Lai administration and local Taiwanese authorities have uncovered numerous espionage cases during Lai’s first year in office, including military officers and a former assistant to Taiwanese national security chief (then foreign minister) Joseph Wu.[32]

The PRC, especially local and provincial governments of Fujian Province, have pushed for Taiwanese visitors, workers, and students in the PRC to receive PRC identification cards. These efforts may reflect a “passportization” campaign similar to Russian lines of effort in occupied areas of Ukraine.[33] Distributing PRC documentation to Taiwanese people is a way promote people-to-people exchanges while intertwining the PRC and Taiwan economically and culturally. It also serves PRC narratives that Taiwan is legally part of the PRC, possibly laying the groundwork for future action against Taiwan on the pretext of “protecting” PRC nationals.[34]

Taiwan’s plan to establish drone units is a significant step in its military modernization. Taiwan’s development of denial-focused capabilities improves its overall ability to deter and repel a PRC invasion. Taiwanese Minister of Defense Wellington Koo said on May 22 that the military will eliminate outdated units and replace them with drone units in 2026.[35] Koo added that the Taiwanese Marine Corps has already begun transforming tank and artillery battalions into drone units.[36]

Taiwan’s military strategy aims to maximize lethality under resource constraints to compensate for the disparity in military power with the PRC. This entails leveraging cheap, mobile, and numerous systems that enhance survivability and impose high costs on the adversary’s larger assets. Former Taiwanese Chief of General Staff Lee Hsi-min, who developed the concept, described it as exploiting “a large number of small things.” [37]Ukrainian success using drones against Russia has provided further impetus for Taiwan’s adoption of unmanned systems.[38] The Lai administration aims to increase drone production capacity to 15,000 per month by 2028.[39] Taiwan currently faces domestic production constraints requiring support from US industry to meet high demand and reorient the supply chain away from the PRC.

Northeast Asia

Japan

A PLA Navy flotilla led by aircraft carrier Liaoning operated approximately 200 km north of the Senkaku Islands between May 25 and 26. This is the first time that Japan has reported PLA carrier-based aerial operations in the East China Sea. The carrier and a Type 055 destroyer subsequently transited the Miyako Strait on May 27. The Japanese Ministry of Defense reported that J-15 carrier-based fighters conducted 90 launch and recover operations, while carrier-based helicopters conducted 30 operations.[40] This is also the Liaoning’s first time operating beyond the waters near its home port of Qingdao this year.[41]

The PRC has not commented on the incident at the time of writing, and Japan did not report any airspace violations. PRC state media claimed that the Liaoning’s activities were “normal, routine and expected to continue to increase.”[42] The PRC often downplays its military activities in the East China Sea, as Beijing sees most of the waters as its territory. For example, PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Lin Jian commented that PLA Navy activities “conformed to China’s domestic law and international law” when CNS Liaoning entered Japan’s contiguous waters near Okinawa for the first time in September 2024.[43]

The Japan Coast Guard (JCC) reported a PRC maritime research vessel conducting unknown activities within Japan’s claimed economic exclusive zone (EEZ) around the Okinotori Island. The JCC spotted the Tan Kah Kee research vessel, which is operated by the PRC’s Xiamen University, deploying a cable-like object in the waters around 270 km east of Okinotori Island. Okinotori Island is Japan’s southernmost island and is located approximately 1200 km northwest of Guam. Japan lodged a protest with the PRC over the Tan Kah Kee’s activities on May 27.[44]

PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Mao Ning rejected Japan’s claim of having an EEZ around the Island, saying that Okonotori Island is a reef, not an island, and that Japan’s EEZ claim and interference with PRC maritime activities violate the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).[45] Mao invoked UNCLOS to justify the Tan Kah Kee’s operations around Okonotori Island despite the PRC itself claiming and often attempting to enforce maritime jurisdictions that do not comport with UNCLOS. Beijing refused to accept the outcome of the South China Sea (SCS) arbitration in 2016, which rejected the PRC’s “historical claim” to nearly the entire SCS based on its “nine-dash line” boundary.[46] The PRC’s construction of artificial islands in the SCS, claim of territorial sea based on these man-made features, and continued presence of China Coast Guard (CCG) and maritime militia within disputed territory have violated multiple UNCLOS articles.[47] The PRC selectively applies or interprets UNCLOS to create the illusion of legal legitimacy for its maritime and military activities in the SCS.[48]

North Korea

North Korea fired cruise missiles a day after its new destroyer sank to signal its military development and war preparedness despite the failed launch. Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) General Secretary Kim Jong Un attended the launch ceremony of a new 5,000-ton-class destroyer at the Chongjin Shipyard on May 21. The vessel failed to properly slide off the ramp and partially capsized during the launch.[49] Kim condemned the incident as a “criminal act,” harshly criticizing and ordering the immediate arrest of the personnel responsible.[50] The destroyer was the second of its kind to be launched following the Choe Hyon, which successfully conducted a missile test on April 28.[51] North Korea fired multiple cruise missiles on May 22, a few hours after the failed launch.[52] This test follows a series of recent missile activities by North Korea,[53][54]

North Korea’s launch of cruise missiles after the failed launch of the vessel is likely an attempt to deflect internal criticism and send a strong message that North Korea’s military modernization is still ongoing.[55] North Korea appears to be reinforcing internal discipline and demonstrating Kim’s commitment to strengthening the military by launching missiles while also punishing those responsible for the incident.

South Korea arrested several North Korean defectors and South Korean nationals for espionage and money laundering for North Korea. North Korea exploits South Korean nationals and defectors to support its own foreign policy and economic interests. South Korean authorities indicted a North Korean defector for engaging in espionage under orders from the North Korean Ministry of State Security (MSS). The individual initially worked as an agent for the MSS beginning in 2009 before defecting to South Korea. She later re-established contact with the MSS in 2015 and resumed espionage activities in Jeju, South Korea.[56] South Korean authorities accused the suspect of photographing an Air Force radar base and surveilling other defectors. The base detects North Korean reconnaissance aircraft and missile launches.[57] The National Intelligence Service (NIS) announced that 11 North Korean defectors had been arrested for espionage activity as of 2021.[58]

South Korean police arrested a South Korean national surnamed Kim for operating an illegal online gambling site in coordination with North Korea. Kim worked with North Korean hackers and departments to create and run the website, generating a total of 17.2 million US dollars. NK News reported that at least 30 percent of the earnings were funneled back to North Korea.[59]

North Korea is intensifying its intelligence collection efforts in South Korea by exploiting South Korean resources and individuals. North Korea continues to use defectors, who are underprivileged in South Korea, as intelligence assets through coercion or persuasion. Some funds obtained through illegal activities in South Korea are funneled back into North Korean intelligence operations, posing a real threat to both South Korea and the United States. North Korea has increasingly diversified its financing schemes in recent years. The North Korean hacking group the Lazarus Group, affiliated with North Korea’s Reconnaissance General Bureau, plundered 1.46 billion US dollars of cryptocurrency in March 2025, the largest amount stolen by any hacker group.[60] North Korea uses these activities to fuel its military development and secure sufficient funding for espionage operations.

South Korea

Democratic Party (DP) candidate Lee Jae-myung remains the frontrunner of the South Korean presidential election set for June 3. He is likely to pursue engagement with North Korea and cooperation with the PRC. Polls from May 28 show Lee leading with 49.2 percent, followed by Kim Moon-soo of the People Power Party (PPP) at 36.8 percent, and Lee Jun-seok of the Reform Party (RP) at 10.3 percent.[61] This represents a 2.6 percentage-point increase for Lee compared to May 21. Conservative candidates, the PPP’s Kim Moon-soo and the RP’s Lee Jun-seok, disagreed over plans to merge their campaigns into a single candidacy.[62] The failure to consolidate conservative voters makes the DP’s Lee Jae-myung the most likely candidate to win the election.

DP candidate Lee Jae-myung’s campaign is emphasizing “pragmatic” diplomacy with the PRC and North Korea. Lee has suggested re-engaging with North Korea, while maintaining good relations with the PRC. DP’s Lee blamed the incumbent PPP administration for failing to respond to trash-filled balloons launched by North Korea between May and November 2025, during a presidential debate on May 27.[63] He also stated that there is no need to remain “unnecessarily hostile” toward the PRC and Russia, dismissing the fact that South Korea’s strained relations with Russia stem from Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine and its military cooperation with North Korea.[64] Lee advocated for an indigenous anti-missile system instead of the US-provided Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, given the PRC’s protests and economic retaliation against South Korea following the 2017 deployment of the weapons.[65]

South Korea’s relations with the PRC are likely to improve under a potential Lee Jae-myung presidency. South Korea’s diplomatic support for Taiwan may diminish compared to the Yoon Suk-yeol administration, such as the trilateral joint statement issued by the United States, South Korea, and Japan on February 15, which expressed support for Taiwan’s participation in international organizations.[66] Lee Jae-myung, in contrast, has stated that South Korea should not interfere in a cross-strait conflict.[67] He will likely face increased pressure from the PRC to prevent the United States Forces Korea (USFK) from expanding its primary role of defending South Korea to counter the PRC, as senior US officials increasingly advocate for USFK’s strategic flexibility.[68]

The PLA obtained classified US Forces Korea (USFK) operational plans through a PRC collaborator within the South Korean military between August 2024 and April 2025.[69] The PRC operative, affiliated with the Military Intelligence Department of the PLA, recruited a South Korean soldier with ethnic ties to the PRC. The individual had lived most of his life in Beijing with his grandfather, who served as an officer in the PLA Rocket Force.[70] The information he gave to the PRC operative included details of South Korea-United States combined exercises, such as the names, ranks, and contact information of personnel in charge of the “Ulchi Freedom Shield,” and the locations of key military facilities, weapon stockpiles, and allied contingency response plans.[71] South Korean authorities are expanding their investigation, suspecting deeper PRC infiltration within the military.

The latest espionage case follows a separate incident involving PRC intelligence agents under the Joint Staff Department of the Central Military Commission, who gathered information on the THAAD system through another South Korean collaborator within the military between July 2023 and January 2025.[72] The PRC agents reportedly sought intelligence related to “OPLAN 5077,” a US military plan for evacuating American civilians during a Korean Peninsula conflict, saying that “information about the US military is the most valuable.”[73]

The PRC’s focus on information related to USFK reflects its concerns over potential US involvement in defending Taiwan in a cross-strait conflict. The PLA may use the information to deter and delay the deployment of USFK and possibly South Korean troops or assets in the event of such a contingency. PRC efforts to gather intelligence regarding USFK are likely to increase as the United States continues to call for expanding strategic flexibility of the USFK to counter the PRC.

The PRC declared no-sail zones within the PRC-South Korea provisional measures zone (PMZ) in the Yellow Sea. The PRC may be seeking to exercise full control over the surrounding waters. The PRC-South Korea PMZ is the zone established in the overlapping area of both countries’ exclusive economic zones (EEZs) based on an agreement to resolve disputes over fishing rights and oil exploration in the Yellow Sea in 2000. The PRC declared three “no-sail zones” within the PMZ from May 22 to 27. Newsweek reported that two of these zones were designated for military activities, and the PRC did not reveal specific reasons for the third zone.[74] The South Korean government stated that “since the PMZ is international waters outside of our territorial waters, there is no problem with the two countries training there,” but conveyed concerns to the PRC through diplomatic channels, warning that such navigation restrictions could infringe upon South Korea’s interests.[75]

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PLA exercises within the PMZ are not unprecedented, according to the South Korean military authorities.[77] The recent surge of PRC activities in the PMZ, including the installation of three structures, may be part of a PRC effort to gain effective control over the Yellow Sea. The PRC has installed three installations, claimed to be fishing installations, in the Yellow Sea since 2018, yet has had maritime conflicts with South Korea.[78] The PRC aims to expand its sea and air control over its surrounding waters, including the South and East China Seas and the Yellow Sea. Enhanced PRC military control over the seas would improve the viability of the PRC’s anti-access/area denial strategy, delaying US and South Korean support from reaching Taiwan in case of war in the Taiwan Strait. Such activities have increased markedly in 2025 and are now escalating tensions between the PRC and South Korea.

Southeast Asia

Philippines

Two China Coast Guard (CCG) ships harassed two Philippine government vessels near Sandy Cay during a scientific research mission on May 21.[79] The PRC’s recent aggression may represent a deterrence strategy aimed at discouraging the Philippines from increasing its security cooperation with the United States and other regional partners. Sandy Cay is a mostly submerged, unoccupied reef in the Spratly Islands that is connected to the Philippine-controlled Thitu Island, which hosts a coast guard base and some military facilities.[80] The CCG ships, which received support from several PRC maritime militia vessels, deployed water cannons, sideswiped, and blocked the two Philippine vessels, which belonged to the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR). The PRC employs non-lethal violent tactics in territorial disputes to avoid provoking direct intervention from the United States.[81]

CCG personnel landed and unfurled a PRC flag on Sandy Cay on April 28 during an operation that the PRC claimed demonstrated the PRC’s sovereignty over the reef.[82] The Philippines has since disputed this claim and landed its own personnel on the cay, but the CCG remains active in the area.[83] The CCG landing on Sandy Cay followed the start of the large-scale annual Balikatan exercises between the United States and the Philippines, which the PRC has criticized as a threat to regional security.[84] The latest confrontation comes on the heels of the annual US-Philippines Kamandag exercises[85][86] Both exercises involved the transfer of US-owned anti-ship missiles to the Philippine Batanes Islands in the Luzon Strait. The Luzon Strait is a strategically significant maritime chokepoint between the Philippines and Taiwan that acts as a conduit between the South China Sea and the western Pacific. PRC control of the waterway is crucial for its ability to encircle Taiwan and achieve control of the sea. PRC officials and media have framed its confrontations with the Philippines in the South China Sea in the context of the latter’s recent military cooperation with the United States, indicating the PRC’s connection of the two matters. [87]

Russia

Ukrainian intelligence accused the PRC of supplying gunpowder and other materials supporting Russia’s industrial base to 20 factories in Russia. The PRC routinely denies supporting Russia’s war effort despite its well-documented support for Russia’s defense industrial base throughout the Russia-Ukraine war. Ukrainian foreign intelligence chief Oleg Ivashchenko told the Ukrinform state news agency that the PRC “supplies tooling machines, special chemical products, gunpowder, and components specifically to defense manufacturing industries.”[88] Ivashchenko said that Ukraine had evidence of 20 Russian factories participating in this exchange, as well as information on five cases of aviation industry cooperation between 2024–2025 and six cases of specialty chemical shipments.[89] He added that as of 2025, 80 percent of critical electronics for Russian drones are Chinese.[90] Ivashchenko’s statements are consistent with numerous past reports by Ukrainian, US, and EU authorities and media that the PRC is supplying dual-use components and goods to Russia’s defense industrial base, including drones and drone parts, machine tools, and chemicals.

PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Mao Ning responded by saying that the PRC has never provided lethal weapons to any party in the conflict, “strictly controls” dual-use items, and opposes “groundless accusations.”[91] The PRC has consistently presented itself as a neutral mediator and framed its support of Russia’s defense industrial base as “normal trade relations.” The PRC supports Russian aims of weakening NATO but has refrained from openly providing military aid to Russia largely because it wishes to maintain good relations with Western countries, which are important PRC trading partners. An EU spokesperson nevertheless called the PRC a “key enabler” of Russia’s war in Ukraine in May 2025.[92]

South Asia

PRC Foreign Affairs Minister Wang Yi held a trilateral meeting with counterparts from Pakistan and Afghanistan, supporting ongoing PRC investment and cooperation efforts with these regional partners as well as its efforts to position itself as a mediator. Wang met with Pakistani Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs Minister Muhammad Dar and Afghan Acting Foreign Affairs Minister Mawlawi Amir Khan Muttaqi in Beijing on May 21.[93] Wang Yi emphasized strengthening trilateral cooperation and integrating Afghanistan into the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a longstanding series of Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) infrastructure projects that the PRC has spearheaded in Pakistan.[94] Wang also highlighted counterterrorism efforts, emphasizing “law enforcement and security cooperation” against the “mutual concern” of terrorism.[95]

Wang Yi emphasized strengthening the bilateral relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan, highlighting the PRC’s interest in playing a mediator role.[96] The Taliban accused Pakistan of attempting to sabotage the relationship between Afghanistan and the PRC after Pakistan blamed militants operating in Afghanistan for an attack on PRC nationals in 2024.[97] Efforts to mediate between Pakistan and Afghanistan reflect the PRC’s interest in stabilizing the region while casting itself as a leader of the “Global South.” The PRC does not officially recognize the Taliban but does maintain an embassy in Kabul.[98]

The PRC has invested in CPEC as BRI’s flagship initiative for years, with a particular focus on developing Gwadar Port in Pakistan’s Balochistan province into a viable commercial port. Pakistan offers access to the Indian Ocean, as well as proximity to strategic Strait of Hormuz shipping routes. It is also a key security partner of the PRC. Logistical, economic, and security challenges, including terror attacks on PRC nationals, have complicated efforts to develop Gwadar and other PRC-funded projects, however.[99] The PRC will likely face similar challenges further complicated by a lack of existing infrastructure in Afghanistan, where PRC nationals and sites frequented by PRC nationals have faced militant attacks in recent years.[100] The Taliban has made statements indicating it aims to protect PRC nationals, however, in line with Taliban interest in seeking PRC investment.[101]