The US Aimed At Iran But Might Have Hit Central Asia – Analysis
The U.S. and Israeli attacks last month on Iran to “obliterate” its nuclear program may have hit another target: Central Asia’s interests in accesses the large Iranian market and use Iran’s transport links to trade with the wider world.
Iran’s “Look East” policy was launched by then-President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2005 to improve relations with Russia, China, and India to counter Western pressure over Iran’s nuclear program and improve the economy. It was continued by Ahmadinejad’s successors and now includes Central Asia, a region with which Iran has had numerous recent engagements.
On May 15, 2025, a free trade agreement between Iran and the Eurasian Economic Union (Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Armenia, and Kyrgyzstan) came into force.
In June 2023, Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev met Iran’s then-President Ebrahim Raisi and Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The 2023 meeting netted cooperation pacts in agriculture, energy, customs affairs, sports, science, technology and innovation, cultural exchanges, health care, Chabahar port, the environment, industry, and tourism.
The June 2023 meetings followed a March 2023 visit by Uzbekistan’s foreign minister, who met Iran’s minister of foreign affairs and minister of industry, mines, and trade. Afterward, the parties announced efforts to increase trade turnover, and to foster business links and people-to-people ties. The ministerial meetings built on the September 2022 visit by Raisi to Uzbekistan that produced 17 agreements in areas such as energy, transport, and agriculture, and discussed how to increase trade.
In September 2022, Raisi had declared that improving relations with Central Asia was “one of the first priorities of the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran.”
Iran wants to increase trade with Uzbekistan fourfold, to $2 billion (it was less than $520 million in 2023); trade with Kazakhstan and Tajikistan aims to reach $1 billion each; deals with Turkmenistan will jump by 30 percent. Although Tajikistan’s economy is markedly smaller than those of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, in this case it sits alongside its heftier neighbors because of the language and cultural ties it shares with Iran and an existing defense cooperation agreement.
Tehran and Tashkent intend to develop a transport corridor through Turkmenistan, which Mirziyoyev first discussed with Turkmenistan’s president Serdar Berdimuhamedov in October 2022. Transportation cooperation between Tashkent and Ashgabat started in 2017 with the opening of the Turkmenabat-Farab railway and car bridges that will link the countries and open opportunities for long-distance trade. Raisi pledged, “The Islamic Republic of Iran is able to easily connect Uzbekistan to high seas via Turkmenistan and Afghanistan.” As Nargiza Umarova of the Institute for Advanced International Studies in Tashkent noted, “Tehran plays a key role in the formation of the Eurasian land bridge to connect China and Europe by railroads.”
The U.S. and Israeli attacks made an impression in Tashkent. Immediately afterward Mirziyoyev “ordered a review of foreign trade and transport routes, emphasizing the need to redirect cargo flows to safer ports amid instability in the Middle East,” changes that could raise logistics costs by 30 percent.
U.S. President Donald Trump declared the United States would attack Iran again if it has future concerns about the country’s uranium enrichment capabilities. More military activity over Iran may degrade regional aviation safety and disrupt air travel from Central Asia to West Asia, requiring costly rerouting.
The impact on regional supply chains will no doubt be on the agenda for the 7th Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia, which will be held in September 2025 in Uzbekistan.
Iran is hydrocarbon-rich Turkmenistan’s second-largest trading partner after Russia, and the two countries recently agreed to a roadmap to achieve $3 billion in trade, up from nearly $600 million in 2024. Also planned is an increase in the annual volume of cargo transit between the two countries to 10 million metric tons by the end of 2027
In 2024, Iran and Turkmenistan agreed to construct a new 125-kilometer natural gas pipeline, and Turkmenistan will deliver 10 billion cubic meters of natural gas for shipment to Iran, eventually rising to 40 billion cubic meters annually. Iran has a deficit of gas for its development plans and needs $45 billion of investments to boost gas production.
Trade between Kazakhstan and Iran is low, just over $300 million annually. Kazakhstan exports mainly agricultural products, and Iran exports mainly foodstuffs and industrial chemicals. In February 2025, the sides signed several agreements to boost trade, and Astana declared it was ready to supply Iran with 75 types of products valued at $250 million.
Iran is attractive to the landlocked Central Asian republics that seek redundant trade routes. In June 2021, Tashkent hosted a conference to highlight Central Asia-South Asia connectivity via Afghanistan and Pakistan. Two months later, the U.S. and NATO retreated from Afghanistan and the country plunged in chaos, so the republics had to consider alternatives.
Recently the region has seen new transport projects that cross Iran, such as the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) a 7,200-kilometer multi-mode network that spans India, Iran, Azerbaijan, and Russia. The corridor will rely on Chabahar port in Iran and will allow Tehran to solidify its ties with Moscow and Delhi. In May 2025, Iran and China launched a railway route from Xi’an in western China to the Aprin dry port near Iran’s capital, Tehran. It will cut travel time from 30 days via sea to 15 days and will avoid the Malacca Strait and the Strait of Hormuz chokepoints. And Iran’s Rail Ministry intends to build the Iran-Afghanistan-China corridor, likely through the Wakhan border.
Also in May 2025, representatives of China, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Iran, and Turkiye met to plan a new transport corridor. The Istanbul-Tehran-Islamabad railway, a 6,500-kilometer rail link was launched in 2009 on a trial basis, then revived in 2021, but poor railway infrastructure is still a hurdle. The Ashgabat Agreement proposed a multimodal transport agreement between the governments of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Iran, India, Pakistan, Armenia, and Oman that may connect with the INSTC. Finally, the Southwest Corridor, from the Persian Gulf/India-Iran-Azerbaijan-Georgia-Ukraine-Europe (or Turkiye-Europe) may cut transport time from India to Europe from over 30 days to 10-12 days.
Central Asia may make use of Iran’s ports, Chabahar and Bandar Abbas, though there is now a risk of U.S. and Israeli attacks against the ports to weaken Iran’s economy. In January 2022, Iran and Uzbekistan concluded an agreement to give Uzbekistan access to Chabahar port on the Gulf of Oman. Iran can offer a large internal market (over 90 million people, 68 percent under 35); a space free of the violence that harms Afghanistan and Pakistan; organized and functioning government agencies; and ports adjacent to the markets of India (Chabahar) and the Persian Gulf (Bandar Abbas).
The Central Asian republics are not burdened by Washington’s sense of grievance against Iran, especially as there will be an economic cost to joining the U.S. campaign against the Islamic Republic with no offsetting compensation, other than maybe a thank-you note from the U.S. ambassador.
The states of Central Asia want a reliable partner to help them deal with instability in Afghanistan. Iran shares that interest and has no territorial aspirations in Central Asia, though it will seek political support in fora such as the United Nations and wants a larger regional role through groups like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).
Iran’s position as a transport node makes it a prime target for U.S. and Israeli attacks by military and financial (sanctions) means. Tel Aviv and Washington may be concerned that as the Central Asian nations increase their trade with Iran, they will support Tehran in fora such as the United Nations. Increased economic activity may benefit the government in Tehran and preserve its legitimacy, while destabilizing the regional supply chains will increase economic distress of Iranian citizens. If Central Asia suffers, that’s a sacrifice Washington is willing to make.
The U.S. thirst for revenge and Israel’s anxieties about an Iran that enjoys normal relations with the rest of the world are a tax on the region. Is Washington ready to subordinate its talk about advancing sovereignty and economic prosperity in Central Asia to trying to isolate and impoverish the Islamic Republic?