Militant Violence in Jammu and Kashmir Post-Abrogation of Article 370
On April 22, 2025, five Islamist militants ambushed a group of tourists in the Baisaran Valley near Pahalgam, Anantnag district of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K, or Kashmir). The attackers executed 26 civilians, mostly Hindus, by shooting them in the head after allegedly asking them to recite the Kalima, the Islamic declaration of faith.a The Resistance Front (TRF), an offshoot of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), immediately claimed responsibility, but days later, it backtracked, blaming Indian agencies for maligning the so-called Kashmir resistance movement.1 The later denial notwithstanding, this was the deadliest militant attack in Kashmir since the February 2019 Pulwama suicide bombing that killed 40 central reserve police force personnel.b The Pahalgam massacre has not only reignited national outrage in India against Islamist terrorism but also underscored the enduring threat of Pakistan-based Islamist-jihadi proxies active in the Kashmir region since the mid-1990s, and set the stage for a new, more assertive phase in India’s counterterrorism and security doctrine.c
Initial investigations led by India’s security apparatus, including the National Intelligence Agency (NIA), have traced coordination between the attackers of Pahalgam and their handlers across the border in Pakistan.2 The attack raises important questions about Pakistan’s long-standing tolerance of jihadi groups, and its symbiotic ties to and tacit support for groups such as LeT and TRF.3 d The communal targeting of Hindus signaled a dangerous shift in militant objectives, from so-called separatist insurgency to more focused sectarian jihadi terror.e For decades in Kashmir, while militants killed indiscriminately or selectively targeted political figures, migrant workers, and security personnel, it had been rare since the massacres of the 1990s to see people based on their faith deliberately isolated and executed in mass-style killings. Pahalgam survivors’ accounts confirmed that the attackers separated men, asked them to recite Islamic prayers, and then shot those identified as Hindus (non-Muslims), a chilling echo of earlier pogrom-like assaults in Kashmir such as the Chhatishingpora (Anantnag) massacre of March 2000 where 36 Sikh villagers (all males like in Pahalgam) were killed for their religion by the Kashmir militants.4 Arguably, this method of singling out victims by faith exposed the ideological drive behind the attack. Despite the rhetoric of ‘self-determination,’ freedom struggle, or ‘anti-India resistance’ often used to cloak this hybrid militancy in Kashmir, the Pahalgam massacre underscored that the LeT/TRF are pursuing a sectarian jihadi project rather than a separatist insurgency. Indeed, the targeting of Hindus at Baisaran Valley was not incidental; rather, it was the intended militant message to terrorize minorities, deter migrants (non-locals), and advance a communal agenda rooted in Islamist jihadi ideology.
The April 22 massacre not only reignited fears among Hindus in Kashmir and elsewhere but also triggered a chain of diplomatic and military responses from India, culminating in a brief but intense military conflict with Pakistan. It underscored the urgent need to reassess the trajectory of violence in Kashmir post-abolition of Article 370 of the Indian Constitution, which ended J&K’s special constitutional status on August 6, 2019.f In the immediate aftermath, New Delhi enforced an unprecedented lockdown, deploying security personnel and imposing a months-long communications blackout in Kashmir.5 These measures largely prevented militant violence against security forces and restricted civil unrest and disruption of law and order, marked by stone and petrol bomb pelting by the pro-militant Kashmir Muslims popularly known as ‘Sangbaaz.’ Still, these punitive or restrictive measures also caused Kashmir’s long-running Islamist militancy to evolve into more covert, hybrid, and lethal forms.
To examine this extreme evolution in militant violence in Kashmir in the last six years, this article presents a chronological and thematic analysis of militant violence in Kashmir between August 2019 and July 2025. It also focuses on how the Pahalgam attack marked a turning point, reshaping both internal security priorities and regional dynamics, triggering a military escalation between India and Pakistan. Against the backdrop of persistent violence and Pakistan’s harboring of jihadi proxies,6 this article underscores why Kashmir remains a volatile security and communal flashpoint, demanding urgent attention and strategic focus.
This article is organized into two core parts to offer a clear and comprehensive understanding of militant violence in Kashmir following the repeal of Article 370. Part I traces the evolution of the conflict through three distinct phases: the immediate post-abrogation period (2019-2020) when strict security measures and COVID-19 lockdowns led to a sharp drop in militant activity; the resurgence phase (2021-2023), marked by targeted killings, the rise of hybrid militants, and systematic intimidation of civilians; and the most recent lethal phase (2024-July 2025), characterized by high-profile audacious attacks, intensified counterterrorism operations, and heightened cross-border tensions. Part II briefly examines India’s counterterrorism response in the wake of the April 2025 Pahalgam terror attack, focusing on the launch of Operation Sindoor in May 2025, which targeted militant bases in Pakistan-administered Kashmir and beyond, and Operation Mahadev in July 2025, which reportedly eliminated three Pahalgam perpetrators in Kashmir. The article concludes with an assessment of the future trajectory of militancy in Kashmir, drawing on developments after Pahalgam to evaluate emerging threats and security imperatives.
Part I: Three Phases of Militancy in Kashmir
Rise of Façade Groups: From Decline to Consolidation (2019-2020). Post-August 2019, the decades-old Islamist militancy in Kashmir evolved through distinct phases, each marked by changes in operational tempo, target selection, geography, and group dynamics. While the government’s security clampdown—starting in previous years and continuing with COVID-19 restrictions—initially reduced militant mobility, cross-border facilitation networks adapted, and new factions emerged to mask the role of long-entrenched Pakistan-based terror groups such as Hafiz Saeed-led Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT),g Syed Salahuddin’s Hizbul Mujahideen,h and Masood Azhar’s Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM).i Though these Pakistan-based legacy terror networks were disrupted in Kashmir due to sustained counterterrorism operations by 2019, several hybrid offshoots (the so-called façade groups) such as TRF, People’s Anti-Fascist Front (PAFF), Kashmir Tigers (KT), Kashmir Freedom Fighters (KFF), and J&K Ghaznavi Force (JKGF) appeared during this time as fresh proxy entities in Kashmir, camouflaging as indigenous ‘liberation’ or ‘resistance’ movements and claiming responsibility for most of the targeted violence and online recruitment and propaganda during the 2019-2020 period. While these pro-Pakistan groups emerged on the scene, transnational jihadi factions such as Islamic State Hind Province (ISH) or Jundul Khilafa and the al-Qa`ida in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)-linked Ansar Ghazwat-ul Hind laid low in operational terms mainly due to security crackdowns, turf wars, and ideological rivalries between different militant groupings within Kashmir.7
Militant attacks in this phase were sporadic and selective, targeting vulnerable civilians to intimidate people from other Indian states from visiting or settling in Kashmir and to disrupt economic activity in the state. Groups such as TRF, PAFF, and JKGF spearheaded multifaceted violence in Kashmir, opposed the revocation of J&K’s special status, which encouraged the return of Hindus to Kashmir who had left the state in the 1990s to escape Pakistan-backed militant violence in the Kashmir region.8 Grenade attacks in Srinagar, Anantnag, Baramulla, and elsewhere,j improvised explosive device (IED) recoveries, and small arms fire incidents persisted intermittently during this time. The PAFF, which surfaced in late 2019 in response to the abrogation of Article 370, unleashed armed encounters and ambushes against security forces in the Poonch area and other locations in Kashmir.9 For these hybrid groups, the strategy remained to broaden the local Muslim support base (including the Over Ground Worker (OGW) ecosystem)k while framing their attacks as resistance to the Indian state, rising Hindu nationalism,l and resettlement of Hindus and other non-Muslims in Kashmir.m These hybrid groups, particularly TRF and PAFF, had cleverly avoided pro-Pakistan rhetoric, Islamic religious symbols, and overt jihadi narratives in their propaganda, aiming to secularize the campaign as anti-fascist liberation movements.n
In October 2019, TRF and other militant factions killed several civilians, including truckers, apple traders, and migrant laborers, in Kulgam and Shopian districts in South Kashmir.10 The most tragic event occurred on October 29, 2019, when armed militants killed five migrant laborers (all Muslims) from West Bengal in Kitrusu in Kulgam district.11 Initially caught off guard, security forces in Kashmir launched sustained ‘search and sweep’ operations in 2020, even at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, killing 225 militants (207 in the Kashmir Zone and 18 in the Jammu Zone), including top commanders of Hizbul Mujahideen, Ansar Ghazwat-ul-Hind, and Jaish-e-Mohammed.12 High-profile eliminations included Hizbul commander Reyaz Naikoo, Junaid Sehrai, Saifullah, Burhan Koka, and JeM’s Qari Yasir, among 46 top commanders killed in 2020.13 Despite these counterterrorism successes, grenade attacks and targeted killings persisted,o such as the October 29 assassinations of three Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) members in Kulgam by TRF militants.14 These recently emerged hybrid groups with newly recruited local militants with no prior records have become a major challenge as they can execute swift, low-key attacks before blending into civilian populations.
Resurgence and Rise of Anti-Hindu (Outsiders) Campaign (2021-2023). From 2021 onward, Kashmir’s hybrid militancy entered a phase overtly characterized by targeted killings of minority community members. Targeted victims in this phase of violence mainly included Kashmiri (Hindu) Pandits, migrant workers, non-Muslim teachers, and elected local self-government members, with TRF,p PAFF, Ghaznavi Force, Kashmir Tigers, and Muslim Janbaz Force frequently claiming responsibility.15
At the start of the year, a lesser-known militant group, Muslim Janbaz Force, claimed responsibility for an attack in Srinagar in mid-February that targeted Akash Mehra of the Krishna (Hindu) restaurant, resulting in his death on February 28, 2021. The group, in a statement, justified the attack as a retaliation against the new domicile rules, which allow “outsiders” to settle in Jammu and Kashmir, sparking widespread fear and panic among the Hindu community.16 Later that year, more targeted attacks against Hindus were reported. The Makhan Lal Bindroo assassination in Srinagar, a popular Kashmiri Hindu pharmacist; the killings of Hindu and Sikh teachers in a high school17 in Srinagar; and the killing of a migrant vegetable seller,q among a few others, in October 2021 made that month the most violent of the year.18 TRF claimed responsibility for Bindroo’s death, portraying him as a Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS)r agent and collaborator for the Indian government.s Frequent gun or grenade attacks on off-duty police and political workers created a climate of fear in Kashmir with the violent resurgence of these hybrid groups.t Militant activity also shifted into urban and semi-urban pockets, particularly in Srinagar, where shooters using small-arms operated in close quarters. In mid-October 2021, the JKGF (Ghaznavi Force) gained an operational advantage by conducting ambush attacks against the security forces in the Mendhar and Surankote areas of Poonch district. These ambushes resulted in the deaths of at least nine armed forces personnel and police.19 Ghaznavi Force also attempted to target a few religious sites in Poonch district with IEDs and grenades to instill fear among the Hindu minority in the region.20
Another pro-Pakistan group, the Kashmir Freedom Fighters (KFF), also emerged during this phase with its first grenade attack against paramilitary forces in Baramulla on November 17, 2021,21 and fatal attacks targeting Hindus subsequently,22 further complicating the militant landscape in Kashmir.u Similarly, on December 13, 2021, the Kashmiri Tigers ambushed a police convoy returning to camp near Srinagar, killing three officers and injuring at least 11.23 These attacks were claimed as proof that militancy remained entrenched despite the Indian government’s claims of peace and normalcy in the state.
In 2022, intermittent militant attacks continued to target security forces, minority Hindus, and migrant workers in Kashmir. A deadly suicide (fidayeen) attack on August 11 witnessed the deaths of four soldiers, including a junior commissioned officer (JCO) at Pargal in Rajouri.24 The ambush underlined that despite tight security measures, militant groups retained the capability to strike hardened military targets.
Minority Hindus continued to be the prime targets, as Kashmiri Hindus were gunned down in repeated attacks in 2022. On August 16, militants shot dead Sunil Kumar Nath while critically injuring his brother in Shopian.25 Two months later, on October 15, another Kashmiri Hindu farmer, Puran Krishan Bhat, was killed in Chowdari Gund, also in Shopian.v These killings reinforced the atmosphere of fear among Hindu Pandits who had cautiously returned to the valley under government resettlement schemes,26 showing how militants deliberately sought to intimidate and drive out the Hindu minority. Similarly, migrant laborers from outside Kashmir continued to bear the brunt.w The militant campaign against non-local workers escalated in mid-October 2022 when two workers from Uttar Pradesh were killed in a grenade attack in Shopian.27 These attacks claimed by TRF and other groups underscore the systematic targeting of non-local workers, a tactic meant to deter migration, and amplify the message that Kashmir remains hostile to ‘outsiders’ and, more plausibly, to weaken local economies.
By early 2023, the conflict’s geography began to expand. The twin terror attacks in Dhangri (Rajouri) on January 1-2—indiscriminate firing followed by an IED blast—marked a deliberate revival of violence in Jammu’s border districts. Seven civilians of the Hindu community, two of them minors, were killed in these incidents.28 High-casualty encounters, such as the prolonged Kokernag (Anantnag) gunfight and the Narla (Rajouri) encounter in September 2023, revealed improved militant fieldcraft, with forested terrain used to store arms and evade capture. A total of five security personnel and two militants were killed in this fierce battle.29
Like TRF and KFF, the PAFF perpetrated several high-profile attacks, particularly in the Jammu region during this phase.x For instance, PAFF claimed responsibility for killing Rakesh Pandita, a BJP municipal councillor, in early June 2021,30 and for the April 20, 2023, Poonch ambush that killed five army soldiers.31 It released a short helmet-camera video of the strike, taunting the Indian security apparatus. The video showed militants executing a well-planned attack, using sophisticated weapons and filming it for the first time in Kashmir. PAFF was also linked to the May 5, 2023, IED attack in Rajouri that killed five more soldiers.32 These two events marked the worst security force losses in Kashmir in 2023, underlining PAFF’s lethal capabilities. Again in December 2023, PAFF militants ambushed an army convoy, killing four soldiers in Poonch district.33
In 2022, Jammu and Kashmir recorded 253 militancy-related deaths, of which 30 were security personnel. In 2023, however, overall fatalities dropped to 134, but the proportion of security personnel killed more than doubled to nearly 25 percent of the total deaths, with 33 security force deaths.34 Militant fatalities also saw a sharp decline, falling from over 170 in 2022 to under 90 in 2023, reflecting both reduced militant presence and a shift in engagement patterns. However, this shift highlights a troubling trend and marks a notable consolidation in this phase. While militant casualties have declined, attacks have increasingly targeted and killed security forces, reflecting a rise in high-impact militant operations.
The perennial OGW problem in Kashmir has also seen a major shift during this phase, though the crackdown started in 2019 as part of India’s broader counterterrorism approach in Kashmir.35 The focus remained beyond armed militants to the wider pro-Pakistan and pro-militant ecosystem that sustained terrorism for decades in Kashmir.y Between 2019 and 2023, over 1,900 OGWs linked to LeT, HM, or JeM, as well as their front groups, were detained. In 2023 alone, 201 OGWs were arrested under the Public Safety Act.36 Even though militancy has persisted, the erosion of OGW networks around this time has significantly disrupted recruitment channels and cross-border linkages, forcing militant groups to adapt under mounting security challenges.
Geographical Expansion and Violent Escalation (2024-July 2025). In 2024, militancy in Kashmir geographically consolidated its southward drift into Poonch, Rajouri, and Udhampur districts. Several attacks, including ambushes on security patrols, assaults on village defense guards,37 and strikes on Hindu pilgrims and tourists, marked the beginning of a lethal escalation phase of Kashmir militancy. Groups such as TRF, Kashmir Tigers, and PAFF have exploited the forested zones near the borders with Pakistan for infiltration, staging zones for renewed violence. The most notable among them was the ambush attack of June 2024. As briefly mentioned earlier, TRF militants attacked a bus carrying Hindu pilgrims to Shiv Khori in Reasi district, killing nine and injuring more than 30 people.38 Claiming responsibility, the group announced its intention to conduct more such attacks on tourists and non-locals, describing the assault as the “beginning of a renewed campaign.”39
In July 2024, Kashmir witnessed an uptick in militant violence targeting security forces, days after India’s prime minister, Narendra Modi, mentioned the waning of terrorism in the state in a speech.z However, that month proved to be one of the deadliest for security forces in Kashmir, with at least 12 army personnel killed in multiple militant attacks and encounters across the region. Several high-casualty incidents occurred, including the July 8 ambush on an army truck in Kathua’s Lohai Malhar area that left five security personnel dead,40 and the July 15-16 encounter in Doda that claimed four more lives.41 Additional fatalities occurred elsewhere in July, underscoring both the sustained lethality of militants and the heavy toll on security personnel despite ongoing counterinsurgency efforts.aa These incidents highlighted the continuing threat in Kashmir’s frontier districts, which since late April 2024ab have increasingly witnessed infiltration-linked violence and militant hideouts in forested areas.42
In September and October 2024, Jammu and Kashmir held elections to the Assembly, marking the first such elections since the 2019 scrapping of Article 370 and the subsequent reorganization of the state. However, in less than three weeks, on October 20, TRF militants killed seven people, both locals and migrant workers engaged in the Z-Morh tunnel project that connects Gaganeer to Sonamarg in Ganderbal district.ac A month later, militants again triggered a fresh wave of violence in a mark of defiance of the democratically elected government. The killing of two village defense guards in Kishtwar on November 7 by Kashmir Tiger militants43 and the November 3 grenade blast in a busy Sunday market in Srinagar that killed a woman44 came as a surprise to both federal and state governments for the complicated security situation in post-election Kashmir. These successive incidents were part of a broader pattern of a new wave of escalating militancy, with activity moving south from the Muslim-majority Kashmir Valley toward the Hindu-majority Jammu region, marking a renewed push to expand the conflict’s geographical and communal scope. According to an official Indian government estimate, in 2024, 68 militants were killed in Jammu and Kashmir, of whom 42 were foreign nationals and the rest were local recruits.ad Key militant commanders killed that year included Basit Ahmad Dar, Usman Lashkari, Arbaz Mir, and Farooq Ahmad Bhat (alias Nali), linked to hybrid militant groups TRF, PAFF, and Kashmir Tigers.45
In early 2025, the PAFF carried out two major strikes in Jammu and Kashmir. On January 11, an IED blast near the line of control (LoC) in Akhnoor’s Laleali area killed two armed force personnel and injured a couple of others.46 PAFF later released a video claiming responsibility for the attack. PAFF struck again on March 27, killing four Special Operations Group (SOG) police and injuring seven others in an armed counter in Kathua’s Safiyan Jakhole locality. 47 These back-to-back attacks underscored PAFF’s lethal footprint with an active network of OGWs in the Hindu-dominated Jammu region.48
The Pahalgam terror attack on April 22, 2025, which overshadowed previous violence by the so-called façade groups, marked the deadliest assault on civilians, including Hindu tourists in Kashmir, in the ongoing phase of a lethal militant surge since June 2024. Five TRF militants, armed with sophisticated weapons, ambushed Hindu tourists in the Baisaran valley. Indian intelligence agencies traced the operation to handlers in Muridke and Bahawalpur, Pakistan, indicating direct cross-border orchestration.ae Indian investigations have established that two senior LeT leaders, Hafeez Saeed and deputy Saifullah Khalid Kasuri,af masterminded the attacks with Hashim Moosa (Faizal Jatt) of TRF, who was later killed during a counterterrorism operation in late July 2025.49
Part II: India’s Post-Pahalgam Counterterrorism Response
The Pahalgam massacre of April 22, 2025, was no doubt a defining moment in Kashmir’s recent militant history, both in scale and in its deliberate sectarian targeting. Survivors and preliminary NIA investigation reports confirmed that the Pakistan-based attackers had carried out reconnaissance in the preceding days, using local facilitators, to identify tourist movement patterns and secure temporary shelter.50 Forensic examination of recovered shell casings matched weapon types frequently trafficked from across the border, from Pakistan.51
This attack proved to be a turning point as clamor for decisive action against Pakistan-based terror fountainheads grew manifold in India. Within a couple of weeks of Pahalgam, India launched Operation Sindoor on May 7, 2025, a cross-border punitive military operation targeting nine major terror training camps, weapons depots, and logistics hubs in Bahawalpur, Muridke, Kotli, and Muzaffarabad, used by LeT, JeM, and Hizbul Mujahideen in PAK (Pakistan Administered Kashmir).ag This military offensive was a step beyond all previous counterterrorism operations deep inside Pakistan, such as the Balakot offensive of 2019.ah This also marked a significant evolution of India’s counterterrorism posture through a series of defining cross-border operations, employing airpower and long-range missiles, aided by drones, satellite surveillance, and psychological warfare. While Pakistan accused India of civilian casualties, India maintained all strikes were on verified non-civilian, militant sites.52 Together, these operations underscore India’s steady shift from reactive defense to proactive, hybrid deterrence against Pakistan-backed militancy.
Pakistan’s military retaliated to India’s actions with its strikes under Operation Bunyan al-Marsoos,53 bringing the two nuclear-armed rivals to one of their most dangerous confrontations since the Kargil conflict in 1999. However, after almost three days of clashes and amid international alarm, a fragile ceasefire came into effect.
Following Operation Sindoor, India’s security agencies launched Operation Mahadev, a targeted ‘search and termination’ campaign that lasted nearly 70 days, was initiated on May 22, 2025, and aimed at tracking and eliminating the three identified TRF militants. This intelligence-driven operation relied on a combination of human intelligence, mobile intercepts, drone surveillance, and satellite imagery. After locating militants’ presence in the Dachigam-Harwan forest belt area, the operation involved a prolonged surveillance phase lasting two months. Using advanced signal-capturing equipment, security forces confirmed the presence of the militants—Faizal Jatt, Hamza Afghani, and Jibran, all Pakistani nationals affiliated with LeT/TRF—on July 22, 2025.54 A joint operation team comprising special forces, paramilitary, and state police killed the three militants behind the Pahalgam killings in late July 2025.55 The operation was hailed as a major success, preventing their escape to Pakistan, as per India’s Home Affairs Minister.56 Earlier, in June, the NIA arrested two local militants, Parvaiz Ahmad Jothar of Batkote and Bashir Ahmad Jothar of Pahalgam, for sheltering and guiding the April 22 Pahalgam attackers. Investigations revealed that the duo provided food, shelter, and logistical support to the three Pakistani militants at a dhok (hut) in Hill Park before the massacre.57 During questioning, they also allegedly disclosed the identities of Pakistani terrorists directly involved in the Pahalgam killings.58
While the two arrested militants remain in custody,59 NIA continues to probe the wider conspiracy and support network behind the Pahalgam attack.60 The swift elimination of the Pakistani assailants underlined India’s resolve to deliver retribution, even as the involvement of local recruits highlighted the persistent challenge of hybrid militancy in Kashmir.
Conclusion: The Future of Islamist Militancy in Kashmir
The Pahalgam terror attack of April 2025 and India’s swift retaliation through operations Sindoor and Mahadev have changed the contours of militancy in Jammu and Kashmir. Over the last six years, militancy has shifted from large, visible militant formations to smaller, harder-to-detect hybrid factions like TRF or PAFF, supported by globally designated terror groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba or Jaish-e-Mohammed across the border in Pakistan. These factions often rely on local overground workers for shelter and logistics, as witnessed in Pahalgam events, while receiving weapons, training, and funding from Pakistan-based groups.ai
Operation Sindoor demonstrated that India is now willing to respond with deep, precision strikes on militant bases across the border. India’s position was further reinforced internationally when, in July 2025, the United Nations Security Council’s 1267 Sanctions Committee report linked TRF to the Pahalgam attack.61 Just before India launched Operation Sindoor, U.N. Security Council members in a closed-door consultation62 strongly criticized Pakistan over tensions with India and the terror attacks on tourists. During that meeting, members questioned Islamabad on the role of LeT in the Pahalgam massacre.63 On July 18, 2025, the U.S. State Department designated TRF as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) entity under Executive Order 13224, freezing its assets within U.S. jurisdiction and prohibiting material support from U.S. persons.64 Again on September 1, a Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) declaration strongly condemned the April 22 Pahalgam terror attack and demanded justice against those responsible.65
The Pahalgam attack and India’s retaliatory military responses reflect a decisive doctrinal shift in counterterrorism policy. India has made it clear that cross-border terror incidents, whether like Pahalgam or Pulwama, will increasingly be met with multi-domain, precision strikes. While retaliation will not be automatic for every militant incident, the threshold for response, however, has been markedly lowered, raising the costs for Pakistan-backed militancy in Kashmir. Going forward, this shift is likely to alter India-Pakistan crisis dynamics, making deterrence more credible but also increasing the risk of post-attack escalations. The threat will continue to come from these hybrid militants, drone-assisted supply lines,66 and sporadic cross-border facilitation by Pakistan-based parent groups. India’s challenge will be to maintain an intelligence and technological edge, disrupt domestic recruitment networks early, and sustain public confidence while ensuring that high-profile, mass fatality attacks, such as Pahalgam, are not repeated.