The U.S.-Taliban Talks: A Strategic Shift in Counterterrorism?
A remarkable transformation has occurred in the three years since U.S. forces withdrew from Afghanistan Washington has discreetly resumed communicating with the Taliban.
A remarkable transformation has occurred in the three years since U.S. forces withdrew from Afghanistan Washington has discreetly resumed communicating with the Taliban. It is now commonplace for U.S. envoys to meet with the former insurgents who have transitioned into the de facto government in Kabul, a fact that was previously inconceivable. Prisoner exchanges, high level meetings, and even proposals to reopen a military base in Afghanistan indicate a pragmatic shift in U.S. strategy. The initial post withdrawal confidence in an ‘over-the-horizon’ counter-terrorism posture has given way to concern that isolated hard power is not enough. As analysts note, Afghanistan is ‘once again a hub of extremist leadership, training, and plotting of attacks against Western interests. In this new reality, U.S. interests including preventing Afghanistan from becoming a sanctuary for al-Qaeda or Islamic State affiliates are forcing a re-examination of policy. The question now is whether engaging the Taliban is a necessary adaptation or a dangerous compromise.
Recent High-Level Exchanges
Evidence of this shift is visible in a flurry of diplomatic activity. In January 2025, the U.S. and Qatar brokered a prisoner swap that freed two Americans (Ryan Corbett and William McEntee) in exchange for a veteran Taliban militant, Khan Mohammad. In March 2025 the Taliban released another detainee, George Glezmann, after talks with a Trump appointed U.S. hostage envoy. More recently, on September 13, 2025, Taliban officials announced that U.S. envoys led by Special Envoy Adam Boehler and veteran diplomat Zalmay Khalilzad had met in Kabul and agreed to a prisoner exchange. Photographs released by the Taliban show the meetings took place in Kabul with Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi on one side and the U.S. delegation on the other. U.S. media report these conversations covered not only hostages, but also larger issues such as lifting travel bans and even the Taliban’s requests to have Guantanamo detainees exchanged.
On September 19, 2025, Reuters cited the Wall Street Journal that the U.S. had held talks about more substantial cooperation namely a small U.S. military presence at the old Bagram air base to launch counter-terrorism operations. These talks, led by Boehler, reportedly included a broad package of ideas: prisoner swaps, economic incentives, and security guarantees tied to anti-terror commitments. Even if details remain unconfirmed by either side, the very fact of discussing U.S. troops at Bagram, which U.S. forces handed over to Kabul in 2021 is striking. It signals that U.S. policymakers are considering more direct engagement in Afghan security, rather than relying solely on drones or intelligence from afar.
Why Now? Reconsidered Strategy
Why has the U.S. shifted toward these talks? The brutal logic of counterterrorism is a big part of the answer. In Washington’s view, the Taliban are now the de facto authorities in Afghanistan, for better or worse. If armed militants like al-Qaeda or ISIS-Khorasan (ISIS-K) operate there, only the Taliban can realistically restrain them. President Biden and his successors have repeatedly insisted that al-Qaeda will never again be allowed ‘safe haven’ in Afghanistan a pledge rooted in the 2020 Doha agreement. But experts now warn that over-the-horizon monitoring is insufficient to guarantee that promise.
Notably, a December 2024 analysis by the Atlantic Council co-authored by a former Afghan intelligence chief argued that the U.S. withdrawal unintentionally emboldened terrorists. The article observes that initial hopes for a benign security situation have been dashed: after 2021, prisons were emptied and ISIS-K rapidly regained strength. The authors assert that terrorist groups are now emboldened both inside and outside of Afghanistan and that the opposite has occurred of what officials had previously stated. In summary, Afghanistan appears to be a risk to the interests of the United States once more.
Washington’s engagement has been precipitated by these developments. In practical terms, U.S. officials acknowledge that the political cost of dialog is significantly outweighed by the potential benefits of negotiating with the Taliban on counterterrorism, including the release of hostages, intelligence sharing, and pressure on jihadist networks. In fact, Brooking’s analysts have observed that other powers, such as China and Russia, are already enhancing their relations with Kabul, and Pakistan has even attempted to engage in dialogue, despite its aversion to the region. Brookings experts have concluded that a ‘low-level equilibrium in engagement’ with the Taliban may be beneficial for U.S. interests, which include counterterrorism. In other words, the United States is advancing toward a calibrated, stay in touch approach that acknowledges reality but refrains from full recognition.
Global Context and Reactions
This U.S. re-engagement falls in line with a wider regional trend. Afghanistan’s neighbours are all contending with the rising power of the Taliban. China, for instance, has travelled to Kabul to discuss security and has even suggested infrastructure projects, primarily due to concerns that Turkistan Islamic Party (Uighur) militants may exploit Afghan soil. It is also known that Russia and Iran have engaged in diplomatic discussions with the Taliban for an extended period of time, as both nations perceive a threat from militants operating beyond their borders. Meanwhile, Pakistan, an ally, is weary of the Afghan regime’s failure to regulate the activities of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) militants during this period. Underscoring the cross-border implications, Islamabad has even gone as far as to conduct air strikes across the border into Afghanistan against TTP camps. In this context, certain experts contend that the United States is not leading, albeit rather aligning itself with a global consensus: should the Taliban be in power, the world should endeavour to influence them rather than deprive them of attention.
Domestically and among allies, views on this shift are mixed. Critics in Congress and the press worry that talking to the Taliban legitimizes a repressive regime and undermines Afghan democratic hopes. Supporters counter that refusing any contact leaves Americans with fewer options to protect citizens. In practice, U.S. policy has tried to thread the needle officials stress that any engagement is tactical, issue specific, and contingent on Taliban counterterrorism performance. As the U.S. Senior Study Group on Afghanistan and Pakistan recommends, the United States should ‘publicly pressure the Taliban to mitigate terrorist threats’ while keeping lines of communication open. So far, U.S. statements have been careful to say that nothing is agreed until approved by the president, even as negotiators explore possibilities.
Weighing the Risks and Rewards
Engaging the Taliban carries risks. It could send a mixed message about U.S. resolve, and some fear any military presence (even limited) could lead to new confrontations. Past Taliban promises such as shutting down al-Qaeda have often been met with scepticism. The senior study group report warns that the Taliban have so far shown interest only in ‘minimal information exchanges and unverifiable assurances’ on extremists. In other words, the Taliban may offer little beyond platitudes unless pressed. That is why certain policy prescriptions advocate for a dual track approach continue to publicly hold the Taliban accountable for harbouring terrorists while utilizing diplomacy to acquire intelligence and concessions.
Risks are present; however, the advantages are substantial. Any success in the release of detained Americans would be considered a humanitarian victory. The potential to prevent or discourage attacks on Western or U.S. targets is present through the mere establishment of a modest counterterrorism presence. In addition, the United States may be able to progressively modify Taliban behaviour through engagement.
For example, if negotiations regarding aid to reestablish the Afghan government are coupled with security enhancements and guarantees for minorities, this provides an external pressure mechanism that does not exist in fact, it provides two distinct types. In other regions, ‘carrots and sticks’ policies of this nature have occasionally provoked hard-line regimes in limited ways; some officials even harbour the hope that the same may occur in Kabul.
Conclusion
The sobering narrative of Afghanistan’s current state three years into Taliban rule also serves as a reminder that policy adjustments are necessary in response to the changes in the geopolitical environment. In the U.S.-Taliban dialogues of 2024–2025, this reality is also evident, as Western counterterrorism imperatives have compelled Washington to adopt a more realistic stance. Who knows whether or not that will be successful? One American reader cautions that the phenomenon of terrorism may be resolved through discussions, but if the threat persists, it could be cited as ‘terrorist threats,’ which could result in military action. However, the Taliban’s complete isolation or unilateral military action are equally implausible alternatives.
Heretofore, it appears that U.S. engagement with the Taliban, at least in the context of counterterrorism, is less motivated by ideology and more by strategic necessity. The exchange of prisoners to Pentagon planning indicates the potential for new connections, but it is a tentative one that may not materialize, rather than a cordial embrace. However, attention will be focused on them: if these negotiations facilitate the prevention of external spillover violence that originates from Afghan soil, they may be perceived as a courageous but uncomfortable recalibration. Otherwise, they will reinforce the adage that in complex conflicts, any diplomacy is preferable to no diplomacy.