ISI’s Shadow Play: Rehabilitating Radical Islamist Networks In Dhaka – OpEd

Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) is quietly staging a comeback in Bangladesh, leveraging shifting political winds, porous borders, and radical networks to reassert its strategic footprint in India’s eastern flank.

Recent developments point to a resurgence of ISI-linked activities aimed at destabilising both Bangladesh and India, under the cover of growing “defence cooperation” between Dhaka and Islamabad.

The Return of the Deep State: ISI’s Strategic Encirclement

The latest signal came when Pakistan’s Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC), General Sahir Shamshad Mirza, met Bangladesh’s Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus. The meeting, publicised by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), emphasised strengthening bilateral defence and security cooperation — a diplomatic euphemism that masks Islamabad’s covert agenda.

Behind this formal veneer, the ISI is reportedly exploiting Bangladesh’s evolving political and security landscape to advance its regional objectives against India. Intelligence inputs suggest that Pakistani operatives are rebuilding networks of Islamist militant groups, reviving pre-1971-era connections with sympathisers within the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI) and Jamaat-e-Islami — an outfit that once opposed Bangladesh’s liberation from Pakistan.

Porous Borders, Fertile Ground: The ISI’s Expanding Footprint

Bangladesh’s porous border with India has long been a vulnerability. Over the years, it has become a logistical artery for cross-border smuggling, arms trafficking, and movement of militants. The ISI and its local proxies reportedly exploit these routes to sustain anti-India operations and maintain clandestine communication lines across the frontier.

Sources indicate that ISI-backed elements have helped set up training and indoctrination camps in Cox’s Bazar and northern Bangladesh, areas with limited state oversight. These facilities are allegedly run by former Pakistani Special Service Group (SSG) operatives and cater to both Bangladeshi recruits and Rohingya refugees — creating a volatile mix of radicalised fighters under the guise of humanitarian displacement.

The camps serve dual purposes: strengthening local extremist outfits like Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) and preparing operatives for cross-border infiltration into India’s Northeast. The use of Rohingya recruits further complicates the security calculus, turning a humanitarian crisis into a geopolitical weapon.

Defence Diplomacy as a Cover: Pakistan’s Creeping Influence

Islamabad’s outreach to Dhaka is part of a calculated attempt to normalise its presence in Bangladesh’s military ecosystem. The 2024 political transition in Dhaka, which strained relations with New Delhi, has created a window for Pakistan to rebuild its influence through military diplomacy and “counterterrorism cooperation.”

The ISI’s objectives are twofold: to legitimise its intelligence activities under the garb of defence cooperation and to reactivate dormant networks across Bangladesh’s strategic regions. Reports suggest a renewed focus on Cox’s Bazar, Rangpur, and Sylhet — areas that historically served as operational corridors for Pakistan’s intelligence before 1971.

Rohingya Militancy: A New Frontline

One of the more alarming developments is ISI’s funding and training of Rohingya militants through JMB. According to the Indian National Investigation Agency (NIA), Pakistan has funnelled funds — estimated at around one crore Bangladeshi takas — via Saudi and Malaysian channels to support this network.

Rohingya youth in Cox’s Bazar camps are being trained in arms handling, guerrilla warfare, and IED assembly, with the aim of infiltrating India through its eastern border. Having failed to sustain infiltration through the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan appears to be shifting its operational focus eastward.

JMB, a Taliban and ISIS-linked entity, now operates across Dhaka, Jhenaidah, and Sylhet, using social media and black-market trade to finance and recruit. The group’s growing reach has already been linked to multiple terror plots in Indian states bordering Bangladesh, raising the risk of a new transnational jihadist corridor.

Terror Networks by the Numbers

Between 2015 and mid-2025, Bangladesh witnessed dozens of attacks attributed to ISI-backed or affiliated Islamist groups. The Islamic State’s Bangladesh network alone conducted at least 40 attacks between 2015 and 2021, killing 47 people and injuring over 200.

The 2016 Holey Artisan Bakery attack in Dhaka — which claimed 22 lives — marked the most chilling reminder of how deeply embedded transnational jihadist networks have become. Despite official crackdowns, these outfits continue to evolve, often shifting their recruitment operations abroad.

In 2025, 36 Bangladeshi nationals were arrested in Malaysia for running ISIS-linked online recruitment cells, a reminder of how the ISI’s digital strategy complements its on-ground operations. Groups like HuJI-B and ISIS-Bangladesh, both tied to Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba, remain active, targeting minorities, foreign nationals, and state institutions.

Dhaka’s Denials, Islamabad’s Designs

The Bangladeshi government routinely dismisses allegations of ISI interference as “unsubstantiated,” but multiple intelligence assessments — both Indian and Western — paint a different picture. Cooperation between sections of DGFI and Pakistani handlers, alongside the persistent survival of jihadist groups despite repeated crackdowns, point to a covert but deepening nexus.

Pakistan’s “defence diplomacy” in Dhaka thus appears less about cooperation and more about strategic subversion — rehabilitating old networks, recruiting new proxies, and re-establishing intelligence assets to serve Islamabad’s regional agenda.

A Renewed Front Against India

The reactivation of ISI networks in Bangladesh represents a renewed strategic frontier in Pakistan’s long-running proxy campaign against India. The mix of ideological indoctrination, clandestine funding, and covert training constitutes a potent hybrid threat to both Dhaka and New Delhi.

For Bangladesh, it risks eroding internal stability, fuelling Islamist radicalism, and straining relations with key partners. For India, it opens a vulnerable eastern flank already challenged by insurgent movements and cross-border infiltration.

A calibrated regional response — encompassing intelligence-sharing, tighter border control, and coordinated counterterrorism measures — is essential to dismantle these transnational terror networks. Left unchecked, ISI’s shadow play in Dhaka could once again plunge South Asia into a cycle of instability that benefits no one but the architects of chaos in Rawalpindi.