South Asia Intelligence Review
From the Streets to the Ballot
On October 29, 2025, Nepal’s Supreme Court Constitutional Bench declined to issue an interim order against the formation of the government led by Prime Minister Sushila Karki and the dissolution of the House of Representatives, paving the way for elections scheduled on March 5, 2026. This followed the September 12, 2025, dissolution of Parliament and the appointment of an interim administration amid widespread unrest, including student-led Gen Z protests that highlighted mass political disillusionment and calls for systemic overhaul. As preparations unfold, including electoral reforms and the possible rise of a Gen Z-backed political party, these developments could profoundly shape Nepal’s evolving democratic landscape.
The crisis traces back to September 8, 2025, when the government imposed a ban on several social media platforms, igniting youth-led demonstrations in Kathmandu that quickly spread nationwide. Protesters’ demands expanded beyond the ban, with placards bearing slogans like “Shut down corruption, not social media,” “Unban social media,” “Youths against corruption,” and “Topple this government,” reflecting deep-seated anger over widespread corruption, unemployment, economic inequality, and political misrule. By September 9, the movement had engulfed multiple cities, culminating in the resignation of then-Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli on September 12, and the subsequent appointment of former Chief Justice Sushila Karki as interim Prime Minister, alongside Parliament’s dissolution.
These elections stake the credibility of Nepal’s traditional parties, the aspirations of its youth, and the nation’s track record of conducting free, fair, and inclusive polls, all within a nascent federal democratic republic where public trust in institutions remains fragile. Major challenges include restoring political legitimacy amid perceptions of dynastic control, corruption, and clientelism that have eroded faith in established parties, as underscored by the Gen Z protests, signalling that the status quo is untenable. Without rebuilding trust, the polls risk low voter turnout, apathy, or even unrest. The Election Commission faces a compressed six-month timeline to update voter rolls, train personnel, devise security measures, and facilitate out-of-country voting, with experts noting persistent legal and technical barriers for diaspora participation. Political violence remains a threat in a linguistically, ethnically, and regionally diverse country, where unaddressed socioeconomic divides – particularly between the hills and plains – could undermine inclusive representation. With informal employment dominant and a 2024 GDP per capita of about USD 1,400, many young Nepalis feel economically marginalized, and without concrete economic policies, the elections might amplify discontent, threatening democratic stability. Youth groups have pushed for constitutional shifts, such as a directly elected prime minister, but Nepal’s fragmented politics makes such reforms daunting, potentially framing the vote as an endorsement of existing flaws rather than genuine progress.
Despite these hurdles, targeted reforms aim to enhance inclusivity and youth engagement. A key change lowers the voting age to 16, allowing those turning 18 by March 4, 2026, to vote, while enabling advance registration for 16-year-olds with citizenship certificates and biometric data at centers or online. As of October 31, 2025, over 90,000 new voters have registered, with projections adding another 100,000 by the campaign’s end. The Election Commission and Interim Government plan a pilot for overseas voting, though its scale is limited by logistical constraints. Internal discussions on party and electoral reforms, coupled with the administration’s outreach to youth organizations and parties, seek to build pre-election dialogue and confidence.
Karki’s Interim Government bears the dual responsibility of ensuring stability and credible elections, leveraging her judicial background and anti-corruption reputation to restore some public faith. Initial engagements with Gen Z activists and major parties demonstrate responsiveness, while the fixed election timeline minimizes uncertainty. Yet, the six-month tenure constrains ambitious reforms, especially amid institutional weaknesses such as low morale in the security forces and the Election Commission, compounded by lingering protest volatility. If youth radicalization persists and traditional parties resist adaptation, disruptions could jeopardize the process, leaving the government navigating between entrenched interests and popular demands. Inherited issues – trust deficits, economic vulnerability, and institutional fragility – further temper expectations for comprehensive success.
A pivotal shift emerges from the Gen Z movement’s potential formation of a political party, announced on October 19, 2025, under leader Miraj Dhungana. While not committing to contest the polls until core demands like a directly elected executive and overseas voting rights are met, the group vows to champion good governance, transparency, and anti-corruption efforts, honouring the movement’s sacrifices. Having already toppled the preceding government through street mobilization, this initiative could harness momentum for electoral influence, especially with newly enfranchised younger voters drawn to its emphasis on accountability and reform – long sidelined by older parties. Though unlikely to dominate, its entry injects unpredictability, potentially reshaping political margins and pressuring incumbents.
On November 1, 2025, Prime Minister Karki met with media editors at her residence, urging collaborative support for the elections and highlighting consultations with Gen Z groups and parties to foster a conducive environment. She emphasized building widespread trust to ensure a smooth handover to the new government.
Ultimately, Nepal’s projected March 5, 2026, elections mark a referendum on its democracy’s resilience, with the Interim Government’s reforms – lowered voting age, overseas voting pilots, and youth outreach – signaling intent for renewal, despite strained execution and capacity. The Gen Z political force adds transformative potential, contingent on converting protest energy into organized structures and appeal. Key markers include youth participation rates, monitoring by international and domestic observers, result acceptance by major players, and initial anti-corruption and inclusivity measures. While major parties may retain sway, with moderated margins and commitment to incremental changes, the youth movement’s imprint could endure, determining whether frustrated citizens, entrenched elites, and frail institutions can forge credible democratic advancement.
HeI: Resurgent Islamism
On October 29, 2025, Hefazat-e-Islam (HeI) Khagrachari District branch formed a human chain to protest and demand a ban on the International Society for Krishna Consciousness (ISKCON), claiming that it was an extremist Hindutva organisation.
On October 24, 2025, HeI staged a protest rally in Chittagong District, demanding a ban on ISKCON, describing it as an extremist Hindutva organisation and an Indian agent.
On October 18, 2025, Local Government, Rural Development and Cooperatives Adviser Asif Mahmud Shojib Bhuiyan announced that a memorial will be built at Shapla Chattar in Dhaka to honour those killed during HeI’s demonstration on May 5, 2013, while addressing a programme at the Osmani Memorial Auditorium in Dhaka. At the event, financial grants were also distributed among the families of 58 people killed in the May 5, 2013, Shapla Chattar incident, as well as 19 others who died during the anti-Modi protest in 2021.
On October 13, 2025, Mamunul Haque, Joint Secretary General of HeI, stated that HeI is a pure religion-based apolitical organisation, and conducting political activities and forming any alliance or coalition with any political party was against its basic principle.
On October 13, 2025, Religious Affairs Adviser AFM Khalid Hossain stated that the Ministry of Primary and Mass Education was currently reviewing HeI’s demand to appoint religious teachers in place of music teachers in primary schools.
On October 3, 2025, HeI Chief Shah Muhibullah Babunagari delivered the keynote address at the Shane Resalat Conference held on the grounds of the Hathazari Parbati Model Government High School in Chittagong, where he urged people not to vote for Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI) in the forthcoming parliamentary elections. Babunagari stated, “To prevent kufr from establishing itself, we cannot vote in the upcoming elections. Those who say worship and fasting are the same, are they Islam?… We must follow the straight path shown by the Prophets and Messengers. Then the world and the hereafter will be right. The Companions are the measure of truth. The path shown by them is the straight path.”
On September 21, 2025, HeI criticised the Interim Government’s decision to appoint music teachers in all government primary schools across Bangladesh. HeI has repeatedly described the Government’s move as part of an anti-Islam agenda.
On September 17, 2025, seven leading scholars of Bangladesh, including the Chief of the Bangladesh Khilafat Majlis, Maulana Mamunul Haque, and HeI Deputy Chief Maulana Abdul Hamid (Pir of Modhupur), visited Afghanistan at the invitation of the Emirate of Islam (the Taliban government).
Hefazat-e-Islam (HeI), a Qaumi Madrassa-based Islamist organisation in Bangladesh, was formed in January 2010 in Chittagong under the leadership of Ahmad Shafi. The group’s inception was fuelled by the 2009 Women Development Policy draft, which proposed giving equal inheritance rights to women. The group is comprised of Sunni Islamists and their vast madrassa network. Although HeI is not a political party, but a pressure group, the leaders have openly lobbied for political and legal reforms. The group has publicly called for a revolution and the creation of an Islamic State in Bangladesh under Sharia Law. On April 6, 2013, HeI came up with a 13-point agenda including reinstating the phrase “Absolute trust and faith in the Almighty Allah” in the Constitution as one of the fundamental principles of state policy, and the scrapping of the ‘anti-Islam’ policy for women. A key event that shaped the HeI narrative was the Shapla Chattar massacre of May 5, 2013, in which the group claimed many of its supporters were killed or went missing during a Government operation under the Awami League (AL) regime. On May 5, 2025, HeI released a preliminary list, naming 93 individuals reportedly killed during the clash with law enforcement agencies at Shapla Chattar in Motijheel, Dhaka, on May 5, 2013.
HeI has actively engaged with mainstream politics, despite its refusal to affiliate with any party, particularly in the lead-up to the anticipated national elections in February 2026. On September 9, 2025, Maulana Mamunul Haque, Chief of the Bangladesh Khelafat Majlis and Central Joint Secretary General of HeI, expressed hopes for unity among Islamic parties to field single candidates and strengthen their position in the polls. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), on the other hand, has also exercised efforts to win HeI’s favour. On August 1, 2025, BNP Standing Committee member Salahuddin Ahmed, after meeting HeI Chief Maulana Shah Muhibbullah Babunagari, described the Shapla Chattar incident as the most heinous massacre in the history of the world. However, on May 27, 2025, Haque criticised BNP for not supporting HeI during the 2013 crackdown, calling it a historical mistake.
HeI also interacted with Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus and other parties on September 2, 2025, reaffirming elections in early February 2026 amid a festive atmosphere. On April 9, 2025, the National Citizen Party (NCP) and HeI agreed on demanding AL’s trial and suspension of its activities, and proposed declaring the AL a “criminal organisation”. To make matters worse between HeI and AL, on June 20, 2025, AL accused BNP and HeI of vandalising and looting the residence of the AL’s Netrokona Vice President Prashanta Kumar Roy in a violent attack, following a recent rally in Netrakona District. Further, on September 7, 2025, HeI accused a group of Sunni activists, backed by AL, of an attack on Al-Jamiatul Ahlia Darul Ulum Moinul Islam Hathazari Madrasa in Chittagong District, on September 6, 2025. In addition to AL, HeI has distanced itself from JeI due to ideological differences, with Babunagari labelling JeI, on August 4, 2025, a “hypocrite Islamic party” following Maududi’s Islam rather than the Islam of Madinah.
HeI has staunchly opposed reforms perceived as anti-Islamic. On May 3, 2025, HeI held a grand rally with its leaders and thousands of activists at Suhrawardy Udyan, Dhaka, and announced a 12-point demand, including dissolution of the Women’s Affairs Reform Commission (WARC) for its “anti-Quran and anti-Sunnah” report, advocating a new commission with Islamic scholars. On April 25, 2025, leaders of HeI warned Chief Adviser Yunus against implementing WARC proposals, warning of a fate similar to Sheikh Hasina’s. Further, on May 23, at the Baitul Mukarram National Mosque in Dhaka, HeI organised a protest, pressing four specific demands which included cancellation of the proposed Women’s Reform Commission, trial of the killings at Shapla Chattar and the July 2025 incidents, withdrawal of all ‘false cases’ against HeI members, and an end to the killing of Muslims in Palestine and India.
HeI’s treatment of minorities has also remained dubious and problematic. On April 10, 2025, HeI denounced the traditional Mongol Shobhajatra as being “rooted in Hindu traditions”; three days later, on April 13, it urged authorities to act against the “neo-paganist culture” of the Poyla Boishakh, calling Dhaka University’s Faculty of Fine Arts a “factory” of such practices. HeI’s ascent has paralleled rising pressure on religious minorities in Bangladesh. On August 5, 2025, Open Doors reported that over 100 Christian families were coerced to renounce their faith and at least 36 attacks on Christians or their property since Sheikh Hasina’s fall, linking the trend to Islamist groups, including HeI, gaining political power and accusing Christians of AL affiliation. Sufi traditions have also come under threat, as conservative Muslim groups regard Sufism as deviant, opposing its mystical interpretation of the Quran. At least 40 Sufi shrine attacks involving vandalism and arson by extremist mobs such as the Tauhidi Janata were reported over the preceding months, on August 6, 2025. HeI was accused of mobilising people to attack shrines, saying it opposed musical gatherings.
Regarding gatherings near shrines, Haque declared, “A group of people gather at shrines, consume cannabis and hold music fests, all of which are prohibited in our religion.” Babunagari has criticised the BDT 20 note on June 4, 2025, for excluding the image of a mosque and instead featuring a temple and a Buddhist monastery. Earlier on February 12, 2025, a Lalon music festival in Madhupur, Tangail, was cancelled following HeI’s objections to its Sufi content. On November 8, 2024, HeI staged protests in Chittagong demanding a ban on the ISKCON in Bangladesh, branding the organisation a militant group.
HeI has engaged internationally, while opposing foreign influences in Bangladesh. On July 5, 2025, HeI’s Babunagari voiced opposition to a proposed United Nations Human Rights Office in Bangladesh, alleging it could interfere with the country’s religious values. Further, on July 19, 2025, HeI protested the signing of a memorandum of understanding (MoU) for the same office, declaring it would be unnecessary if the demands of the July Revolution are met. On May 16, 2025, Babunagari expressed concern over the news of the establishment of a ‘humanitarian corridor’ for Myanmar’s Rakhine state and stated that HeI will not accept any decision by the Interim Government without political consensus on any issue involving the country’s security, religious harmony and geographical integrity. On the other hand, on July 7, 2025, Palestinian Ambassador Yousuf S.Y. Ramadan visited Babunagari, and they discussed various issues related to the interests of Islam and the Muslim Ummah (collective community of Muslim people). Standing in solidarity with Palestine, HeI participated in a global strike against the Israeli military on April 7, 2025. On May 23, 2025, HeI organised a protest at Baitul Mukarram, demanding an end to killings in Palestine and India. HeI has also taken a strong stance against Indian influence, particularly visible during the anti-Modi protest in 2021.
After the fall of Sheikh Hasina’s government, HeI has emerged as a dominant force in Bangladesh’s transitional politics, influencing the Interim Government under Muhammad Yunus. Drawing on its vast qaumi madrasa network of over thousands of affiliated institutions, HeI was able to mobilise massive rallies, such as the event at Suhrawardy Udyan on May 3, 2025, to exert influence over reforms, vehemently opposing women’s rights initiatives as Western impositions contrary to Islamic principles. Its demands for justice over the 2013 Shapla Chattar incident fuel anti-AL sentiments, enhancing its revolutionary appeal among many Bangladeshis. Strategically, HeI forges alliances with parties such as BNP and NCP, with its leader, who is also the Chief of Bangladesh Khelafat Majlis, embedding the group deeply in formal politics, beyond the mere pressure-group status it proclaims, and enabling broader conservative consolidation that could fragment votes yet amplify orthodox voices.
HeI’s resurgence includes actions against minorities and a foreign policy stance marked by anti-Western and anti-Indian rhetoric, pro-Palestine solidarity and efforts to bolster Ummah unity, risking Bangladesh’s international isolation. As a significant influencer over the people and politics of Bangladesh, HeI’s sharp ascent threatens to redefine electoral dynamics, social norms, and Bangladesh’s secular foundations.
Weekly Fatalities: Major Conflicts in South Asia
October 27 – November 2, 2025
Provisional data compiled from English language media sources.