South Asia Intelligence Review

Dawood Ibrahim – The endless chase

On October 25, the Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB) arrested Danish Merchant aka Danish Chikna, a close associate of Dawood Ibrahim, along with his wife, Henna Shah, from a resort in Anjuna in the North Goa District of Goa.

On October 19, NCB arrested Zohaib Shaikh, an operative of Danish Merchant and a close associate of Dawood Ibrahim, and recovered 839 grams of Mephedrone from Merchant’s home in the Mumbai City District of Maharashtra.

On October 18, NCB arrested N. Gaikwad, another Danish Merchant operative and close associate of Dawood Ibrahim, and recovered 502 grams of Mephedrone, in Pune District of Maharashtra.

On August 9, Salim Pistol aka Salim Sheikh was arrested on the India-Nepal border. He was a key conduit for smuggling sophisticated weapons from Pakistan for several years, with linkages to Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and the D-Company.

As reported on July 26, 2025, a key supplier of chemicals to the cartel of drug lord Salim Dola, another associate of Dawood Ibrahim, has been arrested at Surat in Gujarat. Brijesh Morabia was arrested by the Mumbai Crime Branch for also supplying raw materials used to manufacture narcotics through Dola’s nephew, Kubbawala Mustafa.

Significantly, current reports suggest that the D-Syndicate is also active in India’s neighbourhood. As reported on November 7, 2025, Indian intelligence agencies issued an alert over an alliance forming between the D-Syndicate and remnants of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Officials indicate that the syndicate was exploiting South Indian and Sri Lankan routes, to expand its drug trade, after suffering major losses in western and northern India. Intercepted communications suggest that members of the D-Company are in touch with former LTTE operatives and sympathizers to help the syndicate secure access to key maritime and land routes once controlled by LTTE at its peak. Further, it was reported on November 5, 2025, that Dawood Ibrahim’s syndicate had set up bases in Bangladesh. ISI has reportedly instructed the D-Company to use Bangladesh as the main base to push drugs into the Indian market, as well as into Western and Middle Eastern countries. The syndicate has also forged alliances with the drug mafia that operates out of Myanmar.

Dawood Ibrahim set up his crime business in the Middle-East in the mid-1980s. According to a December 2023 report, the gang has two factions. The major one is led by Shakeel Babu Miya Shaikh alias Chhota Shakeel, while the second is run by Dawood’s brother Anees Ibrahim. Indian agencies have recently secured the extradition of a few of Dawood Ibrahim’s associates from the Middle East. They include:

On November 1, 2025, Salman Saleem Shaikh aka Shera Batla, who was working for Salim Dola, was deported from Dubai (UAE) and arrested by the Mumbai Crime. Batla, a resident of Dongri, had been absconding for nearly three years and was wanted in six major drug trafficking cases.

On October 22, 2025, Crime Branch Unit 7 of the Mumbai Police arrested Dubai-based drug kingpin Mohammed Salim Mohammed Suhail Shaikh, a suspected key player in the D-Company’s drug trafficking network, shortly after his deportation from Dubai.

On July 7, 2025, the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) coordinated the return of Kubbawala Mustafa, a member of Dawood Ibrahim’s narco-syndicate, from Abu Dhabi, UAE through INTERPOL Channels. Mustafa was wanted by the Mumbai Police in FIR No. 67/2024 registered at Kurla Police Station, Mumbai, on charges of operating a Synthetic Drug Manufacturing Factory in the Sangli District of Maharashtra from abroad.

On June 13, 2025, CBI coordinated the return of Taher Salim Dola, son of Salim Dola, another Dawood Ibrahim associate, from UAE through INTERPOL channels, to Mumbai. The International Police Cooperation Unit (IPCU), CBI, in collaboration with NCB-Abu Dhabi, brought back the wanted Red Notice subject, Dola, who was wanted by the Mumbai Police in FIR Number 67/2024, registered at Police Station Kurla, Mumbai, on charges of operating a synthetic drug manufacturing factory in the Sangli District of Maharashtra.

The D Company’s businesses focus on a wide range of narcotics: Mephedrone (MD), also known as M-cat, or white magic; Fentanyl; Heroin; Hashish/Cannabis; Ketamine; Methamphetamine, also known as meth, blue, ice, or crystal; Ecstasy; Cocaine; Mandrax/Methaqualone; among others.

Dawood Ibrahim is among the most wanted criminals in India, since he masterminded the 1993 Mumbai blasts. A Government of India notification, dated September 9, 2019 thus notes:

And whereas, a series of bomb blasts were executed by Dawood Ibrahim Kaskar and his associates in Mumbai in March 1993, which resulted in deaths of 257 persons and injured over 1000 persons apart from destruction of properties on a massive scale And whereas, an Arrest warrant No. 4913 was issued on the 1st April, 1993 by the judicial authorities in Mumbai and Red Corner Notice No. A-135/4/1993 was also issued against Dawood Ibrahim Kaskar in 1993 Mumbai serial bomb blast case…
Dawood Ibrahim is also designated as a global terrorist by the United Nations under the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1267 and was also listed in Al-Qaida sanctions list on November 3, 2003. Moreover, on April 6, 2006, UNSC issued a Special Notice No. U-65/4-2006 in Dawood Ibrahim Kaskar’s name.

Dawood Ibrahim is reported to have left India in the mid-1980s, as he was wanted by the Mumbai Police over gold-smuggling, as well as the 1985 murder of another criminal, Samad Khan. Later in or around 1994, he shifted base from Dubai to Karachi, Pakistan. The move was made because of mounting pressure from Indian authorities in the wake of the 1993 serial bombings, and the threat of extradition by UAE made Dubai unsafe, and Pakistan reportedly offered shelter under the patronage of ISI. According to the UNSC Consolidated List, dated, June 11, 2025, Dawood Ibrahim has three addresses in Pakistan: i) White House, Near Saudi Mosque, Clifton, Karachi; ii) House Number 37 – 30th Street – Defence Housing Authority, Karachi; and iii) a palatial bungalow in the hilly area of Noorabad in Karachi.

In addition to the current spate of arrests and extraditions, the Indian government has also launched a number of operations to thwart the D-Syndicate’s narcotics trafficking activities. In August, 2025, the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI), along with Gujarat and Maharashtra Police, neutralised a clandestine mephedrone manufacturing facility, reportedly controlled by Salim Dola, in the Jagdishpur village of the Devas District in Madhya Pradesh, and seized 61 kilograms of liquid mephedrone worth INR 920 million, and more than 541 kilograms of chemicals. In 2024, NCB of India launched ‘Operation Sagar Manthan’, which is ongoing, to dismantle large-scale drug cartel activities of wanted smuggler Haji Salim, also known as the “Lord of Drugs.” Haji Salim supplies large shipments of illegal narcotics through a complex network that spans across Asia, Africa, and the West. A few instances of recovery from this network include: February 2024 – a joint operation, Sagar Manthan-1, carried out by NCB, the Navy and ATS Gujarat Police, seized a consignment of approximate 3,300 kilograms of drugs (3,110 Kg Charas/Hashish, 158.3 Kg crystalline powder Meth and 24.6 Kg Heroin), in the Indian Ocean. November 2024 – in a joint operation Sagar Manthan-4 – NCB, the Indian Navy and ATS Gujarat Police recovered 700 Kg of contraband Meth in Gujarat.

D-Company is also notorious for its involvement in various criminal and terrorism cases. For instance, on September 18, 2017, Dawood Ibrahim’s younger brother Iqbal Kaskar was arrested by Thane Police for threatening and attempting to extort builders. Police said Kaskar had been threatening builders on Dawood’s behalf and demanding huge amounts running into crores as extortion money. On August 4, 2022, Salim Qureshi, alias Salim Fruit, a member of D-Gang, was arrested by the National Investigation Agency (NIA) for suspectedly aiding the gang’s terrorist activities. According to NIA, Qureshi was actively involved in extorting large sums of money in Chhota Shakeel’s name from property transactions and dispute settlements to raise terror funds in furtherance of terrorist activities of D Company. As reported on July 17, 2025, NIA attached a residential property of Arif Abubakar Shaikh alias Arif Bhaijaan, a key accused in a 2022 terror funding case associated with Dawood Ibrahim. On February 3, 2022, NIA registered a case against Dawood, his brother Anees and Chhota Shakeel, among others, for their suspected involvement in arms smuggling, narco-terrorism, money laundering, etc. They were also accused of involvement in acquisition of assets for raising terrorist funds and working in active collaboration with Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) and Al Qaeda.

Since more than three decades, Indian agencies have been neutralizing segments of Dawood Ibrahim’s networks within India, and seeking to dismantle it through cooperative efforts abroad. This malefic enterprise, however, remains a critical threat to India, as well as wide areas across the world. Sustained maritime vigilance and intelligence-driven enforcement underline India’s strategic resolve to dismantle D-Company’s transnational narco-infrastructure.

UKNA: Violent Resurgence

On November 4, 2025, at least four Kuki militants associated with the United Kuki National Army (UKNA) were killed and another one was injured in an encounter with the Indian Army at Khanpi village under the Henglep Subdivision of Churachandpur District in Manipur, along the Manipur-Myanmar border. According to defence sources, the encounter began when terrorists opened unprovoked fire on the Army column. The operation, led to the recovery of four weapons, including one AK-56 rifle, one M4A1 carbine, ammunition, and other warlike stores. Six UKNA cadres were also arrested during the operation. Five of the arrestees were later identified as Paolonlal Kipgen (30), Kamlalien (23), L Longkhel Singsit (26), Thangsawan (14), and Kangjipao (37).

Earlier, on October 27, 2025, a village chief identified as M. Haokip (50) was killed after being attacked by suspected UKNA militants at T. Khonomphai village under the Henglep Sub-division in Churachandpur District.

On July 22, 2025, at least five UKNA militants were reportedly killed and two were injured at the UKNA’s Dabeijang camp under the Khoupum Police Station in the Tamenglong District, near the Assam-Nagaland border, in a factional gunfight between UKNA cadres and the Chin Kuki Mizo Army (CKMA) – both non-signatories to the Suspension of Operations (SoO) agreement with the Centre. The deceased militants were identified as Alex, Seiboi, Pongba, Ringo, and Rambo.

On June 30, 2025, in another suspected case of factional violence, four persons – including three Kuki National Army (KNA) cadres and a civilian – were killed by heavily armed cadres of UKNA at K. Mongjang village in Churachandpur District. The deceased were identified as ‘deputy commander-in-chief’ of KNA Thangboi Haokip aka Thahpi aka Thenkhothang, two of his bodyguards identified as Thahpi Seikhogin (34) and Lengouhao (35), and a woman bystander identified as Phalhing (72). More than 12 empty 5.56mm shells were recovered from the spot.

According to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), there have been at least four UKNA-related incidents of violence in 2025, leading to 14 fatalities (12 terrorists and two civilians). There were two such incidents in 2024, resulting in two fatalities (both terrorists). No UKNA related violent incidents were recorded in 2023. This sharp escalation reflects the outfit’s resurgence in the wake of renewed ethnic polarisation and inter-group rivalries since the crisis of 2023.

Some other significant recent incidents include:

October 1, 2024: The ‘public relations officer’ of UKNA, Satkhohau Haokip, was found dead at Leishang village in Churachandpur District. Bullet injuries were found on the body and was reported that he had been abducted from his residence in Kaprang village under the Tuibong Block of Churachandpur District by unknown armed assailants in the intervening night of September 30 and October 1.

May 5, 2024: A UKNA ‘camp commander’, Thangminlal Haokip (39) aka Hunter aka Tamin, was shot dead by his own bodyguard at Geljang village in Old Nabil near Leimatak, under Henglep Police station in Churachandpur District. Sources disclosed that Thangminlal Haokip was allegedly involved in the attack on oil and gas tankers on the Imphal-Jiribam NH-37 near Kaimai, on April 16.

In a statement issued on April 17, 2024, UKNA claimed responsibility for a highway attack, which targeted supply convoys ferrying essential goods and fuel to Imphal. The outfit’s ‘defense secretary’ stated that the assault was a “first offensive operation” against the alleged movement of materials in support of the Meitei community. One tanker driver was injured in the attack. The UKNA further warned that no Imphal-bound goods vehicles should operate along NH-37, reflecting the group’s attempt to enforce an economic blockade and disrupt state logistics as a pressure tactic.

Collectively, these incidents trace a consistent trajectory of the UKNA’s renewed operational assertiveness.

UKNA represents one of the most active armed groups operating in Manipur’s ethnic insurgency landscape. The group became active following the ethnic clashes between the Meiteis and the Kuki-Zos that broke out in May 2023. Emerging from the complex socio-political matrix of Kuki sub-nationalism, the organization has been implicated in a series of violent incidents, factional confrontations, and organized extortion activities along the Indo-Myanmar border. The UKNA’s ideological orientation is anchored in Kuki ethnonationalism, which seeks to assert the political and territorial rights of the Kuki-Zo community within the context of the larger Indo-Myanmar frontier. However, its activities in 2025, as documented through multiple armed engagements, reveal a transformation from ideological militancy toward predatory violence, extortion, and internecine conflict.

UKNA is an armed Kuki-Zo outfit operating primarily in Manipur’s hill districts, particularly in Churachandpur and adjoining border areas. Formed in 2015, the group claims to fight for the protection of Kuki interests and the establishment of a separate administrative arrangement for the Kuki-Zo people.

Emerging amid growing fragmentation within Kuki insurgent formations, the UKNA drew several former cadres from the Kuki National Army (KNA) and smaller local outfits. Its founding leadership reportedly included self-styled ‘chairman’ Thanglun Haokip and ‘commander-in-chief’ Paokhothang Kipgen, both long-time insurgent figures with prior involvement in earlier Kuki armed movements. The outfit operates largely outside the SoO framework, maintaining autonomous command and control structures, and its leadership has leveraged cross-border networks in Myanmar for arms procurement and mobility.

While earlier armed organisations of the Kuki-Zo community often engaged with the Indian state in cease-fire and peace-process frameworks, the UKNA appears to reject such accommodation – it is not a signatory to the SoO and has repeatedly engaged in violence both against rival insurgent groups and the security forces. Since its formation, the UKNA has combined militant tactics, criminalised revenue generation and inter-group rivalry, making it a complex actor in Manipur’s hill insurgency. Its decision to remain outside the SoO accords implies a rejection of the formal constraints of weapons’ storage and camp restrictions that signatory groups must abide by – thus giving it greater operational autonomy, but less legitimacy in negotiated politics.

Significantly, the renewed SoO Accord in mid-2025 – extended between the Centre, the Manipur Government, and 24 Kuki-Zo groups – aimed to restore calm amid ongoing ethnic unrest. Yet, its limited impact is evident in the continued violence by non-signatory outfits like the UKNA. UKNA exploits the security vacuum to expand its influence through intimidation, extortion, and armed offensives. Its defiance of the truce highlights a deepening divide within Kuki militancy, where signatory groups engage in dialogue while hard-line factions such as UKNA sustain armed violence.

The UKNA’s operations appear to straddle three overlapping rationales: ethnic assertion of Kuki-Zo identity; competition with other Kuki armed outfits; and criminalised revenue generation in areas of limited state presence.

By remaining outside the SoO framework, UKNA has positioned itself as a “hard-line” formation that, in terms of its tactics, combines ambushes, targeted assassinations, extortion and confrontations with security forces.

The UKNA’s interactions with civilian governance structures are increasingly coercive. In October 2025, it issued a diktat banning all sports and entertainment in Kuki-Zo areas from November 1, onwards, alleging that celebratory activities were disrespectful to the “martyrs” of the group.

UKNA’s trajectory since 2024 underscores the resurgence of hard-line Kuki militancy amid the fragile ethnic equilibrium in Manipur. From its initial highway attacks to inter-factional clashes and confrontations with SFs, the group’s operational footprint reveals a shift from political militancy to violent opportunism. Its refusal to join the SoO framework reflects both ideological rigidity and the pursuit of unrestrained autonomy in revenue generation and territorial dominance. UKNA’s actions – marked by ambushes, assassinations, and coercive diktats – have deepened insecurity in the Hill Districts and complicated peace-building efforts. As the state grapples with overlapping insurgent and ethnic fault lines, UKNA’s rise exemplifies how unaddressed grievances, fractured negotiations, and militarised identities continue to fuel cycles of violence, creating a formidable challenge to stability and inclusive governance in Manipur’s borderland frontier.

Weekly Fatalities: Major Conflicts in South Asia
November 3-9, 2025

Provisional data compiled from English language media sources.