The Islamic Emirate Of Afghanistan – Cracks Open Within The Afghan Taliban Leadership
On October 30, 2025, Anas Haqqani, one of the key influential Afghan Taliban leaders and brother of Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani, told a journalist that there are no “Haqqani” or “Kandahari” factions within the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, nor are there any internal disputes between Taliban officials on this matter.[1]
Anas Haqqani, who was brought from prison to Qatar to be part of the Taliban delegation that negotiated the Doha agreement of February 2020 with the United States,[2] also said that those who claim that such factions exist within the Islamic Emirate are “CIA-sponsored propagandists.”[3]
Anas Haqqani is theoretically right. During the 20-year jihad against the U.S. and NATO forces, the Islamic Emirate’s position has been that there is no Haqqani Network within the organization. However, organizations undergo transformations and strong leaders acquire their own cadres while remaining within the system. It is in this context that Anas Haqqani is wrong.
Although he tried to present a view that the Taliban leadership is unified, Anas Haqqani must be aware that a faction led by his brother Sirajuddin Haqqani – militarily strong and known as the Haqqani Network – has always existed within the Islamic Emirate. In 2011, a Pakistani media report estimated the Haqqani Network’s strength at around 15,000-20,000 active members.[4]
After the Islamic Emirate returned to power in mid-August 2021, Sirajuddin Haqqani became the interior minister working from Kabul where all the ministries are based, while Mullah Hibbatullah Akhundzada became the Taliban supreme leader ruling from Kandahar, the spiritual capital and birthplace of Afghan Taliban. The faction led by Mullah Hibbatullah Akhundzada has come to be known as the Kandahari faction. These factions are described as such because of the power distribution between them, which does not mean that they characterize any tribal or territorial association, nor does it mean that the Taliban supreme leader lacks influence in Kabul.
A few days before the 48-hour internet shutdown was imposed in Kabul by the Kandahari faction on October 1-2, Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani had travelled to Kandahar where he met with the Taliban leader to discuss the issue. According to an Afghan media report, Sirajuddin Haqqani held the meeting with Mullah Hibbatullah Akhundzada on Friday, September 26, to persuade him against the impending ban on internet and telecommunications across Afghanistan.[5]
“Haqqani, described as deeply unhappy with the decision, reportedly voiced his objections during the meeting, warning of the severe consequences of cutting off internet and telecommunications nationwide,” the report noted, adding that Sirajuddin Haqqani “returned to Kabul empty-handed.”[6]
The Internet ban is an issue that has opened the wounds and divisions within the Taliban leadership. Within 48 hours, the ban was overturned by the Taliban officials loyal to the Haqqani faction. “In a move that clearly demonstrates disobedience to the Taliban leader’s orders, Kabul’s Internet has been activated, contrary to Mullah Hibbatullah Akhundzada’s order, and on the orders of Mullah Fazel Mazloom, Mullah Abdul Haq Wasiq, and Sirajuddin Haqqani,” noted a Dari-language media report, titled “The Taliban Leadership Split – Kabul Divided Between Two Armed Factions.”[7]
The report, written within hours of the Internet ban being reversed, narrated how battlefronts were drawn in the Afghan capital between the powerful Taliban factions. It observed: “The differences between the Taliban leaders have intensified, which has led to the division of Kabul between the conflicting factions… Mullah Qayyum Zakir, a supporter of Mullah Hibbatullah Akhundzada, on the one hand, and on the other hand, Mullah Mohammad Fazil Mazloom, the Deputy Minister of Defense, Mullah Abdul Haq Wasiq, the Head of Intelligence, and the Haqqani Network faction [led by Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani] have lined up against each other.”[8]
It further noted: “The southern areas of Arg [the Presidential Palace in Kabul] are controlled by Mullah Mohammad Fazil Mazloom in alliance with the Haqqani faction and Wasiq, while the northern areas of Arg are controlled by Mullah Qayyum Zakir. Sources stressed that forces from both sides would be disarmed if they went to areas controlled by the other side. These tensions came to a head after a heated verbal altercation between Mullah Hibbatullah Akhundzada and Mullah Mohammad Fazil Mazloom in a recent meeting.”[9] The Taliban’s Prime Minister, Mullah Hassan Akhund, who works from Kabul also played a major part in opening the Internet.
It appears that following U.S. President Donald Trump’s threats to recapture Bagram Airbase, “deep cracks in the Taliban leadership structure have become even more apparent and the group’s internal stability is faced with serious challenges.”[10] But even before Trump’s threats to recapture the airbase, the factionalism within the Taliban leadership was out in the open, most importantly on the issue of women’s education and right to work. In September 2024, the Taliban’s official media had even prevented a video documentary from being broadcast because it showed martyrs from the Haqqani Network.[11]
Since its rise to power in 2021, the Islamic Emirate has imposed a total ban on girls’ education after Grade Six in schools, colleges, and universities and ordered women to stay within their homes, not to go outside unaccompanied by a mahram (i.e., a close male relative) either to work or visit parks. Taliban Deputy Foreign Minister Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanikzai was forced to leave Afghanistan for the UAE on January 27, 2025, days after his January 18 speech in which he favored girls’ education and women’s rights.[12]
In the speech he declared: “There is no excuse for this [ban on women’s education] – not now and not in the future… We are being unjust to 20 million people. During the time of the prophet Muhammad, the doors of knowledge were open to both men and women.”[13]
In these truly dark times for Afghan women, Sirajuddin Haqqani, the chief of the Haqqani Network, which has executed major suicide bombings including against the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, has been opposing the ban on women’s education and work,[14] while Mullah Hibbatullah Akhundzada has been strengthening his hand by imposing strict shari’a restrictions on women and men through the Ministry for the Prevention of Vice and Promotion of Virtue.[15]
Led by Mohammad Khalid Hanafi, the Ministry for the Prevention of Vice and Promotion of Virtue has been enforcing strict shari’a rules, preventing women from travelling alone or going to schools and colleges, or running businesses such as beauty parlors, or visiting parks. Its inspectors also forbid barbers from shaving customers’ beards and prevent men from playing music or watching movies, among other restrictions.
At meetings with Taliban officials and Islamic religious scholars in different Afghan provinces, Mohammad Khalid Hanafi has even ordered that the Taliban leader’s directives be enthusiastically implemented with iron hands, stating that “Shari’a and hijab are red lines for the Islamic Emirate system” and the ministry’s inspectors must enforce “the law ratified by the Islamic Emirate’s leader [Mullah Hibbatullah Akhundzada].”[16]
In addition to the ministry’s enforcement of shari’a restrictions, the Taliban leader himself has travelled to provinces in recent years and addressed seminars in Kandahar where the Taliban officials and governors were brought from different provinces. Fearful that he might be toppled by Sirajuddin Haqqani, Mullah Hibbatullah Akhundzada delivered several speeches at a three-day seminar organized for the Taliban governors of all districts and 34 provinces in Kandahar in October 2025, stating: “You, the governors and district governors, are the strength and representatives of the Islamic Emirate. All the people are under your command. If you represent the Islamic Emirate and your emir well, then the people will cooperate with the Islamic system and make every effort with you in implementing the shari’a.”[17]
In an article in March 2023, senior journalist Kazim Ehsan wrote: “It is now evident that senior Taliban figures, expressing unease about the group’s direction, have been unable to influence decisions made by Mullah Hibbatullah Akhundzada and those close to him. This demonstrates a significant shift in power toward their supreme leader.”[18]
“As a result, Kandahar has become,” Ehsan said, “the center of power in the Taliban’s government and its power structure. And this means that power gained by the supreme leader results in power lost for others, particularly the group’s interior minister and the head of the Haqqani Network, Sirajuddin Haqqani.”[19] In February 2023, at a public event in Khost, Sirajuddin Haqqani attacked the Kandahari faction for its “monopolization of power” and “imposing views on others” – a speech that was “seen as a direct challenge to the supreme leader.”[20]
At one point in the factional rivalry, Sirajuddin Haqqani even left the Interior Ministry in Kabul, pressuring on the Kandahari faction by putting the divisions within the Taliban leadership out in the open for the world to see. In April 2025, the interior minister returned to his office after 37 days. To quell rumors of factionalism within the Taliban leadership, the Interior Ministry “released photographs showing Haqqani alongside senior Taliban officials, announcing that he presided over a leadership meeting at the ministry” and “deputy ministers and directors were present at the meeting.”[21]
A media report commented on month-long absence of Sirajuddin Haqqani from Kabul: “His reappearance comes after more than a month of absence, during which time speculation grew amid reports of deepening internal divisions within the Taliban. Sources told Amu TV that Haqqani had warned Taliban leader Hibbatullah Akhundzada during a meeting in Kandahar that concentrating power within the leader’s inner circle risked fracturing the movement’s ranks.”[22]
Sirajuddin Haqqani, who is considered militarily powerful among the Taliban, might be getting positive attention from the United States. In March 2025, following a meeting between the Taliban and U.S. officials in Kabul, the U.S. State Department removed a $10 million bounty on Sirajuddin Haqqani, perhaps as part of a prisoner deal, though the Haqqani Network remains designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization.[23] Sirajuddin Haqqani also visited the United Arab Emirates and was welcomed by Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, the ruler of Abu Dhabi, at the Qasr Al Shati palace in Dubai in June 2025.[24]
In an analytical article in December 2024, Afghanistan’s independent daily Hasht-e-Subh noted the ideological nature of the struggle between the pragmatist faction represented by Sirajuddin Haqqani and the religious-ideological camp led by the Taliban supreme leader. The article observed: “In ideological movements, Supreme Leaders hold decisive and transformative roles, making them central to the group’s existence and direction. Challenging such leaders comes with a steep price that not everyone can afford. The only action that carries no cost and allows individuals to retain their existing power and position is blind and unconditional obedience to the leader’s commands.”[25]
The daily reminded readers that Defense Minister Mullah Yaqoob Mujahid and Minister for the Prevention of Vice and Promotion of Virtue Mohammad Khalid Hanafi have stressed the need for obedience to the emir-ul-momineen (the Commander of the Faithful, a position representing temporal and religious authority) Mullah Hibbatullah Akhundzada. In such a situation, barring an external support to the pragmatist camp, “Sirajuddin Haqqani faces significant obstacles in posing a formidable challenge to Mullah Hibatullah Akhundzada.”[26] It added that if Sirajuddin Haqqani led a coup of sorts, he “must meticulously plan and exert considerable effort to legitimize any action against Mullah Hibbatullah.”[27]
[1] X.com, October 30, 2025.
[2] MEMRI Special Dispatch No. 8630, Pakistani Columnist Hassan Niazi On The U.S.-Taliban Deal: ‘The Agreement Is Clear That The U.S. Will Leave, Even If Afghanistan Burns’, March 12, 2020; MEMRI JTTM Report, Qatar-Based Afghan Taliban Commander Anas Haqqani Tells Taliban Leaders: ‘Keep Your Intentions Concealed’, April 20, 2021.
[3] X.com, October 30, 2025.
[4] MEMRI JTTM, Pakistani Daily: ‘Haqqani Network: Another Behemoth In The Making’; It has 15,000 – 20,000 Active Sympathizers, February 14, 2011.
[5] Afintl.com (Afghanistan), September 30, 2025.
[6] Afintl.com (Afghanistan), September 30, 2025.
[7] Khorasantimes.com (Afghanistan), October 2, 2025.
[8] Khorasantimes.com (Afghanistan), October 2, 2025.
[9] Khorasantimes.com (Afghanistan), October 2, 2025.
[10] Khorasantimes.com (Afghanistan), October 2, 2025.
[11] MEMRI JTTM Report, Dari-Language Report: Official Taliban Media Refuse To Broadcast Haqqani Network Documentary Highlighting Group’s Martyrs, Revealing Growing Rift Within Taliban, September 26, 2024.
[12] Theguardian.com (UK), February 3, 2025.
[13] Theguardian.com (UK), February 3, 2025.
[14] DNI.gov (U.S.), accessed November 6, 2025.
[15] MEMRI JTTM, Afghan Taliban’s Virtue And Vice Minister Mohammad Khalid Hanafi Rebuffs West: ‘Implementing Shari’a And Hijab Is Our Red Line’; America And Its Supporters Used All Possible Means To Prevent Afghan Mujahideen From Jihad’, September 6, 2024.
[16] MEMRI JTTM, Afghan Taliban’s Virtue And Vice Minister Mohammad Khalid Hanafi Rebuffs West: ‘Implementing Shari’a And Hijab Is Our Red Line’; America And Its Supporters Used All Possible Means To Prevent Afghan Mujahideen From Jihad’, September 6, 2024.
[17] MEMRI JTTM, At Three-Day Seminar, Afghan Taliban’s Supreme Leader Mullah Hibbatullah Akhundzada Seeks To Consolidate Control: ‘Many Jihads Were Waged In Afghanistan, But Because Their Intentions Were Not Correct, The Deeds That Were Considered The Goals Of Jihad Were Not Achieved’, October 16, 2025.
[18] KabulNow.com (Afghanistan), March 15, 2023.
[19] KabulNow.com (Afghanistan), March 15, 2023.
[20] KabulNow.com (Afghanistan), February 15, 2023.
[21] Amu.tv (Afghanistan), April 20, 2025.
[22] Amu.tv (Afghanistan), April 20, 2025.
[23] Ajazeera.com (Qatar), March 22, 2025.
[24] X.com, June 6, 2025.
[25] 8am.media (Afghanistan), December 19, 2024.
[26] 8am.media (Afghanistan), December 19, 2024.
[27] 8am.media (Afghanistan), December 19, 2024.