Complications of the ‘Cooperative Rivalry’ Between Iran and Pakistan
Iranian President Masoud Pezhakian’s visit to Islamabad on August 2, which led to the signing of 12 cooperation agreements between Iran and Pakistan, is a reflection of the 12-day Israel-Iran war. Pakistan strongly condemned the unjustified and illegitimate aggression by Israel against the Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistani Defence Minister Khwaja Asif vowed to “stand behind Iran” and called for “Muslim unity against Israel after attacks on Iran” at the National Assembly. In addition, the Senate of Pakistan has passed a resolution condemning Israel’s attack on Iran, labelling it a war crime and a violation of the United Nations Charter. The resolution was passed unanimously, demonstrating a united front among Pakistani lawmakers against Israel’s actions.
On the other hand, India, which has close relations with Israel and the United States, has refused to condemn Israel’s military attack on Iran. In addition, India dissented and declined to endorse the statement of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), which denounced the assault on Iran. Therefore, Pezhakian’s visit to Pakistan can be seen as an expression of Iran’s gratitude and satisfaction with Islamabad’s positions. In addition, following the four-day India-Pakistan war, during his six-day visit from May 25 to 30, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif visited Iran, Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Tajikistan. The 12-day war between Israel and Iran, as well as the four-day war between India and Pakistan, seem to have brought Tehran and Islamabad closer together. It is in Pakistan’s interest to have Iran and Saudi Arabia alongside China to weigh in against its long-standing regional rival, India. However, it seems that Iran will continue to pursue a policy of balancing against India and Pakistan.
Iran-Pakistan relations, however, still suffer from numerous contradictions and challenges. For example, in the midst of the Iran-Israel war, and while Pakistan’s defence minister openly declared that “we stand behind Iran”, Pakistan Army chief Gen. Asim Munir met with US President Donald Trump at the White House on June 19. In addition, on June 23, Pakistan formally recommended Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize, citing his “decisive diplomatic intervention” following a spike in violence between India and Pakistan earlier this year. But Pakistan immediately condemned the US airstrikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities, calling the escalation of the tension and violence “deeply disturbing”.
Globalization and Sovereignty
Pakistan perceives Israel’s Iran gamble as far from a bilateral matter, given its tendency to draw in external actors with far-reaching regional implications. In an era of rapidly shifting global alliances and the transition toward a multipolar order, Pakistan cannot afford detachment, Almas Haider Naqvi writes.
Opinions
In addition, on June 28, President Asif Ali Zardari conferred the Nishan-e-Imtiaz Order of Excellence on US Central Command (CENTCOM) chief Gen. Michael E. Kurilla for his military service at a ceremony at the President House in Islamabad. Although Iran did not officially react to this incident, one can understand Tehran’s dissatisfaction. Following the assassination of IRGC Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani, Iran declared CENTCOM a “terrorist organisation”. Specifically, praising the CENTCOM commander six days after the United States Air Force and Navy attacked three Iranian nuclear facilities on June 22, underscores a “contradictory approach” that does not please Tehran.
On the other hand, the terrorist attack by the militant group Jaish al-Adl (Army of Justice) at a courthouse in Zahedan, in southeastern Sistan-Baluchistan province on June 26, which left nine people dead, once again demonstrated the fragility of the 987-km shared border between Iran and Pakistan, as well as terrorist threats. Iran has always accused Pakistan of failing to control and suppress terrorist and separatist militia groups deep within the country, especially in the Balochistan region. In January 2024, Pakistan and Iran fired missiles into each other’s territory in a brief military escalation between the neighbours, which was unprecedented since the establishment of Pakistan in August 1947. However, following the recent terrorist attack by Jaish al-Adl, Iran refrained from openly criticising Pakistan.
Meanwhile, militant and terrorist groups in Pakistan, such as ISIS-Khorasan (ISIS-K), the Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF), and the Baloch Liberation Army-Azad faction (BLA-A) are considered a common threat to the national security of both Pakistan and Iran. Since the beginning of 2025, the Baloch insurgency in Pakistan has also intensified, with sophisticated attacks such as train hijackings and attacks on Chinese nationals in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Undoubtedly, this trend can lead to further escalation in Iran’s Baluchestan region and mobilise Baloch militant groups opposed to Tehran, including Jaish al-Adl, of which the recent terrorist attack on the Zahedan court is a clear example.
Over the past two decades, neither country has been able to stop insecurity stemming from terrorist and separatist groups on both sides of the Iran-Pakistan border, but the situation hasn’t spun out of control. Despite these common threats and security agreements, comprehensive, long-term, and effective cooperation between Iran and Pakistan to jointly confront terrorist and separatist threats has not yet been formed. However, in a recent visit of President Pezeshkian to Islamabad, Iranian Defence Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasirzadeh held talks with his Pakistani counterpart, Defence Minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif in an effort to strengthen military ties.
On the other hand, Pakistan is a vital space for Iran’s foreign trade under sanctions. Bilateral trade has increased 13.6 percent in the Iranian year 1403 (March 2024–March 2025) compared to the previous year, reaching a total of $3.129 billion. In addition, Iran enjoys a trade surplus with Pakistan, exporting goods at 3.5 times the volume of its imports from the neighbouring country. During President Pezeshkian’s recent visit to Islamabad, the two countries convened a high-level business forum, aimed at bolstering bilateral trade ties and finalising a Free Trade Agreement (FTA). President Pezeshkian said he firmly believes “bilateral trade can easily be increased from the current $3 billion to the targeted $10 billion in a short period.” The main challenge is the border regions of Iran and Pakistan, especially Balochistan, which suffer from underdevelopment, poverty, and unemployment, which have played an important role in the creation of drug and fuel smuggling networks, as well as terrorist and separatist militia groups in recent decades.
Nevertheless, the role of the United States as a “third party” in Iran-Pakistan relations cannot be denied, which has prevented the implementation of the Pakistan-Iran gas pipeline project since 2009. Iran has completed the pipeline running on its territory with a $2 billion investment, but work on the Pakistani stretch has yet to begin. With US sanctions on Iran applying to the Iran-Pakistan pipeline project, and Washington denying Pakistan a waiver of the sanctions, Islamabad has been unable to proceed with the project.
Pakistan’s Petroleum Minister Musadik Malik announced in December that he planned to request a sanctions waiver for the Pakistan-Iran gas pipeline project from the Trump administration, but after Trump returned to power, the “policy of maximum pressure” and comprehensive sanctions against Iran have been revived, and even some of his first administration’s exemptions for the Chabahar transit port have been revoked.
Therefore, it seems that the implementation of the gas pipeline remains uncertain, which can be intensified due to the lack of a nuclear agreement between Iran and the United States as well as the possible return of UN sanctions after the activation of the trigger mechanism by the JCPOA’s European troika – France, Britain, and Germany.
Globalization and Sovereignty
Alireza Noori
Tehran has pragmatically agreed to negotiations based on the belief that diplomacy is the only viable solution to its nuclear issue, and that it might be possible to reach an agreement with Trump, Alireza Noori writes.
Opinions
On the other hand, the regional rivalry between Iran and Pakistan cannot be denied. China’s investment in Pakistan’s Gwadar Port and the trilateral cooperation between Iran, India, and Afghanistan in the Chabahar transit port are a clear example. Unilateral US sanctions against Iran, however, have caused India’s participation and investment in the Chabahar transit port to be very limited. Iran has turned to the participation of the Taliban-led Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, Russia, and Armenia in the Chabahar Port transit project. However, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a massive infrastructure project, has led to the development of Gwadar port. In fact, CPEC, as part of China’s larger Belt and Road Initiative, aims to connect China’s Xinjiang region to Pakistan’s Gwadar port via a network of roads, railways, and energy pipelines.
Afghanistan is also an arena of competition and cooperation between Iran and Pakistan. While both countries have de facto relations with the Taliban-controlled Islamic Emirate and have taken a similar approach to expelling millions of Afghan refugees, the escalation of differences between the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and its old ally, Pakistan, has caused the Taliban to pay attention to the Chabahar Port transit project. Iran hopes that by increasing Afghanistan’s reliance on the Chabahar commercial and transit route, it will encourage the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan to be more flexible and cooperate in the use of Hirmand’s water resources, border security, and dealing with millions of Afghan immigrants in Iran.
In addition, following the Second Karabakh War in 2020, the extension of India-Pakistan strategic competition to the South Caucasus has had important consequences regarding the sale of weapons, defence equipment and the transfer of military technology to Armenia and Azerbaijan. While military and defence relations between Azerbaijan, Pakistan and Turkey has developed significantly, Armenia has simultaneously developed its military and defence relations with India. Under these circumstances, Iran is trying to pursue a balancing policy in the South Caucasus, similar to its approach in the subcontinent.
However, the tripartite cooperation between Armenia, Iran and India focusses efforts on “soft balancing” (economic-transit) instead of “hard balancing” (military-security), against the tripartite ties of Azerbaijan, Turkey and Pakistan in the South Caucasus. In addition, the revival of trilateral cooperation between Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey could also be another balancing approach. During his recent trip to Islamabad, President Pezeshkian said that “trilateral agreements between Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey have never been fully implemented despite their strategic importance.”
In sum, the complex relationship between Iran and Pakistan can be best described as a “cooperative rivalry”. While they compete on various fronts in transport, Afghanistan and the South Caucasus, they share common ground in opposing Israel’s wars in the region, confronting militia groups near their shared borders, and maintaining economic ties. Iran, which is under renewed US sanctions amid a fragile ceasefire with Israel, continues to manage relations with Pakistan amidst clear rivalries on various fronts, which can be a breathing space for Iran’s foreign policy.