Balancing Interests in the India–Russia Equation
The December 2025 meeting between Vladimir Putin and Narendra Modi in Delhi came at a moment when Russia continues to face Western economic pressure and India is navigating a shifting multipolar environment. The visit reaffirmed the long-standing depth of India–Russia relations, while also revealing the structural constraints that now shape the partnership.
Public statements from both governments reiterated ongoing cooperation and a willingness to advance a broader roadmap toward 2030. Energy remained the most concrete area of continuity. Russia indicated its intention to maintain stable crude oil supplies to India—a matter of real significance, given how Russian crude has helped India contain domestic cost pressures during a period of global price volatility.
A dramatic shift occurred only after 2022. Before the Ukraine conflict, Russia supplied less than two per cent of India’s crude oil. India’s eventual large-scale purchases were not the product of pre-existing dependence but of market-driven opportunity. As Western sanctions reshaped global oil flows, Russia redirected its exports toward Asia at discounted rates. India, faced with inflationary pressure and the need to stabilize domestic fuel prices, took advantage of these discounts. The decision was pragmatic: Russian oil was priced competitively and available in substantial volumes when other markets were tight. India’s purchases, therefore, were a response to global disruptions rather than a strategic attempt to cultivate dependence.
Defence cooperation—another pillar of the relationship—remains important, though without major new platform announcements. What did emerge, however, was a renewed emphasis on scientific and research-oriented collaboration. Russian officials publicly indicated interest in expanding joint development in areas that go beyond the traditional buyer–seller model. This does not represent an agreed new framework, but it signals a willingness to explore deeper cooperation in emerging technologies. In this sense, the discussions point to a qualitatively different orientation than legacy arrangements like the BrahMos project, which was rooted in technology transfer and joint production in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The new emphasis, still at a preliminary stage, appears to be on co-development of future capabilities rather than incremental upgrades of existing systems—an approach that aligns with India’s stated objective of increasing indigenous technological ownership.
A similar pattern of exploratory cooperation appears in the space sector. Both sides mentioned potential collaboration on human spaceflight and future orbital infrastructure—areas where Russia has long operational experience and where India aims to expand its capabilities as it pursues its own space station plans for the early 2030s. While no formal agreement on space stations or joint orbital missions was concluded, the public references indicate that space research remains an area in which both countries see value. Historically, Indo–Russian space ties involved satellite launches and astronaut training; the current conversations suggest an intent to broaden this into more research-intensive cooperation if feasibility aligns for both sides.
Despite these signals of continuity and potential expansion, the limitations of the partnership remain clear. India has steadily diversified its military procurement over the past decade, a shift that accelerated as Russia’s defence industry faced production delays and supply-chain constraints after 2022. Sanctions and restricted access to Western components have affected Russia’s long-term capacity to deliver large volumes of equipment on predictable timelines. Indian policymakers have repeatedly underscored the importance of reducing over-reliance on any single source and emphasised the need for resilient and diversified supply chains in defence.
The geopolitical environment adds further complexity. Russia’s deepening strategic proximity to China since the start of the Ukraine conflict is an ongoing concern for India. A Russia fully aligned with China would complicate the Asian security landscape in ways that may not always align with India’s interests. Maintaining stable engagement with Moscow therefore remains important—not only for historical reasons but to ensure that India retains diplomatic space in a region increasingly shaped by sharper alignments.
During the Delhi meeting, India reiterated its longstanding position supporting dialogue and peaceful settlement of conflicts. This approach sustains India’s strategic autonomy, even if some Western observers view it as insufficiently critical of Moscow. Indian policymakers maintain that national interest—not alignment—drives their decisions, and that engagement with all major powers is essential for navigating a turbulent global environment.
Several uncertainties remain. It is not yet clear whether Russia can sustain stable, long-term energy and defence supplies while managing the cumulative impact of sanctions and its military commitments. Nor is it evident how India will balance relations with Russia, China, the United States, Japan, and Europe as global alignments continue to evolve. For India, the central challenge is preserving equilibrium—maintaining cooperation with Russia without allowing the relationship to complicate ties with its other strategic partners.
Ultimately, the Delhi meeting reflected pragmatic engagement between two states recalibrating their positions in a changing world. It yielded no dramatic breakthroughs, but it also avoided any hint of rupture. What emerged instead was a reaffirmation of continuity, an openness to deeper scientific cooperation, and a clear recognition of the constraints on both sides. If Russia can maintain steady energy supplies and explore meaningful technological partnerships—and if India continues to steer the relationship with a balanced, interest-driven approach—the India–Russia equation will remain relevant in the geopolitical landscape of the coming decade.