Superpower: While seeking to divide the world equally with the United States, Putin is in fact forced to constantly make concessions

Following the change of power in Venezuela, the United States began to expel Russian companies from the country, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said in early February. Despite signing a partnership agreement with Caracas, Moscow effectively ignored the American capture of Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro, limiting itself to verbal condemnation of US actions. Iran, which was first attacked by Israel and is now threatened with retaliation by Washington for its brutal suppression of protests, has also been left without any tangible Russian assistance. Vladimir Putin is silently making concessions to Donald Trump, because he still hopes to divide global “spheres of influence” with him, according to international security expert Eliot Wilson. In his view, a Cold War-style division of the world is unthinkable today: Trump’s unpredictable volatility, the inevitable clash of interests with the United States, and the rise of China, with which Washington is also willing to engage in dialogue, all stand in the way.

Sir Winston Churchill once called Russia “an enigma wrapped in a mystery within an enigma.” He uttered this phrase in 1939, after the Soviet Union, which had concluded the famous Molotov-Ribbentrop non-aggression pact with Nazi Germany, followed Adolf Hitler’s example and invaded Poland. This episode reminded Western Europe how little it truly understood Russia and the thinking of its leaders.

Attempts to understand the dynamics of the relationship between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin sometimes suggest that the West has learned nothing in the past 90 years. In 2017, GQ journalist Peter Conradi characterized the relationship between the Russian and US leaders as a “bromance,” which, at the very least, reflected its unusual nature.

Like all Trump relationships, this one is volatile, but there’s a strong sense that he finds something appealing—perhaps even admirable—in the former KGB officer who has ruled Russia for more than a quarter century.

Trump finds something attractive—perhaps even admirable—in Putin.
The issue of contacts between the two elderly leaders (Trump turns 80 this year, Putin is 74) has become particularly acute amid attempts to negotiate an end to the war in Ukraine. Too often, this process has been reduced to a bilateral format, in which President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has been sidelined.

Before his reelection in November 2024, Donald Trump repeatedly claimed he could “end this war in 24 hours.” On February 12, 2025, he held what he called an “extremely productive” phone call with Putin, which resulted in a decision to “start negotiations immediately.” A year has passed, and there is still no sign of a ceasefire or peace agreement.

Meanwhile, while Putin and Trump were playing out their complex diplomatic ballet, the rest of the world was not standing still. Nothing happens in isolation—the Ukraine negotiations and relations between the United States and Russia must be viewed in the context of other events of recent months.

Forgotten by Putin
The US capture of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro in early January sent a powerful signal. The meticulously planned and flawlessly executed Operation Absolute Resolve , which lasted barely two hours, stunned the international community. Weeks later, questions about Venezuela’s future remain, especially with Maduro’s deputy, Delcy Rodríguez, appointed acting president.

Given the disastrous consequences of previous US attempts at regime change abroad, as well as Trump’s near-total inability to sustain attention on any given issue, it’s safe to assume Venezuela faces difficult times under American control. But how did Moscow respond to this operation?

In May 2025, Putin and Maduro signed a 10-year strategic partnership agreement. It included joint work in the oil industry within the OPEC+ framework and military cooperation, including the supply of Russian Buk-M2E missile systems to Caracas. The Venezuelan leader apparently recognized the threat posed by the United States and attempted to prepare to counter it.

An alliance with Venezuela provided Russia with expanded strategic influence and a foothold in the Caribbean. In October, the hawkish Alexei Zhuravlev, First Deputy Chairman of the Russian State Duma Defense Committee, stated that Moscow could deploy nuclear-capable missiles “in Venezuela or Cuba,” close to its “main geopolitical adversary”—the United States.

However, when President Maduro asked Putin that same month to hand over anti-aircraft and anti-missile defense systems in response to the American military buildup in the Caribbean, Putin failed to come to his aid. Events in January demonstrated that the Venezuelan leader’s concerns were well founded. The Russian Foreign Ministry called Maduro’s capture an “act of armed aggression,” expressed “solidarity with the Venezuelan people,” and “supported its leadership’s course toward protecting national interests and sovereignty.”

When Maduro asked Putin for weapons in response to the US military buildup in the Caribbean, Putin did not come to the rescue.
How should we understand this reaction? What happened in Venezuela has surely alarmed the Kremlin’s other partners—it’s easy to imagine them rereading the texts of agreements and treaties with Russia, especially the fine print. Cuba and Nicaragua, for example, have close ties to Moscow, but their location within the amended Monroe Doctrine makes them potential targets for US intervention. Is Putin losing influence in Havana and Managua?

These concerns are likely shared in Tehran. Trump threatened the Iranian regime with severe retaliation for the brutal suppression of protests, which has killed thousands , perhaps tens of thousands, of people. On his social media account, TruthSocial, Trump announced that “a massive armada is heading toward Iran, ready and able to quickly accomplish its mission—by force if necessary.” He was referring to the US Navy strike group led by the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln.

Yes, US-Iranian talks regarding the latter’s nuclear program are ongoing in Oman , though they are constantly on the brink of collapse. Iran’s official rhetoric remains harsh and uncompromising: Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated that the country’s armed forces “have their finger on the trigger” and are ready to “immediately and forcefully respond” to any American aggression.

The success of these negotiations remains uncertain, given that the US delegation is led by Trump’s special envoy, Steve Witkoff, who is known for his tendency to accept everything the other side says at face value—something that has even earned him the nickname “Stupid Philby” (a reference to Kim Philby, a high-ranking British intelligence officer who simultaneously worked for the USSR for many years). Furthermore, it’s not entirely clear what exactly the negotiators are trying to achieve. Regardless, the process continues—possibly because the Iranian side understands that Russia won’t come to the rescue.

Silent redistribution
Could this passivity be considered part of Putin’s broader foreign policy? The revised US National Security Strategy, published in late 2025, is revealing in this regard. Among the key interests of the United States, the document identifies “restoring strategic stability with Russia.” Furthermore, it notes that “managing European relations with Moscow will require significant US diplomatic engagement.” Overall, Russia is mentioned only 10 times in the text. By comparison, the word “hemisphere” appears 24 times, “China” 21 times, “immigration” 13 times, and “Trump” 27 times.

The US National Security Strategy identifies “restoring stability with Russia” as one of its key interests.
The Strategy also states that the United States will “support its allies in ensuring a free and secure Europe.” Its core principles are identified as “a focused definition of national interest,” “a propensity for non-intervention,” “sovereignty and respect,” and “the balance of power.”

Combined with the language about shared responsibility, this suggests a reduction in the US military presence in Europe; similarly, the statement that “many Europeans view Russia as an existential threat” implies that the United States does not view it as such.

In these circumstances, Putin likely sees a window of opportunity. He understands that Trump is essentially uninterested in the conflict in Ukraine itself: the US president’s attention is focused, firstly, on the prospect of a “deal” that would add to his dubious list of “ended wars,” and secondly, on the potential revenue from mineral extraction in Ukraine, in light of the April agreement to transfer rights to “any significant natural resource assets” in exchange for investment in the country’s reconstruction.

Trump isn’t concerned with the fundamental issues raised by the war in Ukraine—violations of international law, war crimes, actions potentially qualifying as genocide, even the very concepts of self-determination and sovereignty—but Putin likely understands the opportunities opening up before him. After all, one of his tasks as a KGB officer—through whose prism he apparently still perceives the world—was identifying potential allies and sympathizers.

Trump is not concerned with the fundamental issues raised by the war in Ukraine – violations of international law, war crimes, actions potentially qualifying as genocide.
Putin knows that Trump dislikes President Zelenskyy: he publicly accused the Ukrainian leader of fueling the conflict, while giving the Russian leader a certain amount of credibility. During the protracted and still fruitless “peace” negotiations on Ukraine, Russia has consistently sought to present itself to Trump as a reasonable party with whom to do business and one that advocates a diplomatic settlement. The US president’s enthusiastic embrace of this false Kremlin narrative is troubling.

Putin and Trump share many similar views, even if their relationship at times resembles that of con man and victim. Both value demonstrative, even grotesque, displays of power. Both believe their countries were more powerful in the past. Both disdain international law and global organizations. One could take this line of reasoning even further: Putin’s predatory approach to the “Near Abroad” is in many ways reminiscent of a Slavic interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine.

In other words, Putin may envision a future in which he and Trump agree—to paraphrase Kipling —that “East is East, West is West, and never the twain shall meet.” In this paradigm, the United States would reduce its presence in Europe and its support for Ukraine, while Russia would distance itself from its former allies in Latin and South America, and perhaps even the Middle East, while both powers would dominate their respective hemispheres.

It’s a coherent and attractive scenario. Under a less eccentric US president, it could even become a completely feasible strategy for Putin. However, in the long term, this plan risks falling apart due to Donald Trump’s character.

Reality versus rhetoric
The first obstacle here is Trump’s extreme unpredictability. Any tacit non-aggression pact would require a certain restraint on both sides—an understanding that there are issues best left unaddressed. Such moderation is impossible with the current US president—his impulsive reactions are instantly catapulted into geopolitical reality via social media. It’s easy to forget how much public perception has dulled over the past decade of Trump’s political activity. Statements that would once have provoked a serious diplomatic scandal have now become part of the information landscape. However, this landscape itself has become harsher and more hostile.

Any tacit non-aggression pact would require restraint from both sides – something that is impossible in Trump’s case.
Putin is far more calculating than Trump, but he is also capable of raising the stakes with his rhetoric. Announcing the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, he threatened those who “try to interfere with Russia from the outside” that “the response will be immediate” and “will lead to consequences they have never faced.”

Regardless of the personal qualities of Putin and Trump, there are areas where US and Russian interests inevitably overlap. One of these is the Arctic. The region isn’t mentioned in the US National Security Strategy, but it does feature in the National Defense Strategy : the “Homeland and Hemisphere” section states that the Pentagon “will provide the President with realistic options to ensure US military and commercial access to key areas from the Arctic to South America, particularly Greenland.”

Meanwhile, Putin is increasing Russia’s presence in the Arctic, where it produces a significant portion of its oil and gas. He is positioning Moscow as a key participant in the political debate around the region, hosting the International Arctic Forum last year.

Trump’s impulsive actions often diverge from his stated “America First” foreign policy, which sometimes affects Russian interests. For example, the Kremlin actively supported Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, not least because the military base in Tartus provided it with its only direct access to the Mediterranean. Now the future of this Russian base is in question, as Washington leans toward supporting the interim government of Ahmed al-Shara’a. How this situation will be resolved is impossible to predict.

The Chinese factor
There’s another factor that can’t be ignored: the People’s Republic of China. If Russia is an enigma, then China, as the saying goes, is fundamentally “incomprehensible.” Western observers find it difficult to fully understand a culture that developed virtually in isolation and relies on its own millennia-old traditions of governance and bureaucracy.

Nor can we ignore the radical transformation the Chinese state has undergone in just one generation. This year, the People’s Republic of China and the Communist Party of China celebrate their 77th anniversary; they were founded later than NATO. During the 25 years of communist rule, China’s population nearly doubled, from 550 million to 900 million. After 1978, Deng Xiaoping’s “economic miracle” fueled the country’s rapid modernization.

Today, China is the world’s second-largest economy , roughly two-thirds the size of the US. In 1987, when Donald Trump’s “second-favorite book after the Bible,” The Art of the Deal (which he had no involvement in writing, though his name is on the cover), was published, the Chinese economy ranked eighth in the world, accounting for less than 2% of global GDP.

How does China fit into Russian-American relations? The short answer is “with difficulty,” and this is precisely the position China is seeking. In May 2024, Vladimir Putin visited Beijing, where he and Xi Jinping signed the “Statement on Deepening the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership of Coordination Entering a New Era.” The document harmonized Russia and China’s positions on economic, technological, and political issues, and also provided Moscow with a valuable trade channel and source of resources.

The United States, for its part, clearly views China as its main geopolitical competitor. The US National Security Strategy states its intention to “rebalance economic relations with China toward reciprocity and fairness.” The document declares that “trade with China should be balanced and focused on non-sensitive areas.”

The desired outcome is stated as “maintaining a truly mutually beneficial economic relationship with Beijing,” but with the proviso that the United States maintains the upper hand. The strategy envisions, among other things, deterring any Chinese attempts to establish control over Taiwan—”ideally by maintaining military superiority.”

China can be considered neither an ally of Russia nor an adversary of the United States. Beijing positions itself as a third party, in no way subordinate to the other two players. Trump’s current rhetoric regarding China is cautionary but not hostile, emphasizing the potential benefits of maintaining economic ties.

In its relations with Russia, China undoubtedly positions itself as the senior partner. It has provided equipment to the Russian military, but, unlike North Korea, has not sent troops to Ukraine. Beijing is credited with helping deter Putin’s nuclear threats against the West, even though China is rapidly expanding its own nuclear capabilities.

In its relations with Russia, China certainly positions itself as a senior partner.
China is pursuing a policy of pragmatism. Beijing currently finds it convenient to support Moscow and take the lead in their “comprehensive strategic partnership.” However, it is unlikely to allow this relationship to affect its relations with the United States, which are currently open to coexistence in one form or another. While traditional rivals Russia and America continue their old standoff in a new format, China is choosing its own third path.

Both the United States and Russia want to remain global players with corresponding influence. America certainly has far greater resources to realize these ambitions, but the Kremlin, too, has no intention of isolating itself and ceding the initiative to Trump and his successors. Tensions between the two powers may rise or fall, but clashes of interest are inevitable. The challenge for a true politician is to predict where the next flare-up will occur.