South Asia Intelligence Review
Maharashtra: Terminal Phase
Maharashtra’s excellent performance in dealing with the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) remained visible through 2025. In order to push the Maoists further back in the state, the Maharashtra Legislative Assembly, on July 10, 2025, passed the Maharashtra Public Security Bill 2024, aimed at tackling the spread of radical Left-Wing Extremism (LWE) ideologies and CPI-Maoist influence in the state. Chief Minister Devendra Fadnavis, who introduced the bill, stated that it sought to ban individuals and organisations that promoted violence, engaged in guerrilla warfare, or attempted to destabilise the government through unlawful means. Fadnavis highlighted that the influence of the Maoist ideology had been reported in both the urban and rural regions of Maharashtra, particularly in districts like Gadchiroli and Konkan. The Bill is designed to address these threats, especially where existing laws like the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA) fall short, as UAPA is limited to direct terrorist activities. Under the new law, a three-member authority – comprising a sitting or retired High Court judge, a district magistrate, and a public prosecutor – will oversee case reviews before prosecution to ensure fair and transparent application.
On April 10, 2025, while bringing the Public Security Bill 2024, Devendra Fadnavis noted,
The law proposed by the Maharashtra government is more protective compared to those enacted by the four other states. In view of the ban on their operations in several parts of the country, many banned Maoist organisations have shifted their headquarters to Maharashtra, with their affiliated groups now operating in urban areas.
Meanwhile, according to partial data collated by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), 13 fatalities, two civilians, one Security Force (SF) trooper and 10 Maoists, were recorded through 2025 in Maharashtra. In 2024, there were 27 fatalities, including three civilians and 24 Maoists. 11 fatalities – five civilians and six Maoists – were recorded in 2023; while, seven fatalities – five civilians and two Maoists – were recorded in 2022. A high of 101 fatalities – 12 civilians, 52 SF personnel, and 37 Maoists – was registered in 2009, while a low of one fatality (civilian) was recorded in 2004. A total of 758 such killings – 206 civilians, 172 SF personnel, 368 Maoists and 12 in the NS category – have been registered since March 6, 2000, when SATP started documenting LWE-related violence across the country. In 2026, eight fatalities have already been recorded, including one SF trooper and seven Maoists (data till March 15, 2026).
SFs arrested 17 Maoists in 2025, in addition to nine such arrests in 2024, according to the SATP database. Since March 6, 2000, there have been 508 such arrests. Ongoing SF pressure also yielded the surrender of 103 Maoists in 2025, in addition to 19 such surrenders in 2024. There have been 415 such surrenders since March 6, 2000. On December 10, 2025, 11 senior CPI-Maoist cadres, including four ‘commanders’ with a combined bounty of INR 8.2 million, surrendered before State Police chief Rashmi Shukla in Gadchiroli District. Among the surrendered leaders were ‘divisional committee members (DVCMs)’ Ramesh aka Baju Lekami and Bhima aka Kiran Hidma Kowasi. Lekami, associated with the movement since 2004, served as president of the Edasgondi Gaon Panchayat ‘Janatana Sarkar’ (People’s Government of the Maoists) before becoming a divisional committee member in Bhamragad. Kowasi joined the Maoist ranks in 1998 and became a DVCM in 2019. Other surrendered Maoists included Poriye aka Lucky Adama Gota, Ratan aka Sanna Masu Oyam, Kamala aka Rago Iriya Veladi, Poriye aka Kumari Bhima Veladi, Ramaji aka Mura Lacchu Pungati, Sonu Podiyam aka Ajay Sanu Kato, Prakash aka Pandu Kundra Pungati, Sita aka Jaini Tonde Pallo, and Sainath Shankar Made.
Other parameters of violence also indicated a declining trend in Maoist activities in the State, as in all other Maoist-affected regions across the country. The State did not record any major incident (resulting in three or more fatalities) in 2025, as well as in 2024, 2023 and 2022. The last major incident was recorded on May 1, 2019, when at least 15 SF personnel of the C-60 Force, the Maharashtra Police counter-insurgency commando unit, and one civilian driver, were killed in an ambush by CPI-Maoist cadres, who triggered an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) on the Dadapur Road near Lendali Nullah in Jamburkheda village under Kurkheda Police Station limits in Gadchiroli District.
Further, the State did not record any incident of explosion in 2025, while one such incident of explosion was reported in 2024. On July 6, 2024, two troopers (jawans) of the C-60 troops suffered minor injuries in an IED attack by Maoists near Dodhraj Bhamragad Bridge in Gadchiroli District. The attack occurred while the C60 troops were conducting road search operations.
Incidents of exchange of fire between the rebels and SFs fell from six in 2024 to four in 2025. Overall Maoist-linked incidents fell from 35 in 2024 to 26 in 2025. Incidents of killing also fell from seven in 2024 to six in 2025.
SFs recovered arms and ammunition on seven occasions in 2025, in addition to 10 such recoveries in 2024 and six in 2023. The total number of recoveries since March 6, 2000, is 170. In the current year, three incidents of arms recovery have already been recorded (data till March 15, 2026).
The overall trend remains clearly downward. The absence of large-scale attacks, or coordinated ambushes indicates that the insurgency has lost much of its operational capability within the state.
Maoist violence in Maharashtra is almost entirely confined to Gadchiroli District. All fatalities recorded in 2025 occurred within this district, highlighting the complete marginalisation of insurgent activity elsewhere in the state. Arrests of Maoist overground workers have occasionally been reported in neighbouring districts such as Gondia, Chandrapur, and Nagpur, but these incidents primarily involve logistical networks rather than active armed units. Within Gadchiroli, insurgent activity remains concentrated in the Bhamragad-Etapalli belt, which forms part of the larger Dandakaranya Forest region extending into Chhattisgarh and Telangana. The expansion of road networks, new Police outposts, and improved communication infrastructure has significantly reduced Maoist freedom of movement in these areas. The establishment of new Security Force posts, including Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) in remote villages, has further restricted insurgent mobility.
In a significant development the Gram Panchayat of Yechali village under the Bhamragarh Taluka in Gadchiroli passed a resolution in July 2025 declaring gaonbandi – a complete ban on the entry of and support to Naxalites. A letter to this effect was formally handed over to officials at the Mannerajaram Police Station on August 7, 2025, during a Krishi Melava (agriculture fair) in the village. The villages in Bhamragarh, including Yechali, were once known as Naxalite strongholds, but for a few years now, several villages have been declaring gaonbandi. In 2024, seven tribal hamlets of Bhamragarh tehsil in the foothills of Abujhmarh also banned the CPI-Maoist from entering their villages. In February 2026, two villages (Kumurguda and Irpanar) in Bhamragarh also declared gaonbandi against the Maoists.
The National Investigation Agency (NIA) has also played an important role in dismantling Maoist networks linked to Maharashtra. On January 2, 2025, the agency had filed a chargesheet against four persons in connection with the November 2023 killing of an alleged ‘police informer’, Dinesh Pusu Gawade, in Gadchiroli. An NIA statement noted, “They had kidnapped and killed Gawade on suspicion of being a police informer and a member of RSS [Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh].” Later in the year, on December 20, 2025, NIA arrested two absconding Maoists in connection with the Gawade murder case. The arrested accused were identified as Raghu aka Pratap aka Irpa aka Mudella aka Sailu, a resident of Nizamabad District in Telangana, and Shankar Mahaka of Gadchiroli District in Maharashtra. NIA also re-registered a case relating to a Maoist training camp conspiracy linked to the Sundaropahari region in Gadchiroli District. These investigations were part of a broader national effort to identify and dismantle the financial and logistical networks that sustain the Maoist insurgency across multiple states.
The trajectory of the Maoist insurgency in Maharashtra suggests that the movement is approaching its final phase within the state. The combination of sustained security pressure, a highly effective surrender policy, and an expanding security, administrative and welfare infrastructure in remote tribal regions has steadily eroded the organisational strength of the CPI-Maoist. On May 28, 2025, Maoist ‘commander’ Nagasu Tumareti aka Girdhar, who surrendered before the Chief Minister of Maharashtra, advised fellow cadres:
No place in the whole of India is safe for you; the fort of Abhujmadh has collapsed. Put down your weapons, surrender and live with dignity like us. Now that new youth are not joining the Maoist ranks, the Maoists are not getting the support of the people. In such a situation, the Maoists should be aware of the situation and take the right decision.
The unprecedented wave of surrenders during 2025 dealt a severe blow to the insurgent leadership structure, while the absence of major attacks demonstrates the diminishing operational capability of remaining cadres.
Nevertheless, residual threats persist. On August 11, 2025, an unnamed senior Mumbai Police officer claimed that the existence of “urban Naxals” cannot be denied, though they were being monitored. Police teams maintain strict vigil and take appropriate action, and were alert and monitoring movements of SUCH “urban Naxals”, the officer added. Earlier, on July 22, 2025, Maharashtra Chief Minister Devendra Fadnavis alleged that “urban Naxals” from outside the state were using foreign funds to spread rumours and keep the people of Gadchiroli away from the path of development. Fadnavis cautioned that, at a time when the number of gun-wielding Naxalites was shrinking, “urban Naxalism” was on the rise: “We need to be alert about ‘urban Naxals,’ who are spreading false information.” Further, cross-border linkages with insurgent formations in neighbouring states also indicated that the risk of sporadic violence could not entirely be discounted.
Maharashtra’s continued critical gaps in strength and quality in the State Police Force meant to fight against any kind of internal challenge, remain a concern. According to the latest Bureau of Police Research and Development (BPR&D) data, as on January 1, 2024, the sanctioned strength for the States’ Police was 237,488, but only 207,035 personnel were in position, yielding a vacancy of 30,453 (12.82 percent). Police personnel per 100,000 population in Maharashtra currently stand at a sanctioned 187.07, while those actually available were 163.08. The Police/Area Ratio (number of policemen per 100 square kilometers) for Maharashtra is 67.28, marginally higher than the national average of 65.78. Both the State and national averages on the Police/Area ratio are well below their sanctioned strength, at 77.18 and 83.81, respectively. Further, of a sanctioned strength of 317 apex Indian Police Service (IPS) Officers in the State, 18 posts remained vacant. At least 11 out of 1,193 Police Stations had no telephones and 55 had no wireless/mobiles.
Looking ahead, sustained counter-insurgency operations, improved intelligence coordination, and continued socio-economic development in tribal areas would help consolidate the gains secured thus far.
If current trends continue, Maharashtra may soon emerge as one of the first states to effectively eliminate the Maoist insurgency as a significant security threat. However, vigilance will remain necessary to ensure that the hard-won stability of recent years is preserved and that the region transitions fully from conflict toward lasting peace and development.
Meghalaya: Residual troubles
Meghalaya has remained one of the relatively stable states in India’s Northeast in terms of insurgency and internal security, particularly when compared with neighbouring states such as Manipur, Nagaland and Assam. Over the past decade, the security situation has improved considerably as militant groups have weakened due to sustained counter-insurgency operations, arrests, surrenders and the implementation of peace accords. Nevertheless, the state continues to experience residual insurgent activity, extortion networks, cross-border linkages and occasional law-and-order disturbances. These developments indicate that, while the insurgency has significantly declined, the security environment remains fragile and requires continued vigilance by state and central security agencies.
According to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), Meghalaya has not recorded any insurgency-related fatalities since September 14, 2021, when an Over Ground Worker (OGW) associated with the United Achik Liberation Army (UALA) and A’chik Songna An’pachakgipa Kotok (ASAK) was killed near Tura in the West Garo Hills District. The last civilian fatality occurred on May 12-13, 2019, when a villager near the Indo-Bangladesh border in Lapalang village of East Khasi Hills District was killed by insurgents. The most recent Security Force (SF) fatality dates back to February 18, 2018, when a National Congress Party (NCP) candidate and two security personnel were killed in an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) attack at Samanda in the East Garo Hills District. These figures underline the sharp decline in insurgency-related violence in the state over the past decade.
Historically, Meghalaya experienced intense insurgent violence during the 1990s. The state recorded its peak insurgency in 1997, when a total of 495 fatalities were reported. Civilian fatalities reached their highest level in 1993 with 266 deaths, while SF fatalities peaked in 1997 with 111 personnel killed. Fatalities remained in triple digits between 1992 and 2000, reflecting intense militant activity during that period. However, since the early 2000s, violence gradually declined, as SFs intensified counter-insurgency operations and several militant groups weakened or entered into peace processes. Fatality levels dropped into double digits between 2001 and 2016, and declined further, since.
Over the past nine years, from 2017 to 2025, Meghalaya recorded a total of 18 insurgency-related fatalities. Eight deaths were recorded in 2017, seven in 2018, one in 2019 and two in 2021, while five years – 2020, 2022, 2023, 2024 and 2025 – recorded no such fatalities. Among militant groups active during this period, the now-defunct Garo National Liberation Army was linked to 13 of the 18 fatalities. The Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council (HNLC) and UALA were each linked to two fatalities, while one incident was attributed to the National Democratic Front of Bodoland-Saraigowra (NDFB-S).
Arrests and surrenders of militants played an important role in reducing insurgent capabilities. Meghalaya recorded two insurgent arrests in a single incident in 2026. In 2025, there were 11 such arrests in six separate incidents, while in 2024, 27 insurgents were arrested in 13 separate incidents. Since 2000, Meghalaya has recorded a total of 1,816 insurgent arrests across 836 incidents. In terms of surrenders, the state recorded two surrenders in a single incident in 2025, two surrenders in two incidents in 2024, and six surrenders in two incidents in 2023. Since 2001, Meghalaya has recorded a total of 610 insurgent surrenders in 244 incidents.
The principal insurgent organisation still operating in Meghalaya is HNLC, which claims to represent the interests of the Khasi-Jaintia communities. The group has historically advocated greater autonomy or self-determination for the Hynniewtrep region and has been involved in extortion, intimidation and occasional acts of sabotage. Although its operational strength has declined significantly, the outfit continues to maintain a limited network of cadres and sympathisers. Intelligence estimates suggest that the organisation currently has around 15 to 20 active cadres, with some senior cadres reportedly operating from bases in Bangladesh, particularly in the Maulvi Bazar region.
HNLC has been banned under the provisions of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA) since 2000, and the ban has been periodically extended by the Union Government. The organisation remains under scrutiny due to its involvement in extortion, recruitment and propaganda activities. Between November 2019 and June 2024, authorities registered 48 cases against HNLC and arrested 73 cadres and associates. Security agencies have also recovered arms and explosives during several operations targeting the group. The outfit has increasingly relied on digital communication platforms and messaging applications to threaten businessmen and collect extortion money.
In recent years, HNLC has also attempted to revive its ideological narrative through public statements and propaganda. In January 2025, the group released a new manifesto outlining its demands for recognition of a semi-sovereign status for the Hynniewtrep people. The document accused the Government of India (GoI) of violating historical agreements related to the region’s accession and called for direct dialogue to address issues relating to autonomy, land rights and cultural identity. While such statements indicate the persistence of separatist rhetoric, the organisation’s operational capacity remains limited.
Attempts to initiate peace negotiations between the government and HNLC have been made periodically. The Meghalaya government has repeatedly appealed to the group to engage in dialogue and abandon violence. However, peace talks collapsed in early 2024, due to disagreements over key demands and the framework of negotiations. Following the breakdown of talks, the outfit appears to have reverted to low-intensity activities such as extortion and propaganda, rather than large-scale militant attacks. Security agencies remain alert to the possibility of the group attempting to regroup or recruit new members.
Despite the overall decline in insurgent violence, isolated incidents linked to militant networks continue. On December 15, 2025, an IED exploded at the premises of a private company in East Jaintia Hills District. Although no casualties were reported, the incident triggered a security alert. On December 18, 2025, Meghalaya Police arrested two HNLC OGWs in connection with the explosion. The suspects reportedly confessed to planting the device, demonstrating that the organisation retains the capability to stage occasional disruptive actions.
Security agencies have also intercepted attempts by smaller militant factions to revive their activities. On November 2, 2025, SFs arrested five suspected cadres, including a minor, belonging to the regrouped faction of the Garo National Liberation Army (GNLA) in South West Khasi Hills District. The arrests followed an extortion complaint filed by a businessman who had reportedly received threats and demands for money. The swift action by SFs prevented the emergence of a new extortion network and highlighted the continuing efforts by authorities to prevent any resurgence of militancy.
Apart from insurgent activity, Meghalaya has also experienced occasional law-and-order disturbances linked to political tensions and local grievances. One such incident occurred between March 9-10, 2026, in West Garo Hills District, when violence erupted during the nomination process for elections to the Garo Hills Autonomous District Council. Tensions began escalating on March 9, after protests broke out over the eligibility of certain candidates contesting the council elections. The situation deteriorated further on March 10, when clashes erupted between protesters and SFs in the Chibinang area. Security personnel opened fire to disperse the violent crowd, resulting in the death of two persons. Following the incident, authorities imposed a curfew, suspended internet services and deployed additional SFs, including Army units conducting flag marches, to restore normalcy. The Meghalaya Government subsequently postponed the council elections due to the deteriorating security situation.
Another development that raised security concerns occurred on January 29, 2026, when a threat poster purportedly issued in the name of the Islamic State (IS) was discovered in Tura town. The poster ordered members of the Garo community in several areas of West Garo Hills to vacate their land before 2027, or face consequences. Authorities have not been able to verify the authenticity of the message, and investigations are underway to determine whether the use of the group’s name was intended to spread panic or provoke communal tensions.
Cross-border dynamics continue to play an important role in shaping the security landscape in Meghalaya. The state shares a 443 kilometre international border with Bangladesh, much of which remains porous and difficult to fence due to challenging terrain. The porous nature of the border has historically facilitated the movement of militants, arms and contraband goods. Smuggling of commodities such as betel nut, cattle and narcotics remains a persistent challenge for security agencies operating along the frontier. Thus, for instance, Border Security Force (BSF) data indicates frequent seizures of contraband along the Meghalaya-Bangladesh border. In 2025 alone, SFs confiscated over 750 heads of cattle and contraband worth about INR 117 million, including narcotics such as Yaba tablets and cannabis, during anti-smuggling operations. In addition, earlier enforcement actions recovered 11,435 Yaba tablets, more than 7,500 bottles of Phensedyl cough syrup and about 31 kilograms of cannabis from the border region, underscoring the continuing use of the corridor for narcotics trafficking. Moreover, militant leaders based in Bangladesh have occasionally used cross-border networks to coordinate activities inside Meghalaya. As a result, border management and intelligence cooperation continue to remain critical components of the state’s security strategy.
The Meghalaya government has also focused on consolidating peace processes involving former militant groups. A notable example is the implementation of the tripartite peace accord signed in 2014 with the Achik National Volunteer Council (ANVC) and its breakaway faction. In September 2025, the state government held a high-level review meeting with former leaders of these organisations to assess the progress of the agreement. Officials indicated that approximately 50 to 60 per cent of the commitments under the accord had been fulfilled, while the remaining provisions were under implementation. These include development projects, rehabilitation packages for surrendered militants and initiatives aimed at improving infrastructure and governance in the Garo Hills region.
Overall, the situation in Meghalaya in 2026 can be characterised as one of residual militancy within an otherwise stable security environment. The dramatic decline in fatalities over the past decade reflects the combined impact of sustained counter-insurgency operations, intelligence-led policing, arrests, surrenders and peace agreements. However, the presence of small militant networks, attempts by dormant outfits to regroup, and the continued influence of insurgent leaders operating from across the international border, indicate that the possibility of limited militant activity cannot be entirely ruled out. Sporadic incidents such as extortion attempts, small-scale explosions or propaganda campaigns may continue, even in the absence of large-scale violence. Continued coordination between SFs, effective implementation of peace accords and sustained socio-economic development will therefore remain essential to ensuring that the state does not witness any resurgence of insurgency in the coming years.