Recalibrating Euro-Atlantic Security Priorities In The Indo-Pacific Decade – Analysis
As war rages in Ukraine, the logical step for the United States has been to revitalize its security cooperation with NATO. This is the project that President Joe Biden’s administration has skillfully orchestrated since February 2022.
But waiting in the wings of the Euro-Atlantic alliance—and requiring renewed clarity and focus—is America’s pacing threat of China.
This is the belief which many in Washington harbor—notably among certain quarters of the current GOP foreign policy establishment and even, to a lesser extent, a growing number of Democratic elites—that China, not Russia, is the greater challenge to Western interests, and consequently, that Asia, not Europe, should be America’s primary focus.
Theirs is a cogent assessment, one backed by significant assertions of Chinese power and mounting evidence of Beijing’s aggressive intent. Exhibit A should be new British intelligence claiming that “lethal aid is now, or will be, flowing from China to Russia and into Ukraine,” and US confirmation that China is already providing weapons components to Russia.
This community of so-called Asia “prioritizers” is here to stay. Though sometimes described pejoratively as Asia First-ers, they carry broad bipartisan appeal in Washington. Biden’s own National Defense Strategy, released eight months after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, distinguishes between Moscow as presenting “serious, continuing risks in key areas,” and Beijing’s actions—from gunboat diplomacy in the South China Sea, to debt-trap diplomacy across Southeast Asia, Latin America, and Africa—as representing perhaps “[t]he most comprehensive and serious challenge to US national security.” Furthermore, the Biden administration is staffed by an essential figure in the Asia prioritizers camp: Kurt Campbell, a key architect of former President Barack Obama’s pivot to Asia who most recently served as the Indo-Pacific coordinator on the Biden National Security Council. Campbell’s elevation to the role of US Deputy Secretary of State earlier this February affirms the gravity of Washington’s shifting focus from the Middle East and Europe to the Indo-Pacific.
Whoever occupies the White House in January 2025, the Asia First outlook will continue to permeate US priorities in Europe and most certainly determine the future of Ukraine. Elbridge Colby, another prominent Asia prioritizer, who oversaw development of former President Donald Trump’s 2018 National Defense Strategy and whose name has been floated as a possible candidate for a crucial role in a future Republican administration, has been typecast as a critic of unconditional US support for Ukraine. Colby’s recent comments urging an imminent shift to deterring China around Taiwan should not be construed to signal any rationalization of a sudden decision to abandon Ukraine, but to spur a serious dialogue with European allies about building a more robust and self-sufficient Euro-Atlantic alliance essential for long-term stability against Russian aggression. Therefore, in the spirit of jumpstarting the kind of frank discussion that Colby’s remarks may be intended to elicit, Atlanticists from Brussels to London should set aside their fears of the Asia prioritizers to seek constructive, practical terms with them, regardless of who wins the next US election in November.
First, Atlanticists must recognize that Asia prioritizers are not weak isolationists, and should not be dismissed as such, an argument recently articulated by my colleague Mohammed Soliman. Rather, Asia prioritizers believe that the Indo-Pacific matters most for long-term US interests and thus, that the US Congress should not let Ukraine aid get in the way of enhanced support for Taiwan, that lawmakers should spare no expense for floundering efforts like the Pacific Deterrence Initiative, and that senior officials should not let events in Europe dictate preparations for the long-term strategic relationship-building and partner capability integration needed in Washington’s priority theater. In short, Asia prioritizers like Soliman rejectthe premise of merging the Indo-Pacific and Europe as one unified theater because of the divergent interests and resource trade-offs necessary––not to mention the decisive role of a multifarious group of smaller powers caught in the middle––for such an effort to be successful.
Second, Atlanticists must learn to appreciate that the United States cannot in the long-run afford to continue bankrolling NATO defense at the expense of Indo-Pacific security. Asia prioritizers, like most Americans, acknowledge that Russia’s violations of Ukrainian sovereignty have been unprovoked, brutal, and criminal. They support a strong and stable NATO capable of fully deterring Moscow from further incursions against European security. But going forward, US defense outlays for NATO must begin to be paired with equivalent or greater US investments in Indo-Pacific security. Consequently, US military aid for Ukraine cannot be expected to underwrite the over 120 billion euros in additional defense spending that experts project will be needed for Ukraine’s victory. A significant portion of that difference will need to come from Europe. As European countries increase their contributions to NATO security, US defense budgets should gradually reflect a greater prioritization of the Indo-Pacific. To avoid European frustration with US transactionalism, close coordination to accommodate this new balance of priorities should focus on furthering the concept of a shared Euro-Atlantic dividend from supporting Indo-Pacific security.
Finally, in return for Europe stepping up its NATO support, the United States must more seriously weigh and address the disruptive economic and societal impacts of the war in Ukraine. To date, Europe has borne the brunt of the war’s spillover consequences, which include a refugee crisis, energy shortages, food insecurity, high inflation, and strained social services. The United States has also experienced inflationary pressures, but Europe’s proximity to the conflict and greater dependence on Russian energy has led to more severe and chronic effects. As Europe progresses its military aid for Ukraine and investment in NATO, US policymakers should consider new and innovative ways of helping their European counterparts build economic resilience.
US economic support for Europe may range from energy assistance, in the form of increased exports of US-manufactured natural gas and investments in European energy storage infrastructure, to new economic subsidies and incentives for US businesses to invest in European sustainable energy and other technology projects. Strengthening trade agreements to facilitate smoother, more robust Euro-Atlantic trade flows, reducing tariffs, easing regulatory burdens, and introducing reciprocal exemptions to Buy American and Buy European policies, could also fuel economic growth.
Other novel ideas for building collective resilience may involve investing in European smart cities, transportation, and digital infrastructure––all designed with improvements to Euro-Atlantic quality-of-life in mind. Establishing joint innovation zones for emerging technologies such as AI, quantum computing, and biotechnology––where US and European companies each have much to offer the other––may afford further relief from current economic pressures. Where appropriate, emerging minilateral technology frameworks, such as the US-European Union Trade and Technology Council and the Global AI Safety Summit, should be leveraged to assemble innovative companies from across the Euro-Atlantic to develop new regulatory approaches for harnessing these advanced technologies. More importantly, these initiatives could be used to enhance supply chain security and market stability by strengthening coordination to reduce single-source dependencies for critical technologies and identify potential supply bottlenecks sooner.
Europe is right to worry that Washington’s transition to a primary focus on the Indo-Pacific will not be seamless, or that increased European defense spending may not entirely fill the resultant US-sized gap in NATO expenditures. But as the United States necessarily renews its pivot to the Indo-Pacific, it will be crucial to consider the broader implications for both US and European interests in that region. This shift will not be merely about reallocating limited resources, but about redefining the Euro-Atlantic relationship in a way that acknowledges, prepares for, and invests in the future geostrategic and economic architecture. To overcome the likely political headwinds and budgetary pressures imposed by this rebalancing, Europe’s increased investment in its own defense capabilities will need to be matched by a concerted effort from the United States to buttress the eurozone’s economic resilience. This support can take many forms, but the key will be fostering a more mutually beneficial partnership. With time, once Ukraine reaches a new modus vivendi in Europe, the concept of a shared Euro-Atlantic responsibility for Indo-Pacific security can and must become a cornerstone of combined planning between Washington and Brussels.