The Afghanistan Papers and the Future of Peace with the Taliban

In February 2020, the STRATEGIECS Research and Analysis Department prepared a study looking at the future of the US-Taliban peace agreement, based on an assessment of the overall internal situation in Afghanistan. The study was part of a broader project to prepare the 2020 Outlook Report, similar to the previous edition , but the outbreak of the Corona pandemic and the resonance it received in research and media led to the suspension of work on this project.

With “local” peace negotiations between the Afghan government and the Taliban starting in September 2020, and US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo meeting representatives from both sides in November and calling for “accelerated discussions on a political roadmap and a permanent and comprehensive ceasefire,” STRATEGIECS is republishing its forward-looking study, “The Afghanistan Papers and the Future of Peace with the Taliban,” to provide Afghan file observers with a near-complete picture of the circumstances and complexities surrounding the Afghan scene.

Internally, the report anticipated the difficulty of transferring the external agreement (the Washington-Taliban agreement) to the internal level (the Afghan government and the Taliban). The Taliban does not want to grant the Afghan government the legitimacy of recognition through a serious agreement on a formula for sharing power. The Afghan government is also hesitant to show flexibility with a party involved in cases of killing civilians and soldiers, so as not to appear in a weak position that is lenient in making concessions.

The inefficiency of official structures still dominates Afghan-Afghan interactions amidst multiple power centers. Socially, some tribes enjoy almost absolute authority in their geographical areas, and politically, Kabul lacks a central power capable of imposing its sovereignty over political decisions. Many political parties and figures may not agree with the orientations of the Afghan presidency or may seek to obstruct efforts to achieve Afghan-Afghan reconciliation.

All of this casts a shadow over the current, almost faltering talks, and much of this faltering may be due to the major turning point of the Washington-Taliban agreement. The agreement gave the Taliban “international legitimacy” and the confidence of the victor at the expense of the official government, which was not fully integrated into the Washington-Taliban negotiations. The movement insists that “a foreign party” not interfere in the internal talks. Therefore, the agreement signed in February did not include a comprehensive cessation of violence across all of Afghanistan, but only a cessation of mutual violence with US forces and the start of local negotiations in which a comprehensive cessation of violence would be reached.

BBC quoted official Afghan statistics as saying that 12,000 civilians were killed from February to September, which means that the Afghan talks are at their most intense. The negotiations are merely an extension of the war, and what happens at the negotiating table will be a reflection of what happened in the field of disputes. Therefore, the various Afghan parties will show strength and steadfastness in their positions in the coming stage.

The differences in positions are evident on key issues, such as the Taliban’s insistence on following the Hanafi school of thought as a basis for dialogue and facilitating the country’s affairs, while the government demands the addition of the Jaafari school of thought to ensure representation of minorities such as the Shiites, who constitute 20% of the population. The dispute is also raging on issues related to women, human rights, litigation mechanisms, and the release of dangerous security detainees.

Externally, the Afghan situation may be less ambiguous. What the Taliban wants from Washington in terms of withdrawing its forces has been agreed upon and a timeframe has been set for it. As for what Washington wants, it is limited to ensuring that its withdrawal does not cause a security vacuum that would further shake the balance of power at the expense of the legitimate government, its ally in its “previous” fight against the Taliban.

The US intelligence community may be seeking to formulate a “practical” formula that separates the ideological extremist wing from the wing that accepts the political process as a framework for organizing public life. In this regard, Afghanistan – even if the last American soldier withdraws – will remain under US surveillance to prevent Afghan territory from becoming an exporter of cross-border terrorism.

One of the unlikely scenarios included in the report “The Afghanistan Papers and the Future of Peace with the Taliban” is the return of American forces once again after Afghanistan has become a fertile environment for terrorism. However, the consensus among American elites on the need to raise combat readiness to confront major challenges emanating from China and Russia may prevent an intensive deployment of American forces in Afghanistan.

The Biden administration is not expected to go against what the Obama and Trump administrations have started on the Afghan file, as getting rid of the burden of Afghanistan is a concern and priority for American foreign policy. Previous statements by officials proposed by Biden to fill senior sovereign positions have shown that they will continue efforts to bring American soldiers back from Afghanistan and other conflict zones.

But it is expected that this return will not be a surprise without coordination with the Afghan government, which was “shocked” by what US President Donald Trump tweeted in October 2020 about the return of all US forces from Afghanistan by Christmas, which was later clarified and indirectly retracted.

Kabul fears that a substantial withdrawal of US forces will be implemented before a binding agreement is reached with the Taliban, as such a move would deprive the official negotiator of an important “incentive” and a key pressure card in negotiations with the Taliban.

NATO also fears a sudden US withdrawal, which would have security implications and leave it alone on the mission ground. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg confirmed this fact in a press briefing following Trump’s announcement that US forces would be withdrawn by Christmas, saying: “We have decided together to go to Afghanistan. We will proceed together with the adjustments to the forces and we will leave the country together at the appropriate time.” According to the NATO meeting schedule, the defense ministers of the alliance countries will meet in February 2021, and the future of the mission in Afghanistan will be on the agenda. The Biden administration is expected to agree with NATO allies on a joint working formula that includes a coordinated withdrawal from Afghanistan that takes into account the interests and requirements of the Afghan government.

More details on Afghan entanglements at home and abroad are available in the report “The Afghanistan Papers and the Future of Peace with the Taliban” which can be downloaded from the link at the top of the page.