How Effective Is The Latest China-India Border Patrol Agreement? – Analysis
Indian media has recently reported that the Indian Ministry of External Affairs stated that China and India have reached an agreement on issues concerning border areas. Indian Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri said on October 21 that Indian and Chinese diplomatic and military negotiators have been in close contact with each other, reaching the agreement “on patrolling arrangements along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the India-China border areas, leading to disengagement and a resolution of the issues that had arisen in these areas in 2020”.
On the same day, Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar also stated in an interview with New Delhi Television that the situation along the China-India border has returned to its 2020 status and that both sides have completed the disengagement. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian has also confirmed at a regular press conference that the two countries have reached a solution regarding border issues and that China will work with India to implement the agreement.
In response, some commentaries in China pointed out that the achievement of this agreement signifies a major improvement in China-India relations. Relevant analyses suggest that India has a high economic dependence on China, and since 2020, a series of measures targeting Chinese companies and capital have harmed India’s own economic interests. Additionally, India faces various disputes and conflicts with the West on issues such as human rights, and it needs to improve its relationship with China and strengthen cooperation to cope with Western pressure. While these analyses have their merits, their projection of the effectiveness of the latest China-India border patrol agreement may be overly optimistic, as the actual impact of it is likely to be relatively limited.
First of all, from India’s perspective, its basic positioning as a regional hegemon means that it is unlikely to see substantial easing in its relationship with China. In previous analyses, ANBOUND’s founder Kung Chan noted that the future world will exhibit a situation of coexisting regional hegemons, with India being the undisputed dominant power in the South Asian subcontinent. In terms of India’s strategic understanding and positioning, it seeks to maintain decisive authority over South Asian affairs (primarily involving India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, etc.), comprehensively strengthen its influence over Southeast Asian matters (including Cambodia, Myanmar, and Vietnam), gradually expand its voice in Central Asian affairs, and, on this basis, enhance its control over global issues. This has been India’s consistent strategic positioning and aspiration. However, in key interest regions such as the South Asian subcontinent and Southeast Asia, China maintains considerable influence.
Furthermore, in the Indian Ocean region, after years of sustained efforts, China has significantly expanded its influence in the Maldives and Sri Lanka, which has made India feel increasingly uncomfortable. To consolidate and strengthen its position as a regional hegemon, India feels that it must effectively diminish or even expel China’s actual influence in order to feel truly secure. This necessity also determines that, in the long term (10-15 years), Indian nationalism will primarily target China rather than other countries. The border issue is one of the focal points of the structural conflict in China-India relations, but not the entirety of it. Thus, a reduction in border tensions may not necessarily lead to sustained improvement in bilateral relations.
Additionally, in recent years, India has increasingly intervened in territorial and maritime sovereignty disputes surrounding China to strengthen its position in the confrontation with it. This has been achieved through military cooperation, equipment transfers, and other means, as well as through escalating its involvement in Taiwan-related matters. Recently, India also allowed the Taiwanese authorities to establish a third representative office in India. Based on India’s understanding of its strategic position and its persistent strategic aspirations, these actions that challenge China’s core national interests are unlikely to see substantial changes in the future. This further complicates the possibility of a meaningful easing in China-India relations.
Secondly, strengthening cooperation with the West will be a long-term focus of India’s foreign relations. In the lead-up to and following the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Western countries have made significant investments to draw India into their efforts against China and Russia, and the conflict has further accelerated this process. Through exchanges between governments and businesses, the West has continuously enhanced cooperation with India in various areas, including technology transfer, scientific collaboration, and financial support, with the U.S. government even greenlighting the transfer of crucial aircraft engine technology. The U.S. has also led a group of Western countries in gradually strengthening cooperation with India in key mineral sectors. As India deepens its collaboration with the West, even in military areas where India has long relied on Russia, U.S. and French military equipment is beginning to gradually replace Russian-made equipment in the Indian armed forces.
The influx of Western technology, businesses, and capital has provided tangible benefits to India, evident in several surges in the Indian stock market. While U.S. and Canadian politicians do exert pressure on India regarding human rights, the West generally downplays significant incidents, such as the Sikh assassination incidents. This situation is underpinned by India’s insistence on a confrontational stance against China, which aligns with its strategic positioning and needs. As India continues to strengthen its cooperation with the West, this dynamic makes substantial improvement in India-China relations unlikely.
Thirdly, India’s economic and trade dependence on China should not be overstated. In recent years, Western economic and trade cooperation with India has become increasingly prominent. According to a report from the Global Trade Research Initiative (GTRI) published in August, while China remains India’s largest trading partner for the 2023-2024 fiscal year, the United States has surpassed China as India’s top trading partner from January to June 2024, with total trade reaching USD 62.5 billion, a year-on-year increase of 5.3%.
Furthermore to the significant and growing trade deficit with China, India continues to express strong criticism of its economic and trade relations with China. India’s economic ties with China are not solely advantageous for Chinese companies. As the degree of competition in China’s domestic market deepens and profit growth slows, particularly amid weakening economic and consumption trends in China, the Indian market with its younger demographic and increasing consumption capacity, has become increasingly attractive to Chinese firms. Notably, despite facing multiple challenges since 2020, companies like Xiaomi have remained committed to the Indian market. While Indian businesses rely on China for raw materials, parts, and certain technologies, Chinese companies also recognize the value and necessity of the Indian market.
Final analysis conclusion:
The recent agreement and implementation of the China-India border patrol protocol will indeed help to ease tensions along the border and improve bilateral relations. However, based on the various reasons mentioned earlier, the extent of this improvement is limited, and its duration may not be long-lasting. For Chinese companies and capital, there may be a window of opportunity in the Indian market. However, for trade and economic projects that require long-term commitment and significant investment, the Chinese side will still need to remain cautious.