Geopolitical Implications Of Yunus’s Visit To China – Analysis
Introduction:
China sees South Asia as its immediate neighborhood and a zone of influence. The rise of China is altering the traditional international norms and systems. Bangladesh’s geopolitical location dictates her foreign policy makers to treat India as a significant player in the South Asia. However, South Asia on the eve of the 1971 Bangladesh Crisis was “an area of intense diplomatic activity and conflicting alignment. Big Powers like the United States, Soviet Union and China somehow directly or indirectly were caught up in this fray, along with the two regional powers.
In recent years China has made significant gains in countries such as Myanmar, Nepal, and Bangladesh. In so doing it has eroded some of the historic advantages that India enjoyed in these countries. The idea that is driving the twenty-first century is not the traditional view of geopolitics in a zero-sum game but connectivity that Parag Khanna has developed in his 2016 book titled, Connectography. Bangladesh is locked by India on three sides with a small border with Myanmar and a southward opening towards the Bay of Bengal has made Bangladeshi experts call it an ‘India-locked’ nation. (1) Bangladesh-China bilateral relations developed in 1975, four years after Bangladesh emerged as a sovereign country. The Cold War politics and polarity, however, are deeply tied to the birth of Bangladesh. (2)
Bangladesh’s Importance to China
In general, geographical location, resource endowment, population size and socio-economic-cultural orientation of a people define the importance of a state. In terms of geographical location, Bangladesh is at the northern tip of the Bay of Bengal, which is not very far from one of the busiest sea lanes of the world, and it is a bridge between South and Southeast Asia. Also, Bangladesh is one of the fastest growing economies among the least developed countries with a population of 175 million.
China and India are longstanding rivals, but their rivalry has intensified in recent years since the former announced the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013. The formal inception of the project began in 2013 when the Chinese president Xi Jinping unveiled it during his visit to Kazakhstan. In a speech at Kazakhstan’s Nazarbayev University on 7 September 2013, he proposed the building of a Silk Road Economic Belt Road to expand the Eurasian economic cooperation. Again, in his visit to Indonesia, a Southeast Asian country, he proposed the concept of the twenty-first century maritime silk road. More precisely, the Belt and Road Initiative consists of two components: land-based silk road economic belt; and sea-based the twenty-first century maritime road. (3)
There are growing tensions along the China-India border as these two emerging powers compete for regional hegemony. Bangladesh needs to craft its own strategy of handing issues of the Indo-Pacific and quad alliances. Quadrilateral security dialogue or quad brings together four countries – India, Australia, Japan, and the United States, with a commitment to work as a force for global good and to support a free and open Indo-Pacific that is prosperous and resilient.
A New Chapter in Bangladesh-China Relations
The visit of Chief Adviser professor Muhammad Yunus to China from March 26 to 29 is more than a visit in the traditional sense. During this visit, Dr. Yunus clearly pointed out the significance and prospects of Bangladesh-China relationship. The visit demonstrates a strong departure from previous deposed Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s pro-Indian foreign policy and displays pro-China tilt. What makes the visit memorable and underscores its diplomatic significance is China’s gesture: a special chartered flight offered by President Xi Jinping to take Yunus to Beijing. This reflects the goodwill and positive gesture from the top Chinese leadership. Addressing a roundtable discussion in Beijing on March 28, Professor Yunus had tried to convince Chinese businesses to set up industries in Bangladesh and export to the rest of the world and even China by taking advantage of the country’s seaway. He said,
“Seven Sisters of India are a landlocked region — they have no way to reach the ocean. We are the only guardian of the ocean for all of this region. This opens up a huge possibility.” (4)
Lalmonirhat is strategically located in northwestern Bangladesh, closer to Jalpaiguri and Coachbehar districts of West Bengal. The Chicken’s Neck is geographically closer to the area.It is a narrow stretch of land in West Bengal that connects the northeastern states to the rest of India and is bordered by Nepal, Bangladesh, Bhutan and China. The Indian military has a strong presence in the area. China intends to build an airfield in Bangladesh’s Lalmonirhat district which will emerge as a challenge for New Delhi’s security interests along the eastern border, including the Chicken’s Neck area. China is also willing to build an airbase in Bangladesh’s Lalmonirhat district (The Economic Times, Mumbai, April 06, 2025).
Yunus met the Chinese president Xi Jinping and sought a 50-year master plan from Beijing for the management of Bangladesh’s river water management including that of the Teesta. Bangladesh welcomed the Chinese companies to participate in the Mongla Port Modernization and Expansion Project. As a result, China has reportedly agreed to provide approximately $400 for the modernization of the Mongla Port, $ 350 million for the development of the China Industrial Economic Zone, and another $100 million as technical assistance. Some Chinese companies are coming into the land of Bangladesh for economic investments. China has expressed interest in establishing a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in Mongla to expand trade relations and increase investment flows, according to the Bangladesh Investment Development Authority (Bida). The Chinese government and businesses committed $2.1 billion in loans, investments, and grants to Bangladesh during Chief Adviser Prof Muhammad Yunus’s visit to China. Additionally, $1 billion in development funding from the New Development Bank (NDB), a multilateral development bank established by the BRICS states, is under discussion for 2025. Bangladesh under Yunus has assumed the Chairmanship of the BRICS in the latest meeting in Thailand.
The remarks made by Dr. Yunus, however, created a lot of reactions and discussion in the Indian print electronic media. (5) In turn, Dhaka made it very clear that Dr. Yunus made the comment on seven sisters with honest intention. The unresolved water sharing dispute about the Teesta and Feni River is a major issue of contentious politics between Bangladesh and India.
Politics of Great Power Competition
The signing of Indo-US nuclear agreement, in March 2006, has been a breakthrough in the bilateral relationship between India and the United States with far reaching security implications for South Asia and beyond. After long years of cost benefit analyses and a complex process of negotiations, India and the US have forged a strategic partnership that includes exchange of nuclear technology, which even in the recent past has been almost unthinkable. The United States of America wants to check the rise of China by means of strategic partnership with India. It is also to be noted that China has border disputes with India. Since the birth of the two nations in the Great Divide of 1947, both India and Pakistan are rival and engaged in physical war regarding the disputed boundary of Kashmir.
China has a historic sovereignty claim over the Arunachal state of the Northeastern part of India. The Doklam area, also known as Donglang in China, is a disputed plateau in the Chumbi Valley that lies at the tri-junction of India, China, and Bhutan, with China and Bhutan disputing sovereignty over it. Again, the USA under the newly elected president Trump is imposing tariffs in different countries. Trump’s policy of “America First” created a sense of nationalist tide across the world. China is the main competitor to the exiting US-led hegemonic world order. The liberal internal order is under tremendous challenges from multiple fronts. Trump’s age of tariffs has shown worldwide repercussions about trade and investments.
In Bangladesh, another major source of tension is the Rohingya refugees. In October 2024, the official number of Rohingya in Bangladesh was 1,004,986 (previously 971,904 in December 2023), with 969,096 residing in refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar and 35,890 in camps on Bhasan Char. (6) As a densely populated, developing country (the eighth largest country by population and 92nd in terms of landmass), Bangladesh faces tremendous challenges in relation to providing protection for such a large number of refugees. Some of these stateless Rohingya people are reportedly involved in criminal activities and illicit drug trade in the Golden Triangle, Golden Crescent and Golden Wedge region.
The radicalization of the Rohingya might hamper their ongoing process of their repatriation to Myanmar. Given the political circumstances and ascendency of the Arakan Army in the Rakhine state of Myanmar, the prospect of the repatriation of these Rohingyas seems gloomy. In short, the geopolitical tensions and confusions in Bangladesh are likely to increase for the changing patterns of great power alliances, conflicts and cooperation.
Endnotes:
Yasmin, L. (2019). India and China in South Asia: Bangladesh’s Opportunities and Challenges. Millennial Asia, 10(3), 322-336.
Yasmin, L. (2023). Understanding Bangladesh-China relations: Bangladesh’s rising geopolitical agency and China’s regional and global ambitions. Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies, 12(1), 87–109.
Shahriar, S. (2019). The Belt and Road initiative: what will China offer the world in its rise. Asian Journal of Political Science, 27(1), 152–156. https://doi.org/10.1080/02185377.2019.1594324
The Daily Star, April 02, 2025.
The Times of India, April 01, 2025.
Sikder, M. J. U., Sultana, I. Z., Reza, S., Azad, S. N., & Baniamin, H. M. (2025). Why Do the Rohingya Embark on Dangerous Boat Voyages from Bangladesh? A Qualitative Study. International Migration Review, 0(0). https://doi.org/10.1177/01979183251325198