Counter-Terrorism Imperatives In Balochistan: A Strategic Necessity For State Stability – OpEd
The re-escalation of militant violence in Balochistan, most recently marked by the establishment of militant blockades in Barkhan and the storming of a Levies post in Kachhi district, underscores a critical national security dilemma that Pakistan can no longer afford to defer.
The recent surge in attacks—claimed by the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) under the operational umbrella of “Operation Herof”—is not merely a manifestation of a separatist insurgency but a calculated, transnational security threat that challenges the writ of the state, undermines regional stability, and endangers economic corridors critical to Pakistan’s future.
In a broader security context, these developments are symptomatic of a hybrid insurgency that has evolved in both strategy and capability. Gone are the days when the Baloch insurgency could be characterized by low-intensity ambushes in remote terrain. Today’s threat matrix includes coordinated attacks on military convoys, intelligence offices, resource transport routes, and even local infrastructure. The incorporation of psychological operations—such as the release of combat footage and propaganda through encrypted Telegram channels—adds a dangerous new dimension to this insurgency, aiming not only to destabilize but to demoralize.
From a doctrinal standpoint, the state faces a clear counterinsurgency (COIN) dilemma: how to assert sovereignty and restore peace without alienating the civilian population or falling into the trap of protracted, militarized conflict that fuels further radicalization. This balancing act has historically proved difficult in Balochistan, a province where deep-seated grievances about political marginalization, economic exploitation, and cultural alienation have been weaponized by insurgent networks into a narrative of secession.
The time has come for Pakistan to recalibrate its approach—moving from reactive containment to a proactive, intelligence-driven counterinsurgency strategy that combines kinetic operations with meaningful political engagement and economic inclusion. In military terms, this necessitates the development of a robust framework that synergizes efforts across conventional armed forces, paramilitary units, intelligence agencies, and local law enforcement. Strategic clarity and operational cohesion must underpin all counter-militancy campaigns. The state must identify, isolate, and neutralize insurgent strongholds—especially in areas such as Surab, Zehri, and the mountainous zones surrounding Anjeera and Najjeera—without resorting to indiscriminate force that could alienate non-combatant populations.
At the operational level, real-time intelligence and aerial surveillance must be harnessed to disrupt militant logistics and command networks. The reported movement of over 40 military vehicles and personnel in current operations reflects a growing realization of the scale of the challenge, but this momentum must be institutionalized into sustained presence and civil-military coordination.
Equally important is the recognition of the information battlefield. Groups like the BLA have developed their own strategic communications ecosystem—spanning Telegram bots, digital magazines, and affiliated media outlets such as Hakkal Media—which they use not just for internal propaganda but to influence external perceptions. It is critical for the Pakistani state to counter this narrative warfare by establishing credible communication channels that amplify state successes, humanize security forces, and showcase developmental initiatives. Strategic communication must be elevated to the same priority level as operational security.
However, military means alone cannot resolve the insurgency. A comprehensive approach must address the structural deficits that insurgents exploit: poverty, underdevelopment, unemployment, and lack of local political agency. The state must invest in education, healthcare, and infrastructure while simultaneously building trust with tribal elders and civil society actors. Development must not be cosmetic or transactional; it must be participatory and sustainable.
The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which traverses through the heart of Balochistan, should be leveraged as a vector of integration rather than exclusion. By ensuring that local communities have ownership over CPEC-related economic dividends, the state can undercut the appeal of militancy. This will also help delegitimize the secessionist argument that Balochistan is a colony of the federation rather than a stakeholder in the national enterprise.
Moreover, the international dimension of the insurgency cannot be ignored. Several reports suggest that external actors may be exploiting internal unrest for strategic gains. India’s alleged support for Baloch separatist elements is not a matter of conjecture—it has been discussed in various international and regional security forums. Pakistan must internationalize the issue not just as a domestic rebellion but as a cross-border terrorism threat orchestrated to destabilize its territorial integrity. Strategic diplomacy at forums such as the United Nations and SCO must expose the international linkages of Baloch insurgents and demand accountability from complicit actors.
In conclusion, the escalating security situation in Balochistan represents a multidimensional challenge—tactical, ideological, and geopolitical. The Pakistani state must act decisively, but intelligently. It must combine hard power with soft power, surveillance with service delivery, and counter-terrorism with counter-narratives. The objective is not merely to crush dissent but to reclaim legitimacy in the hearts and minds of Baloch citizens while dismantling the operational capacities of militants.