Operation Hot Pursuit: The Indian Army’s Surgical Strikes Into Myanmar – Analysis
China, Bangladesh, Bhutan and Myanmar, has historically been a home for various insurgent factions advocating for autonomy or secession over many decades. In 2015, India expressed growing apprehension regarding escalating violence in the Northeast, particularly after the unsuccessful attempt to renew a ceasefire with the Khaplang faction of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN-K), predominantly based in Myanmar.
On the morning of June 4, 2015, 18 brave soldiers from the Indian Army’s Dogra Battalion were killed and about a dozen others injured in a meticulously planned militant attack in Manipur’s Chandel district. Enemy forces attacked with improvised explosive devices and gunfire during a road opening patrol exercise on the Tengnoupal–New Samtal Road. The newly established United Liberation Front of Western South East Asia claimed responsibility for the devastating assault.
As the Army reeled from its bloodiest ambush since 1982, another attack hit an Assam Rifles camp in Arunachal Pradesh (Tirap district). In April and May 2015, around 11 soldiers from the Army and Assam Rifles were killed in the Northeastern provinces of Nagaland and Arunachal Pradesh.
In retaliation, on June 9, 2015, based on credible intelligence inputs regarding the insurgents, the Indian Army executed a cross-border operation along the India–Myanmar Border. Codenamed Operation Hot Pursuit, this operation had about 70 Special Forces troops target the training facilities and camps associated with NSCN-K. The commandos traversed the border, conducted a thorough reconnaissance to identify the insurgent encampments located deep within Myanmar’s jungles and subsequently eliminated their targets. This is their story of guts and glory.
The militant outfits
In March 2015, a significant development occurred when SS Khaplang, the leader of the Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN-K), terminated a 14-year ceasefire agreement with the Indian government, setting the stage for subsequent attacks. The NSCN-K had been actively working towards the establishment of a sovereign Naga state encompassing present-day Nagaland, Manipur and certain regions of Myanmar.
In April 2015, the NSCN-K collaborated with eight other organizations, including Ulfa (I), National Democratic Front of Bodoland (Songbijit) and Kamatapur Liberation Organization, to establish the United Liberation Front of Western South East Asia. Many attribute the formation of this front to the actions of Khaplang and Ulfa (I) leader Paresh Baruah, who played significant roles within the new organization.
It is vital to note that Myanmar hosted approximately 60 rebel camps of varying sizes, distributed across a broad area adjacent to India’s Northeast region. The border with Myanmar, which extends 1,643 km, exhibits significant permeability due to an established agreement that allows individuals from either country to enter up to 16 km for trade activities. The fragmented landscape and dense forests bordering Myanmar facilitate the unobstructed movement of insurgents, enabling them to launch attacks on the Indian Army. The insurgents employ hit-and-run tactics in Manipur, utilizing camps that facilitate their ability to execute strikes within the state before retreating to Myanmar territory. The Indian armed forces are thereby prevented from pursuing them across the borders.
The Indian Army’s plan
The fatalities necessitated retribution. Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar convened a meeting with Home Minister Rajnath Singh, Army Chief General Dalbir Singh and National Security Advisor (NSA) Ajit Doval to meticulously assess the ambush and strategize appropriate countermeasures. The atmosphere in the room was somber yet determined. The Army had experienced its most devastating single-day counterinsurgency loss in nearly 30 years, which left India’s security apparatus profoundly unsettled.
The meeting examined the possibilities of conducting air strikes utilizing Sukhoi and MiG-29 fighter aircraft, alongside ground operations executed by the Army’s Special Forces. This alternative posed a significant risk of collateral damage associated with aerial bombardment, so it was not considered further.
The Indian Army received directives to undertake a discreet “Search and Destroy” mission that targeted the camps of militant groups situated along the borders of India and Myanmar. The selection of the unit was unequivocal — the 21st Battalion of the Parachute Regiment stood as the Army’s distinguished entity for specialized jungle warfare operations. It had been stationed in the Northeast for nearly 20 years. Deployed strategically across pivotal insurgency-affected regions, 21 Para Regiment (Special Forces) (Para-SF) operated as the Eastern Command’s elite response unit. One of its contingents was waiting in Delhi, prepared to embark on a special flight to South Sudan; they had been chosen for the United Nations peacekeeping deployment.
Without a moment’s hesitation, the Army issued the directive for this team to return to its Northeast base. The unit possessed a remarkable network of local informants. This battalion drew many of the officers and personnel from the Northeast region and appointed one of the unit’s most distinguished officers, Lieutenant Colonel Oscar Delta (pseudonym), to lead this mission.
To plan this operation, the Army drew upon insights provided by intelligence agencies who identified two camps approximately 8 km away from the border with Myanmar. The planners decided to launch the two Para-SF teams along distinct axes directed at the two insurgent camps to enhance the mission’s success.
The decision required considerable deliberation. Myanmar presents itself as a welcoming nation. Was it practical to ensure that the Myanmar government and its military were informed and involved in the discussions? Was it conceivable that Myanmar would consent to such an operation? These questions necessitated prompt responses. Ultimately, following extensive discussions among all relevant stakeholders, including the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), the NSA and the Army, the group reached a consensus; they would target the large camps. The NSA and the MEA took responsibility for managing communication with Myanmar at appropriate levels. Subsequent reports indicated that the Myanmar government had been engaged at the highest echelons before the incursion of Indian Special Forces into Myanmar’s territory.
One tactic the military uses to eliminate danger or achieve an objective is the surgical strike, which is an extremely precise and focused attack on a specific target. Each camp, believed to accommodate 40–50 insurgents, would be addressed with a classic Special Forces-style hit-and-run operation that relied on the element of surprise. The camps exhibited a comparable configuration, with the NSCN-K camp situated centrally, encircled by other resident groups within a 10 km radius. The principal rationale for keeping space between the camps in any such settlements throughout the region was security. Should one camp be assaulted, cadres from the others could promptly mobilize to initiate counterattacks. In a hilly terrain, even a large army would struggle to execute simultaneous assaults on all the camps.
Infiltration
The commandos decided against using helicopters because of the attention they would attract in the forward zone. Instead, they devised a deception strategy; on June 7, they posed as regular troops and traveled in Army trucks, and arrived at their prearranged staging location on the border. A handful of soldiers of the Kuki ethnic group who serve in the Indian Army changed into civilian clothes and proceeded into the village to gather intelligence. Meanwhile, the team entered the neighboring Assam Rifles camp. The villagers had not seen any militant movement. The locals were accustomed to these teams working along the border, so they did not view the Special Forces troops with suspicion or hostility.
After midnight, the 70-man Special Forces group started its roughly 20-km trek on foot in the direction of the international border. The commandos split up into two teams, each armed with night vision goggles, assault rifles, rocket launchers and grenades. The party unexpectedly encountered a group of Burmese hunters searching for wildlife while trekking through the dense bushes in extremely high humidity. The hunters were just as shocked as the Special Forces soldiers, who had not factored in this complication.
The Team Leader had to devise a strategy to deal with the hunters after his party rounded them up and inquired about insurgent camps within Myanmar’s territory. He simply chose to take the hunters along with them as the team could not kill them or afford to leave them on the loose. So the Team Leader reserved a portion of his men to protect them. Due to the hunters’ familiarity with the terrain, information about the camps and the actions of the militants in the vicinity, the Special Forces were able to refine their final plan.
By late afternoon on June 8, the team was roughly 5 km away from the large terrorist camp. The hunters feared for their lives and would not proceed further. Special Forces scouts, who advance ahead of others to inspect the area, noticed a mix of small and large huts and sheds on a ridge in the distance. When the scouts returned, they informed the Team Leader that their mission would be difficult; the only way to get to the camps without being noticed was to scale the steep cliff, launch an attack and then travel back the same way.
Execution
As darkness fell, the Team Leader had to decide on the approach to the camp and the timings for the final assault. The commandos opted to recoup after a difficult day of marching through the mosquito-infested jungles. As they were already in a foreign country, the Team Leader began dividing troops for the mission at hand, with the team heavily outnumbered in strength; intelligence indicated that the camp housed at least 100 insurgents. The fundamental drills are, of course standard, but each task is unique. So the Team Leader decided to stick with the original plan of attacking two or three major buildings to inflict the maximum casualties and make a speedy return without pausing to count the dead. He divided the team in two: one half carried large caliber weapons and the other light weaponry. The two halves were further divided into two sub-groups each: One took charge of the direct assault, and the other established an outer ring to prevent any rebels from fleeing.
At midnight on June 9, the entire team, except a squad that was left behind to safeguard the captive hunters, had advanced and established themselves at the base of the steep escarpment, which rose approximately 600 meters straight up. The Special Forces personnel heard gunfire and observed a group of militants approaching the cliff’s edge. The soldiers, who were clothed in camouflage and had their faces darkened by black paint, remained entirely still; their primary challenge was to avoid reacting and giving themselves away by opening fire.
Many of them wondered, “Will we be detected before we can reach the target?” However, the Team Leader was certain that the militants were not in possession of definitive information regarding any Special Forces movement, but rather were conducting a routine patrol and taking precautionary measures to safeguard the camp. The militants appeared to unwind at approximately 2 AM — they began singing songs, and their voices progressively diminished. The patrol had presumably returned to the camp. The commandos now waited for the first light.
At dawn, the first group of Special Forces personnel began gently climbing the steep ridge as others followed in a well-practised drill. They crept stealthily forward, forming a semicircle and racing toward the target. As the soldiers approached the camp, they noticed the lookout sentries at the entrance compound had abandoned their posts for their morning meal! The Special Forces crossed the compound barrier without being challenged.
Each commando took up a predetermined position and opened fire with automatic weapons, rocket launchers and hand grenades. For the first 15 minutes, the camp’s occupants, most of whom were either asleep or on the verge of awakening, had no idea what had happened. There was no retaliation, and most of them were killed.
Soon, the other terrorists, who lived in the second and third tiers of the enormous camp, regrouped and responded using whatever weapons they could find from behind well-defended positions. The Special Forces’ element of surprise was now gone, and the Team Leader opted to pull back. It was time to begin the return journey, and the soldiers reassembled and retraced their steps in a well-practised maneuver.
Exfiltration
Because of the oppressive heat and humidity that prevailed in the tropical jungle, the journey back was grueling. More than the heat, there was the possibility that the militants or personnel of the Burmese Army might pursue them. As a result, the Special Forces squads walked back quickly despite their exhaustion. They continued until noon when they had passed into Indian territory. Even though they were still being held captive, the hunters were finally set free after being given a stern warning to never discuss the incident under any circumstances. The Team Leader was confident they would not utter a single word; doing so would endanger their lives.
As soon as the Special Forces unit entered India, the Team Leader immediately called Corps Commander Lieutenant General Bipin Rawat, who was in the Operations Room monitoring the raid’s progression. He asked the team to come by the helicopters that had been kept on standby to transport them back to headquarters. Operation Hot Pursuit had successfully killed as many as 38 Northeast insurgents belonging to NSCN-K and KYKL militant organizations and wounded many others.
The meaning of Hot Pursuit
Guerrilla warfare evens out the advantages enjoyed by even the most highly trained and well-equipped security forces when confronted with extremists entrenched in their strongholds. Success, therefore, is not a guaranteed outcome. The Indian Army’s capacity to respond with significant power to provocations and to take decisive preemptive action was clearly illustrated by this surgical strike — extremely precise, focused attack on a specific target — in Myanmar.
The Myanmar raid initiated a series of actions aimed at enhancing India’s internal and external security policies. This operation was regarded as the inception of a significant transformation in India’s increasingly assertive stance, moving away from a previously restrained perspective. The strike exemplified India’s emerging willingness to proactively address terror threats, unencumbered by geographical boundaries. The unit received a Kirti Chakra and Shaurya Chakra each — medals awarded for a demonstration of valor in front of the enemy — and five Sena Medals to members who displayed individual acts of devotion and significant courage during the mission.
This was not merely a singular event; rather, it represented India’s strategic choice to adopt a preemptive stance in addressing terror threats. “Hot pursuit” serves as a valid articulation of national defense; however, for reasons that are more comprehensible than they are easily articulated, India has historically refrained from employing this strategy in neighboring nations. In a statement, the Indian Army declared: “While ensuring peace and tranquility along the border and in the border states, any threat to our security, safety and national integrity will meet a firm response.”