Why Taiwan should matter to India

In contemplating an attack on Taiwan, China’s leader would need to ensure there is no significant damage to the economy, nor large-scale social unrest and, above all, no resultant threat to the party’s rule

That the world is going through turbulent times is not in doubt. Rising geo-political risks have increased the cost to national security and development. As the post-World War II global order disintegrates, perhaps abetted by the Trump administration’s policies, the chances of geo-political conflicts intensifying can no longer be ruled out. Some might be contained, but one in particular might harken to global war—the Taiwan Strait.

In 1950, India’s first prime minister described the Taiwan Strait as a danger point. It represented the intersection of two major powers—a dominant United States and a newly established People’s Republic of China. In the 2020s, the Taiwan Strait remains the most dangerous flashpoint. China and the US are in confrontation mode. It is not merely a contest for dominance. It is a clash of values, interests, and their respective self-perceptions of being a world leader. The fact that they also happen to be the world’s largest economies makes the situation even more fraught with danger for the rest of the world. Will China take Taiwan by force at the cost of war with the United States is, thus, a valid question that must be debated among Indians, the more so since India will soon be the third-largest economy and has enduring interests in the Indo-Pacific.

In 2021, Admiral P Davidson, Commander of the US Indo-Pacific Command, pronounced that this threat would manifest by 2027. This time frame, known as the ‘Davidson Window’, led to intense study of such a possibility. The Pentagon’s annual report to the US Congress, known as the China Military Power Report 2024, avers that China continues to erode long-standing norms in and around Taiwan. Since 2022, the PLA has conducted several military exercises in the Taiwan Strait. There are daily air incursions into Taiwan’s Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ). China provides no prior warning. Admiral Paparo, the current Indo-PACOM Commander, has called them ‘rehearsals’, suggesting that they might be in preparation to seize the island without warning. Independent research indicates that the Chinese have a range of options––large-scale cyberattacks, a naval quarantine, limited kinetic action or invasion—to get Taiwan to submit.

Western debate centres around two subjects. First, has the United States’ commitment to defend Taiwan if attacked been diluted or changed? Second, are the government’s actions on Taiwan pushing the envelope on ‘Taiwan independence’ in breach of the Chinese red line?

On the first question, since 1979, Washington has maintained the ‘strategic ambiguity’ policy about whether the US will militarily intervene. Former US President Joe Biden famously said, in an interview in September 2022, that if there were an unprecedented Chinese attack, he would commit US forces to defend the island, although, subsequently, the White House said there had been no change in policy. The appointment of a senior Trump official in the Department of Defence, who had previously said that the Taiwan problem was not an ‘existential threat’ to the US, has re-ignited debate. Although the same official has since iterated the long-standing American policy to the US Congress, concerns remain as to whether China might perceive an apparent dilution of American commitment, even if not a fact, as such. Some suggest that this could lead China’s leader to misread American intentions. President Trump’s foreign policy initiatives on Ukraine, Iran and Syria might also be seen in Beijing as the US’s inclination to avoid conflict.

There are two views on the second question about whether Taiwan is offering provocation to give China a pretext to use force. While some deem President Lai Ching-te’s actions no different from those of his predecessor, others think Beijing’s mounting rhetoric signals concern that he is pushing the island towards independence. Depending on which side of the strait you live on, Lai’s actions are seen as intentionally provocative or as legitimate reactions to Beijing’s constriction of Taiwan’s space.

Less known is whether China is preparing to seize Taiwan by 2027. If it is presumed that China’s military has the ability to do so, the question hinges upon intention. This is harder to determine because of their opaque polity and the systemic controls on information flow, especially since President Xi Jinping took office. They are determined to re-unify Taiwan with China by 2049. However, whether that comes about in this decade and through force remains open. The PRC’s official position is to strive for peaceful re-unification, but it will never give up the use of force. In principle, therefore, they could deploy force on the claim that Taiwan is moving towards independence.

It boils down to how China’s leadership looks at the question. The publication of the White Paper on National Security last week might offer clues. The key takeaway is the linkage between national security and development, and the core premise that technological and economic ascendancy and social stability are equally important to China’s national security as conventional security. The document also categorically says that ensuring the communist party’s permanent hold on power is the foundation of all national security policy. Both points read together might imply that in contemplating an attack on Taiwan, China’s leader would need to ensure there is no significant disruption to the economy, nor large-scale social unrest and, above all, no resultant threat to the party’s rule as a result of economic or social instability. It is not so much achieving the limited objective of seizing Taiwan as containing the resultant international and national repercussions so that the communist party’s absolute rule is not threatened. This is difficult to guarantee even for a state as powerful and globally influential as China or a leader as dominant as Xi.

Whatever happens in the Taiwan Strait must become integral to India’s national security policy. There is an urgent need to assess the likely impact of a crisis on India’s economy and to identify ways to mitigate it. The adverse consequences of a crisis, even short of conflict, on shipping, supply chains, semi-conductors and submarine cables might, collectively, prove very costly unless critical sectors are adequately hardened and dependencies on China are reduced. India’s strategic and business communities cannot afford to pretend that what happens in the Taiwan Strait is not India’s business.