SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Maoists: Banking on Explosives
On June 14, an Assistant Sub-Inspector (ASI), Satwan Singh (34), of the Jharkhand-based 134 Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) battalion was killed in an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) blast along the Odisha-Jharkhand border during a joint combing operation against the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) in the Banko Forest under K. Balang Police Station limits of Rourkela in the Sundargarh District of Odisha. The blast site remains tense, especially as it comes in the wake of the banned CPI-Maoist operatives hijacking a truck and looting industrial explosives from the same Banko Forest on May 27.
In a disturbing development, on May 27, 2025, the Maoists looted five tonnes of explosives from a truck transporting licensed commercial explosives to a stone quarry in Banko. While 3.8 tonnes of the stolen explosives were subsequently recovered, 1.2 tonnes remained in the possession of the Maoists. Speaking on the explosives’ heist, Odisha Director General of Police (DGP) Y.B. Khurania, while affirming the involvement of armed Maoist ultras in the daylight heist of this huge quantity of explosives by hijacking a vehicle from the Banko Mines area under the K. Balanga Police limits of Sundargarh District, noted,
Upon receipt of the information, the Odisha Police, Jharkhand Police and Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) jointly launched search operation in Saranda Jungle. The joint operation which started on May 27th night is still on. Around 3.8 tonnes of explosives, out of the looted explosives weighing around 5 tonnes, have so far been recovered. The joint operation by Odisha police, Jharkhand Police and CRPF is still on to recover the remaining amount of explosive.
On June 9, 2025, Akash Rao Giripunje (42), Additional Superintendent of Police (ASP), was killed in an IED blast suspected to have been planted by cadres of the CPI-Maoist in a quarry at Dondra village in the Konta area of Sukma District in the Bastar Division of Chhattisgarh. Two other Police personnel on foot patrol duty were also injured in the blast. The incident took place when ASP Giripunje, along with other officers including the Town Inspector (TI) and Sub Inspector (SI), were patrolling an area on foot where Maoists had set a JCB machine on fire. When ASP Giripunje and the team reached the location of the fire, Giripunje stepped on the IED, triggering an explosion. Bastar Range Inspector General of Police (IGP) Sundarraj Pattilingam disclosed that the blast was triggered by a pressure IED on the Konta-Errabore Road when a team led by Giripunje was patrolling the area to prevent any incident ahead of the 10 June Bharat Bandh (general shutdown strike) call given by the CPI-Maoist to protest the deaths of several of its senior cadres, including ‘general secretary’ Nambala Keshava Rao alias Basavaraju (70), in encounters on May 21.
On May 21, 2025, a District Reserve Guard (DRG) jawan, Ramesh Hemla, was killed in an IED blast suspected to have been planted by the CPI-Maoist when the forces were returning after completing a combing operation in Bijapur District. The blast took place hours after Security Force (SF) personnel gunned down 27 Maoists, including the top leader Basavaraju, in a major operation in the Abujhmad region. Ramesh Hemla accidentally stepped on an IED and died on the spot in the explosion.
On May 7, 2025, three junior commandos of the Greyhounds, the elite anti-Naxal [Left Wing Extremism, LWE] force of the Telangana Police, were killed, and an Assistant Assault Commander (AAC) of the elite force was injured in a landmine blast triggered by CPI-Maoist cadres, while the commandos were on a routine area domination exercise in the Wazeedu–Perur Forest zone. The explosion occurred near the Veerabhadravaram-Tadapala hillocks near Penugolu village in the Wazeedu Mandal (administrative sub division) of the Mulugu District of Telangana. The deceased commandos were identified as Vadla Sridhar, N. Pavan Kalyan and T. Sandeep. The AAC, Ch. Ranadheer, sustained firearm injuries in the attack that took place in the forested area close to the volatile Telangana-Chhattisgarh border. The Greyhounds unit, which was part of a patrol team including Mulugu Police, launched a search operation in the forest area to unearth IEDs planted by Maoists and defuse them. Police disclosed that the search operation was launched in the wake of the statement purportedly given by the Maoists stating that they had planted bombs in the area, warning locals against movement. “One of the mines was triggered by Maoists resulting in the fatalities. The Maoists also opened fire at the commandos after the mine was triggered,” a Police source disclosed.
In these recent incidents, SFs participating in area dominance exercises have been targeted by the Maoists using explosives [IEDs and landmines]. In certain instances, civilians have often fallen prey to these traps, as they venture out to the forest to collect wood or graze their cattle. In some of the incidents in the past, the Maoists have also been killed or injured in the exchange of fire that followed the initial shock of the explosion triggered by them.
According to partial data documented by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), at least 32 incidents of Maoist-linked explosions have been recorded, resulting in 22 fatalities (five civilians and 17 SF personnel) and injuries to 33 (seven civilians and 26 SF personnel), since the beginning of 2025 (data till June 15). During the corresponding period of 2024, 23 such incidents resulting in 20 fatalities (five civilians, two SF personnel and 13 Maoists) were recorded, with injuries to another 20 persons (four civilians and 16 SF personnel). Through 2024, a total of 42 incidents of explosion were recorded, with 30 fatalities (nine civilians, eight SF personnel and 13 Maoists), and injuries to 42 persons (seven civilians and 35 SF personnel).
A total of 1,677 incidents of explosion have been engineered by LWEs, resulting in 1,934 fatalities (545 civilians, 1,216 SF personnel, 133 Maoists and 40 deaths which remained unspecified) and injuries to 2,383 persons (735 civilians, 1,453 SF personnel, 138 Maoists, and 57 in the unspecified category), since March 6, 2000, when SATP started documenting data on LWE-linked violence across the country. A maximum of 187 incidents of such explosions was recorded in 2009, resulting in 182 fatalities (36 civilians, 128 SF personnel and 18 Maoists) and injuries to 301 (64 civilians, 145 SF personnel, 81 Maoists and 11 unspecified). 2010 was the worst year in terms of fatalities, with 388 killed (200 civilians, 177 SF personnel, two Maoists and nine unspecified) and another 295 injured (208 civilians, 71 SF personnel, one Maoist and 15 unspecified), in 149 incidents of explosion.
The deadliest IED attack to target SFs was carried out on April 6, 2010, in which at least 75 Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) personnel and a State Police trooper were killed in an ambush at Chintalnad in the Dantewada District of Chhattisgarh, when the Maoists first detonated an anti-landmine vehicle before firing indiscriminately on the CRPF troops.
The geographic distribution of IED attacks indicates that the highest number of such incidents have occurred in Chhattisgarh, with 502 incidents (749 fatalities and 767 injured); followed by Jharkhand, with 386 incidents (384 fatalities and 547 injured); Andhra Pradesh, with 237 incidents (162 fatalities and 262 injured); Bihar, with 232 incidents (187 fatalities and 248 injured); Odisha, with 189 incidents (126 fatalities and 170 injured); West Bengal, with 64 incidents (222 fatalities and 268 injured); Maharashtra, with 45 incidents (90 fatalities and 112 injured); Telangana, with 15 incidents (four fatalities and eight injured); and two incidents each in Uttar Pradesh, with three fatalities and one injured, Karnataka, with six fatalities, and Kerala, with one fatality. Madhya Pradesh reported one incident with no fatalities.
The Maoists employ an explosives arsenal comprising landmines, claymore mines, grenades, sticky bombs, pressure cooker bombs, crude rocket launchers, gelatine sticks, mortars and a range of IEDs to administer a first shock before engaging SFs with small arms fire, while the latter are engaged in area domination, cordon-and-search, combing, search, long-range patrolling, ambush-cum-patrolling and other operations. The use of IEDs also helps the Maoists avoid direct confrontation on the ground. IEDs are hidden underground or in bushes, on national highways and important state roads, as well as near SF camps/posts. IEDs have been among the most potent tools deployed by the Maoists, and are often very difficult to locate, resulting in higher SF casualties, without any loss of their own cadres.
The lethality of IED attacks was demonstrated in the beginning of the current year, on January 6, 2025, when eight security personnel of the DRG and a driver were killed in Bijapur District, when CPI-Maoist cadres used an IED to blow up their vehicle. The SFs were returning from an operation when the IED blew up their Scorpio SUV at Kutru in the Bastar region at around 2.15 PM [IST].
Meanwhile, according to an April 14, 2025, report, the National Investigation Agency (NIA) alerted the Central Paramilitary Forces as well as State Police in Bihar, Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand about hidden IEDs in different locations of the three States. The development took place following the interrogation of several suspects involved in Maoist activities. On April 8, 2025, NIA recovered two IEDs with three kilograms each, concealed underground between two rocks in the Kari Pahadi area of the Bhusiya Forest region of Lutuwa in the Gaya District of Bihar. Speaking to ETV Bharat, security expert Brigadier (Retired) B.K. Khanna observed that IEDs had become a challenge for the SFs as their components are easily available in the market and the devices can be prepared within hours by an expert. Brigadier Khanna added, “They (Maoists) can plant IEDs targeting the security forces [SFs] in selected locations in advance. This is posing a significant risk to security operations against the Maoist cadre hiding in deep forests.”
Taking actions against the Maoists’ explosives campaign, NIA Hyderabad, on May 30, 2025, formally took over the investigation into three cases registered by the Telangana police, related to the planting of IEDs in the Karregutta region, located on the Telangana-Chhattisgarh border. The Karregutta area is a heavily mined and LWE insurgency-prone zone. The cases, originally registered by various Police Stations in Mulugu District, were handed over to NIA on May 23, 2025, following directives from the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (UMHA) citing national security concerns and the need to investigate a wider Maoist conspiracy.
On March 21, 2025, NIA charge-sheeted two arrested accused in a 2024 case of purchase and supply of explosives by the banned organisation CPI-Maoist in Chhattisgarh. The anti-terror agency, in its chargesheet filed before the NIA Special Court, Jagdalpur, named Mantosh Mandal and Sela Nagarjun alias S. Nagarjun, both residents of Patnampara, District Sukma, Chhattisgarh, under various sections of the Explosive Substances Act and the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA). The two men were identified as supporters/overground workers (OGWs) of CPI-Maoist and were found to have been actively involved in the online purchase of explosives and other items for the proscribed outfit. They were found to be in unlawful possession of such material, meant for supply to CPI-Maoist members in the Jagargunda area of Sukma District, for the preparation of IEDs for use against SFs.
According to the SATP database, SFs recovered arms and ammunition from the Maoists on 116 occasions during the current year, as on June 15, 2025, to foil rebel plans. Since March 6, 2000, a total of 5,179 occasions of the recovery of arms from the Maoists have been documented across the country.
The Maoist insurgency across the country has been successfully contained to a certain extent, with strong action by Central and State Police Forces on the ground, to meet the deadline of March 2026 set by the UMHA, for the complete elimination of the rebel threat. The Maoists are now fighting for their survival with rapidly depleting cadre strength, and explosives are increasingly their weapon of choice, inflicting continuous losses on SF cadres, as well as civilians. As SF operations meet with increasing success, penetrating deep into erstwhile areas of Maoist domination, they will be met with increasing Maoist efforts to target their movement with concealed explosive devices. If the consequent loss of life is to be minimized, following Standard Operation Procedures. (SOPs) and evolving counters to the Maoists’ IED and mine campaigns become urgent imperatives.
Arunachal Pradesh: Longding – Insurgency Dynamics
On June 5, 2025, two Yung Aung faction of National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang (NSCN-K-YA) cadres, identified as ‘sergeant major’ Nyaklung and ‘lance corporal’ Neyung Aung, were killed in an encounter with the Indian Army near Langkhu village in the Longding District of Arunachal Pradesh.
On April 27, 2025, an encounter broke out between Indian security forces (SFs) and NSCN-K-YA militants in the Pongchau area of Longding District, during a joint rescue operation by the Indian Army and Assam Rifles. The operation aimed to rescue two construction workers – Giyas Uddin and Janlung Wangpan – who had been abducted on April 25, by NSCN-K-YA cadres. During the exchange of fire, three militants were killed and two were injured and subsequently apprehended. SFs recovered four automatic weapons, including three AK-47 rifles, along with ammunition and other war-like stores from the encounter site. While Janlung Wangpan, a site supervisor, was successfully rescued, the second abducted worker, Giyas Uddin, was killed during the gunfight. They had been employed with PSK Enterprise and were abducted from a work site in Pongchau.
On October 25, 2024, a clash occurred between the Assam Rifles and NSCN-K-YA cadres in Longding District, in which an NSCN-K-YA cadre, ‘major’ Gangjun Gangsa, was killed. The NSCN-K-YA initiated the attack by firing at the Assam Rifles personnel, while they were moving from Wakka towards the Indo-Myanmar border.
On November 24, 2024, two civilians – Vignesh Kumar Jha and Bishnu Chetry – were abducted by a 10-member heavily armed group of NSCN-K-YA, from a bridge construction site located between the Pongchau and Konnu villages in Longding District. Sources stated that the group was led by NSCN-K-YA leader Akham Konyak.
In 2025, Arunachal Pradesh recorded a total of five fatalities (all terrorists) all of which occurred in Longding District. Since March 6, 2000, Longding has recorded a total of 34 fatalities (30 terrorists, three civilians and one SF trooper) in 22 incidents [South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) data till June 15, 2025.] There was one (terrorist) fatality in 2024, and five killed (one civilian, one SF trooper, three terrorists) in 2023.
In 2025, Longding reported one case of abduction. According to data compiled by SATP, the district has witnessed a total of 11 abduction-related incidents since 2019, further underlining its vulnerability to insurgent tactics aimed at disrupting civil life and infrastructure development.
Longding District, part of Arunachal Pradesh’s Tirap–Changlang–Longding (TCL) corridor along the Indo–Myanmar border, remains a critical hub for insurgent activity by factions of the NSCN [such as NSCN‑K‑and NSCN – Isak-Muivah (IM)] and the United Liberation Front of Asom – Independent (ULFA‑I.)
A major flashpoint has been the persistent wave of abductions and extortion in Longding. Since 2018, over 90 cases of abduction have been logged, most aimed at civilians and officials, for ransom or intimidation. Even with Armed Forces Special Power Act (AFSPA) in force, insurgent groups have not relented, using these tactics to assert control and demand “taxation”. As noted, by SATP, it is “an overflow” of neighboring states’ insurgencies and a “transit route” for various militant outfits exploiting the border terrain.
Not surprisingly, on March 30, 2025, the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (UMHA) declared that the Central Government extended AFSPA in Arunachal Pradesh and declared Tirap, Changlang, and Longding Districts ‘disturbed areas’, for six months.
Extortion and abduction remain two of the most entrenched tools of insurgent operations in Longding, severely undermining the rule of law, economic stability, and civilian morale. Militant outfits such as NSCN-K-YA, ULFA-I, and even NSCN-IM – the last, despite being part of peace talks – have continued to exploit local populations and small businesses through ‘taxation’ and threats. Contractors, school teachers, government employees, and traders are routinely targeted and forced to pay hefty sums, with refusal often resulting in abduction or physical harm. In several instances, armed cadres have infiltrated villages and summoned local leaders or contractors to undisclosed locations – sometimes across the border in Nagaland or Myanmar – where they are coerced into making payments.
In February 2024, NSCN-K-YA and ULFA-I jointly abducted 10 coal mine workers from the Finboro area in Changlang, prompting a regional alert, as they were suspected to be held near the Longding frontier. Similarly, in May 2024, cadres abducted two civilians from Pongchau, and later demanded a ransom for their release. These incidents were not isolated – they reflect a broader pattern of coercive control used to fund insurgency and assert political leverage in areas where the government presence is minimal or contested.
The local community, especially the Wancho tribe, has grown increasingly vocal. On May 9, 2025, hundreds joined the “United Peace Rally” in Longding town, organized by the Wancho Council, students, market boards, and village leaders. Protesters held banners reading “No More Abduction” and “We Want Justice” and marched to the Deputy Commissioner’s office to demand urgent action. The rally highlighted that civilians, “trapped between insurgents and security forces,” are demanding stronger measures and accountability.
On February 18, 2025, Governor K.T. Parnaik reviewed the security situation across the TCL Districts during a high-level meeting at Khonsa in Tirap District. He stressed that a secure environment is essential to enable development and vowed that “no external interference will be tolerated.”
Significantly, on June 6, 2025, SFs launched a targeted operation against suspected militants in Pongchau Circle in Longding, based on specific intelligence inputs. Troops from the Indian Army and Assam Rifles encountered unidentified individuals during a patrol and issued a challenge, which was met with heavy gunfire from militants armed with high-calibre weapons. In the ensuing firefight, the militants retreated into Myanmar, taking advantage of the dense forest and rugged terrain. The incident underscores the security concerns posed by insurgent activity along the unfenced Indo-Myanmar border.
Amid this dynamic, Longding’s security outlook remains precarious, albeit gradually improving. It reflects the complex and deeply entrenched insurgent dynamic that has plagued the TCL corridor for decades. Despite sustained counterinsurgency operations and the enforcement of AFSPA, groups such as the NSCN-K-YA, ULFA-I, and NSCN-IM continue to operate with impunity, leveraging cross-border sanctuaries in Myanmar and exploiting the porous and rugged Indo-Myanmar border to evade Indian SFs. The combination of persistent militant incursions, high-profile abductions, and fragmented insurgent networks is being met with determined state action and assertive civic resistance. While arrests of key figures and armed casualties have delivered noticeable deterrence, sustainable peace will depend on sustained joint operations, border surveillance, legal enforcement under AFSPA, and deeper socio-economic engagement with local communities – particularly the tribal leadership. The rising assertiveness of locals in demanding accountability might well be the decisive factor in turning a fragile ceasefire into lasting stability in Longding.
Weekly Fatalities: Major Conflicts in South Asia
June 9-15, 2025
Provisional data compiled from English language media sources.