Muslim Question in India after 78 Years of Independence

Seventy-eight years after India’s independence in 1947, the condition of the country’s Muslim community raises a number of enduring questions—about equity, integration, and justice. The community, which comprises roughly 14.2% of the country’s population according to the 2011 Census and an estimated 19.7 crore (197 million) individuals in 2023, still bears the visible imprint of disadvantage on many socio-economic and political fronts. In demographic terms, the growth of India’s Muslim population has been steady, yet the community’s share remains modest compared to its absolute size. The government reported that in 2023, the Muslim population was projected at about 19.7 crore, based on maintaining the 14.2% share from 2011 and applying it to the projected total population of ~138.8 crore. While this amount confirms that Muslims are a large minority, the growth is not accelerating at a pace that would radically shift India’s religious composition over the short term. However, the demographic weight calls into question equity, access, and representation.

While there has been progress in education, significant gaps still exist. According to studies, only about 4.64% of Muslim students are enrolled in higher education, even though their population share is ~14.23%. The research further shows that among youth (aged ~20 or so), educational attainment (graduation or equivalent) for Muslims in 2017-18 was only about 14%, compared to 18% for Scheduled Castes (SCs), 25% for OBCs, and 37% for upper-caste Hindus. Despite improvements in literacy rates, the trend shows that many Muslims continue to encounter obstacles to educational advancement, especially into elite and professional levels.

Employment and labour‐force participation data also point to systemic disadvantage. The 2001 data show the work‐participation rate (WPR) for Muslims at about 31.3%, compared with national averages near 39% for the total population. Formal or salaried employment among Muslims is low: one committee found that only ~13% of Muslims were in salaried jobs, and in urban areas less than 8% were in the formal sector, compared to the ~21% national average. Further, a large share of Muslim workers are engaged in informal, casual, or self-employment in low-margin sectors; for example, nearly 64% of Muslims work either as self-employed or as casual labourers, according to one study.

The ownership of assets and wealth also reflects this inequality. A 2020 study based on the All India Debt and Investment Survey found that Hindu high castes (despite being only ~22.2% of households) held about 41% of the total wealth, while Muslims—at ~12.1% of households—held only about 8% of it. This gap in asset accumulation reflects both historical exclusion and continuing structural impediments.

Turning to accessing amenities—on certain fronts, the picture is more encouraging. The government’s Multiple Indicator Survey (2020-21) found that 94.9% of Muslim households reported an improved source of drinking water, and 97.2% reported access to an improved toilet. Further, it was noted that 50.2% of Muslim households had purchased or constructed a new house or flat for the first time since March 2014. These figures indicate that on basic infrastructure fronts, many Muslims have made substantial progress.

Nevertheless, progress in infrastructure or amenities does not automatically translate into economic or educational parity. The combined effect of low higher-education enrolment, weak formal employment participation, limited asset ownership, and relative poverty ensures Muslims continue to lag. One authoritative review bluntly observed that “poor Muslims are much poorer than poor Hindus” and that in many human development indicators, Muslims are “seriously lagging behind”.

Regionally and socially, disparities within the Muslim community compound the challenge. Muslims are unevenly distributed across the Indian states, and in several states (for example, in the Hindi‐belt), Muslim youth attainment in education was as low as 3% (Haryana) and 7% (Rajasthan) in 2017-18. Moreover, the internal diversity of the community means that some subgroups—for instance, Pasmanda Muslims (Muslims from historically backward castes)—are particularly disadvantaged, yet data on these groups remains thin.

Muslims’ representation in politics and institutions falls short of their population share. While no exact nationwide figure is uniformly updated, analyses suggest that Muslims hold far fewer parliamentary or bureaucratic positions relative to their share of the population. This under-representation limits the voice of the community in the democratic process, policy shaping, and resource allocation. The implications are that structural disadvantage may persist not only because of socio-economic deficits, but also because of weak institutional access and influence.

A structural question emerges: if after nearly eight decades of independence and formal equality under the Constitution, one of India’s largest religious minorities remains disadvantaged on multiple metrics, what does that say about the effectiveness of policies, the depth of structural reform, and the social contract between the Indian state and the Muslim community? Two broad threads can be teased out. First, absolute improvement has occurred: access to amenities has risen, literacy has improved, and millions of Muslims are moving into the mainstream more than ever before. Second, relative disadvantage remains: compared to other communities, Muslims often have lower visibility in elite education, formal jobs, assets, and institutional power.

One must also bear in mind the intersecting dimensions: gender (Muslim women often have even lower labour force participation and educational attainment), class (the poorest Muslims face double disadvantage), region (poor states amplify Muslim disadvantage), and sector (the artisanal and craft sectors, in which Muslims have traditionally been over-represented, have declined). These intersecting disadvantages mean that while, on average, the community may be making headway, large segments remain vulnerable.

From a policy perspective, the evidence suggests that tackling the “Muslim question” in India requires more than generic poverty alleviation. It suggests targeted efforts: improving higher‐education participation, bridging the formal‐employment divide, enhancing asset ownership and land rights, strengthening political representation, and addressing the intra‐community disparities (e.g., Pasmanda Muslims, Muslim women, regions with high Muslim concentrations). The legacy of socioeconomic exclusion will not be undone simply by economic growth; structural and institutional reforms are needed.

In conclusion, seventy-eight years on, the story of India’s Muslims is one of both progress and unfinished business. The community has undeniably advanced in many respects—millions of households are better off than their parents’ generation, and literacy and access to amenities have risen. But the persistence of relative disadvantage — in employment, education, wealth, and representation — points to a structural challenge for India’s inclusive dream. For India to truly fulfil the promise of equality and pluralism, the Muslim question remains a central part of the agenda.